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Trick or Treat

The Relationship Between Destabilisation, Aid and Government Development Policies in Mozambique 1975-1990

A dissertation submitted
by Yussuf Adam
for the PhD degree in Development Studies



International Development Studies
Roskilde University
February 1996

U.S.A. DOG

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ABSTRACT

Trick or Treat: The Relationship Between Destabilisation, Aid and Government Development Policies in Mozambique 1974-1990

Aid, destabilisation and government development policies are uneasy bedfellows. Efforts to correlate them have been considered as an attempt to mix oil and water. Foreign aid is usually seen as an altruistic flow of resources; destabilisation as a conspiracy, and government development strategies as a positive effort to change the socio-economic and political reality of a country to the better.

The results of my research on Mozambique, based on the simultaneous use of multiple methods of social science, shows that the conventional wisdom approaches to the relationship between aid, development strategies and destabilisation, which see the first two factors as positive and the third as negative, are simplifications which reproduce the blame lying schemata of the holders of state power. The combined effects of the three factors in post colonial Mozambique converged to create a vicious spiral of social-breakdown. Challenges from different social forces who were negatively afected by the government policies, were designated by the holders of state power as destabilisation, considering the assault against the state as an act of bandits, colonial or imperialist lackeys. Development aid, on the other hand, consisted not only in the transfer of resources but also of influences, pressures and sanctions. Development strategies and associated policies are characterised by value endogeneity and heterogeneity.

The so-called destabilisation had a social base in the Mozambican political economy and had an impact on changing it. The groups under attack by the government policies: capitalists, shop-keepers, rich peasants, traditional élites, religious élites eventually became more powerful, sometimes even taking advantage of the same policies. A new rich class was empowered and supported in changing development strategies and the political system. The class nature of the members of government was also changed.

PREFACE

A PhD thesis is a piece of work which ends up being more than just one piece. In my case the research project was intended to be a continuation of work in progress, and ended up as a central part of my life during a long period. This is not to say that all my life gravitated around it: on the contrary, it became part of my life and it was good that it happened that way.

My PhD program was part of a very interesting period. I changed home twice - from Maputo to Gothenburg and back - and lived part of the time in a train and a ferryboat between Roskilde and Gothenburg. Annual field work trips to Mozambique were combined with consultancies that supplemented our family income. After returning to Maputo, and long before the present final version of the thesis was finished, its chapters and preliminary conclusions were used in my teaching activities in the University Eduardo Mondlane.

PADRIGU was a good station in Scandinavia. The younger researchers working on themes not related to Mozambique (Catarina Gustafson, Joran Carlsson, Joakim Ojendal, Michael Schultz, Helena Lindholm, Jonas Ewald, Elizabeth Abiri and others) were most helpful, and Annika Forssell a good example of the worth of a good administrator for a recently arrived foreign researcher. Mats Friberg and Bjorn Hettne Anders Närman. Svante Karlsson and other faculty members opened up new visions and perspectives and also showed the limits of understanding "us" and "them" from the position of their own normal environment. Hans Abrahamsson and Anders Nilsson and their work on Mozambique supplied a concrete example of the style, sources and reproduction of approaches I was struggling to dismantle. The Latin american perspectives of Edme Dominguez created a basis for comparison and discussion.

Roskilde and house 5.1. are remembered. I feel like returning to that place - as architecturally inhospitable as it may be - always full of life and human warmth. Conny helped with my installation. Colleagues at the PhD program were most helpful and created an environment where the need to go back south, looking for the sun, was at its best shelved. The PhD seminars were a good opportunity to see that beyond an author's name was a face, a hat or a beret Basque: I'm thinking of Gun Mickels, Mette Masst, Suzane, Christian Lund, Shumita Basu, Norbert Tangwende, Tina Bensauola and so many others. The faculty at IDS-RUC (International Development Studies, Roskilde University), their lectures and comments are remembered: Professor Preben Kaarsholm, Agnete Weis Bentzon Mogens Buch Hansen, Laurids Lauridsen, Fiona Wilson, Bodil Folke Frederiksen.

AKUT and Uppsala also created a space for discussion and reflection - to Bjorn Beckman, Kenneth Hermele, Lars Rudebeck, Bosco Parra, Olle Tornquist. Inga Brandell a "saudação especial". The Scandinavian Africa Institute was an important resource centre. Kjell Havnevik and Peter Gibbon contributed a lot to create a space for me.

Professors Lars Rudebeck and Signe Arnfred tutored me through my thesis and endured my Portuguese-English. Loose ends were tied up and clarification sought. Lars and Signe were more than professors and tutors. Their friendship and solidarity, their constant efforts, went far beyond the call of duty. Uppsala and Copenhagen, Arteligatan and Stockhomsgade, became like second homes. Signe, Jon and the "meninas" became a second family.

Thyge Enevoldsen, Phil Raikes and Alpheus Manghezi, who had all worked in Sabié, which was one of my case studies, generously shared their experiences with me. Enevoldsen and

Manghezi provided copies of interviews and other material. Alpheus gave me the courage to continue probing on the issues I was exploring.

Friends like Kenneth and Elizabet, Jonas, Kajsa and Gertrud. Gunnar and his working class life and experience also became part of my work. The hospitality of the Brandberg family in Tune, Trollhattan (Paula, Bjorn, Erik, Gustavo and Ana), the Bloms and the Thomsen in Copenhagen, Kajsa Persson in Stockholm provide a good example that home is where your friends are. All my documents, field note books and tapes travelled with me. A "hitchhike" in Lars and Lise Stenrud's container from Maputo dropped them in Carlstad.

The adaptation to a new environment for me and for most of my family was difficult. An environment as different as Muskotgatan and Sweden, the climate, the light, the temperatures put pressure on our life and work. My wife Wenke, and our children Maimuna, Camilo and Magdalena had to navigate through the growing piles of notes, papers, books and diskettes in an effort to see the "tese" finished. Wenke deserves a special note for having read my endless manuscripts and versions and having prompted suggestions to clarify and lighten the text. Her professional comments and assistance have a mark on my final work.

My family and friends in Maputo played a role both when I was in Scandinavia and when I returned. My sister Farida and her husband Ismael had a collection of "vales" (IOUs) when difficulties were around. Teresa Cruz e Silva, Paulo Soares, Eric Morier-Genoud, Bertina Silva, Maria Jose Arthur, Fernanda Cabanas, Rosemary Galli and many other colleagues and friends helped me. Maria Jose Natividade merits a special note for having salvaged most of the early version of the full text from electronic chaos (a conversion error from the MAC system in RUC to our DOS based system which made everything unreadable was only discovered after returning to Maputo). Fatima Arthur read the manuscript from the point of view of an electronic engineer and highlighted its inaccuracies. The daily puns and pinches of Carlos Lobato (reminding me of the urgency to finish off the work) will be remembered with gratitude; although I hated it at the time. My students in Maputo gave me courage and had the very salutary attitude of disagreeing with me continuously. João Paulo Borges Coelho ended up editing two of the chapters in the review Arquivo.

All the people who in libraries and documentation centres, with my chronic inability to relate to machines, helped me through; the people at the CEA documentation centre, Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, the Ministries of Agriculture and Planning, the various aid agencies, the peasants in Boane, Changara, Moamba and Mueda, the National Directorate of Water, Mr Alvarinho, Miguel Angel and the gringa are part of the story. Listing all of them would be an impossible task. The help given, the promptness to share information and insights, their life-histories, documents, their time, remind me of this awkward situation where the work of so many persons ends up as a work of only one.

All of them tried hard to show the difficulties and the errors in my work and interpretation. But I am solely responsible for persisting in some of the errors.

DOC

MAPS

Map 1 - Mozambique

Map 2 - Changara district (Tete province)

Map 3 - Boane district (Maputo province)

Map 4 - Mueda district (Cabo Delgado province)

Map 5 - Moamba district, including Sabié (Maputo province)

Map 1 - Republic of Mozambique. Administrative division



Desenhou: Maria Celeste Martinho

Map 2 - Changara district (Tete province)



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

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

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

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CHAPTER ONE

The fate of post colonial Mozambique

1 Introduction

Twenty years have passed since Mozambique gained its independence, on 25 June 1975. The social and political processes that led to independence and the developments which occurred thereafter have fuelled a great deal of debate, conflicting appraisals and evaluations.[1]

This thesis looks at the evolution of the political and socio-economic set up in Mozambique after independence, in the 1975-1990 period, through three factors: government development strategies and associated policies, foreign aid and "destabilisation". An attempt is made to relate these three factors and to study their impact on the various social forces present and on the social structure.

A review of the growing literature on post-colonial Mozambique and some of the debates (for instance in the Southern African Review of Books) shows that most of the explanations offered so far have been biased in favour of unilateral causal relations, blame attributing schemata, uncritical acceptance of historical myths, current fashions in the academic world of the moment ,or a mix of all these.

There are many understandable reasons why this should occur. The task I set myself in the present study was to appraise current theories on the Mozambican situation and to link internal and external factors in a more comprehensive way through the interaction of three major forces of change: i) government development strategies and associated policies, ii) foreign aid, and iii) "destabilisation". During my work I have found that these three factors

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[1] The exchanges published in the Southern African Review of Books (SARB: September - October 1989), following the publication of Clarence-Smith's review article of the book edited by Meyns (Meyns: 1988), is a good example of a "dialogue de sourds" (dialogue of the deaf). Clarence-Smith presented his standard argumentation on the nature of the crisis in post-colonial Mozambique (and Angola), which he had given at the Baden Homburg seminar (and in Smith's main points are similar to those developed on Angola (Clarence Smith: 1988) which were mutatis-mutandi applied to Mozambique. An excellent opportunity for dialogue and debate ended up just reaffirming positions under the same "problematique" - who should be blamed for post- independence developments? (Clarence Smith: 1989a,b,c; Cahen: 1990a,b) A second exchange occurred involving individuals both from academia and solidarity work in Southern Africa Report (SAR). See Anon.:1990d and Roesch: 1990b. Noteworthy in both debates is the absence of Mozambican social scientists.

certainly interact and influence each other, often with unexpected results, far from the alleged objectives of those formulating or implementing strategies or policies.

2 The object of study

The relationship between aid, destabilisation and government policies in post-colonial Mozambique is the theme of this Ph.D. dissertation. The aim is to characterise the post-colonial period in Mozambique during the 1975-1990 time frame and to demonstrate that the developments which took place are a result of the conjugation of these three factors. Aid, destabilisation (covert or overt external intervention) and government development policies helped shape the recent history of Mozambique, contrary to some interpretations which try to lay the blame on just one of these factors.

I have chosen this theme taking into consideration i) my previous experience as a researcher and the theme of my "Licenciatura" thesis; ii) the possibility it offered of using previously collected material; iii) the need to link together different approaches; and iv) the idea of contributing to the political and scientific debate about the transition to socialism in Mozambique and the role of aid.

The research theme is a result of my previous research experience and academic work i.e. the Licenciatura thesis. I chose as the research theme for my Licenciatura thesis the Co-operative Movement in Mozambique from the inception of the first formal or modern co-operative in 1911 up until 1984, which was when I started my research. I tried to tackle the prevalent and vulgar interpretations in post-colonial Mozambique, which wrongly correlated co-operativisation with socialism i.e. which regarded co-operative units as promoters of a society without exploiters and exploited. The final thesis ended up with a more manageable focus, just covering the colonial period. The completed work had the title "Cooperativization and Relations of Production in the Colonial Period in Mozambique (1911-1974)"[2].

At that time I had some vague ideas about developing my knowledge of co-operation. I wanted to conduct research on co-operation between states, which can be viewed as an expansion of the theme researched in the Licenciatura thesis, co-operation between individuals integrated in co-operatives. That is how aid as a topic became part of my research agenda.

From 1984 to the present, I have worked on issues related to Mozambique's post-colonial history. It is a continuation of my previous research

2 Adam: 1986.

on colonialism, resistance to colonialism, nationalism and liberation. My work has centred on studying the evolution of FRELIMO as a political party and its concrete praxis in the liberated zones in Mueda.

Interest in development and destabilisation stemmed also from the concrete work done on research projects designed to study Mozambique's post-colonial transformations. These concepts were key to the government's discourse about policies and their negligible results. In 1990, when planning my Ph.D. research and thesis I chose as a theme "Trick or Treat: The relationship between aid, destabilisation and government development policies (1975-1990)"[3]. I thought that the formulation of my research theme in itself already indicated one of the objectives of my work: the critique of the official interpretations - explanations put forward by the government and the ruling party and by the academic work which reproduced this version of the facts.

3 The limits of the blame-laying approach

The aim of my work is to show the limits of several schemata that are concerned with attributing blame. Such schemata were intended to explain post-colonial developments in Mozambique. Assorted variants of conspiracy theory have been designed to explain the shortcomings of post-colonial development plans, and these permeate the literature on post-1975 Mozambique (this literature is analysed in chapter three).

This dissertation was written with the intention of contributing to the intellectual and academic debate on post-colonial Mozambique. In the academic arena, this debate has been taking place among scholars both in Mozambique and elsewhere.[4] My contribution can be useful at four levels:

- Contributing to the understanding of the history of post-independence Mozambique, particularly of the People's Republic of Mozambique (1975-1990);
- Analysing the development strategy and associated policies implemented in Mozambique and their contradictions;
- Analysing the type of sanctions suffered by the holders of state power in post colonial Mozambique;

3 The figure "Trick or Treat" emerged during a discussion with Thomas Ohlson and others on Halloween day 1989 in Binghamton, NY.

4 Is this applied or pure research? It is both. For a discussion see Hedrick; Beckman and Rog: 1993.

- Identifying alternative sources of information which allow for a different perspective and understanding of the problems.

In this thesis I have tried to develop an analysis which shows i) the contradictory nature of the development strategy and associated policies, ii) the nature and scope of negative sanctions on the government's development strategies and associated policies, and iii) the relationship between covert actions and overt pressures as a form of conveying negative sanctions against the government's development strategies and associated policies.

There is a trend in the literature which explains post-colonial developments in Mozambique as a result of apartheid South Africa and imperialist intervention. The uncritical use of official sources has led to the reproduction of the official version of the history of post-colonial Mozambique.[5]

4 The time frame

The research conducted overflowed the time boundaries defined for this thesis (1975-1990). The research looked not only at post-colonial development strategies but also at colonial ones (1895-1974) and at development strategies applied by FRELIMO when it was challenging the colonial state (1962-1974).

The need to expand my time frame for the analysis was dictated by the subject matter itself. The holders of state power legitimised their post-colonial development options by reference to their praxis during the liberation war (1964-1974) and to colonial development models (1895-1974). Their policies, at least at the level of discourse, were directed towards abolishing the contradictions inherited from colonialism by using the liberation struggle model.

5 Constraints to research and understanding of Mozambique

Analysts of Mozambique have to face at least three major problems: i) the fragmentation and manipulation of available empirical data by political forces; ii) the researchers' own political stances; and iii) the general environment in which research is produced.

The empirical data to which a contemporary researcher on post-colonial Mozambique has access is fragmented. War created obstacles to field research particularly after 1983-84. Bureaucratic red tape hindered access to official

5 For a review of the literature see Chapter Three of the present dissertation.

information. Ideological and state imperatives dominated the release of information by the state. Socio-economic information was, between 1974 and 1986, regarded as a state secret. The statistical base, especially macro-economic data, is very fragile and consists of estimates (or guesstimates).

The release of information by the government was conditioned by a political objective. Data would be released to support a political thesis or to justify a political decision. In an atmosphere of secrecy, off-record briefings were used by officials to place the blame for policy options on other officials or to publicise a critical analysis of the options that had earlier prevailed. [6]

In releasing information individuals holding posts of political responsibility would carefully distinguish between off the record (private record) and for the record (public record).[7] Joseph Hanlon's books on Mozambique[8] illustrate the problems about the release of official information. Some of his informants insisted that he should not quote them.[9] This stance is understandable in the situation of post-colonial Mozambique. The public articulation of dissent was outlawed. Dissent in FRELIMO's official-public discourse was equated with betrayal or treason. Two terms appear in the public discourse related to dissent. One is "descontente", literally malcontent, someone who is dissatisfied with a specific policy, its result or any other factor. Another one is "infiltrado", literally infiltrator, at the service of the enemy. This designation bears the connotation of being a foreign agent, on the payroll of foreign interests and/or carrying out activities that they dictate, and of being an enemy of the people, acting against the will of the people. An "infiltrado" would be doubly illegitimate. First, for being at the service of foreign powers and second, for being against the people, against the interests of the whole nation. The literature within the field omits this kind of question.

Analyses of post-colonial Mozambique illustrate a constant tension between the researchers' own visions, values, aims and theories and the empirical data. Analysts are either FRELIMO or RENAMO supporters. The tension between solidarity and a critical point of view has tainted many analyses of post-colonial Mozambique by downplaying the overall impact of neglected policies and abuses of power. But these researchers' commitment has also documented many events and social and political processes which undoubtedly occurred. They have documented the difficulties faced by a third world country in designing and implementing its own political options. The tension between power, politicians and social science is not a problem which faces only the solidarity activists/social scientists concerned with Mozambique: it is a universal

6 For the discussions of concept of public and private records and its social role see Scott: 1991.

7 Ratilal: 1990; Ratilal: 1991; Hanlon: 1990a.

8 Hanlon: 1984a; Hanlon: 1990a.

9 Hanlon: 1990a:8.

dilemma arising from the relationship between Science and Power. As Wittrock notes,

> "Knowledge about society cannot hope to establish its legitimacy by derivations from the pinnacles of the powers that be. Rather it has to be constituted through the authority of the scholarly process itself and the needs of the people to reflexively, and as accurately as possible, draw on a discourse about society."[10]

Communities (and the scientific community is no exception) are not devoid of struggles for power, but one could argue at least that norms of conduct are set within the community. A study of post-colonial Mozambique reveals the tension between the analysis of an alternative development or a socialist transition by individuals actively involved in the process.[11] Some questions about the socialist transition and the nature of the war of liberation were only asked by social scientists/solidarity activists when the crisis of Mozambican socialism became obvious (i.e. not during the armed struggle (1964-1974) but several years after independence), because of their political allegiances.

A solidarity stance can lead to an idealised view of post-independence developments [12] and create difficulties for a critical analysis:

> "The European 'sympathisers' of FRELIMO, the internationalist volunteers and other 'red feet' have done great damage to the Mozambican revolution: unconditional supporters of FRELIMO, believing to have found in Machel a new "great helmsman", not criticising errors until FRELIMO itself has criticised them, denouncing critical voices as playing the game of imperialism, they were, or at least the great majority of them were, troubled by Nkomati (the agreement between South Africa and Mozambique), with a few fortunate exceptions".[13]

At the start of the 1990's the solidarity movement, recently shaken by a crisis of faith arising from Mozambique's abandonment of the socialist path, was discussing the relationship between solidarity and a critical view of the prevalent situation.[14]

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10 Wittrock: 1989:505.

11 Meyns and Lohman: 1976; Meyns: 1991.

12 Bragança, Depelchin: 1986; Cahen: 1987.

13 Cahen: 1987: 95. My own translation from the French.

14 Southern African Review of Books: August-September 1989 and January 1990; Hermele: 1992a; Roesch: 1988; Southern Africa Report: 1990.

This type of problem - romanticising the object of support -is not exclusive to the left. FRELIMO and RENAMO supporters alike show this continuous tension in their writings.[15]

The world of research is not a "closed" world.[16] The influences that act upon it stem from the significance that the object of study has on the global situation (e.g. FRELIMO's post-colonial project as a response to remnants of pre-colonial authority, colonial occupation and neo-colonialism), from the type of support it had received, and from the relation of the object of study to the funding strategies of aid agencies. The literature on post-colonial Mozambique illustrates this assertion on at least two accounts:

- Mozambique's development strategies and associated policies had an impact on donor agencies, the western intellectual milieu and members of the public concerned with the Third World. The holders of state power in Mozambique were considered to be very courageous people. After a supposedly flawless ten year armed struggle against the most archaic and repressive colonial power, they were presenting a program that would redress the colonial situation, which was much more articulated than the rhetoric of "African socialism" and which would prevent the reproduction of neo-colonialism. Mozambique was an alternative to Ghana of the fifties and Tanzania of the sixties. The Mozambican struggle for independence was a blow against colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid and imperialism in Southern Africa. Implementation of UN sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and support for the struggle against apartheid helped boost the recognition of Mozambique as a development alternative. Mittelman's analysis of Mozambique illustrates this stance. He wrote: "If it does not work, there will be no solution for the third world".[17] In a subsequent analysis [18] Mittelman, prompted by the changes on the Mozambican reality which eroded his own mythical images, concedes that the model can succumb to its own paradoxes.

- Some of the scientific analysis of Mozambique illustrates the effects of aid on research. Research produced in the context of aid shows the tensions and pressures (overt or covert) put on the analysis by participants in the aid process and their conflicting agendas - the donors or fund providers, the recipient governments and the target group.[19] The impact of the aid environment on social science research is sharpened by the fact that most

15 Hoile: 1989.

16 Frederiksen: 1990.

17 Mittelman: 1979:327.

18 Mittelman: 1988:154-155.

19 Elzinga: 1981.

of the research undertaken is funded by foreign donations. The availability of funds transforms most social science research in countries like Mozambique, directly or indirectly, into development research. Basic social research is unlikely to be funded.

6 Aid, destabilisation and government policies

While most researchers agree that both internal and external factors must be accounted for in the analysis of post-colonial Mozambique, until recently there has been a distinct tendency to concentrate on explanations looking for scape-goats, either external or internal: FRELIMO did not succeed in consolidating a socialist process because of domestic errors, or because of an international conspiracy (the Soviets or the Americans, according to taste and political preference). There seems to be an agreement among scientists both within the field of social science studies concerned with Portuguese speaking Africa and within the specific sub-field on Mozambique about the need to shift lines of inquiry onto the concrete historical processes which occurred. Thus the main issue for research is the relationship between the external and internal factors.[20] A traditional approach to research has been to consider everything that occurs within the borders of a country as "internal" and the particular international context of the moment as "external" (conveniently sub-divided into "regional" and "international"), and to link both areas by stressing the constraints and opportunities the country faces in its dealings with certain phenomena or forces.

I consider this sterile, since the processes that occur in the real world tend to be much more complex than such an approach would suggest. Therefore, I have considered that each of the major forces contributing to change in Mozambique acted inside the country (and had roots in the Mozambican social formation), regardless of their linkages with the "external". I have concentrated the focus of my research on the connections between these forces and how they have influenced each other.

I have thus made an attempt to enlarge and deepen the "problematique" of the linkages and relations between internal and external factors in the development of post-colonial Mozambique by choosing a multiple method research strategy. This avoids the straightjacket imposed by conventional disciplines in the field of social and human studies.

I chose as my object of study the relationship between aid, government development policies and "destabilisation", three factors present in the post

20 Head: 1993. A very good example of an alternative path of analysis which departs from blame laying schemata "imperialism the culprit of the African regimes and population growth, low productivity and bad policies, the villain seen by the IMF-WB" is Raikes: 1988.

colonial development of Mozambique. These three factors and their inter-connections provide a point of departure for understanding the evolution of the post-colonial period and the relation between internal and external factors. Aid has given Mozambique's post colonial government financial, human, military and diplomatic resources it needed and was not able to raise internally. "Destabilisation" has been regarded as an activity hampering and limiting development and is quoted by many as the main bottleneck preventing development. Development strategies and associated policies shaped (and were also influenced by) the socio-economic reality of Mozambique.

I have employed a multiple methods research strategy which allowed me i) to understand the changes which occurred in post-colonial Mozambique in a historical perspective; ii) to go beyond official discourses and ideology concerning aid, "destabilisation" and development and the analyses which reproduce that ideology; iii) to break out of the straightjacket imposed by a strict adherence to disciplinary boundaries.

I have tried to capture the voices, visions and perspectives of the various actors involved, and to escape from data and interpretations that holders of state power and their challengers have carefully released and which the "red feet" and "cold war warriors" have popularised. And at every step I have asked myself: Did development strategies and external influences in any way enhance or deter destabilisation ?

I have followed an iconoclastic approach in order to reconstruct the post-colonial or contemporary history of Mozambique.

7 The argument

In the beginning, I had assumed, both from the official accounts[21] and from the literature, that aid and "destabilisation" were external factors influencing development strategies and associated policies (options, implementation and results) i.e. a simple relationship between external and internal factors: Aid, because the volume of aid flows was not sufficient to put at the government's disposal the resources necessary to apply its development strategies, to implement its plans and attain its objectives; "destabilisation", because it destroyed infrastructure and blocked state actions, curtailing the possibilities for development. Aid (through its conditionality) and "destabilisation" were conspiring (deliberately) against the Revolution.

21 I am reluctant to use the designation "official history" because there has not been a single case of a book or a publication considered or pretending to be an official version of recent history. But historical accounts were included in party or government documents.

Through the research I concluded that i) this was a very reductionistic and linear conception of aid, development strategies and "destabilisation"; ii) a broader analytical framework (multi or transdisciplinary) was needed to allow me to question the determinist approaches or the chronologies shown in government and party documents and by analysts who reproduced them or their contents; and iii) the relationship was not as simple as I had assumed.

In this thesis I present three types of arguments. The first is related to the relationship between development strategies and associated policies, external aid and "destabilisation". The second concerns the relationship between internal and external sanctions. The third refers to the violation, by aid and by foreign intervention, of the principle of sovereignty of states embodied in the UN Charter.

The first argument deals with the relationship between development strategies and associated policies, aid, and "destabilisation". The three processes are mutually reinforcing and so locked together that a simplistic characterisation of aid as a positive or stabilising factor, of "destabilisation" as a negative factor or as external intervention and of development strategies as positive or as neutral factors, dependent on the other two, does not explain the process which occurred.

The second argument is that the development strategies, due to their characteristics and contradictions, suffered sanctions imposed both by internal and external forces. External sanctions can only produce results when there are internal social carriers who echo them, voluntarily or otherwise. Forces dissatisfied with development strategies and policies challenged them in various ways ranging from passive resistance to armed insurgency. Sanctions directed against post-colonial development strategies were officially seen as "destabilisation", treason, betrayal, infiltration, acts carried out by lackeys of imperialism and colonialism. "Destabilisation" is a very useful metaphor to give meaning to disruption of the government's development efforts, to destruction and sabotage as seen from the perspective of those who hold state power, who use conspiracy theories to explain opposition. But it is misleading because, by definition, it denies legitimacy to anyone challenging the state, regardless of their social origins and of the reasons and aims underlying their activities. The social carriers of external opposition were Mozambicans dissatisfied with the regime and who felt marginalised by the development strategies adopted. There is a dialectic between opposition to post-colonial development strategies and shortcomings in the chosen development model.

The third argument concerns aid and those visions which see it as help, assistance, altruism. Aid is a weapon in the political armoury of nations. Negative sanctions against the Mozambican government from outside the Nation State were implemented through support (public or clandestine, by states or Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO's) for the insurgency and through general state to

state relations - which includes development aid. Aid or development assistance constitutes an external intervention and violates the principle of sovereignty embodied in the United Nations Charter. I also argue that aid in the present World System plays a stabilisation or system maintenance role. The system stabilisation role includes the use of violence (war, covert operations, political and diplomatic pressures) to force changes in parts of the system to maintain its overall cohesion and logic. I argue that: i) aid was used, in the context of inter-state relationships, to convey both positive and negative sanctions to the post-colonial Mozambican state; ii) post-colonial development strategies were constantly influenced by aid donors, and the distinction between importing models and practices and "autonomy in decision making" in its formulation was very difficult to draw. Aid flows increased when the donors were satisfied with government policies and declined or came with strings attached when they were not. Aid and covert interventions both violate the sovereignty rights guaranteed in the UN Charter.

The overriding argument of this thesis is that the various versions of international imperialist conspiracy against the Mozambican Revolution do not explain sufficiently the post-colonial history of Mozambique. The various versions of scapegoatism are ideological justifications for failing to consider specific realities where development strategies were applied. The general argument which runs through this thesis, and is documented by the case studies, is the lack of respect or consideration for, and the sheer ignorance of, existing reality, shown by those who formulated and implemented the development strategy and its associated policies. Instead, they adhered to the "tabula rasa"[22] principle. The post-colonial holders of state power could apply the "tabula rasa" approach because, at the moment when power was transferred from the colonial state there was no organised social movement capable of defying them. Those who challenged the colonial state and became the holders of post-colonial state power had a monopoly on armed force and enjoyed legitimacy deriving from the support given by the majority of the population. The holders of post-colonial state power were seen as "liberators". Why ? Because they had fought the colonial government, won "independence" and eliminated the basic contradiction of the colonial regime - political and economic rights in the hands of a minority - which affected the majority of the population, regarded as "natives", rather than as citizens. [23]

8 Organisation of the thesis

In chapter one, the introduction, I define in broad strokes the object of the thesis, setting it in the context of current academic debate on Mozambique.

22 Clean slate.

23 For a analysis of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique see Mondlane: 1969.

Research procedures are described and a first outline of the argumentation followed is presented.

In chapter two, the research methodology is spelled out. It characterises the multiple methods research strategy employed. The criteria for selection of case studies is described.

Chapter three reviews the existing literature, highlighting analysis shaped by the ideology of the post-colonial state in Mozambique.

Chapter four deals with development strategies. In an overview of Post-Colonial Mozambique (1975-1990), government development strategies and associated policies are described, changes are identified and the reasons for change are explained.

Chapter five considers the opposition to the post-colonial regime, identifies the negative sanctions imposed on the government, their origin and social carriers

Chapter six illustrates the relationship between the post-colonial Mozambican government and the aid donors. The evolution of aid (main donors, type of aid, conditionalities) is shown. The relationship between four donors - United States of America (USA), Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Portugal and Sweden - and the Peoples Republic of Mozambique (PRM) is described.

Chapters seven, eight, nine and ten present case studies of four districts with different political economies. The analysis presented in the previous chapters is based on them. In each case I try to show how the development strategies applied worked against the interests of certain groups of peasants which opposed it, while other groups of peasants benefited from the strategies. Chapter seven, a case study of Changara District in Tete Province, illustrates the concrete results of post-colonial development strategies. Chapter eight, a case study of Boane, near Maputo, illustrates the relationship between the war and the formation of a class of propertied Mozambicans. Chapter nine focuses on the district of Mueda, and shows the discontinuities between FRELIMO's liberation struggle and post-independence praxis. Chapter ten, on the district of Sabié, illuminates the type of development activities maintained during the most intensive period of the "destabilisation" war.

Chapter eleven concludes the analysis by setting the results of the study in the wider context of Mozambican history and of the role of aid and altruism in the world system. It dwells on the reasons why aid flows are linkages between disparate participants in the chain. It deals with the relationship of aid,

"destabilisation" and development showing how a vicious spiral was created. After the exploration of each of these themes an attempt to relate them is made.

The bibliography lists the literature and documentation used. All documents were listed by authors. I decided not to follow the common division - books, articles, primary documentation and interviews - because it corresponds to an approach to science which considers some sources as primary and others as secondary. All sources -whatever their differences in format, media, type of collection procedure - have to be treated in the same way: scrutinised for internal and external contradictions, for the values, aims and objectives of its author or authors, the role of its message, etc.[24]

9 Conclusion

The content of post-colonial development strategies originated from a perceived necessity by the revolutionary nationalist elite for an absolute break with all pre-colonial and colonial forces and classes. The past and the present (imprinted with residues from the past) were seen as an unclean slate. Those formulating and implementing strategy and policy accepted the principle of the "tabula rasa". A sense of denial and resentment emerged among sections of the peasantry who saw their possibilities for production and reproduction hampered. Sections of the Mozambican bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie (not yet clearly developed and better captured by the concept of a modern elite)[25] found their possibility of inheriting the benefits of the transfer of power curtailed. They had been shut off the scene by the particular process of transition to independence which occurred in Mozambique and had seen their access to capital accumulation blocked by the post-colonial state. The social composition of the revolutionary nationalists (the leadership originating from the south, educated, Protestant and Marxists, mixed with individuals from the northern border areas, educated, young and catholic) and the development strategies they chose alienated several groups in society. Some of the groups marginalised by those strategies, or whose interest and needs were attacked by the post-colonial government's strategies, supported, actively or passively, military attacks by RENAMO against the institutions (and their symbols) engaged in applying these development strategies.

If the development strategies and associated policies of the post-colonial government were the breeding ground for forces which opposed the post-colonial holders of state power, then aid and the relations between the

24 Eco: 1992:23-43; Eco: 1994:18-21, 174-202.

25 By elite I mean a group within a population with power on the basis of special traits: education, family, life-styles etc. For a discussion on elite theory and elite concepts, see Gran, et al: 1990:57-64.

Mozambican state and other states, were the enabling environment for opposition forces to operate.

CHAPTER TWO

YOM: A multiple method research strategy

1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the multiple methods research strategy used in this dissertation. It cannot be characterised as specific to any given science, but as a series of operational instruments and tools to gather information allowing an understanding of the specific reality under investigation, a characteristic practice of Development Studies.

In my quest for understanding, I used any evidence, produced by any discipline, in order to grasp the characteristics of a given region's social formation, political economy, society and political institutions.

To the historian's traditional research areas - the past and written documents - I added the exploration of other sources (oral interviews, questionnaires). Statistics (demography, agriculture, cattle, trade), and works on the geology, ecology, geography, anthropology and hydrography of each region under study were also used.

My focus was the present, current events, a research area where the concerns of contemporary historians and of development studies meet. The difference between my approach and the approach of traditional development studies is that history has not been relegated to a secondary position. Generally, development studies analysis considers the past just as a complementary background information. My approach has been to include the three dimensions - past, present and future - at the same time, and not necessarily in any neat order.[1] In each case study it was necessary to look simultaneously at the past, the present and the future, as seen by the participants.

The development studies perspective helped me to follow the principle so beautifully expressed by Theodore Zeldin: "To have a new vision of the future, it has always first been necessary to have a new vision of the past."[2]

This approach was conditioned by the following aspects:

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[1] For a critique of history as legitimisation of present political or policy choices see Friedman: 1992. For counter-arguments to this simplistic views of history see Thompson: 1982.

[2] Zeldin: 1994:vii.

- the method used in collecting information, particularly oral testimony where, in general, the informants themselves made an analysis which integrated past, present and future;

- the cases chosen for field work where some present day problems were constantly articulated with past policies and actions e.g. the post-colonial villagisation in Changara and the colonial strategic hamlets (aldeamentos) policy; the development strategies of the armed struggle in Mueda and colonial and post-colonial development strategies.

I have applied techniques which are commonly referred to as "Problem Oriented Research", which recognises and defends the need for a dynamic relationship between research theme choice, data collection and analysis, and the writing up process.[3] The inter-relationship contributes towards a systematic use of existing data and the redefinition of the theme during the course of research work.

I have also used the case study method[4] by selecting four districts where I did my field work. To elaborate some of the themes I also selected cases for in depth study and analysis e.g. US, Soviet, Portuguese and Swedish aid to understand foreign aid to Mozambique. The vast array of methods and techniques that those who work under the historical social sciences have access to was applied: conversations (interviews,[5] individual or collective; structured or non structured [6], life-histories,[7] key informants[8]), archives and other written documentation, plus observation and surveys.

The research methodology was developed as part of research undertaken at the Centre for African Studies in the Eduardo Mondlane University in which I was involved. The need to go against the various idealisations of Mozambican history obliged me to take a stand against the colonial and nationalist versions of the past and present.

The Centre for African Studies (CEA) developed research on Mozambique in the international and southern African context. Different CEA departments or research groups applied specific methodologies to their research. Reading their work allowed me to develop a critique of their

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3 Arnfred: 1994. See also Strauss and Corbin: [s.d.].

4 Flyvbjerg: 1989. For a detailed discussion see Yin: 1993.

5 See Whyte: 1982.

6 Burgess: 1982d.

7 See Cottle: 1982; Burgess: 1982b. See also Mandelbaum: 1982; Langness: 1973.

8 For a discussion see Tremblay: 1982.

research practice which accepted as true the various formulations and versions of the official story about development.

My research methodology continued maturing during several research projects in which I participated on the current history of Mozambique, the government's development strategies and associated policies, the "destabilisation" process, aid programs, the rationale behind them and their impacts and results.

The lack of an historical dimension in the analysis of rural reality and the lack of problematisation of the official history led me to find sources and information which contradicted the general analysis of socialist transformation.

2 Transdisciplinarity

I have used a transdisciplinary approach, which, in my opinion, is an established tendency in the contemporary social science panorama and, in the case of the post-colonial history of Africa, has been used by pioneers like Benoit Verhaegen.[9]

The tendency towards multi or pluridisciplinarity is shown by the modification of dominant paradigms in each social science discipline and subdiscipline by incorporation of explanations about the relations between external and internal factors, the interdependence of actors and systems at the world level, the relation between subject and object, the role of quantification, the disciplinary architecture and boundaries between disciplines.[10] Approaches in different social science traditions are being enlarged to accommodate inputs from other disciplines (history and sociology, history and anthropology, history, economics, social science).[11]Approaches within sociology are being opened to the international relations field. Linguistics is playing a role in explaining political discourse.[12]

> "Explorations behind and beyond disciplinary boundaries have their origins in the complexities of present day societies. (...) This complexity (...) demands a broad sweep of vision and a synthesis of

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9 Verhaegen: 1986.

10 For an analysis of the transformation and the three paradigms (the traditional, the crisis and the future) see B.S.Santos: 1989.

11 Worsley: 1964; Skocpol: 1991; Galtung: 1990a.

12 For a discussion.see Arnfred and Bentzon: 1990.

knowledge in a transdisciplinary perspective. An interdisciplinary approach to the study of demographic, economic, biomedical, technological, educational and socio-cultural problems is an imperative of our times. The discipline-specific approach of the classical academic world to the understanding of natural and social phenomena has failed in solving problems facing humanity and society i.e. the creation of development strategies that are politically, economically, socially and environmentally sustainable or participation in multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies.".[13]

2.1 Rethinking the 19th century paradigms

Boaventura de Sousa Santos[14], analysing the evolution of social science, considers the existence of three paradigms: the Traditional, the Crisis and the Future. The Traditional paradigm corresponds to the approaches institutionalised in the 19th century, which consider Social Sciences as a copy of the Natural Sciences and distinct from these, gives primacy to measurement and accepts the 19th century division of disciplines. The Crisis paradigm corresponds to the present day practices, which have seen the limitations of the Traditional paradigm and try to create an interaction between the various disciplines and approaches, being multi- or transdisciplinary. The Future paradigm considers that there is no division between the study of society and nature. Humanity is society and nature at the same time. All sciences are socio-natural. The dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative methods is eliminated.

Immanuel Wallerstein has proposed to take the challenge of changing the dominant social science or science paradigms to its logical consequences by defending the need to."unthink the 19th century social science paradigms" and the false dichotomies between nomothetic-ideographic sciences and issuing a call for "the destruction of the different faculties (economics, sociology, history) and the creation of a single faculty of historical social-sciences.[15] The boundaries between social and natural sciences are being redrawn or questioned.[16] At the same time that an emergent or future paradigm in science is being established and the erosion of boundaries between disciplines is advocated, new disciplines are trying to establish themselves, such as International Political Economy, while

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13 Pethe: 1990.

14 B.S.Santos: 1989.

15 B.S.Santos: 1989.

16 Wallerstein: 1989a; Wallerstein: 1992.

existing ones (anthropology, political science) are trying to consolidate their domains.[17]

It has been suggested that political science is a better tool than political economy to explain social change in the debate on Post-Colonial Africa.[18] Anthropologists claim the realm of culture as an exclusive area of inquiry for their science.

The contribution of various approaches is fundamental to illuminate the picture of post-colonial development in Africa. To understand the rationality of post-colonial developments in Mozambique I have tried an "integrative approach", working in the "border country between disciplines" [19] and with an approach to theory "as middle ground theorising" i.e. "theorising which has to do with the object under study rather than with an adherence to explanations which would have universal explanatory value".[20]

I am not searching for heroes or villains (bourgeois, colonialists, neo-colonial élites, philosopher-kings [21]) nor for the graveyard of Mozambican socialism.[22]

Development studies, a multi- or transdisciplinary field *par excellence*, can be included, by its characteristics, in Sousa Santos' Crisis or Future Social Sciences paradigms, which correspond to my research approaches.[23] Starting from this platform, I have chosen a multiple method research strategy.[24]

2.2 From oral history to development studies and YOM

My personal brand of research methodology can be called adaptive research, in other words, methodology adapted to the object under study, to the

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17 At least five positions can be distinguished in the debate about social sciences: i. A proposal for the abandonment of the 19th century paradigms by i. Wallerstein: 1992 and 1989a; ii. A justification of the existing social science set-up (Gellner: 1983); iii. The non acceptance of social sciences. None of the social science disciplines would be more than sects (Gareau: 1987); iv. A defence of the indigenization of the social sciences (Riggs: 1987); v. A defence of the universality of social sciences and of non differentiation between social and natural sciences (Krajewsky: 1992) Similar debates are also present in the field of development studies. See Hettne: 1993.

18 More: 1986.

19 Frederiksen: 1990.

20 Wilson: 1990.

21 Freund: 1989.

22 O'Meara: 1991.

23 Hettne: 1993. See also Mendonça: 1985; Conyers: 1986; W.Adam: 1992.

24 For a comprehensive discussion see Burgess: 1982c.

type of information needed, to the type of sources and to the general research conditions available, e.g. time, place, climate, funds. This type of approach is linked to practices which were commonly referred to as Rapid Rural Appraisals and later as Participatory Rural Appraisals. The transformation of RRA/PRA into a model and a turn-key type of approach to research undermined the basic critique and proposal of Robert Chambers in relation to research methodology regarded more as a tool to be adapted to research needs than as a straightjacket. It is a paradox that a synonym of the key-word for Robert Chambers critique of wrong research practices (the "quick" and dirty) became the key-word of correct research (the "rapid" appraisals).[25] I tend to call my own mix of social science methodologies YOM - Yussuf's Own Mix or Your Own Mix. The Y, can - and should - be substituted by each researcher's initial, showing the personalised use of the techniques each one of us has at our own disposal.

The standard recommendation that many theorists on social science methodology make to their readers varies between two extreme positions. One position argues that i) a method has to be defined: and ii) consistently applied. The other extreme maintains that i) the researcher has to adapt his research methods to the concrete reality and the object of study; ii) rules need not be obeyed. [26]

A critique has been levelled against the research methods used by social scientists in development studies in general, and in rural settings in particular: survey slavery, cold or dry season work, tar road syndrome, etc.[27] Methods which allow peasants to communicate have been proposed. These efforts have tried to demarcate themselves from "the two intellectual styles (....) (dominating) social science activity, (.....) the story tellers and the pyramid-builders".[28]

3 The research methods

The following research methods were used: documentary or archival research, interviews (individual and collective, structured and non structured, life stories and key informants), surveys. The sources used in writing the current thesis were a mix of oral information (interviews of various types), documentary information and observation.

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25 Chambers: 1994. See also Chambers: 1980.

26 These debates are reported in various introductory manuals to the social sciences. See Taylor and Bogdan: 1992. The first chapter pp 15-27 delineates the debate.

27 See Chambers: 1988.

28 Galtung: 1990:96.

Two methods were used to collect data: consulting written documents, published or not, and collecting oral testimony based specially on life stories and non-structured oral interviews. Surveys based on questionnaires were also consulted. Each research theme was given a similar treatment, in order to ensure uniformity of approach, to permit comparative analysis and deal with issues linked to conceptualisation, theorisation and the concrete case under investigation.

The work done in prolonged field studies in certain areas (e.g. Mueda, Boane, Changara) showed the need to collect other sources of information and to deal with issues which were left out of the accounts produced by FRELIMO and the government itself.

The lack of a historical dimension in the analysis of rural reality and the lack of problematisation of the official history led me to find sources and information which contradicted the general analysis of socialist transformation.

4 Sources

The collection of information is a process of permanent dialogue between the researcher and his/her sources. The uncritical use of official sources has led to the reproduction of the official version of the history of post-colonial Mozambique.[29] A way out involves exploring other sources (oral interviews, questionnaires)

The sources used in writing the present thesis are a mix of oral information (interviews of various types), documentary information and observation. My own experience is one of the sources of information that, overtly or covertly, has conditioned my analysis.

The sources used are documents which were produced by their authors with a defined objective which is not necessarily that of the researcher using them. The oral interviews, even those which were made to gather knowledge about specific themes, are not necessarily testimonies on the subject under inquiry: the person interviewed has his own strategy and his/her own objectives when he/she is speaking.

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[29] For a review of the literature see Chapter three of the present dissertation.

4.1 Written sources

In each geographic area where research was conducted, e.g. a Ministry, a Village, a district administration, I tried to locate written sources and documentation about the subjects under research - aid, destabilisation and government development strategies and associated policies.

The information on development was gathered mainly from written sources and from field studies in the districts.

On the post-colonial period I used the official documents, correspondence, reports, speeches which are publicly available. Development project reports, consultancies, surveys were also used to gather information.

Research reports and other publications on the issues being studied were used. In some cases discussions were held with the authors on their work, the difficulties they had faced and the limits of their findings. Some researchers forwarded information which they had gathered earlier and which had not been used or published. Each source was considered a historical source and methods of critique and verification were applied.

4.2 Written sources and ideology

The colonial sources were designed to satisfy the information requirements of the colonial state and most of them were moulded by colonial ideology which tried to prove that "Mozambique was Mozambique because it was Portugal". The positions and actions of the colonised were relegated to a secondary position and were generally interpreted by using conspiracy theory i.e. challenges to the colonial state were seen as the activity of a misguided minority, serving the interests of foreign powers. Nevertheless some of the reports, particularly those regarded as secret and confidential, present some of the real problems involved: repression, the low prices paid, the peasantry's refusal to accept the colonial administration, the nature of the régulos and their collaborators.

The post-colonial sources, especially administrative reports, take a similar ideological position towards the state they tried to serve. Opposition to the post-colonial state was also regarded as the action of a minority, serving foreign interests and without popular support. Most of the information regarding RENAMO actions and organisation was considered secret and it was very difficult to gain access to such data.

If the day to day reports from various state bodies echo the official line and try to justify the policies adopted, documents produced on special occasions

(party congresses, special investigations, balances of activities) put very clearly the problems and depart from the official line.

For many years the official documentation reproduced the official line of the party and state on development projects and socialist transformation. Peasant positions and actions were mostly characterised as resulting from their "low level of technical and scientific knowledge".

4.3 Written sources on development strategies, destabilisation and aid

As far as development strategies and associated policies are concerned I studied the official documents, both party and state, the speeches and public interventions of leaders in which balance-sheets were drawn of the application of the policies, plans announced and critiques made. The speeches and public presentations put forward a different image of those policies than the ones shown in official balances made at party congresses or on official dates by government leaders. The field studies allowed an understanding of the relationship between the official discourse and the reality in the field.[30]

As for destabilisation, written sources were used as far as they conveyed the vision of different actors - RENAMO, the opposition to the government and the government. Material produced by some scholars who had access to RENAMO prisoners in government camps or ex-RENAMO members was also used taking notice that the information was gathered in a situation of repression and lack of liberty. In the field work most material on RENAMO was gathered in interviews where the informant asked not to be named. I tried to interview more than one source to cross-check information.

I have searched for different sources on aid: the Mozambican government, OECD, donors, independent evaluations. But whatever the sources on aid, they do not permit an analysis of the volume of foreign aid pledged or given, the number of projects, the amount used to pay wages, the value of the Mozambican contributions etc.

The only source published regularly is the Development Co-operation Report, compiled by the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) offices in Maputo from 1983 up to today.[31] The UNDP compilation, although it has the advantage of being systematically maintained over the years, is incomplete: i) many donors did not forward the required information; ii) the data given is

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30 Yarmolinski: 1975.

31 UNDP: 1983 to 1991.

aggregated in a format that does not permit any distinction between amounts pledged, amounts actually transferred, amounts invested in Mozambique and what returned to the donor country as, for example, wages of expatriates, payment for equipment, etc.. and iii) different categories and concepts are used every year.

The information on aid involved interviews with aid donors and government officials, the collection of information on the projects financed by aid and its results in the places of implementation. Sources for aid included reports produced by aid agencies, contracts between the Mozambican government and donors, evaluations and interviews. As for negative sanctions against the government, various testimonies of those involved were used.

Sources on aid are also generally ideologically biased because they try to give an idea of common interests and humanitarian goals. Generally the discourse of humanitarian imperatives and shared concerns takes precedence over business, geo-political and other type of interests.

As far as development strategies and associated policies are concerned I studied official documents from the party and the state, development agencies. NGOs, the World Bank. the speeches and public interventions of leaders in which balance-sheets were drawn of the application of the policies, plans announced and critique made. The speeches and public presentation put forward a different image of those policies than the ones shown in official balances made at party congresses or official dates by the leaders of the government. The field studies allowed an understanding of the relationship between the official discourses and the reality in the field.

Information about development projects financed by aid and of their results in the places of implementation were collected from evaluation studies, planning documents and surveys in different projects.

On negative sanctions against the government through aid some written documents have been found but generally this type of issue is not put into writing in any straightforward way.

The written documents specially on aid and development generally reproduce the agreements. Discordance and critiques are not mentioned.

4.4 Documentary research sites

Documentary research was carried out in the archives of ministries or government institutions supervising and monitoring each one of the themes - the Ministry of Co-operation for Aid, and the Planning, Agriculture and Health

Ministries for Development strategies - or conducting public administration in a given region or territory - the district administrations of Boane, Changara, Mueda and the administrative post of Sabié.

In Maputo I also researched at the Historical Archive of Mozambique, the Documentation Units of the Centre for African Studies, the National Directorate for Water, the State Secretariat for Irrigation and Drainage and the archives of the Maputo daily newspaper, "Notícias".

I used extensively the archives of the Mueda water project, of the Integrated Rural Development Project of the district of Mueda, (the FO9 project) and of the district administration in Mueda-sede. In Boane district, I investigated documents from the district party office, the district administration, and the district directorates for health, commerce and agriculture. In the case of Changara, the field records of Marco Teixeira had information on documents existing in the district administration.

I used project and agency documents (evaluation reports, official publications) to gather understanding about aims, internal structure, and activities. I also used press reports on certain subjects. In some of the villages, the president or the secretary maintain registers of occurrences in the village. Cases judged by the village court are recorded. Decisions of the village executive council are written down. Notes are sent to the district administration.

My personal collection of documentation on Mozambique constructed over the years has also been useful.

During the PhD course, I explored the libraries at the universities of Roskilde and Gothenburg, IDS/Sussex and the Scandinavian Institute for African Studies in Uppsala, mainly in search of updated literature on theory, methodology and African studies in general.

4.5 Statistics and surveys

Apart from the national statistics published by the government's statistics board (Direccao Nacional de Estatística) I have used data generated from surveys run in Changara, Boane, Mueda and Sabié by development projects or by researchers commissioned by these In the case of Changara, I tabulated data myself from its primary listings (information on 79 families of the villages of Caomba and N'Temangau). I also used the data in the Ministry of Health Nutrition sector on Changara.

I refrained from using new surveys for two reasons: i) an inflation of surveys by aid agencies and development projects ii) the limits of the type of information gathered.[32]

5 Analysing the existing literature

I began by analysing the literature on post-colonial Mozambique concentrating not only on published books and articles in academic journals but also on unpublished papers and reports. The reason for this was not only that this literature dealt with the object of study but also because the authors who signed the "published", more formal material were also involved in consultancies, commissioned research and advice to the government.

The three main themes were researched at the level of the general theoretical literature on the subject, similar studies on other countries and the ongoing debate on them: destabilisation, development and aid.

Concerning destabilisation I studied the Chilean experiences during the Allende government in relation to which the term destabilisation, a new word in the English language was coined. Various studies on Chile were consulted at the same time as readings on countries which had suffered similar experiences: Nicaragua, Granada, Jamaica. Literature on "foreign military intervention", on covert operations, on military doctrines was consulted.

6 Oral information

6.1 Interviews

One of the methods used to explore new sources of information was the conversation: interviews,[33] individual or collective; structured or non structured, life-histories, key informants. In conducting oral interviews I have used two type of contacts: i) individual interviews; and ii) collective interviews. The selection of one of the methods depended on the issue and on the willingness to talk of the persons being interviewed. In some cases, interviews followed the life story approach whereby the person interviewed was asked questions about his/her autobiography, family, work and political participation.

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32 For a critique see Chambers: 1994.

33 See Whyte: 1982.

The interview material on Boane was collected by an Oficina de História (History Workshop) brigade in 1987-1988 in which I participated. After 1988 I continued to work in the district on my own.

The interview material for the 1979 and 1981-1982 research campaigns in Mueda was taped. The use of the 1979 material was from field transcripts made by the research team. The 1981-1982 interviews were transcribed in their totality. I have checked the transcriptions, which were completed only in 1992, with the field notes from the research brigades. The interview material from the remaining campaigns in Mueda from 1982 onwards was registered on cards.

The interview material from Sabié in 1981-1982 was produced by CEA brigades working in a project on the state farm sector in the area. I have used the transcriptions which exist in the Centre for African Studies. In 1992 I did my own interviewing in Sabié.

As for the Changara case-study, I have used transcriptions of interviews done by Marco Teixeira and existing field work reports. Dr. Omawale, who was involved in the research on Changara, provided valuable insights.[34] In 1993, after the signature of the Peace Accord, it was possible to visit Changara briefly.

Interviews were also collected on aid, destabilisation and government development strategies and associated policies. The information on aid involved interviews with aid donors, agency representatives, technical assistance officers, and government officials involved in the processes. Beneficiaries or victims of these processes were also interviewed.

In the field work most of the material on RENAMO was gathered in interviews where the informant asked not to be named. After the Rome Peace Accord and the legalisation of RENAMO as a political party, it was easier to find informants willing to talk. Interviews with RENAMO cadres, dissidents and members published in the official press added a difficulty in interpretation: the interviews were published as in a propaganda campaign, generally depicting internal contradictions inside RENAMO. Cross-checking this type of sources became a difficult (or well-nigh impossible) task.

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[34] I have relied for the situation in Changara on three written accounts: Akesson: 1985; Teixeira: 1985a. I have worked with Marco Teixeira's field notes which reproduce documents existing in the district administration. I had access, in the Ministry of Health in Maputo, to the data which was collected through questionnaires. Computer print-outs with processed socio-economic information were made available.

6.2 Life histories or life passages

In the method used in the collection of oral testimonies, which we have called the collection of life histories, I tried in each case to construct a biography of the informant which allowed me to correlate his views on the main themes of research (development, destabilisation and aid) with his or her social origin, work history, class position etc.

The interviews were not conducted so as to gather a chronological account of the life history of the informant although some basic questions were asked i.e. name, age, parents' social origin, number of wives, size of family, profession, economic activities, cattle and land holdings. Generally the informant oriented the interview to focus on questions which concerned him or her. A discussion about aid in a village could for example be used by the president of the village to speak about grain prices, the land law and the activities of traditional chiefs. A dynamic emerged whereby the interests of the researcher and the interests of the informant intersected. Many informants had lived through the colonial and the post-colonial periods and they compared life experience during these different periods.

6.3 The informants

Selected informants were used to gather information on the colonial period, taking into consideration their age and experience related to matters under investigation. On the armed struggle, I used extensively interview material produced by the History Workshop of the Centre for African Studies for research projects conducted in the Mueda area. Most of the interviews carried out from 1979 onwards were reanalysed. The oral material has been transcribed and translated into Portuguese and was available for the first time during the research period of this thesis.

The oral interviews were particularly aimed at three types of individuals: leaders ("responsáveis" in the Mozambican jargon), people who had directed a certain sector prominent for the research, local administrators and officials, and ordinary citizens. The idea was to obtain different visions, values, and views on certain processes under way pertinent to the subject under research.

The interviews, undertaken at various periods of fieldwork, before joining the PhD. program and after, were conducted with political leaders e.g. ministers, party secretaries and district administrators; village leaders and members of the "Conselho Executivo" or administrative council, co-operatives, and other institutions; traders, technicians, project staff, leaders of state farms; and peasants.

For some subjects considered controversial or where the informant was uneasy I gathered information through long, informal conversations. In some cases, when asked, I have not revealed the identity of my source or I have removed the possibility of tracing the source to any particular individual.

6.4 Tape recorders and transcriptions

The life histories or the information collected through conversations (structured interviews, informal discussions, group interviews) were transcribed and translated. A first register in writing was done at the same time that the data was being collected. In analysing the data the information was checked for coherence and when any inconsistency was found when compared with existing knowledge and information, a new collection of the same data was done, using different sources. The data gathered through the oral interviews was checked with information collected through written documentation and observations.

A tape recorder was always used in my initial research projects to record interviews. At the same time field notes were taken during the interview. Afterwards they were taped and voids filled in from memory or using the tape recordings. Later, the use of tape-recorders had to be discontinued, in some cases due to difficulties in processing the information (transcription, translation, typing), the costs involved and lack of translators or transcribers.

As time passed I became more selective in the use of the tape-recorder. Only interviews thought particularly important on a case-by-case basis, were recorded. Informants were selected for taped interviews according to the quality of their testimonies (first hand knowledge, central figure in a social process, a leader, a peasant) and their relevance for present and future research.

6.5 Oral testimonies and manipulation by the informant

A very good example of manipulation of history is given by officials who were interviewed on general themes like development options. Some of them presented themselves as those who had initiated or were responsible for policy changes e.g. the adoption of a market strategy rather than the centrally planned economic system. Individuals were trying to take credit for changes which had more to do with general conditions in Mozambique and the world and regional political order, and with popular acceptance of certain policies and strategies.

Oral testimony collected in 1991 and 1992 from state officials often gave a more realistic portrait of issues and developments than reports written by those same officials which I also consulted. Many of the interviewees tried to present themselves as subjects and implementators of change trying to avoid any

association with past policies. The fact that they had supported previous policies, which they were criticising at the time of the interview, was explained as due to coercion by the leadership.

This openness contrasts with the previous practice of the same informants. Critical appraisals during the 1980s of government policies, of anti-government activities and of aid were generally supplied by "estruturas" (the Mozambican designation for "nomenklatura") in off the record conversation. During interviews, when notes were being taken or a tape-recorder used, the sources asked explicitly not to record in any form or not to attribute specific information to them.

In 1978/1979, during interviews, informants referred to Portuguese development projects, such as the Mueda water system, as colonial undertakings, examples of discrimination and exploitation, without any benefits for themselves as the population. In 1993, informants, including the administration, who had made some of the fiercest critiques of colonialism in the 1978/1979 interviews, considered the colonial water project a good example of a simple design, which although limited, was always operational and did not consume too much diesel. Why the change? It is understandable that very soon after independence (three or four years) all the past was judged as colonial, which in fact it was, without taking into consideration the goals set in designing a water system, for example, which could have included low running costs.

The interviews, even those which were made to gather knowledge about specific themes, are not necessarily accurate testimony to the subject under inquiry.

6.6 Discussions with informants

The general analysis and conclusions reached after a certain period were put directly to the informant and then I stressed the difference between my own analysis and the one the informant was producing e.g. peasant support for RENAMC. The informant would explain why certain information could not be given by himself or in the case of a district administrator the difference between what could be said in public for political reasons and the real situation on the ground, e.g. villagisation policies and peasant response to them.

In the analysis I also confronted the explanations given by various groups or individuals i.e. the visions of a district administrator on the break-up of the villages, of a trader, of a peasant or of different kinds of peasants. The breakdown of informants into different categories was not established a priori. It depended on the subject under inquiry and the quality of the informant - his age, experience, willingness to talk etc. In a co-operative I interviewed the president,

members of the leadership and peasants who stayed in the co-operatives but also those who had left and then compared the reasons for leaving the institution given by the various individuals.

7 Patterns of research

The same pattern of research was followed concerning government development strategies and associated policies, destabilisation and aid. Concepts, theories and practical experiences were studied. In terms of development, theoretical work and experiences of countries in a situation similar to Mozambique and of other alternatives were studied through the literature. These issues were also dealt with in seminars and courses held as part of the PhD program and in the institution to which I was linked in Gothenburg, the Peace and Development Research Institute, PADRIGU. As far as aid is concerned I had to rely more on the general and specific literature. No systematic approach to its effects and influences was developed on the courses or in any seminar. References were made to aid and its relationship to development specifically on a Methodology course at Roskilde University Centre (RUC).

These three themes were also investigated specifically for Mozambique - the development strategies applied in Mozambique, the evolution of aid and the opposition to the post-colonial government and its policies.

8 The complementarity of different information sources

Written reports, for example, presented the internal organisation of an institution (e.g. co-operatives) in a certain way, while our observation showed that the co-operative's real internal organisation was different. These contradictions were put to the informants.

Only an in-depth inquiry over a long time period and a confrontation of different sources has made it possible to show the contradictions between different social classes and groups, the results of the development projects, the effects of certain policies, the nature of "destabilisation".

9 Selection of field work sites

The four locations chosen for field work and as case studies were selected taking into consideration the following criteria in each area: i) the type of political economy, ii) the existing development projects, iii) security and practical conditions of access, and iv) my previous knowledge.

The district cases were used in conjunction with the general portrait of each theme which was constructed with information obtained at central government level.

My field work (actual travel to and interviewing in the area of the district) has been limited to three areas - Sabié, Mueda and Boane. My work in Boane began in 1987 and I have continued to work continuously there. During the period of my writing in Denmark I returned to the district. The district which can be considered as new in terms of field work is Sabié where I only returned in 1991. I had worked previously in Sabié in 1974-1975, in research brigades from the History department.

Sabié has special characteristics so far as war and defence are concerned. On site in the district I worked for a period of eight days. Mueda is a district where my fieldwork started in 1979 and has continued ever since. My last visit was in 1992. Fieldwork in Changara, especially in N'Temangau, was not possible to organise for various reasons, particularly security. But from 1984 onwards I have been monitoring the situation in the district collecting data available in various ministries and aid organisations. In 1988 I visited Tete where I interviewed some of the staff involved in the N'Temangau project. I have collected reports on the evolution of the Changara project up to its closure in 1991. In 1993, I made a brief visit to Changara.

To do my fieldwork in the districts I worked under a CEA Oral History project [35] and other short-term commissioned research projects. The research strategy followed in these four cases has been one of building a base of information about the history and the political economy of the regions in the post-colonial period so as to make possible an understanding of the various social, economic and cultural processes.

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[35] I have used data gathered by other researchers working under Centre for African Studies projects. The projects are referred in notes in each chapter. I have tried in each case to quote the project, the researchers involved and the particular individual involved in making a specific interview. In collective projects done under the auspices of a research institution the attribution of the data and interviews is sometimes a difficult task. I do apologise for any involuntary misquotations and non recognition of some material. The data collected by myself used in this writing also come from different projects. I have re-analysed the material which I collected in different periods for this thesis.

10 Ego-history

My analysis covers a period and a geographical space in which I have lived. The analysis of post-colonial development in Mozambique involves institutions in which I have worked or by which I have been personally influenced.

My own experience is one of the sources of information that, overtly or covertly, has conditioned my analysis. I have been a member of FRELIMO since 1972. Before independence, as a journalist from 1974 to 1978, and later as a researcher, I have participated in debates on the policies I am analysing, and in their implementation.

As a Mozambican intellectual, I have followed or participated in the debates. My own social condition and my own idea of Mozambique are part and parcel of the work and analysis I have produced.

The choice of the research theme "The relation between aid, destabilisation and government policies" is related to my values, to what my idea of good is. In a way it is an inquiry about self-sustained development and participatory social change which is capable of creating common ground for work and transformation.

An analysis of development, destabilisation and aid is a political and politically motivated activity. I do not believe there is any such thing as value-free analysis or social science. My values are of a just society, of participation by every citizen in the definition of the political system where he/she is going to live, of social justice and rule of law.

What has moved me to select the present theme is the research which I had already been doing, the need to integrate my analysis in order to explain the post-colonial situation in Mozambique in a way that the explanation is as near to reality as possible.

11 Conclusions

Research is a process of collecting information, and the aim of any methodology is to allow a systematic collection of relevant information in a short period of time. Data collection is a process of permanent dialogue between the researcher and his/her sources. This dialogue and the flow of information depends on inter-action between the researcher and his/her subject. In the case of informants, respect for their views, sensibility to their needs, the desire to

understand their actions as the best response in a given situation has allowed for the maximisation of results.

Rather than being a straightjacket, a ritual, a formula, a recipe or a check-list of research tasks and procedures, the methodologies applied showed the constant inter-action between differing phases and procedures. The research object in some cases had to be changed because the collection of data showed that the problem had been wrongly chosen (e.g. studying state farms or state support for peasants in a region where this was non-existent).

The explanation of the practical implications of the research done and its importance for those involved on the other side as objects or informants has helped me carry out research tasks, has given a social role to the research and has created a more balanced relation between researcher and "researched".

I have tried to follow the recommendations of C. Wright Mills in The Sociological Imagination: **"Be a good artisan (...) That each man be his own methodologist"**[36]

[36] Mills: 1959:224.

CHAPTER THREE

An iconoclastic history of post-colonial Mozambique: A review of the literature

1 Introduction

The main argument of this chapter refers to the relationship between the literature on post-colonial Mozambique and the founding and evolution myths of the Revolutionary Nationalists. The latter enjoyed hegemony in the organisation that waged the liberation war and became the party in power in the post-colonial period, the Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO.[1] Although a growing number of authors have produced analyses delving behind the self-portrait of the holders of state power, some influence of the nationalists' accounts of themselves lingers on in the alternative accounts. The paradox of some of the literature on post-colonial Mozambique (from friends and foes alike) is that the legitimating discourse of the party in power and of the hegemonic group inside it still finds a niche in the analyses. The foundation and development myths of FRELIMO have been reproduced in full or have permeated the analysis, even of those attempting to look behind the nationalist discourse or the image that holders of state power try to give of themselves.

An iconoclastic approach, which can define its own analytical parameters, is needed because "to understand nationalism as an historical reality it is essential to step outside the history that nationalism (and revolutionary nationalism-YA) gives to itself".[2] A certain duality has been present in some of the analyses of contemporary Mozambican history. Questions are continually asked about the outside influence in the articulation of counter revolution but similar questions have been more or less set aside in the analysis of the revolution and the armed struggle. Peasant actions against the colonial state were regarded as acts of resistance but the same type of action against the post colonial state were not even mentioned, let alone treated as resistance.

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[1] For the development of these themes see Apter: 1987:295-322. See also a critique of nationalist historiography in India by Kaviraj: 1992 and Guha: 1992. Discipline and mobilise, the watchwords of the Congress Party of India were also extensively used by FRELIMO.

[2] Kaviraj: 1992: 1.

FRELIMO's account of its own history falls into the trap that rulers always fall into when they write their own histories isolated from the social and political context. "The party becomes an entity in itself which directs and conditions the evolution of the entire society." [3] The Central Committee report to the Sixth FRELIMO Congress illustrates this point extremely well since the organisation takes credit for most of the changes occurring in the country's post-colonial history. "Once more, FRELIMO is the subject and driving force in the process of transformation, once more it is fundamentally in FRELIMO that we find the origin of the changes."[4] This type of analysis makes a mockery of the Gramscian maxim that to write a history of a political party is to write the history of the society of which it is a component from a particular monographic standpoint. In other words, "no history of a communist party is finally intelligible unless it is constantly related to the national balance of forces of which the party is one moment and which forms the context in which it must operate" [5]

This chapter analyses the various approaches within the literature on post-colonial Mozambique.[6] It tries to throw light upon and question the nationalist myths reproduced in full by the outside influence approach, and queried by those trying to produce an analysis of the contradictions of post-colonial development, of the inconsistencies of the policies adopted and of the myths of the discourses and analyses.

Gervase Clarence Smith, reviewing the book edited by Peter Meyns on agricultural development in post-colonial Portuguese speaking Africa, and Cahen's book on post-colonial development in Mozambique,[7] stated that these "pointed to a paradigm shift in the analysis of the Mozambican crisis. RENAMO and South African destabilisation used to be placed at the root of the problem. Now the emphasis has shifted to a focus on FRELIMO's Agrarian Policies".[8]

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3 Adam; Depelchin and Littlejohn: 1983: 1.

4 FRELIMO: 1991:8.

5 Anderson: 1981: 148.

6 I have been inspired by Mats Friberg VETA Method to understand existing analysis on Mozambique. Friberg argues that any social science analysis depends on four vectors - the Values and Visions (V) of the analyst, the aims and objectives of his/her work (A), the theory or theories adopted (T) and the empirical facts that have been considered (E). Friberg spelled out his method in courses on Methodology given at the Peace and Development Research Institute (PADRIGU) at the University of Gothenburg. For a written account see Friberg: 1986.

7 Meyns: 1988; Cahen: 1987 and 1988.

8 Clarence-Smith: 1989b:5. In an interview with Pietro Petrucci in 1974, Samora Machel said that FRELIMO's triumph and the implantation of socialism in Mozambique were the result of the ideological concerns of FRELIMO from the beginning. The First Thesis to the Third Congress of FRELIMO makes the same argument. The impact of the Nkomati Accord on FRELIMO's "compagnons de route" is illustrated by the fate of a title of a book about contemporary Mozambique. The Accord,

Clarence Smith's analysis and theorising is a good example of what Watts has described as "theory shaping facts".[9] The multi-faceted crisis of post-independence Mozambique and the complexities of the country's history have been reduced to agrarian policies. "The problems of today lie mainly in the terrible logic of villagisation policy as it developed in Independent Mozambique". Clarence Smith's review article provoked a long list of replies in the subsequent numbers of Southern African Review of Books (SARB). Researchers and analysts on Mozambique came to the fore to question Clarence Smith's assertion that villagisation was the root cause of destabilisation and to reaffirm that RENAMO and UNITA had South African backing. The exchanges showed that researchers on Mozambique had different perceptions and interpretations of the phenomenon called destabilisation and that differences existed as to which of the factors, internal or external, were more important in explaining post-colonial Mozambique.

Most writing on post-colonial Mozambique takes only a narrow look at the complexity of the country. Multi-faceted historical processes, their causes and consequences are reduced to a single factor, or shrunk into the post-independence period. Everything is supposed to have begun with the creation of FRELIMO in 1962 or with Independence in 1975.

A blurred picture is conveyed, which only partially explains what happened between 1975 and 1990. The approaches used can best be described as a continuum running between two extreme poles. The two opposing poles differ on the basis of the weight given to internal factors (which henceforth will be referred to as the Internal Contradictions approach) or external factors (referred as the Outside Influence approach). This is not to say that analysts do not mention or take into account internal or external factors but, when the time for balance comes, either "destabilisation" or "state socialism" gets the blame for the havoc.

In between these two opposing views, the middle ground is held by attempts to relate external and internal factors. How does one go about it ? Can the problem be solved by just advocating a cocktail of internal and

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signed between Mozambique and South Africa on 16 March 1984, led to a sharp change in the book's very name. Up until that date its title was "Mozambique: an original road to socialism". But when published in 1985 it had a post Nkomati title: Mozambique: a Difficult Road (Saul: 1985). Braganca and Depelchin: 1986 show in "De la idealisation de La Histoire de FRELIMO" how compagnons de route of FRELIMO, such as John Saul: 1985, through their solidarity stance contribute to myth formation. This chapter tries to develop further the debate reported by Bragança and Depelchin: 1986. Already in 1981, Roger Leys: 1981 showed the double sidedness of the approach of John Saul to Mozambique. When analysing the state in Eastern Africa he referred to the nature of state, its class basis, its policies. But when analysing Mozambique Saul dropped his early approach and entered into an apology for existing options.

9 Watts, cited in Taylor and Mackenzie: 1992:9.

external causes, or should we abandon the whole internal/external dichotomy and identify, in each specific case, the various factors which are present?

The divide between those who explain the development results of Mozambique by external or by internal factors is not political. Marxists, revolutionaries, liberals, sympathisers of RENAMO can be found on both extremes. What divides them is their position towards the nationalist discourse, its origins and development.

2 The outside influence approach

Two versions of this approach, which I have labelled the Imperialist Siege and the Communist Coup approaches, can be distinguished. The former holds that imperialism can explain the counter revolution. The latter attributes the changes to the holding of state power by self-proclaimed communists or marxist-leninists.

The Imperialist Siege approach claims that there is a direct relationship between the post-colonial situation in Mozambique and a deliberate western attempt to punish the government for its policies and development options. For those who subscribe to this line of argument, the socialist project was showing results but was undermined by a South African-Western siege or boycott. Measures ranged from trade embargoes to military actions by "armed bandits", who were described as an "instrument created, supported and directed" by international imperialist powers and their regional representatives. The following quotation illustrates masterfully the argument which reduces the post-colonial history of Mozambique to an imperialist conspiracy:

> "(...) Why should a destabilisation operation, planned and directed from abroad, which serves exclusively the strategic interests of another state (a state whose policies were declared a crime by the international community) and an organisation which has no national project of its own, suddenly be elevated to the status of a national legitimate political actor?"[10]

The "Communist Coup" scholars explain post-colonial developments in Mozambique as a result of a "communist take-over". An international communist conspiracy created a regime dependent on Moscow. Mozambique's post-colonial government was a communist regime without legitimacy. This is reflected in the economic results. The repression of the masses and the development options were imposed by a communist clique

[10] Ohlsson: 1989a.

linked to Moscow, defending an "undemocratic project dictated by an alien Marxist Leninist ideology and introduced by Mozambique's FRELIMO government". The Soviet influence created chaos.[11]

Given their conflicting ideological foundations, the "Imperialist Siege" and the "Communist Coup" approaches make uneasy bedfellows. But their emphasis on the importance of outside factors to explain post-colonial developments unites them.

This type of "blame attributing schemata"[12] overvalues outside factors such as imperialism/apartheid or revolution/socialism and reduces internal forces and actors to mere agents or proxies. It a priori de-legitimises one of the contenders and justifies and confers legitimacy on the official political positions of the side the analyst supports. It shows an inability to differentiate between political discourse and reality, and considers the government as a homogeneous block containing no cleavages, no differing political projects.

Four themes are present in most of the literature on Mozambique, and illustrate the continuation of nationalist myths in the analysis of the post-colonial period:

- the backward character of Portuguese colonialism
- the unique nature of FRELIMO
- the unity and discipline of the leadership
- foreign influences

2.1 Portuguese colonialism

The uniqueness of Portuguese colonialism (its backwardness), of FRELIMO as an organisation (a front that promoted unity and was different both from previous nationalist parties and from the colonial state) and of FRELIMO's leadership (strict moral standards, self-sacrificing) are the building blocs of nationalist historiography of post-colonial Mozambique and of the official history. These myths try to portray FRELIMO as a supra-class organisation, composed of disciplined leaders, and as the only truly nationalist organisation, which struggled for the common good of the whole nation. It was a future-oriented and forward-looking party which thus created progress. It was not involved in petty politics and its leaders, unlike the leaders of earlier movements, did not put their hands in the till and were a disciplined and united lot. The nature of Portuguese colonialism, "a colonial

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[11] Hoile: 1989: 11,20,23.

[12] As it is used by Moscovici: 1991. The arguments against conspiracy theory have been drawn from Moscovici and Kruglansky (ed): 1991.

system of an extreme variant"[13], has been regarded as an explanatory factor for post-independence development performance, because it gave FRELIMO and Mozambique in 1974 comparatively low advantages in terms of cadres, infrastructures, and capacity to engage in post-colonial reconstruction. Distorted development due to colonialism is as evident in Mozambique as elsewhere.

Portuguese rule was not fundamentally different from British, French, Belgian or any other colonialism. Differences can be distinguished, but an emphasis on particularities can lead us away from what characterises a colonial situation. Colonial systems, in any given time and space, are maintained on the same basis: denial of access by the colonised group to political power. Portuguese colonialism had the characteristics both of direct and indirect rule. It was grounded in a process (like any other colonial system) that barred access to political power for the colonised population and based its economic strategies on the exploitation of cheap labour provided by the majority of the population. To maintain its rule, Portuguese colonialism used a mixture of coercion and co-opting.[14] The theories developed around the unique character of Portuguese Colonisation have given weight to myths and have been unable to capture the contradictory character of Portuguese rule. Ultra-colonialist, Un-economic imperialism, Luso-Tropicalism - these are characterisations which do not reflect the nature of Portuguese colonialism.[15] To conclude: Portuguese colonial policies were constantly influenced by other colonial practices (French and British). Despite manifest differences among colonial bureaucrats on the type of policies to be adopted, colonial policies were guided towards maintaining separation between those who had full citizenship rights (Portuguese and white) and those who did not (colonised and non-white). This did not prevent the growth of social differentiation among the colonised. Social groups were co-opted by the colonial power and became part of the state apparatus with a stake in the preservation of the colonial system. An educated elite (albeit limited in numbers) emerged and was interested in gaining full political rights. [16]

Colonial policies were beneficial for the ruling class, which was mainly constituted by the colonial bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. Colonised groups which had the same class interests as the colonial groups were pushed into a subordinate position on the basis of race.[17] This created a

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[13] Brochmann and Offstad: 1990: 1. For a Portuguese analysis of Mozambican economy and its distortions, see Anon.: 1967; Anon.: 1973; Santareno: 1973; Mosca: 1989; and Leite: 1990; Leite: 1991a and Leite: 1991b.

[14] Adam: 1986; Adam: 1992.

[15] Leite: 1991b; Felle: 1964.

[16] See R.B.Honwana: 1985, 1986 and R.B.Honwana and Nhaca: 1982.

[17] Adam: 1986; Wuyts: 1981; Honwana: 1978.

sense of denial which the Mozambican nationalist movement tried to redress by struggling for independence.[18]

2.2 FRELIMO

The unique character of FRELIMO's foundation and development, the political and ideological discourse of FRELIMO about its origins and its ideology, "which developed through a protracted internal political struggle while it was waging a military and political struggle for liberation",[19] has attained the status of conventional wisdom. It has perpetuated the foundation and development myths of the Mozambique Liberation Front.[20]

Revolutions are complex phenomena which cannot be ascribed to just one factor.[21] Many elements, such as the nature of the existing regime, the types of policies, the social structure, the denial of social mobility, the world system and the nature and strategies of the revolutionary movement have to be considered, if one wants to remove one's analysis from the rewriting of history by the victors, who present themselves as the messiahs ("we won because our struggle was just", "the correctness of our line", "we represented the people")[22], or by the losers (who speak of "betrayals" or "international conspiracies").[23]

Various efforts have been made to write a critical history of FRELIMO, deleting the myths created by the official renderings of the Party's history or by the solidarity approach.[24] A new wave of critical analysis of FRELIMO and Mozambique was sparked off by the changes in Mozambique's foreign policy in 1984 i.e. the signing of the Nkomati Accord with South Africa and the changes in development options.[25] The discourse of delusion, although it illuminates motives and values behind earlier analyses, is not sufficient to allow a more scientific reconstruction of the past. It shows a need for more research into some of the questions pertaining to the Mozambican

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18 See Penvenne: 1990 and 1992 for anti-colonial struggles.

19 Rosberg and Calaghy: 1979: 10

20 FRELIMO: 1977c. See also Manslow: 1983.

21 Galtung: 1975.

22 FRELIMO: 1977b.

23 Spínola: 1978.

24 Adam and Jose: 1988; Bragança and Depelchin: 1986; Alpers: 1978; Opello: 1977; Cahen: 1987:7.

25 For an overview of the treatment of opposition and dissent in the "states of real existing socialism" see Claudin: 1975. For an overview of FRELIMO's analysis of opposition see FRELIMO: 1977b.

Revolution, and for interpretations that guard against the ideology of the social actors themselves and their self-serving interpretations.

Despite efforts to put the record straight, key issues in the contemporary history of Mozambique are still presented as stated in the official record. The following examples help to illustrate the party's mythological renderings of its own history: (a) FRELIMO's foundation in 1962 as a unification of three pre-existing parties, (b) A party called a Front; (c) The struggle between the two lines: From nationalism to revolutionary nationalism; (d) the military victory against the Portuguese army.

The account produced in the official chronicles and in subsequent work helps to perpetuate the legitimising myths of FRELIMO: i) FRELIMO was a party which united all Mozambicans and genuine nationalist organisations, ii) the adoption of Marxism was rooted in the popular will and developed during the struggle for national liberation, iii) the options taken were adequate to the situation and helped win the war, expel the colonialists and gain independence.

A teleology is evident in FRELIMO's slogans regarding the war of Liberation: we won because our struggle was just, because our line was correct. Let us confront the differing interpretations with the historic record.

The story that FRELIMO resulted from a merger of previous parties does not correspond to reality[26]. The fusion of three pre-existing parties into a Front is a myth that derives from an analysis which confuses the process of institutionalisation with the institution created. By presenting the foundation of FRELIMO as a merger of pre-existing parties, the official version tries to foster an idea of continuity between earlier nationalist organisations and FRELIMO.[27]

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[26] The sources used for my reconstruction of the early phase of FRELIMO's development are: For MANU: oral interviews in the Mueda District, Mandanda: 1974; Mmole and Mallinga: 1962; Archival material on the Mueda Massacre. For UNAMI, Letter from Chagonga to Mondlane: 1962; Coelho: 1984; Costa: 1989. For UDENAMO, Constitution: 1962; Bucuane and Chambal: 1986; Chilcote: 1972c; Marcum: 1969; Opello: 1977. Struggles in the foundation of FRELIMO: Mmole; Gwambe and Sigaúke: 1963; Gwambe: 1963; Gwambe; Mmole and Sigaúke: 1963, Gumane: 1965. The documents quoted are those available in book form (Chilcote: 1972b). I have worked with a microfilm of the Chilcote Collection offered by the author when we met in 1983. Documents of the Mário de Andrade Collection have been published by the CEA in mimeo (Andrade and Reis: 1985). Insights about the period were also brought by exchanges with Mário de Andrade, who animated a course in Mozambique in 1985 and Aquino de Bragança. These two sources have been fundamental to cast light on some documents and events. According to Andrade and Braganca, MANU was newer present at the Commons Conference in 1961 because its representative newer arrived (contrary to Marcum's: 1969). The similitude between the constitution of UDENAMO and FRELIMO does not prove that UDENAMO's ideological standpoint was transferred to FRELIMO as argued by Alpers: 1978; because UDENAMO's constitution was written by Marcelino dos Santos.

[27] FRELIMO: 1975a:39,40

The establishment of FRELIMO in 1962 is a process of the creation of a new nationalist party in Mozambique. In its institutionalisation a method was adopted through which previous organisations ceased to exist. FRELIMO was a new organisation, with its own rules and agenda. Although the existing nationalist parties (MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI) agreed to join the new party, disagreements soon surfaced and the leadership of all of them left FRELIMO and tried to establish organisations of their own. There were differences between the nationalist parties on issues such as: the nature of the independence struggle, strategies and tactics to adopt, the future outlook of post-colonial Mozambique. The differences could not be reduced to the quest of individual leaders of earlier parties for positions of power. The contradictions which erupted during the formation of FRELIMO had a social basis and were prevalent among the nationalist elite. A Mozambican student body characterised the situation: "It is evident that the perspectives of those who formed the front were quite diverse and conditioned by several conjunctural factors; however, there was enough room for the accommodation of at least the principal interests of each group, which are of prime importance to the country as whole." [28]

2.3 The FRELIMO leadership

During the creation of FRELIMO, the leaders of UDENAMO, MANU and UNAMI were removed from their positions of power. FRELIMO became the party of the nationalists who were dissatisfied with existing organisations and were trying to find ways and means to struggle for independence. The "fusion" was much more an expression of the will of nationalist leaders to create unity and transform the reality of Mozambican nationalism, which in the sixties was very fragile, without any well established party, beset by internal divisions, faction fighting, and the quest of individuals for leadership positions.

The strategy of "unification" nevertheless paid some dividends for FRELIMO organisers: i) it allowed militants from these parties to join FRELIMO; ii) contradictions between the leaders of the earlier parties and their members were publicly revealed, and sharpened; iii) the general incapacity of the early nationalist leaders to wage a struggle against the Portuguese and their corruption were put on public display; iv) the intervention in by Ghana and Egypt in the affairs of Mozambican nationalism was reduced. [29] (The leaders of UDENAMO had close contacts with Ghanaian government officials and were willing to implement Ghanaian recipes for the liberation of Africa.) The role of Tanzania as a rear base was

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[28] UNEMO declaration in Chilcote collection. Chilcote: 1972b.

[29] M.Santos: 1984.

consolidated, and the possibility of organising against FRELIMO amongst workers and refugees reduced; v) the new political party was legitimised as a mass based, unity promoting institution.

The new party emerged with a double legitimacy - as a single and unity promoting organisation. It practised what it preached. Everyone could be a patriot, regardless of colour, sex, religion, class, and part of a single party. Aquino de Bragança used to say that "FRELIMO although called a Front was a Movement". And fronts do not necessarily involve an end to previously existing parties. A Front's political program shows an agreement between different parties.

When founded in 1962, FRELIMO was a party with clear ideological commitments at the level of its leadership due to its political praxis in the international revolutionary milieu and in the interior of Mozambique. On paper, the parties which existed before FRELIMO (UDENAMO, UNAMI and MANU) ceased to exist, giving birth to the new party called a "Front". The documents approved at FRELIMO's first congress were very carefully drafted. A symbiosis is achieved through blending a simple nationalist struggle for independence is blended with the accomplishment of the first phase of a revolution: the completion of the phase of national and democratic struggle. FRELIMO's 1962 constitution stated that the "structure of FRELIMO is based on Democratic Centralism". Right from the beginning FRELIMO included in its praxis elements similar to labour, communist or liberation movement practices.[30] These features became the distinctive pattern of FRELIMO vis a vis the other nationalist parties in Mozambique and elsewhere on the continent.[31] These elements were: democratic centralism, respect for decisions taken collectively, respect for the leadership and hierarchy; mythical belief in the need for awareness, training and mobilisation; a need to be united and to be constantly grounded in the majority of the population; a need for support from all quarters of the international community regardless of their ideology or political position.[32]

The practices listed above consolidated the hegemony of the revolutionary nationalists in the FRELIMO leadership group and institutionalised their supremacy within the organisation. They had a higher rank in social terms (more educated, had directed other organisations, had links to international organisations)[33].

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30 Reis and Muiuane: 1975.

31 M.Santos: 1984.

32 For an analysis of political mobilisation during the armed national liberation struggle, see Chabal: 1983: 190,191.

33 Andrade and Reis: 1985.

The name of the new party in itself shows the political skills and analysis of the situation in the country. A Front was open to all, independent of race, class, sex, language. The main task was to end Portuguese rule and obtain independence, using all forms of struggle, including armed struggle. At that time for many nationalists it was the only solution for independence.

An alternative to the existing struggles in Africa was formulated by the FRELIMO leadership as the "struggle for the total end of colonialism". It meant the negation of colonial development and political practices.[34] But due to the specific situation of Mozambique in that period, and to the nature of the rural communities in the areas targeted for launching the armed struggle, the FRELIMO leadership had to manage its hegemony by consolidating relations with its popular base, without which it ran the risk of its erstwhile supporters "voting with their feet".[35] The organisational effort was mainly directed at the Mozambican interior to pave the way for the start of the armed struggle. In Tanzania, in the areas where Mozambican workers were concentrated, a mobilisation process was also carried out to eliminate the confusion created by other parties and to popularise FRELIMO's options: protracted war, unity. The campaign was also directed to the exterior in order to reduce the impact of propaganda by UDENAMO, MANU and others who were trying to carve a personal niche by playing with issues then dominant in African and International politics: the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Egyptian and Ghanaian quests for African Leadership, etc.[36]

FRELIMO's early success has been presented as a result of the enlightenment of its leadership. The 1968/69 changes inside FRELIMO have been presented in FRELIMO's own accounts[37] and by analysts[38] as a change in FRELIMO's class nature. This is supposed to have changed from domination by petty bourgeois elements to representatives of revolutionary intellectuals, workers and peasants. The struggle between the two lines is presented as a watershed in FRELIMO's political history. It is said to mark the triumph of the revolutionary line over the nationalist line. The FRELIMO second congress formalised the transformation of the organisation's political line from a nationalist outlook to a revolutionary nationalist strategy.[39] The agenda was no longer simply anti-colonial: it was a revolutionary agenda which included the rudiments of socialism: the end of exploitation of man by man and the creation of the New Man.

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34 Andrade: 1973.

35 M.Santos: 1984.

36 M.Santos: 1984.

37 FRELIMO: 1977a.

38 Saul: 1973.

39 FRELIMO: 1975b:53-63.

The organisation's class basis, ideology and political praxis are reported to have changed. The reality of the liberated zones did not show such changes in FRELIMO's ideology and class basis. According to FRELIMO, contradictions between the revolutionaries and the conservatives grew over time and reached crisis point in 1968/69.[40]

It was the solution to this crisis which brought clearly forward the option for socialism. FRELIMO's account explains the transformation of its ideology as an unplanned, step by step process, which matured from the armed struggle itself. It was the peasants' attack against Nkavandame that convinced FRELIMO that its strategies had to push for revolutionary socialism.

My readings of the documentation and of declarations by FRELIMO leaders at the time[41] show that FRELIMO was concerned with ideological questions right from the start, although it refused to discuss them in public. It was believed that a national liberation movement could not triumph if the struggle for Independence was not at the same time a struggle for socialism.[42]

The triumph of the revolutionary line and the ousting of individuals struggling for the regional independence of Cabo Delgado, the expulsion of Simango, who was the FRELIMO deputy president, and FRELIMO's condemnation of racism, sexism, regionalism and tribalism among its ranks, did not end these practices. Not all the individuals defending the values that the revolutionary line was opposing were expelled.

2.4 The liberation war

The result of the war against Portuguese Colonialism is seen in FRELIMO's account as a victory. If one judges the results of the war as the independence of Mozambique, it was indeed a victory. But if one considers the military balance, the impact of the war and the territorial presence of FRELIMO forces, the panorama becomes more nuanced.

The type of struggle conducted by FRELIMO from 1964 to 1974 was much more intended to stretch the colonial army and institutions to breaking point then to control territory.[43] FRELIMO controlled limited areas of the

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40 FRELIMO: 1970; FRELIMO: 1975b:91-94.

41 Machel: 1974.

42 FRELIMO: 1977c.

43 FRELIMO: 1975a.

country, basically in the northern provinces of Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Tete. The level of transformation varied from region to region, depending on the security situation and on the capacity of FRELIMO's armed forces to contain Portuguese military attacks. The only area where social transformations advocated by FRELIMO were being put into practice was the Mueda region near the border with Tanzania. A good indicator of FRELIMO's implantation is the level of development of co-operatives. In Cabo Delgado there were co-operatives constituted almost from the beginning of the war, functioning with varying degrees of efficiency and with different types of organisation. In Niassa they were practically non existent until the end of the war. In Tete they were at a very initial stage in 1974. In other areas they did not exist.

FRELIMO's organisation and presence in Mozambique as a whole can be easily mystified. Various forms of presence coexisted: linkages to individual nationalists, reconnaissance and propaganda units controlled from Dar-es-Salaam, and "subversive units". In 1971, Kaúlza de Arriaga was already worried by FRELIMO's support network. According to him "elements of the (white population groups), in Tete, (...) collaborate with the enemy". He was also worried because "in the remaining populations of colour, particularly in towns and the surrounding areas, the degree of subversive contamination has grown in depth and extension".[44]

But this organisational set-up was quite fragile due to the war. It was over-extended and gave rise to local commanders and leaders taking matters into their own hands, regardless of official policy. Contact with FRELIMO militants in the colonial capital, Lourenço Marques, was rather difficult. Poor communications also hindered a thorough assessment of the situation in the whole of the territory. Security rules had to be maintained. On the same day that the 25 April 1974 coup took place in Lisbon, FRELIMO militants in Lourenço Marques were receiving the envoy whom they had sent to contact FRELIMO in Switzerland.[45] But after the April coup FRELIMO was nevertheless the organisation which had widespread support all over country. This support had to do more with the significance of FRELIMO activities for the fall of the colonial system than with its political values and organisational activities inside Mozambique.

To sum up, the movement's self-portrait led to an overvaluation of the "socialist transformations" that its own struggle promoted. Widespread support for national liberation and independence was interpreted as support for socialism.

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[44] Arriaga: 1971, In: Antunes: 1975: 119; Jardim: 1976; Melo: 1969; Swift: 1974.

[45] Silva: 1986.

Two main questions arise from the previous analysis: Was FRELIMO's praxis during the armed struggle tactical or strategic? Was it a utopia or a public agenda for obtaining support and solidarity? It was all of this. The FRELIMO leadership during the liberation war, after examining its own experience and the results of the actions undertaken in the rural areas concluded that: i) Political and development options had to respond to the needs of the various social groups present; ii) A purely military approach to problems of war and society would not allow for the development of an alternative political system.

These two elements were present to such an extent in the organisation that they constituted its basic credo or ideology. But the praxis in the Liberated Zones was far removed from the ideology.

The analysis of Mozambican reality used to justify and plan the development strategies of post-colonial Mozambique was faulty. It was based on a simplified reading of Portuguese Colonialism in Mozambique and its treatment of the colonised population. Although denying the colonised access to political power colonialism permitted social mobility, albeit limited. The FRELIMO leadership believed that Portuguese colonialism had not allowed the formation of national propertied classes. [46] There was a complete disregard for social groups whose political projects were different from that of the revolutionary nationalists. [47] An erroneous belief emerged in the correlation between popular support for independence and opposition to colonialism and support for FRELIMO's development policies. Independence enjoyed support because it removed colonial barriers and this had different meanings for different groups. For a peasant producer, independence meant not only the elimination of forced cultivation and forced labour, but also better agricultural prices and access to land. The assessment of the liberation struggle overvalued the extent of the transformations inside FRELIMO and in the areas which it controlled. The limited changes which FRELIMO had brought about in the Liberated Zones were regarded as a definite example of socialism. FRELIMO was treating regions with differing political processes (those which had been subjected to the armed struggle, those inhabited by the population controlled by FRELIMO and those controlled by the Portuguese) in the same way. Regions where the armed struggle and subsequent transformations had taken place were put on the same level as regions untouched by the guerrilla war.

FRELIMO, and those analysts who reproduce FRELIMO sources uncritically, regard Mozambican Independence as the result of a military take-over by the National Liberation Movement. FRELIMO as a revolutionary

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[46] Adam: 1986.

[47] Machel: 1983b.

movement was a factor in bringing about change. But the revolution occurred because there were other structural conditions in colonial society which allowed the revolution to take place. [48]

Marxist Leninist parties, liberation movements and social democratic parties all represent a "variant of a single strategy: the seizure of state power by a party claiming to incarnate popular will and using state power to develop the country". [49]

FRELIMO's actions after independence and its adoption of marxist-leninist ideology and a socialist development model validates this assertion of Wallerstein. Socialism in Mozambique is the result of FRELIMO's accession to power and a strategy through which the party thought the popular will would be satisfied - a change of the colonial system and the building of a radically different alternative. This alternative praxis during the war was not based on "faith in equality via growth".[50] Even if the faith and dreams were there, they were totally anachronistic.

The strategy used by Socialist, Social Democratic and National Liberation parties to take state power is different from the one they use to maintain it. The margin for manoeuvre to implement the politics of representation was limited by the war itself which forced a resort to people's participation. During the Liberation War, FRELIMO used a mixed legitimating strategy which consisted in alternative forms of power organisation and political practice coupled with the use of force. The party structures were built and functioned in such a way that all social forces could participate. The party was not the incarnation of the popular will, but people were inside the party structures and participated in the decision making. Probably this was neither the will nor the strategy of the leaders, but the logic of the struggle for power in the capitalist system obliged them to follow this path. They were too fragile to follow Brecht's suggestion for rulers facing upstart masses: "dissolve the people and elect a new one". During the period of fighting for state power they could not do this, but with the reins of power in their hands they could try.

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[48] Galtung: 1974.

[49] Wallerstein: 1989b. My quotes are from a previous formulation of the paper, a mimeo from Fernand Braudel Centre. The formulation of the published version (Wallerstein: 1992: 104-124) is different.

[50] Wallerstein: 1992: 123.

2.5 Post-liberation

One of the myths which gained acceptance was that of a united and disciplined nationalist leadership. FRELIMO rejected a key Leninist dictum on the political party (broad exchange of perspectives and a battle of rival positions) as a strategy of control and not, as Mittelman argues, "because of attempts of external forces to discredit and divide independent Mozambique (...) different currents simply have not formed (...) a centrist FRELIMO position and collective leadership exists today, since sharp differences were resolved in the turbulent pre-independence years".[51] Schisms and different points of view were kept in check by the leadership through a disciplinary stance. Changes in the political system, after 1990, which recognise the right to free speech have allowed public expression of dissent.

This stance (the denial of public expression of differences) gave the leadership the monopoly of information and of the public image it wanted to give, and which is conveyed by analysts like Mittelman.[52]

In 1991, disagreements were openly expressed by State officials, once considered part of a political establishment free of schisms. They had different explanations for failures just as they had different policy proposals for development. Discipline was maintained by the idea of "democratic centralism" and the image created of a party functioning with an internal democracy. Three explanations for what happened in the post-colonial period (which also contain the ideas that those producing the accounts presented at the time) can be identified.[53] The most dominant is the triumphalist explanation, deriving from the party and state leadership, which argues that the model implemented from 1977 onwards was functioning and there was considerable growth in the economy. The model went into crisis not because of internal contradictions nor to its inadequacy. Difficulties were created by external aggression, by South African and Western boycotts and by adverse climatic conditions (droughts, floods). 1981 and 1982 were the best years since independence and showed a considerable growth in the economy. The growth in 1981, regarded as the best year since independence, showed that the options were correct and could work given an "enabling environment" i.e. no external aggression. FRELIMO's development options were the only possibility for ensuring meaningful development. Due to regional (apartheid, colonialism) and world system constraints (imperialism, capitalism,

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[51] Mittelman: 1979:319

[52] Mittelman: 1979; 1988.

[53] These three explanations come from inside the government. Explanation one is the official interpretation. It is part of what J. C. Scott has called the "public transcripts or records" (Scott: 1991:87) and can be traced to existing written documents (Comissão Nacional do Plano: 1985) (Ratilal: 1990a). Explanations 2 and 3 belong to the "private record or transcript". The notion of public or private records and transcripts are J. C. Scot's. See Scott: 1987.

colonialism) and internal contradictions caused by colonialism the only way to promote meaningful development was socialism. Regional and international opposition were responsible for the problems faced. Internal opposition originated from a minority with no political programs of their own. They were infiltrators or agents of colonialism, apartheid or imperialism.[54] The official discourse or the discourse of the group which enjoyed hegemony within the party and the state is an attempt to justify the development model adopted and to blame the results on outside factors using conspiracy theories.[55]

The public discourse[56] about the development of the economy did not reflect reality. The economy had been in decline from 1974 onwards and the growth in 1981 corresponds to a supply of crude oil donated to the Mozambican government by Iraq and Algeria.[57]

The development model chosen right from the start (heavy reliance on foreign investment) would not allow a sustained growth of the economy. A similar argument was being developed inside FRELIMO and in the government by forces which during the party's Fourth Congress pushed towards the adoption of a development strategy based on small-scale projects and the capacity of the peasants.

Arguments against the publicly presented model existed both inside and outside the government. The critique of government development options (both by the minister and by the expert) is presented as not being in contradiction with the party political line - even when the proposed analysis clearly contradicts the official story, its assumptions and data. The Swedish economist Tom Alberts, at the time a "cooperante" (expatriate) in Mozambique, in an analysis of Mozambique's development options[58], argued against the official policies and choices. But Alberts' critique of Mozambique's development option is peppered with extracts from President Samora Machel's speeches in order to defend "an alternative development strategy based on the use of available labor which together with a relative abundance of land, (constitutes) Mozambique's greatest asset. To that end only minor new investments should be allocated to capital intensive development which demands high levels of administrative efficiency and a high input of human capital".[59]

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54 Comissão Nacional do Plano: 1985:41-44; Ratilal: 1990; Nilsson: 1986; Cardoso: 1986; M.Santos: 1987.

55 Moscovici: 1991: 11.

56 Comissão Nacional do Plano: 1985:20.

57 Ratilal: 1991.

58 Alberts: 1980.

59 Alberts: 1980:iii. I wish to thank Tom Alberts for the permission to quote from his draft paper.

A second set of arguments - the unsustainability of the development models - dealt with the sustainability of the economic model and the development strategies (particularly their financial aspects). The model implemented from 1975 onwards was unsustainable. "(...) Economic growth was initially financed by foreign aid and the huge differential between the official and market gold prices. After South Africa unilaterally scrapped the agreement (the gold clause)[60], growth was financed by the sale of gold reserves and by heavy borrowing and hence the accumulation of a relatively enormous debt. One can argue that if there had been no war, Mozambique would have been in better position to pay back its loans, but anyway it would have been forced to go through the Paris Club because it would have been impossible to service the debt under normal conditions as the debt ratio before rescheduling would have represented around 40 to 50 per cent of 1974 exports of goods and services valued at 1990 prices".[61] The model was bound to die a natural death due to its own contradictions.

A third argument - the copy of the Soviet development model -argues that the problem was created by copying the Soviet model and not recognising the need to implement a market economy. The economic growth of 1980 and 1981 is due to donations of oil and the resumption of normal traffic along the Beira Corridor. Production in the agricultural and industrial sector did not show noticeable levels of growth.[62]

The existence of at least three contradictory appraisals of Mozambique's post-colonial development inside the government shows that FRELIMO was not a monolith and that fundamental differences have always existed, even inside its leadership, on the type of development strategies to adopt. The narrow or restricted leadership, the Party Politburo, took the ultimate development decisions. Positions which contradicted the official line were not aired until 1985 by "responsáveis", the Mozambican political jargon for "nomenklatura". The second and third arguments wee only publicly aired after 1989 when the new constitution was already being drafted.

Members of the government with technical training had a different vision from the politicians, but the final word in decision making came from the political leaders. This type of behaviour was characteristic of the political system which defended the duty of lower level echelons to obey higher ones and their decisions. Democratic centralism as a method of work transformed

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[60] The gold clause refers to the provisions of agreements between the Portuguese and South African Government on migrant labor from Mozambique. Part of the revenues were paid to the Portuguese government in gold at fixed prices. For details see First: 1983; Leite: 1990.

[61] Osman: 1990b:4.

[62] Ratilal: 1991.

the leader's decision into a binding rule. Two of the arguments - the triumphalist one, and the market versus central planning - are openly politically motivated. They outline a development project which is presented as the solution. The argument which deals with the sustainability of the development model and with the contradictions in its formulation refers specifically to the financial backing for the development model - from domestic or foreign sources. This narrow definition of sustainability is probably to do with the profession and training of its presenter but certainly it also illustrates other dimensions of development which were not sustainable - the social, the political, the cultural, the gender and the ecological ones.

Why did the government opt for capital intensive, state centred development? Because the FRELIMO leadership believed in it, it was justifiable in terms of the needs of Mozambique, and it permitted support to be mobilised - both inside and outside the country - for the party and government project. It has been argued for the case of Guinea[63] (and sometimes extended to the other former Portuguese colonies in Africa) that the liberation movements, after taking the reins of power, applied suicidal development strategies. I do not agree with this type of argument which idealises both the armed struggle and the post-colonial situation.

In the case of post-colonial Mozambique development strategies were not suicidal for the nationalist leaders. These development options corresponded to the values of the FRELIMO leadership and to their political options and programs. The values, political projects, visions of groups other than the FRELIMO leadership were reduced to zero. To be Mozambican meant to be defender of FRELIMO's values and analyses, to be a Marxist Leninist. Revolutionary nationalists tried to engineer society in order to create the proletarians who in their opinion were the social carriers of socialism.

The theory behind FRELIMO's strategies was taken from any manual of Marxism and revolutions: to be successful a Revolution has to transform the economic base (new forms of production which negate the exploitation of man by man) and to create a superstructure. This superstructure must be wrested from the hands of the agents of the old regime. "We went directly to Justice, Health and Education (...) the essence of the superstructure. And today the Fourth power which is Information. That's why, with respect to nationalisation we did not negotiate with anyone. Here the process is irreversible."[64]

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[63] Schiefer: 1991.

[64] Machel: 1982b:56.

2.6 Foreign influences

To speak of outside influences on development options and strategies is almost a truism. In the case of post-colonial Mozambique there has been a whole spectrum of arguments to account for the external influences which conditioned change. Sanctions against the post-colonial regime have originated both from states in the region - South Africa, Rhodesia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland -, from the Portuguese state, the former colonial power, and from global powers such as the USSR and the USA. France, Britain and West Germany have also been present. It has been argued that East European aid brought foreign ideological influences which led to the corrosion of the armed struggle model, but at the same time provided material support. The west boycotted the process and the American arm twisting, Portuguese re-colonisation efforts and South African and Rhodesian intervention eliminated the possibility of implementing the development options and the correct model.

The analysis sometimes becomes simplistic when western powers or NATO governments are linked to negative sanctions (political pressures or direct interventions), while the USSR and the socialist world are linked to positive sanctions at the material level and negative ones at the ideological level --a state centred model of development, obsolete guns and military hardware.

Departure from such vulgar analyses leads one to ask why, how and to what extent these influences came into being. The values of the FRELIMO leadership were shaped by the values of international revolutionary milieu right from the foundation of the organisation.[65] Post-colonial development options also received inputs from existing development and economic growth theories in vogue.

The nature of the policies implemented has been linked to the ideological influence of existing socialist models on FRELIMO leaders and their options. Maoist influence has been referred to in the first years of Independence and Soviet influence in the period after the Third Congress.[66] The "Soviet tutelage" - Eastern Europe included - might help explain why modernisation ideology dominated, especially in agricultural policy, taking what Phil Raikes characteristically calls, "a more than unusually pure form".[67] A de facto symbiosis of colonial heritage and Eastern European state socialism led to the prevalence of "centralist and bureaucratic methods of

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[65] Jundanian: 1974; Opello: 1977:41.

[66] Serra: 1991.

[67] Egero: 1987: 184.

work, to the detriment of debate, critique and creative methods of work".[68] The argument about "Soviet Tutelage" begs some questions:

Why would a government very jealous of its sovereignty and nationalism copy a foreign model? Was this copy made because:

- the government had to accept pressures from its foreign partner to receive aid, or,
- the foreign model served the government's interests domestically, or,
- the local government, because it accepted the same assumptions, ended up by reproducing the same practices, or,
- the differing practices also reveal long lasting problems inside Marxist Theory?

The post-colonial development paradigm in Mozambique had features in common with the Soviet model (plan over market, big projects, rapid socialisation of the countryside, need to destroy the reactionaries in the bud, the role of leaders and hierarchy), in spite of the continuous struggle within FRELIMO to consider "Mozambican reality as the point of departure and the international experience as a reference".[69] Maoist concepts are also identifiable in FRELIMO's belief in the creation of the "New Man", the urbanisation of the countryside, and the elimination of the rural-urban division.

Mozambique relied heavily on cooperantes because of the scarcity of technically qualified nationals. In 1982, of the two hundred foreign staff employed by the Ministry of Agriculture and paid from the Mozambique Nordic Agricultural Program (MONAP), 28.5 per cent were Portuguese, 19 per cent were Nordic, 16.5 per cent were from other European Countries (Eastern Europe, France, Italy), 13.5 per cent Chileans, 17 per cent from other Latin American Countries and 5.5 per cent from other countries.[70]

The presence of Soviet "cooperantes" (or of any other nationality of the more than 50 present throughout the country) in the Ministry of Planning or in other areas as "advisers" would have brought some influence to bear in the choice of development strategies, but other causes have to be ascertained: i) the extent of the developmental problems of Mozambique; ii) the conviction that results had to be obtained in a short period, hence the need for a rapid and extensive development; iii) the existence of projects identified by the Portuguese government in the colonial period; iv) natural limits due to geo-ecological factors; and v) FRELIMO leadership values.

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68 Egero: 1987.

69 FRELIMO: 1978a.

70 More et al: 1990: 157.

Some of the staunchest defenders of state property in agriculture were Brazilian political refugees and the person responsible for agricultural planning between 1976/1980 was a student of Samir Amin's Institute in Dakar. The gigantic development projects planned in post colonial Mozambique are situated in areas already identified as "growth poles" in colonial development planning.[71] They were identified taking into consideration natural and ecological factors: existence of minerals, water, land.[72]

The projects and plans identified were appraised and recommended by consultants coming from different countries with varying ideological positions.

The first FAO-Nordic mission to Mozambique approved and recommended projects for farms covering up to 50,000 ha.[73] This pervasive belief in the importance of economies of scale was reinforced by the experience of the United States and other industrialised countries[74] and by the widespread belief that large, capital intensive estates are a solution to a long run dynamic of economic development through labor specialisation, capital investment, and productive innovation.

The 10 year development plan for Mozambique - Plano Prospectivo Indicativo (1980/1990) - recreated projects and activities identified by Portuguese colonial planners. The differences between the Portuguese plans and the post-colonial plans are that: 1) Portuguese plans did not contemplate the intervention of the state as the owner of economic units; 2) the targets were limited; 3) Portugal had the human resources to undertake such enterprises and financial and political support from World and Regional Powers; 4) the plans were mainly directed towards settler groups with Mozambicans included in the projects merely as stabilised labor pools.

Let me reply at this stage to the questions posed in the beginning of this section: Why would a government very jealous of its sovereignty and nationalism copy a foreign model? I do not believe that any foreign model was copied. Instead, there as a reproduction of existing practices within the limits of a Marxist development theory.

These outside influences came through various channels: i) The formation and values of FRELIMO cadres and "cooperantes", expatriate

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71 Enevoldsen: 1982.

72 Interview with Derlugian: 1992; Derlugian: 1990.

73 FAO-Nordic: 1975.

74 Johnston: 1991: 156.

advisers; ii) Part of the aid packages which FRELIMO received; iii) The model served the government's interests domestically; iv) The Mozambican government reproduced policies which were applied in other socialist transition experiments; v) The acceptance of the same assumptions ended up reproducing similar practices. Mozambique's post-colonial history does not present anything analogous to the Chinese Cultural Revolution or to the Stalinist purges, but there were other similarities: the reeducation of prostitutes and collaborators, and forced collectivisation; vi) The differing practices reveal also long lasting problems inside Marxist-Theory.

The international milieu has been both a source of negative and positive sanctions on Mozambique, and Mozambique has also intervened in the milieu. A danger exists that an analysis based on the external-internal dichotomy or on its variant of international, regional and local sanctions becomes just a more nuanced version of scapegoatism - more nuanced in that it distributes blame more rationally and equitatively.

3 The internal contradictions

A group of authors have studied concrete themes of Mozambique's post-colonial development that highlight the contradictions of state policies i. e. peasant struggles for just terms of trade, women's struggles for equal rights, land policies, development strategies, democracy and people's power. The analyses of these themes have highlighted the contradictions between public and private transcripts and have shown the contradictions of existing policies and practices.

Scientists trying to figure out the contradictions of the development policies adopted have produced a richness of empirical evidence and observations based on concrete studies which show a major weakness of state policies, of the nature of the post colonial state, and of the holders of power within it.

The post-colonial state treated peasants in a way contrary to their interests and expectations. Peasant communities were regarded as homogeneous.[75] The socio-cultural characteristics of peasant communities were not taken into consideration.[76] This led to peasant opposition, resulting in the poor performance of the development initiatives undertaken. [77]

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[75] O'Laughlin: 1981a:21.

[76] Geffray: 1990:64-66.

[77] Geffray: 1990; Casal: 1988; Adam et al: 1986; Jose et al: 1990.

Government rural development policies have revived the past: peasants became involved in the same kind of activities as at the time that colonial rule was imposed. Civil society was totally ignored.[78] People's power, which was a consistently pursued goal during the struggle for national liberation, wore away in the post colonial situation.[79]

The problems with integrating the peasantry into the post colonial development process derived from government policies. Due to the emphasis on state ownership of the means of production, capitalists and entrepreneurs (local and foreign) were marginalised in the economic development process.[80] The class alliances forged explain the development policies adopted and their failures.[81]

How did these policies come about? Emphasis has been laid on the class basis of the post colonial regime, as explaining the policies and their results. Different analysts characterise differently the classes and their importance.

These lines of argumentation try to explain development failures in reference to social classes that: i) have benefited from the development process or are directing it or; ii) which have been marginal to the political and development process.[82] The petty-bourgeoisie consolidated itself through the state it controlled.[83] FRELIMO's ideological commitments were pure rhetoric.[84]

These attempts have made a positive contribution to the understanding of Mozambique's post-colonial history by drawing our attention to policy measures adopted after independence and by illustrating the relation between the post-colonial state and society. These attempts have thrown light on the contradictions of the development strategies and have shown their complexities. Nationalist myths, now and then, have been taken on board because not enough attention has been paid to history. Generalisations, which are not grounded factually, crop up, when an attempt at political intervention is taken so far as to propose policies or to be normative without considering existing reality. Such interpretations do not have a concrete grasp on the relations between the various strata of the peasantry in particular and social classes in general, and FRELIMO.

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78 Karsholm: 1990: 14.

79 Rudebeck: 1988a:363.

80 Rudebeck: 1988b:363.

81 Hermele: 1992a, Hermele: 1990b:31; Hermele: 1989:7.

82 E.Adam: 1991; Hermele: 1990b; Cahen: 1987; Brito: 1988; Rudebeck: 1990; Adam: 1988.

83 Brito: 1988.

84 Cahen: 1987.

Cahen attributes the failures of post-colonial development to the fact that FRELIMO never became a serious Marxist-leninist party. "FRELIMO's transformation into a Marxist-leninist party in 1977 has continued to be formal not signifying any major political evolution. After 1969 FRELIMO continued to be a cross-class nationalist organisation without these classes provoking a process comparable to the developments in Cuba (from the rebel army to the Communist Party) and in Nicaragua (from Sandino and to sandinism after 1967)." [85] FRELIMO like the "liberation movements in power in Portuguese Speaking Africa, the Social Democratic States of Scandinavia and the marxist-leninist Regimes of Eastern Europe" failed because they did not develop into anti-systemic political regimes. These regimes represented a variation on the same strategy: maintaining themselves in power as representatives of the popular will".[86]

Each one of these arguments reveals a generalisation which has more to do with the researcher's theories than with reality. Concrete studies reveal a more nuanced inter-action between state policies and peasant communities. The relationship between the post-colonial regime and civil society was complex. Government policies at local level changed in order to accommodate challenges made by local communities. (Case Studies of Changara, Mueda, Sabié and Boane)

Consolidating the breakthrough in the analyses and understanding of post-colonial politics and development produced by what I have called the "internal contradictions approach" calls for a consideration of history. Analyses of post-colonial Mozambique have been lacking in this historical dimension. The date of independence, 1975, or the formation of FRELIMO, 1962 are considered as the points where everything began.

The analysis of Mozambique is both of "theory shaping facts" and of "fictions masquerading as facts". A good example of the first case is given by Joseph Hanlon's analysis of Mozambique, in his use of Gordon White's model of socialist transition in the Third World. White argues that "one can distinguish three key phases and transitions in revolutionary socialist development: i)revolutionary voluntarism and its limits; ii) bureaucratic voluntarism and its limits iii) Reformism and market socialism.[87]

However, Gordon White recognises the difficulties in fitting Mozambique into his schema. "The three-stage transition is, of course, an ideal type, and sits uneasily between with some cases". He considers that

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85 Cahen: 1987:94. My translation-YA.

86 Wallerstein: 1989b.

87 White; Murray and White: 1983.

"newer socialist countries like Mozambique may not approximate this path, due to different historical contexts and political traditions".[88] Hanlon in his analysis of Mozambique between 1975/1981 suggests that the three stages have occurred in Mozambique. His narrative is constructed as illustrating the three phases without either mentioning if the theory, reproduced in a annex, was his starting point or if his empirical work does in fact support White's construction.[89]

One of the myths dealt with by social scientists is the claim by FRELIMO and the government to represent a worker-peasant alliance. Two methods have been adopted to cope with the incongruence between the claims of the holders of state power and their actual class composition: one has been a comparative analysis between the three post-colonial states in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. A second has been the analysis of government policies and particularly of their formulation and implementation.

Franz Wilhelm Heimer, looking at the class alliances in place in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau remarked that "until 1981 there was no attempt whatsoever by those in power at making class alliances".[90]

Hermele, also in a comparative analysis, arrives at the opposite conclusion. "In terms of alliances, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique passed through three phases. The liberation struggle supported by a broad front, with the basic alliance composed by peasants and nationalists, with components from strata of traditional power and the petty bourgeoisie. Next a change in the alliance from the peasants to the state bureaucracies and the party. And now a new alliance is being created between the capitalists (national and foreign) and international finance and co-operation institutions. State bureaucracies are playing a complementary and dependent role." [91]

Hermele's conclusion comes from an analysis of Mozambique and Angola. In the case of Mozambique his conclusions derive from an analysis of government policies, their implementation, and Mozambique's general economic performance. He deduces the content of class alliances from the results of specific development options for certain classes.[92]

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88 White; Murray and White: 1983.

89 Hanlon: 1990a:277-279.

90 Heimer: 1991.

91 Hermele: 1990a: 18.

92 Hermele: 1986.

The merit of these analyses has been important, as noted earlier, because they revealed the inconsistencies of the self-images of the holders of state power. But because they used, as indicators, policy formulations and their impact in general macro-economic terms, they were unable to distinguish between intentions and results. The public transcript does not give an idea of the processes which occurred, so the maximum we can conclude is about intended or virtual class alliances.

Heimer's analysis in 1991 is contradicted by his own case study of a regulado in Moamba district, Vundiça, which shows how the "régulo" managed to stay in place, albeit informally, and the peasants in his area escaped villagisation. Hermele's analysis captures changes in the public discourse of the party and the state. It captures the changes in the ideological stances of the party, its political program. It also illustrates changes in the public presentation of policies, in the strategies for mobilising support and in the groups at which state discourse is aimed. But between the ideological discourse and the praxis there is a long gap and this gap is captured in Hermele's own study of Chókwè.

My observations about the social basis of Party and State do not allow me to agree with the authors quoted. I argue that the class nature of party membership or of state functionaries did not essentially change during the 1975/1990 period. From 1975 onwards i) The class composition of FRELIMO has been stable ii) There has not been a massive expulsion of cadres from one social group or another iii) The social origin of party membership or of state functionaries has not changed. The "estruturas" (apparatchniks, those who had leadership position at any level of the state and party apparatuses) had privileges that derived from being part of the "nomenklatura". Some of them were accused of "desvios (theft)" of public goods, of making commercial profits through the allocation of quotas for scarce goods and services, of maintaining networks of patronage ("cunhas") and of using relatives to front for them in various economic activities. This political and economical practice has not changed.[93] But for the analysts writing in SAR it was a phenomenon which only appeared with the World Bank. The norms governing the admission into the public and state service and into the party were defined as early as 1974, even before independence. To be a FRELIMO member a Mozambican citizen had to be revolutionary, committed to the cause of the people. He or she could not practice any religion, could not be sexually or morally corrupt, and could not exploit the labor of others.[94] Expulsions and condemnations of FRELIMO militants and cadres were based on the disciplinary code defined at the Mocuba (1974) seminar and subsequently refined at the Third (1977) and Fourth Congresses (1983). This kind of norm

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[93] FRELIMO: 1977b; FRELIMO: 1978b; FRELIMO: 1978c.

[94] FRELIMO: 1975c

made the requirements for membership of an organisation which was supposed to be representative of the population as a whole similar to requirements for joining a cadre-based party, claiming to represent one class (the working class) alone. Such norms were certainly not representative of the broad political alliance of the armed struggle. The norms for party and state membership changed only after the Fifth Congress (1989) to accommodate changes which had already happened.

In 1984/85 the change in political discourse marked a coming together of norms and practice. What changed in 1984/85, when FRELIMO allowed its members to enter into private accumulation, was not the practice of some of them but the recognition of this practice in the discourse.

Before that the expressed norms were a denial of what was actually taking place.[95] After 1985/86 and specially in 1991, norms and laws transmitted a positive image of reality. The public discourse and the legitimising strategy used by the leaders of the party and state changed. Their motto changed from the "defenders of the interests of the labouring masses, workers and peasants" of FRELIMO's Third and Fourth Party Congresses [96] to the "champions of all people's rights" of the Fifth and Sixth Congresses.[97] A change in class alliances was not visible but a change in the type of policies towards different social groups could be witnessed. Up to 1986 FRELIMO applied "dissociative" strategies towards its opponents, seeking their total exclusion. After 1986 FRELIMO adopted associative strategies towards existing social classes, particularly those who favoured a different content for development strategies and policies from FRELIMO. The changes which FRELIMO has undergone since 1989 indicate a change which could mutate into new alliances - the power inside the party is now divided, with representatives of classes never before allowed into the leadership, entering the central committee at the 1991 Sixth Congress[98]. Changing FRELIMO strategies since 1989 indicate deeper changes in the party's class basis. Allowing FRELIMO leaders to enter into private economic activities did not mean that party members had not engaged in private business before. Some economic activities were conducted in the name of family or friends. The list of farmers in the District Agricultural Directorate (DDA) in Boane contains several names of party leaders. Their agricultural activities began before 1983. A major growth in owners with political posts was verified after

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95 In an explanation of the economic difficulties in Mozambique, the development options taken were justified as necessary because they would respond to the consumption needs of the population in terms of food and clothing and that they meant sacrifices in the present for the sake of the future. FRELIMO: 1982a. See also FRELIMO: 1983e. For the colonial plans see Anon.: 1973.

96 FRELIMO: 1977a; FRELIMO: 1983b.

97 FRELIMO: 1988m; FRELIMO: 1991.

98 FRELIMO: 1991.

1985. EM, a party leader in Mueda, headed a co-operative which was a disguised private enterprise. A businessman from Montepuez appeared in the Cabo Delgado delegation to the Fourth Congress, in 1983, as "a patriotic and honest trader".[99]

To put it bluntly: There has not been a change in real social alliances as expressed in the various social origins of party members and state cadres. There was a change in the political discourse, in the kind of alliances which the party leadership tried to forge by co-opting groups previously opposed to party policies or whose interests the party had attacked (traders, private farmers, religious believers). There has been change, not in the real or concrete class alliances, but in the virtual (projected, intended) class alliances. The relative rank of different groups inside the party changed only at the sixth congress with some prominent "revolutionary intellectuals" removed from the Politburo. Those who held state power recognised the existence and rights of other groups to develop their social and economic projects, but under the direction of the party leadership.

The concept which best describes the behaviour of Mozambique's ruling elite in the post-colonial period is that of "transformism" i.e. continuous change in the discourse, that does not correspond either to changes in the social origins of those in power or in their political goals. It corresponds to changes in the public transcript, in the official discourse but not in the hidden transcript, and thus in real policies. A transformation in the class position of the leaders occurred which consolidated their own economic situation. They then had to legitimise their own changed reality in their discourse.

Another attempt at demystification of the ruling class in post colonial Mozambique came from researchers who analysed its urban origins. It has been argued that the development options of Mozambique can be attributed to the urban petty bourgeoisie which consolidated itself through access to state power. This group took a very negative position towards urban culture and towards phenomena such as prostitution. The party leaders and state cadres originated from the urbanised petty bourgeoisie. They used the state as a instrument for capital accumulation. [100] During the armed struggle, these petty-bourgeois elements are said to have adopted a Maoist ideology which they swapped for a Soviet style ideology after independence.[101]

Two problems are posed by this type of argument. First, were all FRELIMO leaders petty-bourgeois? A male nurse with extensive family land holdings - is he a petty bourgeois? The son of the translator in the Xai-Xai

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99 Adam and Littlejohn: 1984; Adam; Depelchin and Littlejohn: 1983.

100 Brito: 1988; 1991.

101 Serra: 1991.

administrative offices who earned enough to pay 300,000 escudos for a house in 1968 - is he a petty-bourgeois? A second problem is posed by adopting concepts such as Maoist, Soviet, etc. This sort of comparison, when not properly backed up with empirical research, leads to simplistic analyses.

The state was used as an instrument for accumulation by a wider range of social groups than the urbanised classes. The post independence state was not filled exclusively with urbanised petty bourgeois elements, but had a very heterogeneous character: urbanised elements, "déclassé" or lumpen elements, young professionals, cadres from the liberation war, etc.

The links between some of these elements and the rural economy in the country was not so feeble. Some FRELIMO leaders belong to land-owning families. They are linked to the traditional political structure in the rural zones. Important FRELIMO leaders from the southern provinces were sons of Protestant farmers.[102] had a relative with a high post in Maputo were better off then their neighbours in the villages.

The biggest cattle owners in Sabié District are linked to the holders of state power. They were not without cattle in the colonial period, but after independence their connections and having a family member in the right place secured resources for developing their herds. Rich peasants in the colonial period have become large farmers. In some cases the total land under their control has risen from 5 hectares to 110 hectares. Where they once had no tractors at all, they now have three, plus two trucks. The post-colonial state removed the colonial colour bar.

Individuals who had previously been tailors or were otherwise employed in retail trade have gone successfully into farming, and today control farms of 40/50 hectares.[103]

Already in 1975/76 a race by Mozambicans with only primary school education for government posts left vacant by departing staff (Portuguese or Mozambican) was noted. [104] As early as 1974/75 the state recruitment rules were changed to allow the promotion of individuals who did not have the required schooling and formal training. Those who had some practice were first placed under suspicion and later regarded as collaborators and had their political and civic rights suspended.

Whatever the discourse about empowering workers and peasants the net result of post-colonial development has been the consolidation of the

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102 Machel: 1982e.

103 See Chapter Ten.

104 Centro de Estudos Africanos: 1978a.

existing class structure. The position occupied in the colonial period by the Portuguese was transferred to Mozambicans who had an education or a job in the state apparatus or a economic position. The colour divide among the classes disappeared. Those who were at the bottom of the social pyramid in the colonial period remained in that position after independence.

4 The building blocks of nationalist discourse

The analyses of the varied kinds of Mozambican nationalist renderings of history gave me the opportunity to review the arguments which explain post-colonial developments as a natural outcome of the specific nature of Portuguese colonialism and of the liberation movement which opposed it. The myths about the social, economic and cultural reality of Mozambique and about national liberation itself were at the root of post-colonial development strategies. These myths, the building blocks of nationalist discourse, have also permeated the analysis.

Social scientists engaged in the production of an alternative analysis to the official accounts of post-colonial history have not accepted the analytical parameters set by those who hold state power and have tried to escape from their management of information.

Consolidating this break with the nationalist discourse involves not only new strategies of interpretation and analysis but also new strategies for collecting empirical evidence. A surge of publications on Mozambique has occurred. Authors seize the opportunity created by the profound political changes which took place after the peace process in 1992 and the first multiparty elections in 1994. The contributions show the contradictory nature of the analyses on Mozambique and the dilemmas one still has to solve.

Anders Nilsson and Hans Abrahamsson in their development history of Mozambique[105] tried to go beyond official explanations. Their effort shows more clearly the dilemmas created to research in a context of solidarity and aid. The relationship between internal and external factors, the differences between the inherited situation, the plan or project and the results, and the consultancy situation end up producing a balance sheet type of analysis[106]. The reasons for not fulfilling the acts, the difference between projects, plans

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[105] Abrahamsson and Nilsson: 1994

[106] See Abrahamsson and Nilsson: 1994: 20-55. The present day situation in Mozambique is some kind of a arithmetic operation involving as factors 1. What we had and what we wanted; what was done and what was obtained. In a way it is more the use of the model used by development economists as described by Chenery and Srinivisana: 1988.

and outcomes, the incoherence between words and deeds end up being filled with data and explanations given by the holders of state power. The past, the inherited situation, the world and the region, end up taking the blame for results of activities, policies and attitudes, of their contradictions and the way they were solved.[107]

A break with the modernising. planning, correct liners, their praxis and discourse, will only come from a search of new data and from a new problematique witch is prepared not to consider blame or insufficiencies. The self-deceiving state to justify its discourse has to create a general acceptance of its own history, of its own version of facts. The fact that the authors did not want to reply clearly to the question of FRELIMO and its errors, the reasons why and the class basis of the party and their leaders in general to reply to the question why the forced modernisation also shows the problem of the relation vis a vis the powers that be.[108]

Minter's book - "The Apartheid Contras" - is also a very interesting example of efforts to grasp the complexity of Mozambique post-colonial history. [109] A effort is made to problematise or to question the generally held beliefs about the RENAMO dynamics and government policies and strategies. A limitation of the sources and the difficulties of making a critical analysis of them is openly accepted. A effort at theoretical triangulation is made to question the generalised explanations which have been given.[110]

These autocritical efforts, although welcome and important, ended up limiting themselves. Minter shows the general difficulties and double standard Americans have in relating to war and to covert operations. The definition of LIC given by Minter is more benign then Sarkesian's and of the USAF forces. For Minter LIC is a third phase of conflict having the following limits. For Sarkesian is "give em the thing they know best".[111] A certain "veteran complex" is also evident. Those who have more contact with Portuguese as a language and with Mozambique and Angola have better ideas and produce better sources.[112] One could argue also the contrary :that fresh eyes see what those who are used do not see. The criteria to judge sources have to be multidimensional: cnecking with different sources on the same issues, field

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107 The proposed use of Mats Friberg VETA method heralded a result which was not reaped. A conscious effort is not made to discern in the sources used the Values and value judgements, the Aims and objectives, the Theories and the results. The translation into Portuguese of Friberg's "swedish square" shows also the reductionist use of the method. Abrahamsson and Nilsson: 1994:5

108 Abrahamsson and Nilsson: 1994:355

109 Minter: 1994.

110 Minter: 5 1994:56-79

111 Finnegan: 1992. Sarkesian: 1985.

112 Minter: 1994:79

work in the areas and the capacity to question the sources i.e. determining the VETA of each one of them. Finnegan's reporting and book on Mozambique shows how a new arrival prepared to observe contradictions and ask new questions and not to accept any given explanations reveals aspects which were not mentioned by the experts and the "iniciados".

The limitations imposed by the modernisation of old arguments or half hearted/half baked acceptance of the critiques are also shown in John Saul.[113] His readings of books like Geffray's, Minter, Finnegan's and a reply to critiques which have been made end up with a argument of the type "the critiques which have been made are right, but... you had to be there to understand" The analysis although it seems to be a critique of the various lectures is a effort to declare the present day situation is Mozambique a neo-colonialist situation, aid donor's paradises. Aid which is a client-patron relationship involving disparate elements as citizens in the two sides, the states and its agencies is transformed in a relationship where even the clients are corrupt.

Saul is silent in regard to the critique levelled against the solidarity stance as part and parcel of nationalist and petty bourgeois myth formation - as made by Braganca and Depelchin -and enters in his pet theme - the state. States are not formed and do not operate in a void or vacuum. The logic behind the "messianism" of the ruling class - for whom social scientists have worked as consultants and clarifiers -is forgotten.[114]

Annamaria Gentili in her book "Il leone e le cacciatore"[115], which deals with Africa in general, devotes some pages to Mozambique. Her remarks about the evolution of the peace negotiations in Rome throw light on the issues involved in the post-colonial conflict. In 1994 the struggle over the spoils of a war-ridden country shows the agenda and the nature of the wielders of state power and their challengers.

Newitt, in his "History of Mozambique"[116] engages in a broader analysis of the country from its origins till today. The hundred and one years of Mozambique with its present day borders show the continuity of certain conflicts and issues when a small elite tries to foster the creation of a nation in a heterogeneous territory as far as the people, their history, the multiplicity of states that have existed, the different social groups and their projects.

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[113] Saul: 1994 and 1995

[114] The literature produced in 1994 is in need of a more profound treatment. Limitations of time and scope and the fact of being produced after the bulk of my work has been written led me to concentrate on the aspects on the "old wine in new bottles" aspects of it.

[115] Gentili: 1995.

[116] Newitt: 1995.

The majority of the re-analyses are produced in the context of the post-peace agreement and the post-election period which showed a RENAMO presence and legitimacy which went beyond a mere bandit group. The reality has led the analysts to question their old ideas but this questioning is not taken to their last consequences . It stops before breaking the taboo and accepting that our mode of inquiry, our critique of the sources has been insufficient. Our values, theories and aims have transcended the empirical data, transforming them into mere illustrations of our own ideas.

If there is no break with the past methods the arguments will be more and more justifications and half baked auto-critiques and the problem under study will continue as clouded as it has been.

I have earlier analysed some themes illustrating the need to sharpen up alternative analyses of the post-colonial period in Mozambique: i) the nature of class alliances; ii) the urban character of the ruling class; iii) foreign ideological influences. This critical effort (in which I include my own work) highlights the contradictions of the post-independence regime, which pursued policies that were not in harmony with the social, economic and political reality of the country and shows that the present status of Mozambique is the direct result of the development path chosen by the government and the party in power and the political system adopted. It is also a critique of schemata which seek to attribute blame and conspiracy theories which allow the government to escape responsibility for its own actions.

The following chapter periodises the post-colonial development of Mozambique, highlighting changes in the formulations of policies and their nature.

CHAPTER FOUR

Reformulating development policies

1 Introduction

After 15 years of post-colonial Mozambique, the country's official name changed from People's Republic, adopted in 1975, to simply Republic in 1990. The change in the official name symbolises deeper changes in the political and economic systems and development strategies. [1]

In the 1990 constitution, FRELIMO ceased to be the "guiding force of state and society".[2] Marxism-Leninism was abandoned in the public discourse as the official ideology.[3] The existence and formation of political parties other than FRELIMO was permitted. The freedoms of association and of expression were enshrined in the new constitution. [4]

In this chapter I present four kinds of argument. The first concerns the general relationship between the content of development strategies adopted by the post-colonial state, their contradictions, and change. I argue that there was no single event that caused the redesign of Mozambique's political and economic options in 1991 (e.g. destabilisation, the nature of the state, western pressures, donor conditionalities).The change in the Constitution, which also marks a fundamental shift in development strategies, is the corollary of contradictions and changes in development policies and practices which occurred after independence. The second kind of argument concerns the specific development strategies applied, their content and the length of time for which they were applied. The third kind of argument is that development strategies changed so as to integrate what had previously

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1 I have discussed elsewhere the problems of periodisation of post colonial Mozambique. See Adam: 1988. In Chapter Three, I have outlined my analyses of the existing literature.

2 My sources for the reconstruction of the post-colonial development strategies vary from official reports, academic studies, interviews and observations. I have in the writing of this chapter used the speeches of the President of the Peoples Republic of Mozambique, Samora Machel to illustrate policy changes. President Machel's speeches were considered law in Mozambique and were the way used to announce policies.

3 Cahen (1987) does not accept FRELIMO's claims of being a Marxist Leninist party. See Chapter Three.

4 Fauvet: 1991a.

appeared as a contradiction but which the government had refused to admit was a problem (e.g. concessions to the capitalist sector of the economy. The fourth kind of argument is that there are changes in development strategies, but the justification given by the government is based on the principle that no change occurred. A process of substitution (by Mozambican nationals) of the colonial economy and society developed under cover of a process of transition to socialism. While the facts pointed towards the recomposition of the colonial economy and the replacement of the colonial bourgeoisie by Mozambican heirs, ideology pointed to a transition to socialism and the empowerment of workers and peasants. The legitimacy of the ruling party, strong at independence because it was seen as having brought about the downfall of colonial rule, was steadily eroded.[5]

The overriding argument is that the contradictions of post colonial development strategies created both the breeding ground for internal opposition and the enabling environment for external opposition.

2 Concepts, typologies, theories, strategies and paradigms

Developmental options in any sector (health, education, agriculture, industry) were presented in the Mozambican government's official discourse as "options", "objectives", "strategies", "tactics", "political options", "ideology", "political line", "policy" and "policies". In the government's most detailed documents the strategies are referred to as economic and social development strategies.[6]

2.1 The concept of development

Development is an elusive concept.[7] Ingrained by evolutionist biases, it assumes that societies and states can be grouped along a scale of

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[5] "As for legitimacy we can state: 1. Legitimate because it is in accord with traditional cosmology; 2. Legitimate for being in agreement with new cosmological visions (Islamic, Christian, secular nationalist), etc.; 3. Legitimate because of the success of the national process. 4. Legitimate through the representation in the government of the social groups present in the zone. Some of these incorporate the concepts differently formulated by Max Weber on the basis of concepts of the Greco-Roman and western tradition (charismatic legitimacy which incorporates a bit of the cosmological concept)". Liesegang: 1994; Rudebeck: 1989.

[6] FRELIMO: 1977c; FRELIMO: 1984; FRELIMO: 1988m.

[7] Sen: 1988. Sen characterises the difficulties with the concept. One of the difficulties in adequately characterising the concept of development arises from the essential role of evaluation in that concept. "What is or is not regarded as a case of "development" depends inescapably on the notion of what things are

"development".[8] Dissatisfaction with the concept is manifest among social scientists because it does not capture the essence of distorted development. A limited definition of the concept of "development in the conventional sense of economic growth, institutional modernisation, industrialisation, technological advance, commercialisation and rationalisation of agriculture and the monetisation of the economy" [9] is an attempt to escape the difficulties because development needs to be defined in terms of:

i) universal access to healthy food, unpolluted air and water, hygienic clothing and shelter ;
ii) enhancement of the resource base while improving yields;
iii) self-reliance, and optimal use of the potential of each locality, region and nation in the perspective of better use of ecological resources;
iv) harmony between the individual, the family and society.[10]

If the concept of development is vague and in need of definition the same can also be said about the paraphernalia of concepts which refer to actions taken to promote development (policies, strategies) or to the thinking behind them (theories and paradigms).[11] Policies are proposals for deliberate activity to affect the workings of society in areas conventionally considered in a development definition (economic growth, change in industry, agriculture and technology).[12] Even development economists have departed from an economistic approach to development, integrating social and political factors, considering a development strategy "in terms of two sets of factors:

- initial conditions: structural features such as natural resources, and other elements that are usually treated as "endowments", and
- policy choices: social preferences (growth vs. equity), trade policies (outward vs. inward), the levels of investment, etc."

"Earlier studies of development experience usually considered each of these factors separately, but the more recent trend is to identify

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valuable to promote. The dependence of the concept of development on evaluation becomes a problem to the extent that 1) the valuation functions accepted by different people differ from each other, and 2) the process of change involved in development alters the valuations of the people involved. These two problems may be called respectively "value-heterogeneity" and "value-endogeneity". (Sen: 1988:20).

8 Dube: 1988:1.

9 Hettne; Karlsson and Magnusson: 1990:44.

10 Ghosh: 1992; Rudebeck: 1990:29; Galli: 1991; Wallerstein: 1986.

11 For a discussion of the concept of development see Esteva: 1985; Julien: 1990.

12 Gans: 1975:4.

representative country types on the basis of two or three dominant features".[13]

2.2 Development strategies

Mozambique's post-colonial development experiences are a difficult case to set neatly into the categories proposed by different typologies of development strategies. Immanuel Wallerstein has considered that within the World System two development strategies are possible:

i) "attempts to gain an improved position within the capitalist world system. Two variants are possible: seizing the chance and promotion by invitation. Seizing the chance involves state action to transform the structure of comparative advantages. Promotion by invitation aims at opening up the doors to the international capital"
ii) "attempts to break out of or at least reduce the dependence on the system. Two variants are possible: self-reliance and non-alignment and orientation towards the socialist bloc"[14]

In a comparative analysis of the development strategies of African states, using Wallerstein's framework, Hettne and associates included Mozambique in the group of countries which tried to disengage from the capitalist world system using a development strategy situated in between the strategies of self-reliance and of orientation towards the socialist bloc. [15]

Mozambique represents a case which can be fitted into all of Wallerstein's categories. The government of Mozambique after 1974 made attempts to rely on all these strategies at the same time. Self-reliance inspired (or at least that was the justification) policies of Co-operativisation, villagisation and popular participation. Non-Alignment characterised international relations and militancy in the Non-Aligned movement. The approximation towards the socialist bloc was expressed in development assistance, military support and even an attempt to join COMECON, first as an observer and later through an unsuccessful application for full membership.

Attempts at integration into the World Capitalist system involved the adoption by the Mozambican government of strategies both of seizing the chance and of promotion by invitation. Even during the transition to

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13 Chenery and Srinivisana: 1988:1538.

14 Wallerstein's ideas as formulated by Hettne; Karlsson and Magnusson: 1990:34.

15 Hettne; Karlsson and Magnusson: 1990:35.

independence documentary evidence suggests that attracting foreign capital for investment was government policy.[16] In order to attract international investors, the Mozambican government publicised investment opportunities and set up a legal framework for investment.[17] The flow of foreign investment increased only after Mozambique joined the IMF and the World Bank.

Mozambique's development strategies are difficult to classify. As if to illustrate this, Mozambique keeps falling between stools in the neat boxes of classifications and typologies. Typologies are helpful to give an overview but can lead easily to stereo-types because complex processes and situations are simplified and slipped into two dimensional structures. Mozambique has been considered a nationalist collectivist regime in a typology of African regimes based on the "link state-society power relationship and macro-economic management policies pursued". Three categories are broadly defined in the typology just mentioned:

i) "Liberal economies - open door foreign investment policy, state machinery and national elite with a secondary role in resource allocation. State intervention reduced to a minimum. Maximum growth rates are aimed at. Income distribution and equity are secondary concerns. Ivory Coast. Senegal, Niger, Chad, Malawi.
ii) Nationalist Regimes - interests of national élites take precedence over foreign capital, the State plays a key role in allocating resources and controlling the development process. Economic growth is a key goal. The accumulation process rests in the hands of the national elite which controls the state. Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, Botswana, Kenya.
iii) Nationalist Collectivist systems - Focus on distribution rather than growth. Many characteristics similar to Nationalist regimes - importance of the state, national élites, control of foreign capital. Government intervention in investment and business is bigger. Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia." [18]

Due to the specific state-society link and to macro-economic management policies, the Mozambican case displays characteristics of both Nationalist and Nationalist Collectivist regimes. [19]

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16 Tembe: 1979; Paiva: 1975.

17 Isaacman: 1978.

18 Ndulu: 1986:82-83.

19 Chirot: 1986, includes Mozambique in a list of Leninist regimes.

2.3 Mozambican eclecticism and development theory

The theoretical underpinnings of Mozambique's post-colonial development strategies constitute an eclectic mix, which can be related to all four main schools of thought in development theory. Three major groupings[20] of development theories have been identified:

i) "Modernisation and growth. This brand, an orthodoxy in development theory, is represented by neo-classical economics and the modernisation paradigm (including the classical Marxist concept of progress).

ii) Dependency school. This includes a number of variants which mainly focus on relations between the more developed centre and the less developed periphery. The obstacle to development is not a lack of capital or skills but the relations with the centre.

iii) Another Development: this stresses the importance of basic human needs, ecologically sustainable development and self reliance. (Hettne: 1990) Two qualitatively different approaches can be distinguished: the Basic Material Needs Approach (BMN) and the Basic Human Needs Approach (BHNA)".[21] To this stream of alternative development thinking one could add the "development from below" theorists converted to "development from within" theorists.[22]

The inclusion within the modernisation paradigm of socialist concepts of development captures the reality of existing socialist experiments (Eastern bloc) or the Stalinist project [23] but does an injustice to formulations which defend changes in relations of production. They are better placed among the another development theories. Johan Galtung distinguishes the Eastern Europe Development Model from the Maoist one. Friberg[24] and Galtung characterise five models of development (capitalist blue, socialist red, social

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20 The major groupings are also referred to within the literature as development paradigms. The concept of the paradigm has been attributed to Thomas Kuhn, author of the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, a study of the history of physics in which he concludes that major changes occurred in the theoretical framework which he calls revolutions and which imply transformations in basic methodology and in the perspective through which reality is analysed. He uses the concept of paradigm to describe the changes from a Newtonian to an Einsteinian perspective (Kuhn: 1971). The concept has been popularised to mark shifts in theory or respective. "In a wider sense a paradigm is essentially a mode of thought and associated methodological commitment, problem sets, as practical activity involved in dealing with given problems. In this case one talks more generally of a world picture, an ideal of science (i.e. what kind of methods are good) and some of roles of actors working in accordance with a given paradigm". Elzinga: 1981:17.

21 Hettne: 1990; Hettne: 1991; Hettne: 1992; W.Adam: 1992. See also Sefali; van Rensburg and Davies: 1987.

22 Taylor and Mackenzie: 1992.

23 Gouldner: 1975.

24 Friberg: 1985.

democratic pink, Japanese yellow and green) considering the market-state mix. [25]

3 Evolution of development strategies in post-colonial Mozambique

A standard periodisation of the history of post-colonial Mozambique is presented both in government documents and in academic analyses. Three phases are distinguished:

i) a transition phase from 1974 up to 1977,
ii) a development phase from the Third Congress in 1977 to 1981 and
iii) a phase of decline from 1982 onwards.

Official history presents post-colonial Mozambique conveniently divided into three neat periods: i) the establishment of the new power which created "natural" and justifiable problems in an underdeveloped economy and a colonised society; ii) the second period when the economy functioned and the results obtained showed that the policies were right; and iii) a third period, where, due to external intervention and climatic mishaps, disaster struck. The official account and periodisation has an organising principle: the evolution of the Global Social Product which presents 1981 [26] as the best year ever.[27]

I felt that a macro economic indicator was not sufficient to illustrate post-colonial development for at least three reasons:

i) it did not show the general conditions affecting the economy,
ii) statistics in post-colonial Mozambique are more guesstimates than calculations and
iii) the account produced in the official documents was self-serving.

When trying to construct a chronology of the post-colonial period I noted that certain events marked discontinuities: a change in international relations towards certain states, a critique of development strategies, an admission of failures or poor results from the policies adopted, a change in

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25 Galtung: 1990c:15-24.

26 Comissão Nacional do Plano: 1985.

27 The picture given of 1981 by the macro-economic indicators does not correspond to the interpretations presented by FRELIMO leaders themselves. The growth shown for 1981 is probably due to double counting of donations of crude oil in that period contest the standard periodisation and account the post-colonial development in Mozambique. Comissão Nacional do Plano: 1985; World Bank: 1985; Egero: 1987; Hanlon: 1984a; O'Meara: 1991; Adam: 1988b; Serra: 1990.

the public formulation of development policies. Each one of these events was associated with an established pattern in terms of development strategies. A nucleus of ideas, of beliefs, existed that gave coherence to the period and which served as a basis for the public pronouncements on development strategies, as a yardstick for analysing the development practice in any sector (health, agriculture, commerce, industry).

In the 1974/1990 period I have identified five major development strategies:

i)"The Liberated areas strategy" (1965/1974) which is more a utopia than a reality. Attempts to apply the strategy were only made during the armed struggle and constituted an ideological reference for post-colonial practices;

i) "Killing the crocodile while it is small" (1974/1978);
ii) "The state managing barber-shops?" (1979/1984);
iii)"The state out of the market place" (1984/1986);
iv)"The free market strategies " (1986/1990).

Each strategy can be used to characterise a period due to its dominance in that time span but that does not eliminate the fact that some of these strategies are present in other periods e.g. the liberated areas strategy has served as an ideological reference throughout the post-independence period. In the descriptions of each strategy I have concentrated on the overall performance and evolution. The characterisation of each period is necessarily schematic, more an illustration of each period than a complete history or chronology. The designations given to each period were taken from presidential speeches or interviews.[28]

3.1 The liberated areas strategy (1965/1974)

During the liberation struggle, patterns of colonial development in Mozambique were challenged by FRELIMO in the liberated zones where an alternative development strategy was applied.[29] The development strategy rested on the following issues: struggle against the exploitation of Man by Man; creation of political and administrative structures that guaranteed people's participation in the development processes and in political and administrative decision making; development of popular and local solutions i.e. which could be implemented with existing human and material resources;

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[28] My description of each period is quite brief. Issues which have been already debated in the literature have been left aside i.e. the central plan, the PPI and "Operação Produção".

[29] Machel: 1973b:10. See also Abshire and Samuels: 1969.

establishment of co-operative forms of production and marketing; protracted guerrilla warfare against Portuguese colonialism.

The Liberation Struggle strategy was applied in limited areas of the country and in different time-frames - basically the provinces of Cabo Delgado (after 1965), Northern Niassa (after 1970) and Tete (after 1971). The level of transformation was different from province to province and from region to region within each province. It largely depended on FRELIMO's military capacity to contain Portuguese military attack. Only in the Mueda region, near the border with Tanzania, did FRELIMO find the favourable conditions to apply - in very embryonic forms and in a war situation - its strategies and policies for the development of the liberated areas. The extent of the transformations and level of implementation of the strategy was far from the blueprint and the idealised interpretations of it. The ideal renderings of the liberated zones speak of the new man, absence of exploitation of man by man, the disappearance of colonial alienation and of the practices of "feudal society" - lobolo (bride price), polygamy and initiation rites. The concrete praxis, in the liberated zones, balanced between outright repression and the creation of a type of government based on consensus, trying to satisfy the needs of the population, relying on public discussion of problems and difficulties and working out solutions acceptable to all interested parties. To capture the contradictory empirical evidence a definition of popular power was formulated as "power exercised in close connection with the working people and legitimised by the fact that it meets concrete and fundamental interests of the people as experienced by them".[30]

The strategies and tactics of development during the liberation war always depended on the situation existing in each place. FRELIMO's ultimate goals were to confront militarily the Portuguese army and to maintain popular support and participation on the warfront. FRELIMO combatants knew that peasants dissatisfied with their behaviour would or could flee to the zones controlled by the enemy. The relationship between FRELIMO and the peasants was quite complex and should not be idealised. It included both the use of force and the creation of participatory structures and the satisfaction of specific needs felt by the population. Peasant perceptions of FRELIMO praxis during the armed struggle presented both the use of force and alternative political praxis [31]. FRELIMO's development strategy during the liberation war was vaguely defined as anti-colonialist, anti-neo-colonialist and against all exploitation of man by man. FRELIMO's caution about its ideology is noted by John Saul who in 1972 observed that "the terms of the emerging ideology are

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30 Rudebeck: 1990:16.

31 Adam et al: 1986.

still left somewhat undefined" and "any public hint that the movement has socialist intentions is systematically avoided " [32]

In the zones where a consolidated military presence existed the relationship between FRELIMO structures and peasants was stable, based on participatory structures and common consultation. In the zones where FRELIMO's military presence was being established, or where there was confrontation with the Portuguese army, the military and repressive aspects of FRELIMO tactics gained the upper hand.

FRELIMO's analysis of the social reality of Mozambique during the liberation war conformed to a Marxist paradigm: the role of exploitation of man by man, class struggle, the end of capitalism because of its internal contradictions.[33] During the war Marxism was not regarded as FRELIMO's official ideology. It was much more an instrument for analysis, a method. After the war, when FRELIMO became the party in power, Marxism became a state ideology, a catechism or a religion.

FRELIMO's post independence analyses of the Liberated Zones were highly ideologized and idealised.[34] The liberated zones were presented in a highly abstract manner, as an example of FRELIMO's success rather than as a concrete historical praxis. Even as a utopia, liberated zones were an important contribution: "It is our task not only to expose the harmful contradictions, but also to construct viable alternatives, blueprints, utopias. The "liberated zone" was one such utopia. It is the task of social science to find out how one can participate in that liberation, designing strategies for strengthening the weak and weakening the strong"[35] An idealised presentation of FRELIMO's liberated zones and of the strategies applied there is certainly not a contribution to liberation.

3.2 Killing the crocodile while it is small (1974/1978)

As soon as a cease fire and transfer of power were agreed between FRELIMO and Portugal, the liberation movement re-conceptualised its development strategy, restricting membership to those who were not capitalists. Measures were taken to implement FRELIMO's development strategy, now more amply and concretely formulated as a strategy of socialist

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32 Saul: 1973:397; Alpers: 1978:52.

33 Machel: 1983a:14.

34 For FRELIMO public discourse as an alternative movement, see Braganca: 1975, 1979 and 1984.

35 Galtung: 1990a:16.

transition. The new formulation included, as aims, the negation of colonial and neo-colonial models of development, and the continuation of strategies developed during the armed struggle,[36] but stressing the need for genuine socialist development based on institutions which (in the government's view) did not promote the exploitation of man by man, namely co-operatives, state farms, state factories, collectivised forms of trade. The resettlement of peasants in communal villages and the transformation of their scattered pattern of occupation into a concentrated pattern was considered the "backbone of FRELIMO's development strategy".[37]

Policies designed to "kill the crocodile while it is small" were the following: nationalisation of the land; nationalisation of education[38], health services, private law practices and rented housing; creation of structures to ensure the participation of workers in company management; alteration, in class terms, of the basis for recruiting state officials and of the norms by which the state apparatus was supposed to function. In the agricultural sector, the state attempted to transform colonial capitalist agriculture into forms of state planned socialist agriculture. Efforts were made to establish communal villages, co-operatives and other forms of collective production. [39] The crocodile in the egg was the "national bourgeoisie " or the "aspirants to the bourgeoisie".

Those who had benefited from the colonial system saw their position menaced by FRELIMO in 1974/75. "The old functionaries of the colonial state, the traders - small and big - the owners of small production units, all of them saw their future menaced by the coming to power of FRELIMO"[40]

For these classes FRELIMO, as characterised by the colonial power, was a terrorist group which had no respect for individuals or property. Based on this characterisation the big traders and owners spread propaganda that FRELIMO was going to appropriate everything: women, children, cashew

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36 FRELIMO: 1975a:169-173.

37 FRELIMO: 1977c; Araujo: 1988.

38 The educational system implemented in the post-colonial period was in tune with the modernisation development strategies pursued. For an analysis of the contradictions see Brambilla: 1990. "The urban social strata (leaders, technicians, teachers, administrative employees, industrial workers and traders) are more or less the unique beneficiaries of the secondary school. The recent origin and the fragility of the acquired social position (which for example inhibits the hereditary transmission of professions and the generational reproduction of membership to a same social strata) takes them to satisfy, their aspiration to social upward mobility through the school, considered the only channel of upward social mobility" . Brambilla: 1990:11 .

39 Machel: 1975a.

40 Depelchin: 1984. For a colonial reaction see Anacleto: 1974; Gouveia: 1974..

trees, boats, shops, houses, cattle, small animals, etc.[41] This propaganda struck home in some circles. In Ibo, a island in Northern Mozambique, where there was a stratum of Mozambican traders and functionaries, the process could be observed almost as a model. Coffee plots were abandoned, houses were not maintained, valuables were hidden. The owner of a fishing company urged the government to buy it and form a state enterprise. Capitalists got rid of their investments before they could be nationalised. A large number of Portuguese, 200.000 out of 250.000, left Mozambique between 1974-1976.[42]

The development strategy implemented allowed a total monopoly of state power and hegemony over all social, economic and political forces. It allowed FRELIMO to establish its hegemony over the entire country. "With the conquest of power we defined our first objectives: abolish the forms of exploitation which characterised colonial-capitalism, increase production and productivity, destroy the bourgeois state, meet the most pressing needs of the working masses. For that we nationalised the land, some of the factories and capitalist enterprises, local or foreign, we centralised control of the economy in the hands of the government, we mobilised the people to increase production of foodstuffs, clothing and other basic necessities. Simultaneously, we nationalised education, the health services, and, in the sector of housing, the buildings for rent. In February of this year, we created the marxist-leninist Vanguard Party"[43]

As FRELIMO's development strategy was being formalised in February 1977 during the party's Third Congress, an economic crisis was already setting in. Shortages in the supply of consumer goods were becoming increasingly evident. A National Commission for Supplies (Comissão Nacional de Abastecimento) was created on 9 February 1977 to take urgent measures to solve the problem. The causes for the lack of consumer goods in the cities were given officially as the following:

i. Decline in production in all sectors;
ii. Destruction of the marketing circuits;
iii. The state apparatus was not yet structured to direct the economy;
iv. Increased consumption;
v. Lack of a transport network.
vi. Speculation and hoarding. [44]

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41 Depelchin: 1984.

42 See Pires et al.: 1987.

43 Machel: 1977a. For a more detailed analysis of FRELIMO strategy to establish its hegemony see Samora Machel's Meeting with the Churches (Machel: 1988b). See also Morier-Genoud: 1994. For another view on FRELIMO, see Spectator: 1979.

44 Machel: 1976.

The results (intended or otherwise) of the chosen development strategy were explained as the result of enemy action and not as a direct consequence of the options taken e.g. formation of villages, construction of a network of state shops. One cannot break eggs and then cry because there are no new chicks.

3.3 The state managing barber shops (1978-1984)

Roughly four years after the end of the liberation struggle, and barely a year after the Third Congress of February 1977, which officially declared FRELIMO to be a Marxist Leninist party, its development strategies were assessed. This signalled the start of a process of re-conceptualising of the development strategy which ended up by redefining of the role of the state in development.[45]

The decline in production was linked in this period to a growth in consumption, especially in the towns, due to the demagogic wage rises granted by the final colonial government. To this were added the necessary wage increases for the poorest categories of public servants, the fall in house rents, the virtual elimination of health and education expenses, and price controls on some essential goods. "The foreign exchange used every year to feed the populations concentrated in the country's three major cities, Maputo, Beira and Nampula, are equivalent respectively to 10,000 tractors, 1,200 trucks and 1,300 jeeps." [46]

This first assessment, centring on a discussion of "questions linked to the national economy especially to our development strategy",[47] ended with the sacking of a minister and FRELIMO leader accused of corruption and indiscipline. One individual was thus held responsible for the results of a policy which had been adopted by an entire government and its party. [48]

Between 1978 and 1984 the limitations of the development strategies applied in the previous period were analysed and the need for concessions to various internal and external forces was recognised.[49] FRELIMO presented its development strategy and associated policies as not in contradiction with the interests of class forces, who were previously regarded as enemies of the

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45 Notícias: 1977.

46 Machel: 1978c.

47 FRELIMO: 1978a.

48 Moçambique, Governo: 1978; Anon.: 1979.

49 Bowen: 1986:100-159.

Revolution (traders, industrialists, farmers). The crocodiles became respectable again. Concessions were made to those who opposed to state's monopoly on marketing by privatising the commercial networks. The Lojas do Povo were abolished, and private farmers recognised. The creation of communal villages was not enforced as in the first period.

The development strategy presented initially, based on the nationalisation of strategic economic areas and on the predominance of the state sector, was (re)conceptualised again. Space, in 1981, was being conceded to small private entrepreneurs.

Grocery shops, beauty parlours and other small businesses which had fallen under state control were re-privatised. The economic role of the state was redefined.[50] The state was withdrawing from trading and services. The state reserved for itself the arena where the investments needed could only come from the state. The need for reducing the bureaucratic sectors of the state apparatus dealing with production was recognised.

The lack of consumer goods was attributed to feeble production and to the increase, after independence, in demand and in the access by Mozambicans to goods and services. The economic difficulties derived from the war and from the deterioration of the terms of trade in the international market between Mozambique's exports and its imports.

The government reacted to interpretations that FRELIMO was revising its Socialist policies by emphasising that "the offensive does not intend to correct a system of ours, to correct the system that we chose for our development. It is not in contradiction with our policies. Our offensive is against the structure left by colonialism - against the ideas, the mentality and the methods of work".[51]

A public debate on the situation was started with the document "The present situation in our country" [52] which was widely discussed. Workers and other participants were encouraged to present their points of view. But the debate was limited by the perspectives of the party and of the document itself.

The theory of development lying behind the explanations given for FRELIMO's strategies, in the 1982 document quoted above, recalled not so much Marx as Walt. W. Rostow's Stages of economic growth theory of

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50 Santos: 1991.

51 Machel: 1980a.

52 FRELIMO: 1982a. See also Sketcheley: 1982.

development: "The economy must save, not consume, a certain proportion of its national income".[53]

Further changes in the development strategy are indicated by FRELIMO's leadership efforts to start a dialogue with sectors who were at loggerheads with the state and party structures: the Church, the War Veterans and the so called 'Comprometidos' (collaborators with colonial fascism).[54]

At independence, the catholic church had been treated as part of the colonial state apparatus and was accused of opposing independence; although FRELIMO recognised individual church leaders who had worked with the national liberation movement.[55] The nationalisation of church assets, the reduction of some of its areas of activity (e.g. education and health which were both nationalised), difficulties in proselytising and in exercising religious rights. (which although guaranteed in the constitution were curtailed in practice). together with the church's advocacy of "national reconciliation" (i.e. talks with RENAMO). were at the root of a church-state conflict.

The war veterans - those who had fought in the liberation army - after being demobilised had at best been placed in camps or in villages with a promise of support which never came. Combatants in the National Liberation Struggle resented the role they had been playing in a society which marginalised them because of their lack of formal education. They resented being treated as "lixo da defesa", in other words, as war surplus or garbage.[56]

The "comprometidos" included Mozambicans who had been part of the Portuguese army's special units, political organisations which opposed FRELIMO or which had collaborated with the fascist state. This heterogeneous group included women who had written letters to soldiers in the Portuguese army ("madrinhas de guerra"), agents of the Portuguese political police, PIDE, accused of torture and massacres, and those who had been compulsory members of Portuguese political and para-military organisations because they were working in the colonial state. In 1977 the photos and biographies of the comprometidos were displayed on placards at

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53 Dube: 1988:37.

54 Machel: 1982e; Machel: 1982h.

55 For discussions about the church see Bispos de Moçambique: 1984 and Machel: 1982b. In the 1982 meetings the problems posed by all religious groups referred to a lack of clear respect of the constitutional provision for free religious beliefs. The catholic church was the only organisation which did not consider that it had a better status in post-colonial Mozambique than in colonial Mozambique.

56 Machel: 1982d and 1982c.

their work places and living areas and their political rights were suspended. Although the government regarded this as a humane way of treating collaborators (because in other processes they would have been shot), it put considerable pressure on those who had been obliged to join organisations against their will, and now were kept out of certain types of work they could do.[57] The reasoning behind the condemnation of those who had worked for the colonial state, if pushed to its logical conclusion, meant that all who had lived in the areas controlled by the colonial government were collaborators. This kind of assumption clearly lay behind party and government actions in the district of Mueda. [58]

The relaunching of an internal debate and holding out a hand to forces previously regarded with suspicion was accompanied by a campaign to respect legality. Many were freed from prisons and reeducation camps.[59] But the lack of respect for legality continued to be a structural problem in Mozambique. Repression was a resource that the state used to patch up its eroding legitimacy and to respond to forces which challenged it.

The disintegration of the scientific socialism strategy applied from 1974 onwards continued after the Fourth Congress.

3.4 The state out of the market place (1984-1986)

Unable to establish total hegemony and facing a challenge from various forces inside and outside Mozambique, the Party and the state made more concessions to the challengers (internal, regional and international), while trying to keep control of the transformations. Changes were made which allowed Party and state leaders to own private business. Preparations for joining the IMF and the World Bank were under way as early as 1984. Efforts were made in various ministries to prepare statistics and other information required by the IMF and the World Bank.[60]

The negotiations with the World Bank were a tightly kept secret up until December 1985 when the information was released in the People's Assembly originating a heated debate. For the first time, differences among the FRELIMO leadership towards development strategies were aired in full.[61]

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57 Machel: 1982e.

58 See Chapter Nine.

59 Machel: 1984a.

60 Interview with Luís Pereira: 1991.

61 Assembleia Popular: 1984.

In 1984 the military situation worsened. War, drought and floods put an additional strain on the economic situation which continued to deteriorate. In Tete Province, the first years of a prolonged famine were already established. The Government did not possess resources to import either food or any other much needed, consumer goods. A pressing need to solve the debt question emerged. 1982 was the last year in which Mozambique was capable of servicing its debt. Contacts with the Paris and London Clubs were started to reschedule the debt. An awareness grew that the model implemented from 1975 onwards was unsustainable.[62]

The need for foreign financial assistance led to contacts between the Mozambican government and the major western countries: the USA, Britain, West Germany and France.[63] The profile of Mozambique's foreign relations underwent a change. Mozambique obtained the support of the Tory government in Britain led by Margaret Thatcher and normalised relations with the US, which started a program of development aid.[64] A Mozambican ambassador was sent to Washington, relations with West Germany were normalised by signing the Berlin clause, and Mozambique joined the IMF and the World Bank and signed up for Lome III. Contacts with western governments to obtain financial support reveal three main conditionality issues:

i) Need for changes in the relationship with the Soviet Union and the Socialist block.
ii) Adoption of a development strategy based on free market ideology, devaluing the metical to a "correct" exchange rate, and dissemination of statistics and data.
iii) Establishment of relations with South Africa in order to support western efforts towards a transition to a post-apartheid system. [65]

The Mozambican government explained to some western governments that it agreed with the economic policy recommendations but had reservations about political changes. [66] But in the end the same pressures came through the World Bank and the IMF. Contacts with South Africa, which

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62 For a public discourse analysis of Mozambique's ten years of independence, see Ministério da Agricultura: 1985; Ministério do Comercio: 1985; Ministério de Construção e Aguas: 1985; Ministério da Educação: 1985a,b,c,d; Ministério da Justiça: 1985a,b; Ministério da Industria e Energia: 1985. For a different perspective than the government's on the first ten years see: Thomashausen: 1986.

63 Machel: 1984b. For the "ideas" about Mozambique of these countries in the beginning of the 20th Century, see Smith: 1991.

64 Vieira et al.: 1988.

65 Osman: 1990c; Osman: 1991b; Ratilal: 1991.

66 Osman: 1990c.

had already started in 1983, led to the signing of the Nkomati Accord on 16 March 1984. [67]

The foreign policy measures accepted by the government were accompanied by legislative measures to encourage foreign investment. A Foreign Investment Code was adopted. The role of national capitalists was recognised, and the state supported their activities.[68]

There had never been any specific law restricting the role of private enterprises in Mozambique, but the government clarification drew a response from a major donor, the USA, which started a program in support of the private sector. The FRELIMO leadership considered that its diplomatic endeavours had paid off:

> "In the international arena we have neutralised the imperialist siege, the net that imperialism wanted to close around us. We managed to advance in isolating the aggressive forces in our region. We strengthened our alliances and we won more friends. () While respecting our socialist options we promoted co-operation with all the members of the international community." [69]

3.5 The free market strategies (1986-1990)

In 1986 the development strategy was (re)conceptualised again and policies were adapted to agreements with the IMF.

Changes were made in the internal political structure to maintain power and to broaden the social base of support for the government and the ruling party.[70] Initially the new changes were justified as not in contradiction with socialist options. All changes were made by a Parliament elected in the previous period, when the country was a one party state. Its members were regarded as defenders of FRELIMO options.

In January 1987, the PRE (Economic Recovery Program) was approved by the People's Assembly. At the same time a new chairman for the

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67 Brittain: 1988:134,135.

68 O'Meara: 1991, presents a critique of Mozambique which is mainly motivated by the Nkomati Accord.

69 Machel: 1986b. See also Howe and Ottaway: 1987.

70 The problems linked to the abuse of human rights in Mozambique have been documented by Amnesty International (Amnesty International: 1989). Four of my interviews were with people who described their own experiences in prison. It reminded me much of the descriptions of jail made by nationalists during the colonial period.

Assembly was nominated. The head of the legislative body was no longer the head of state. The theory of unity of power was abandoned and one which recognised the separation of executive, legislative and judicial power began to be adopted. The negotiations with the IMF led Mozambique to start applying the PRE - an adjustment program cast in the IMF mould. Prices were liberalised, government management of the market practically came to an end, budgetary cuts were made in the social sectors, and major policy changes were introduced in health and education, where a system granting access on the basis of earnings was established. Previously universal access to social services had been an essential element in FRELIMO development strategy.[71]

The PRE was implemented over three years (1986/1989) and the first assessment by the World Bank and the IMF indicated mixed results. In terms of macro-economic indicators and policy change there was a more realistic approach to economic problems and policies were consistent with the defined development goals, but poverty was on the increase.

Mozambique's foreign debt had grown, as had its dependence on foreign sources to meet its external financial requirements. Exports had not increased substantially. War was considered the main obstacle to development.[72]

The PRE was adopted in a context where the government and FRELIMO had to contend with five sets of pressures:

i) The failure of previous economic models;[73]
ii) Existence of internal pressures to abandon socialism;[74]
iii) Change in the world order i.e. the change of Soviet policies under Gorbatchev and the collapse of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc;
iv) Aid conditionality by all donors including those critical of the World Bank and the IMF;
v) Political conditionality imposed by the US and Britain in the Southern African context to secure Mozambique's co-operation in a managed transition from apartheid to majority rule;

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71 For a general debate on World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs (SAPs) see Gibbon: 1991; Beckman: 1990. See also Hermele and Rudebeck: 1989.

72 Osman: 1991b; Osman: 1990a.

73 Azam and Faucher: 1988; Azevedo: 1990: Bager: 1989 and Birgegaard: 1990a.

74 Silva: 1987a describes FRELIMO militants' critique of the party economic, social and political performance. Silva: 1987b shows the solution adopted: hear the public opinion.

Which of the pressures were more important, the internal or external ones? The internal pressures limited the government's room for manoeuvre. Outside pressures were determinant in imposing the rhythm of change. The government could not continue to have access to external financial resources or debt rescheduling if it did not change the value of the metical and liberalise the economy by removing barriers to the full development of the private sector.[75] Those who paid the piper set the tune.

Three important areas of negative effects can be distinguished:

I) the disruption of the social sectors (health, education) where access has been easy for those who have money,[76]
II) the growth of a speculative capitalist sector
III) the weakening of the state because the few highly skilled cadres have moved into the private sector. The post-colonial government had prioritised education, because "the diffusion and legitimisation of the new political and social system needed the maximum extension of the socialisation function attributed to the school system" and "the emergence of a national awareness and the unification of different cultures and traditions could only be achieved through a unified educational system in the whole territory".[77]

Privatisation has not been linear or free from contradiction. Health workers have defended the public sector in health care arguing that "as a government we have to take very responsible measures. We are committed to providing medical care to the whole of the population".[78]

Whatever the justifications given for PRE, success seems difficult to achieve[79].

"The general economic model underlying the prescription for overcoming Mozambique's problems, however, is problematic. It relies on the economy being able to expand exports substantially, while the investment budget - and a large part of national consumption - is totally dependent on a sustained and increasing external support over a considerable time period. The current account deficit is expected to increase by 20% from 1990 to 1994, with exports at that point still

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75 Roesch: 1988:7; Mittelman: 1991.

76 See Alvarinho: 1988, Green: 1989; Martins: 1983; Birgegaard: 1990a and Adam: 1990a.

77 Brambilla: 1990:6. See also Nhawoto: 1985; Nhawoto: 1988; Medeiros: 1989.

78 Southern African Economist: 1991.

79 For PRE and its results, see Waterhouse: 1991, 1992a,b.

covering less than 20% of imports. Such an externally-funded debt-financing growth model is precarious and it must make some heroic assumptions about the future ". [80]

Major changes happened in two other aspects of Mozambique's contemporary development, concerning the war and the political system: a multi-party system was installed: a peace accord was signed with RENAMO in 1992. [81]

One of the new features of the political system in Mozambique, which emerged as from 1989 was the recognition of parties other than FRELIMO. Numerous organisations have made a public appearance but up until 1992 only four had been legally registered.

4 Contradictions and changes in development policies

Government discourse has presented the changes neither as re-conceptualisation of its analyses nor as reformulation of policies, but as a continuation of the socialist development strategy.

The new policies were justified as:

i) being in line with the tenets of socialism and
ii) a continuation of the basic choices made in 1977 at the Third FRELIMO Congress. This legitimising reference to the Third Congress continued up until the Fifth Congress, in 1989, when the party formally ceased to be marxist-leninist.

The development strategies applied between 1974 and 1990 presented contradictory features.[82] The policies applied after 1979 altered the basic assumptions of the previous strategy of full socialism, which nevertheless continued to be presented as an obligatory reference to justify

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80 Disch: 1989c. For the World Bank's own analysis of Mozambique, see World Bank: 1989; World Bank: 1990a,b,c; World Bank: 1992.

81 Mário: 1992; Gonçalves: 1989; Maier: 1989. See also articles by Paul Fauvet in Mozambique File for the year 1991. For RENAMO's views see RENAMO: 1989. See also Wennberg: 1992. Gentili: 1995 describes the division of spoils between FRELIMO and RENAMO at the negotiation table.

82 The contradictions were of two types. Horizontal or internal contradictions were those related to the development strategies and associated policies themselves. Their degree of internal coherence, possibility of application, translation to applicable policies and projects. Vertical contradictions are the ones which pertain to the relationship between the strategy and the social and natural realities of Mozambique. Its complex climatic and ecological conditions and its heterogeneous social reality (ethnic, cultural, racial, linguistic, economic, political and social). See also Murteira: 1991.

the changes. The strategies applied after 1986 were based on the free market, seen as the regulator of the economy. Prices were set by supply and demand. The state role was defined, after 1986, as creating conditions for the exercise of private initiative, whereas in 1977 it was defined as killing the crocodile while it is small.[83]

The development strategies adopted delivered neither social equality nor economic prosperity. Two main reasons led the government and the party in power to change the development options:

i) the low level of outputs in terms of conventional economic indicators
ii) the negative sanctions from within the nation state and from the world system.

The holders of state power changed their development strategies - at least in the public record - because they were unsustainable socially, politically, economically, culturally and ecologically.[84]

The development strategies were not sustainable socially and politically because they did not consider the heterogeneous social, economic and political reality of Mozambique and went against the interests of those very peasants and workers whom FRELIMO regarded as the social basis of the Revolution.[85] Those who held state power disregarded social reality, which was seen as capable of undergoing a massive social engineering project designed in line with the visions and values of the "Revolutionary Nationalists" i.e. elimination of bourgeois or capitalist elements. This led to faulty analysis of reality. The idealised analyses of the liberation war and of the end of colonialism, used to justify the choice of the development strategies, were very reductionistic. It was claimed that FRELIMO won the war militarily and that power was transferred from the colonial masters. The national liberation struggle was a key factor in the collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime but was not the only one. Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique - as in the other colonies - was full of contradictions and about to fall or die a natural death due to the incapacity-impotence of the Portuguese rulers to strike a balance between different factions and alter the colonial system.

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83 Machel: 1977c; Machel: 1986a; Machel: 1985e.

84 For FRELIMO's analyses of Mozambique, its values and objectives, see Braganca et al.: 1975.

85 For a general analysis and theoretical formulation see Rudebeck: 1986b, 1989, 1990 and 1991.

The post-colonial development strategies were generally formulated from an ideological or political standpoint.[86] Options for development were chosen after political decisions were taken. These political decisions were always presented as a consensus and a result of collective discussion. Development decisions were taken at the political level and by political leaders. These decisions had to be applied by the party itself or by the state apparatus even when judged to be incorrect. The FRELIMO leadership was also not homogeneous in terms of visions of development and social and political projects. There is a constant gap between policy as formulated on paper or in public discourses and the way in which it was implemented. The public discourse was very much wishful thinking. The actions taken to produce change in a given reality were not consistent with the public discourse. Policy formulation came after action had already been undertaken. Although the socialist option model was only systematised in the Third FRELIMO Congress in 1977, the application of the policies started immediately in 1974 after FRELIMO formally took the state machinery into its hands. The "nationalisation policies" formally announced in July 1975 had already been decided at Tofo,[87] shortly prior to independence. Most of the decisions taken by FRELIMO concerning rural development and spelled out at the Third Congress had already been announced by Samora Machel in the Rovuma to Maputo journey of 1975.

Post-colonial development strategies attracted opposition from those social groups who had political interests and post-colonial projects different from those of the FRELIMO leadership. Opposition to official policies was considered a crime and outlawed. This meant that opposition to government options had to be clandestine. Groups marginalised from power and decision making resorted to covert forms of opposition. Internal sanctions to development strategies applied differed from social group to social group. Peasants sold a good part of their grain surpluses for a counterpart in manufactured goods at official prices, while reserving another part to sell at market prices on the "candonga" (parallel market). Traders also used different strategies to counter government controls and regulations (escape from price controls, sale of goods on the candonga, export of capital).

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86 For contradictions and limits of various FRELIMO policies, see Adam: 1990c for agricultural policies; Pankova: 1990 for the lack of understanding of peasant reality; Roesch: 1986a,b for rich peasants strategies; Sato: 1987 for agricultural co-operatives; Serra: 1991 for development policy options, and Tickner: 1989 for agricultural commercialisation.

87 Reis and Muivane: 1975.

The external sanctions[88] on the development strategies came not only from states but also from international financing agencies. Mozambique did manage to get credits at commercial rates from various organisations until 1982, the last year the country managed to service its debt. After 1982 Mozambique lost its credit worthiness and sanctions were applied in terms of acceptance of World Bank and IMF recommendations. Support for the development strategies of the post-colonial government also came from relations it maintained with other states.[89] Mozambique received support from several countries in terms of credit lines, goods, investment funds, equipment etc. These channels also provided military and development aid. These state to state relations were established in a context of "sanctions", positive and negative. The transformations in FRELIMO policies were destined to improve the relationship by reducing negative sanctions. This meant obtaining more support in terms of aid but also changes in diplomatic support for the government and condemnation of RENAMO or any other challengers.

Mozambique acted in the international milieu in a multitude of ways. In some cases it associated itself with the geo-political interests of certain powers in the region such as the US or Britain who wanted to ensure that the transition to post-apartheid South Africa would be favourable to their interests. In other cases Mozambique did play on East-West conflict taking up a set of positions which allowed it to defend its own national interests by taking advantage of "big power rivalry".

To streamline the economic, political and social system that they defended the "revolutionary nationalists" modified their development strategies. First they made minor adjustments e.g. removing the "nós de estrangulamento" (bottlenecks). This removal of "barriers" was done in a haphazard manner in the first period of development. In 1978 when a shortage of consumer goods was felt in Maputo, the government used credit lines to import canned meat and beans from Brazil, buses were imported from Hungary, etc.. Later a rationing system - the Novo Sistema de Abastecimento - was organised in Maputo and was supposed to be extended to other major towns. The only city outside Maputo which benefited was Beira. Later, strategies were changed, e.g. the withdrawal of the state from retail trade and price liberalisation. The queue, one of the most important institutions of post-colonial Mozambique, became invisible again. The position in the queue was no longer marked by the moment of arrival or the social importance of the individual, but by the amount of money the individual possessed.

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88 I have used the English term sanction as meaning both 'penalty for disobedience' and 'reward for obedience attached to a rule of conduct'. I have not used the term in the sense of ratification, agreement, permission or authorisation.

89 For a more detailed analysis see Chapters Five and Six.

The development model chosen from the beginning, 1974/1975, (a heavy reliance on external investments) would not allow for sustained economic growth. The investment patterns chosen (heavy industry, large scale projects) were wrong.[90] Notes of warning about the negative effects of "tendencies towards a capital intensive, import biased, high technology development" were sounded as early as 1980[91]. Modern style development "implies imports of capital goods and also intermediary inputs. The economy inherited from the Portuguese was dependent on the foreign sector. Exports became less and less able to finance the import needs. Such a development is not viable in the long run. These tendencies towards a dependent development have been accelerated since independence in 1975 and the discussions of the Perspective Plan do not indicate that this trend will be broken. Taken together, the results are alarming. The Mozambican economy will tend to grow at a much lower rate than it could and foreign debt will be increasing rapidly so that eventually the balance-of-payments constraint will make this strategy unworkable". [92] Later events proved the truth of this prediction.

Development strategies had entered what Mats Friberg has called the circle of Social Breakdown. in his analyses of the crisis of the welfare state.[93] His model is useful for understanding the limits of the development strategies applied in post-colonial Mozambique because they, like the development strategies of the welfare state, were based on the growth and modernisation paradigm. Why where all this policies and strategies adopted? Scott's formulation on high modernism as a development paradigm, captures the situation in a nutshell:

> "The variant of high modernism serves several manifest and latent purposes. It elevates the knowledge and values of the vanguard elite; it gives them the high goal and responsibility of modernising their people, it justifies their rule and whatever draconian measures they feel is necessary, and finally, it radically devalues the knowledge and practices of the population whose lives they are transforming. Popular resistance can be dismissed as obscurantism and 'starting from zero' is justified. It is only such strong convictions, I believe, that can explain why such policies (e.g. collectivisation, ujamaa villagisation) are pursued long after evidence accumulates of the suffering they are

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90 Osman: 1990a.

91 Alberts: 1980:I; Hermele: 1987; Warner: 1989; Warner: 1990; Wield: 1983.

92 Alberts: 1980: ii.

93 Friberg: 1985:7. For an analysis of development policies in Mozambique see Adam: 1990a. See also Brett: 1986 for a wider analysis on Africa.

causing, of the coercion required to apply them, and the actual failures of production which they have brought in their wake".[94]

The development strategies adopted after Independence were punished by internal and external forces, which coalesced. In the next chapter we deal with the issue of opposition to the post-colonial strategies.

[94] Scott: 1995:122.

CHAPTER FIVE

Challenges and challengers to post-colonial development

1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the challenges and challengers to post-colonial development and associated policies. Three types of argument are made:

i) The sanctions imposed against post-colonial developments in Mozambique can be classified in two ways. One classification refers to agreement with or support for government strategies and policies. Positive sanctions equal support, approval. Negative sanctions mean disapproval or opposition. The sanctions (positive and negative) can also be grouped by geographical origin: internal (originating inside the borders of the nation state) and external (originating beyond the borders). There is a relation between internal and external negative sanctions which in certain periods have coalesced. The confluence of internal and external sanctions against the post-colonial state and its development strategies has been conceptualised, in government documentation and scientific literature, as destabilisation.

ii) Destabilisation is a metaphor which has been transformed into an umbrella concept. It hides the nature of a vast range of negative sanctions ranging from everyday forms of resistance by peasants and workers, to acts of mercenaries working for international finance capital and covert interventions by foreign forces. The concept equates all opposition to the state, its policies and strategies and lumps them together as a foreign conspiracy, qualifying them as unjust, illegal and criminal acts.

iii) Post-colonial development strategies and associated policies created the breeding ground for protest and resistance by blocking the post-independence political projects of groups other than the revolutionary nationalists who held state power. This sense of denial created resentment which was used to articulate opposition/negative sanctions against the post-colonial state and government. In the articulation of dissent, various forces - Portuguese or Mozambican finance capital,

sections of the white elite, former settlers and rich peasants - have been involved. The social carriers of destabilisation, whose interests it defended and who decided to foster its expansion or adoption, have been young and "déclassé" elements. In their actions in rural areas they have used both force and a legitimisation strategy which tried to harness peasant grievances against the state, and its local representatives. RENAMO's trajectory is the trajectory of a certain "decolonisation elite" that was being nurtured by the colonial state to inherit power. Its main goal has been to force the post-colonial holders of state power (the revolutionary nationalists) to relinquish their monopoly over it.

The official rendering of destabilisation analysis in Mozambique often verges on a perfect image of conspiracy theory. All opposition comes from outside. According to the government its good policies have been destroyed by "infiltrates", literally the infiltrators. agents of the enemy.[1] Academic analyses have dealt with the phenomenon on a topical basis - case studies - or through the analysis of published sources. Differences exist in the analyses produced with regard to: i) the methodologies used by the researchers; ii) the scientific discipline of the analyst (from archaeologists to journalists and anthropologists) and iii) particular geographic area where they have worked.

2 Conceptualising the counter revolution in Mozambique

The concepts used to characterise challenges posed to the post-colonial state and to the holders of state power, often very confusing, correspond to the way each group of analysts looks at the war and at the history of RENAMO, regarded as the principal organisation behind it. Some of the concepts i.e. destabilisation, proxy, pseudo, are in line with conspiracy theories which at the outset transform any opposition to a government into an act of foreigners, minorities, conspirators. The contradictions which produced the situation in the first place are reduced to a secondary dimension.

The legitimacy of the government in power is unchallenged and the challengers deprived of legitimacy. Local dynamics of the violence are ignored.[2] Holders of state power use designations like bandits, counter-

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[1] For a review of analyses on RENAMO see Chapter Four of this thesis. See also Darch: 1990; Hall: 1989; Green: 1987. For a critique of Geffray's work on RENAMO (Geffray: 1990) see O'Laughlin: 1992.

[2] Kruglansky: 1991.

revolutionaries, surrogates, destabilisers, or terrorists to legitimise themselves and strip the challengers of any legitimacy. Challengers to those who hold state power consider themselves as "resistance fighters" or "liberators". Each party in the conflict tries to convey a message that its struggle is just and has popular support.

In this context words become part of the war for legitimacy. The diversity of designations for the war and for the organisations which have been involved can be grouped into five categories according to the indicator used to characterise it.

2.1 The type of warfare

The first category refers to the post colonial situation in Mozambique as a war, and qualifies it in accordance with the type of warfare used - guerrilla[3], irregular, low intensity conflict/low intensity war or regular war[4]

Concepts which refer to the type of warfare, Low Intensity Warfare (LIW), Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), guerrilla, are concepts that reduce opposition to the post-colonial state to a mere type of warfare and conceal the true extent of the military operations, loss of life and destruction. LIW refers to a type of war that can be developed with the minimum involvement of US combat personnel.[5] In different typologies of war Mozambique's armed conflict has been classified as a "civil", "internal" or "external internal" war. Typologies of the war in Mozambique simplify a complex process which has elements of different types of war.[6]

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[3] Challiand considers that "the last vestige of guerrilla warfare is its use by South Africa in Angola and Mozambique, and later by the US, to destabilise marxist-leninist regimes that are themselves a product of an armed insurgency. The characteristic feature of these guerrilla wars, notably in Mozambique and Nicaragua (the case of Angola is more complex), is that they have no need for popular support. A sanctuary, commando operations based on sabotage and harassment, are sufficient if carried out on a large enough scale to force the state into an exhausting permanent mobilisation. This leads to economic paralysis and general upheaval". Challiand: 1987:64.

[4] For Minter, RENAMO is not, as often portrayed, a loose collection of warlords and roving bands, but is rather an army with a clear hierarchical structure and good command, control and communications. Minter: 1990:11

[5] Sarkesian: 1985:9; Klare: 1988; Kornbluh: 1987. See also Bjelajac: 1962; Worsley: 1961; Yarbrough and Yarbrough: 1962; Williams and Robin: 1982.

[6] For an analysis of problems of classification of wars see Gurr: 1970:10. For a concrete classification of the war in Mozambique see K.Lindgren: 1991:13; Wiberg: 1991:25-27.

2.2 The illegitimacy of the organisation

The second category of concepts uses as an explicit indicator the illegitimacy of the organisation which is challenging the holders of state power and as an implicit category the legitimacy of the holders of state power: the situation in Mozambique becomes the responsibility of pseudo-guerrillas, proxy armies, surrogates, bandits or armed bandits, revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries.

Concepts that explicitly or implicitly refer to the legitimacy/illegitimacy of each party involved use terms such as proxy[7], surrogates and pseudo-guerrillas to characterise the agents of destabilisation - in the Mozambican case, RENAMO.

These concepts assume that the organisation under analysis does not have an independent existence but is part of some other organisation. The relationship between states or between states and other movements (parties, national liberation groups) has been portrayed as the "carrot and stick" relation. One of the partners is given support (carrot) when its behaviour is considered correct and is punished (stick) when it fails to provide what is expected. The "carrot and stick" image does not reflect a two-way dynamic inter-relationship in which the two partners can both offer a carrot and a stick. The concept of pseudo-guerrilla was used by the Rhodesian Army to refer to its units and personnel who operated as nationalists in disguise.[8]

Bandit is a widespread term used to designate contemporary anti-state organisations all over Africa. The designation, also applied to RENAMO in Mozambique, has been used to cover a wide range of movements and groups fighting from different perspectives and for varied objectives [9]. Organisations accused of banditry range from national liberation movements to groups struggling for recognition of their legitimate religious, social or economic rights.[10] Bandit was the term used, in 1990, by 10 out of the 50 governments of established states in Africa, to refer to those who challenged state power. Challengers are referred to by those in power as bandits although each of the organisations has its own history, objectives, purposes, social basis, support, external alliances etc.

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7 For a debate see Dunner: 1981.

8 Flower: 1987:115.

9 For FRELIMO characterisation of RENAMO as "armed bandits" see Machel: 1982e:61-66; Machel: 1984d; FRELIMO: 1987d. A critique of the European conceptions of banditry and its application to Africa see Austen: 1983.

10 Nzongola-Ntalaja: 1985; Crummey: 1983a:7; Ranger: 1983:373. See also Boseman: 1976.

The bandit of the status quo becomes the resistance fighter of those challenging the establishment. Resistance[11] is in fact a problematic concept: we may know what is resisted (exploitation, domination, insecurity) but "once we leave behind the idea that proletarian resistance necessarily prefigures a classless socialist society, we have no simple yardstick for measuring the significance of a particular expression of resistance".[12] The same type of complexity is encountered when applying the concept in other contexts (colonialism, neo-colonialism, capitalism). The concept of resistance as applied to colonial Mozambique has been criticised as romantic, as running together different struggles and processes.[13]

2.3 International relations

A third category uses as an indicator international relations and norms of conduct between nations, and the situation in Mozambique is presented as destabilisation, imperialist conspiracy. The concept linked to international relations most commonly used in Mozambique is destabilisation.

Destabilisation as a word and as a concept is a newcomer to Anglo-Saxon lexicography. The Oxford Dictionary quotes its first usage in 1974. The term can be traced to the US covert operations against the Unidad Popular Government in Chile.[14] The US Ambassador in Chile under Unidad Popular, Nathaniel Davis, attributes the paternity of the term destabilisation to a US senator, Michael Harrigan.[15] US government destabilisation activities have been reported in Central and South America: Nicaragua,[16] El Salvador, Guyana,[17] Grenada [18] Jamaica.[19]

The President of Jamaica, Michael Manley, ousted by a process of destabilisation, offers a definition:

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11 See Scott: 1986; Wilson: 1992. For discussions on the concept of resistance see Ranger: 1979.

12 Brandell: 1990:19.

13 Isaacman: 1974; Walt: 1982.

14 Davis: 1985:316; Alexander: 1978:226-235; Simonsen and Sorensen: 1976; Sweezy and Magdoff: 1974; Vilder: 1974.

15 Davis: 1985:320.

16 Bodenheimmer and Gould: 1989: 77-78.

17 Interview with Jagan: 1983 in Searle: 1983.

18 Seattle: 1983.

19 Manley: 1982.

"destabilisation describes a situation where some forces, either inside or outside the country - or two forces working together, in concert, one outside and another inside, set out to create a situation of instability and panic by design".[20]

Destabilisation is a metaphor that describes very well the situation as seen by the holders of state power who feel the ground beneath them crumbling because of the actions of various challengers. US intervention became more pronounced during the Reagan presidency. "The ideology of the Reagan Doctrine is not new: it is a reassertion of the basic Cold War precept that the United States has the right and the ability to conduct secret wars of aggression against governments Washington deems undesirable".[21]

In Southern Africa, the term "destabilisation" was popularised after the independence of Mozambique and Angola and the accession to power of parties committed to socialism in these countries. It has been used to designate South African (with imperialist and western support) efforts to change governments or their policies throughout the sub-continent: in Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Angola and Lesotho.[22]

2.4 Social processes

A fourth category uses as an indicator wider social processes and phenomena (violence, peasant rebellion, insurgency) without trying to use normative concepts.[23]

Concepts which refer to such wider social processes clearly show political manipulation. Designations of insurgency, counter-insurgency or anti-insurgency have been used to describe the war in post-colonial Mozambique. If the first concept describes quite accurately the events, the last two are very politically concocted in the way they are used. Cross border raids by South African forces against the ANC, of the Portuguese army against FRELIMO or of Rhodesian soldiers against ZANU are designated by those organising them or taking part as counter-insurgency or anti-terrorism.

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20 Manley: 1982:138.

21 Kornbluh: 1987: ix. See also Sklar: 1988.

22 Brittain: 1988:107-110; Crummey: 1983a:7.

23 For a debate on the conceptualisation of insurgencies see Desai and Ekstein: 1990. See also Nkendirim: 1977; Olsen: 1991; Tilly: 1963; Galtung: 1974; Worsley: 1961.

To be understood, violence (collective, political, mass) must be set in the general societal context.[24] Acts of violence by those challenging state power have to be understood in the context of government violence.[25] Violence and the role of the army (even one as problematic as RENAMO) has been seen by social scientists and analysts of Mozambique in ethical terms, thus relegating the whole phenomenon to the level of a persistent inhuman aberration or in romantic terms, as a continuation in the present of old phenomena of anti-colonial and post colonial resistance.[26]

2.5 Sanctions

Dunner argues that, to capture the relationship between two organisations, concepts such as surrogates and proxies should be abandoned and the wider concept "sanctions" used instead. Two types of sanctions can be distinguished "positive" and "negative". In a relationship two partners can apply positive and negative sanctions. A positive sanction rewards compliance with further political, military or economic support. A negative sanction implies reduced support or rewards or a redirection of support so as to show the partner disapproval of his behaviour.[27]

In conclusion, a concept such as sanctions (negative and positive) is more appropriate than the other types because it considers the relationship between two institutions as dynamic.

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[24] On social science perspectives on political violence see Hirsch and Perry: 1973. A illustrative piece on the debate is Apter: 1987, specially the references to terrorism of the right (p.267-268) and primordial terrorism (p.268-270). Interesting similarities between what happened in Mozambique and what is happening in South Africa is conveyed by this appreciation of the violence in KwaZulu: Another witness, director of the Durban Legal Resources Centre Richard Lyster, told the commission that much of the violence could be blamed on a clash between modernising rural people aggressively rejecting the traditional power structures, and chiefs and headmen desperately defending the system. Lyster said traditional leaders, their councils and officials formed the local government system in rural areas and were an integral part of the KwaZulu government. They benefited from the homeland system and were committed to protecting their status and income. The new generation of rural people saw the chieftain ship system as arbitrary and anachronistic. Weekly Mail(SA): 12.04.1992.

[25] Fleming, Stohl and Schmidt: 1988; Ford: 1985.

[26] Ranger: 1979.

[27] Dunner: 1981:356.

3 Theories and destabilisation

A review of theories which try to explain revolution and counter-revolution, instability, war and insurgency would be a gargantuan task.[28] The theories behind explanations of the post-colonial situation in Mozambique constitute a cocktail of psycho-economic theory - "the greater the frustration, the greater the amount of aggression and the greater the intensity of deprivation, the greater the magnitude of political violence",[29] - theories of peasant resistance and of the moral economy of the peasant[30] and Balance of Power theories.[31]

The recent literature on Mozambique and particularly on the war does not address theory and theoretical questions in an overt manner. Theory is enmeshed in the long narrative of empirical material. Some of the texts are more annotated chronologies than histories. They are simplistic renderings of complex issues.

To understand the nature of the counter-revolutionary nationalists one has to step outside of the history of nationalism (in all its variants). The popularised versions of the history of RENAMO (written by those who accept the assumptions of the revolutionary nationalists) trace the organisation back to the foundation of FRELIMO and to efforts by the CIA and PIDE to eliminate FRELIMO. The popularised versions of the history of RENAMO (written by those who accept the assumptions of the counter-revolutionaries) trace the origin of RENAMO back to struggles within the nationalist movement during the formation of FRELIMO. Analysts who share FRELIMO's values, ideologies and political objectives consider outside factors in its development a secondary issue but regard the outside element in RENAMO's development as a fundamental factor. Researchers who share RENAMO's values, political objectives and ideology consider its development solely a result of internal contradictions in Mozambique in the post-colonial period.[32]

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28 See Huntington: 1968:45. Not only does social and economic modernisation produce political instability, but the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernisation. For a overview of social sciences theories used to explain instability and stability see Schultz and Douglas: 1984. Ten Theories in search of Central American Reality in Schultz and Douglas: 1984:3-57.

29 Schultz: 1984:13.

30 Scott: 1976.

31 Schroeder: 1992:683-686; Zur: 1987.

32 For documentation of peasants struggles vis a vis Aldeias Comunais see Adam et al: 1986 and Adam: 1990b., See also Araujo: 1988.

4 RENAMO

The Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) - Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) - has been regarded by the post-colonial government in Mozambique, by itself and by analysts, as the main instrument of destabilisation. An analysis which tries to understand the social, political and economic processes in post-colonial Mozambique has to reject the analytical parameters supplied by the two strands of nationalism in Mozambique, the nationalist revolutionaries and the nationalists, and the myths about the creation and evolution of the organisations which embody their projects.[33]

4.1 The extent of RENAMO's warfronts

RENAMO's attacks all over Mozambique give a false impression of the war. To understand the extent of the war I have constructed an indicator of destabilisation. The indicator is constructed using the same principles used to quantify FRELIMO's control in the liberated areas of Cabo Delgado. The index shows the number of individuals under government control or to whom the state had access inside the territory for every hundred individuals who ought to be present in each province.[34]

Table 5.1. The extent of RENAMO's activities

PROVINCE	POPULATION in 1000	POPULATION OUT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL in 1000	INDICATOR OF RENAMO IMPACT %
Niassa	635	250	39
Cabo Delgado	1134	80	7
Nampula	2943	1059	36
Zambézia	3078	1948	63
Tete	1010	604	60
Manica	764	355	46
Sofala	1242	597	48
Inhambane	1324	109	8
Gaza	1230	108	9
Maputo	550	38	7
Maputo city including Matola	1090	0	0

Source: Ministry of Commerce: 1989

[33] All strands of nationalism joined FRELIMO but this marriage was very short lived because Nationalist Revolutionaries had a hegemony inside the organisation and subalternised the Nationalists or Reformist Nationalists. For a more detailed analysis see Chapter Three of this thesis.

[34] For a quantification of economic losses due to the war see: Rodrigues: 1986.

This indicator shows that the provinces most highly influenced by RENAMO were Zambézia, 63%; Tete, 60%; Sofala, 48%; Manica, 46%; Niassa, 39%; and Nampula, 36%. The comparison can be drawn with the armed struggle led by FRELIMO: figures from 1972 give an equivalent "destabilisation index" for the Portuguese "Circunscrição" of Macondes, 80%; Mocímboa da Praia, 60 %; and Macomia, 3%.

4.2 Myths of creation and evolution

RENAMO's history [35] - government version - is tailored so as to show an anti-popular movement against independence trying to recreate the status quo ante. For Samora Machel, "armed banditry (was) a new phenomenon in the history of Africa. The emergence of armed banditry expresses the resurgence of internal agents of international imperialism".[36] Joaquim Chissano, Samora's successor, follows the same line, albeit phrased differently: "This war was imposed on us to rediscuss History and question the independence and sovereignty of Mozambique".[37] Samora Machel's speeches show a dichotomy in the official analysis of RENAMO. On the one hand RENAMO is dismissed as bandits, but on the other hand complex features in Mozambican history and society (diversity of languages, ethnicity, problems of the armed struggle) are regarded as factors which contributed to the emergence and development of RENAMO.

But official analyses are omiss on the relationship between the crisis in the government's development strategy and the growth of RENAMO.

RENAMO's public discourse about its own values and history became openly publicised in Mozambique after the peace agreement with the government.

RENAMO's account of its own history articulates a counter point discourse to FRELIMO's discourse about itself or of the revolutionary nationalists about themselves. RENAMO presents FRELIMO as a divided group, at the service of a foreign force, communists, without respect for the people's traditions, while FRELIMO presents itself as a united group, at the service of national and popular interests, revolutionaries but rooted in the people's struggles and traditions.

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[35] Various overviews of RENAMO evolution exist. Vines: 1992b; Taju: 1988a; FRELIMO: 1987d; Johnson and Martin: 1989; Oliveira: 1990; Braganca: 1986; Marsh: 1981; Meldrum: 1988; Fauvet: 1990a; Sitoe: 1991 present diverse approaches to the problem.

[36] Machel: 1983e.

[37] Chissano: 1990.

RENAMO's first congress took place in 1989 in Maringue, 13 years after its foundation and the start of the war. The speeches by RENAMO president Afonso Dhlakama stressed two points: the reasons for RENAMO's struggle and willingness to find a negotiated solution.

> "As president of RENAMO, I personally want to make clear to the world that RENAMO is not fighting to replace individuals or to transfer power from one group to another. Rather, we are fighting to give the people of Mozambique for the first time in their history the opportunity to choose their leaders who will serve their expectations and respect their traditions".[38]

RENAMO was presenting itself as responsible for the change of political system.

The difference in values, when compared to FRELIMO's, is expressed in the documents from that RENAMO congress. The history of national liberation in Mozambique is retold in a RENAMO version to legitimise RENAMO's discourse.

> "The consolidation of national unity under the leadership of Mondlane, generated a profound sense of national liberation (...) During this phase Mondlane was killed under strange circumstances. In his place appeared a minority group, characterised by a preponderance of people with a total disregard for our indigenous tradition and culture, who proceeded to impose foreign ideologies on FRELIMO and our people. International communism soon replaced our essential African values creating confusion, suffering, resentment and hostility".[39]

This discourse of RENAMO has a certain revivalist characteristic. It not only tries to insert RENAMO into the struggle between "revolutionaries" and "reactionaries" in FRELIMO (revolutionary nationalists versus reformist or moderate nationalists) but it also tries to co-opt the traditional elite, chiefs and régulos, who FRELIMO regarded as part of the colonial system, although a large group amongst them did develop anti-colonial activities and even supported FRELIMO. RENAMO's syncretism (Mondlane, anti-colonial struggle, respect for tradition, redressment of injustices, participation of all groups regardless of their ideologies) is a strategic syncretism.

The clashes between segments of the modern elite (the revolutionary nationalists, the reformist nationalists, the conservative or black nationalists) which occurred during the liberation struggle and were part of a "crisis

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[38] Dhlakama: 1989:1.

[39] RENAMO: 1991:2; Frank: 1990.

because of ideological divergence" [40] are being stated again in public. The discourse of RENAMO leaders is similar to the discourse of the conservative line in FRELIMO in 1968-69. Revolutionary Nationalists are being confronted by the Nationalists in 1990.

RENAMO's behaviour during the peace negotiations was not that of a movement which wanted to publicise its values but of one which wanted to use its capital of violence to affirm itself.

A cease-fire agreement was signed between the government and RENAMO in Rome in 1992. Elections were held in 1994. [41]

In 1979, the Movimento Nacionalista de Mozambique (MONAMO) was created "in response to the need to organise a force which gave a certain political ideology to the National Resistance Movement and because we perceived that Southern Rhodesia and the government of Ian Smith were using the armed struggle in Mozambique to defend their interests and use our nationalists as cheap mercenaries". This effort did not bear fruit thanks to opposition from South Africa, and from MNR leaders such as Evo Fernandes.[42]

In 1988, RENAMO veterans published a communiqué in the Portuguese right wing newspaper "Tempo" which revealed a "period of crisis inside RENAMO. The movement which was created to struggle for democracy and independence became an instrument of South African racist policy". The communiqué states that Dhlakama, a runaway criminal, became an agent of NIS, the National Information Service, (South African intelligence service). The assassinations of Mateus Lopes, João da Silva Ataíde and Evo Fernandes are mentioned as acts committed by Dhlakama's agents because he was afraid of reconciliation with the Mozambican government. [43]

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[40] Machel: 1977d.

[41] Guebuza: 1992; Mário: 1991a, b; Mario: 1992; Rafaelli: 1992; Anon.: 1992; Davies: 1991; Darnau: 1991; Gentili: 1995.

[42] Dias: 1990.

[43] These particular assassinations took place at a moment of conflict. The assassination of Evo Fernandes has been presented as the work of a Portuguese working for SNASP - (Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular), the Mozambican secret service. In the case of other assassinations the available information also points towards some conflicts over who did it and why. For a resume see Vines: 1991b; Oliveira: 1990 presents a first hand account of some of the executions. One of the problems with the analysis of RENAMO is the need for extreme care with sources. Individuals who had carriers in RENAMO and later abandoned the organisation had been linked to SNASP. Constantino Reis who led a group of students protesting against the post-Independence government joined RENAMO and later defected. Information gathered by me shows that Reis was recruited by SNASP. Researchers who interviewed Reis had the impression that Reis was linked to Mozambican security. Paulo Oliveira describes Reis' and his own trajectory in a manuscript. His early liaisons with SNASP are shown.

RENAMO's history - RENAMO's version - is being rewritten to show a movement based on the people, trying to redress old grievances. Dhlakama downplayed the reports of terror and violence committed by his organisation claiming that "No guerrilla can survive 14 years by cutting off the noses and ears of the people. It is the population which gives us food, which knows local conditions and gives us information about enemy movements".[44] More recent versions of this self-portrait try to equate RENAMO with all the guerrilla movements which emerged in the Portuguese colonies and in Southern Africa. "We emerged just as FRELIMO, the ANC, SWAPO, ZANU, ZAPU, PAIGC, and MPLA emerged, in a situation of oppression where political dialogue was not possible". The question of foreign support - from Rhodesia, South Africa and others - is regarded as "a necessity determined by the general situation and a condition that any guerrilla movement in southern Africa and in the Portuguese colonies had to accept (...) No guerrilla movement could operate without a rear base of support".[45]

4.3 A counter-revolutionary front

In the creation of RENAMO a convergence of all the groups opposing the revolutionary nationalists occurred. Mozambican and foreign participants in the creation and development of RENAMO can be traced through the documentation.

The main internal groups which coalesced under RENAMO were:[46]

i) remnants of the colonial establishment, settlers, who maintained themselves in Mozambique after Independence,
ii) sections of the nationalist elite struggling for a post-colonial order (market forces, multi party system, freedom of the press, private property, private education and health systems)[47] different from the one defended by FRELIMO (nationalisation, socialism, one party system, co-operatives)
iii) sections of the rural elite[48],

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44 Strandberg: 1992.

45 Adam: 1995.

46 Machel: 1982h; Machel: 1983b. For the debate about revolution and counter-revolution in Mozambique and its history, see Henriksen: 1975. For the general theoretical debate, see Galtung: 1974 and Minter: 1994.

47 Some of these elements have been members of FRELIMO in some period of its history and left or were expelled for ideological or material "deviations".

48 For concrete illustrations see Chapter Ten.

iv) poor peasants,
v) lumpen elements,
vi) individuals who had fought in the Portuguese army,
vii) the white elite - Mozambicans defending a system similar to apartheid South Africa or UDI Southern Rhodesia;
viii) members of the traditional elite,
ix) religious groups inside Mozambique who resented state policies towards religion and education.[49]

Sectors of the catholic church were considered "spiritual inheritors of colonialism just as the armed bandits are the historical continuity of the colonial army".[50]

Internal sanctions against development strategies varied from social group to social group. Peasants sold some of their surplus crops for manufactured goods at official prices, but reserved another part to sell at prices practised on the candonga (black or parallel market). Some peasants refused to live in government designated villages and took refuge in mountainous or inaccessible areas. Other peasants migrated to neighbouring countries. Traders would also devise different strategies to counter government controls and regulations. Religious groups organised clandestine networks. The catholic church adopted an organisational set-up very similar to FRELIMO's committees and developed a grass-roots approach.[51]

The list of the alleged foreign participants in the counter revolution and in the creation of RENAMO includes:[52]

i) Rhodesians, South Africans and Western sectors who had strategic interests in the region in which Mozambique was an important factor;
ii) the Rhodesian Security Police, which was looking for a tool to use against the Zimbabwean nationalist guerrillas and their bases inside Mozambique: they imagined such a force might deter Mozambique from any further support for the Zimbabwean guerrilla movement (pseudo guerrillas organised by the Rhodesian Regime were deployed in Mozambique and units of the Mozambican army disguised as ZANU guerrillas operated inside Rhodesia),

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49 Machel: 1986a.

50 Machel: 1982b:64.

51 See Morier-Genoud: 1994.

52 Nilsson: 1991a.

iii) Sectors of the Portuguese establishment who wanted a form of (de)colonisation that was not a transfer of power.

Evidence about the role of these connections in supporting RENAMO has been documented. For its operations inside Mozambique, RENAMO depended on the Rhodesian regime. Following the Lancaster House Agreement which established the transition to Independence for Zimbabwe, RENAMO was transferred to South Africa.[53] After the 25 April coup in Portugal commando units manned by Mozambicans in the Portuguese army were ordered to return to their areas of origin, bury their weapons and await new orders. These orders were given by Portuguese officers who were accompanied by South African and American advisers. Direct support from Western states for RENAMO is not documented. Existing information points to non-state support given by right wing organisations. In some cases a link between the state (the US government) and right wing organisations - such as the Free the Eagle Foundation - has been established.[54]

From the creation of RENAMO efforts were made to transform the organisation's image from a "proxy" army to a bona fide insurgent organisation. The counter-revolutionary army was supposed to mutate into a counter-revolutionary front englobing all organisations that challenged the post-colonial state and the ruling party. After 1980 the attempt to consolidate a counter-revolutionary front was stepped up: Individuals opposed to FRELIMO and who had been members of movements such as UDENAMO, COREMO, or even of FRELIMO itself at an earlier stage, were invited to regroup under RENAMO. The idea was to give RENAMO a history of opposition and resistance.

But the unification of the opposition did not take place, thanks to continued disagreements among the various individuals and organisations involved.[55] The modern elite was still divided by political project, origin, education, the shareout of positions and international alliances. RENAMO offered a military wing to the nationalists, but at the same time it was tainted with an image of destruction, murder and of being in the service of foreign powers.

The establishment of a counter-revolutionary front was riddled with the same kind of difficulties that the establishment of a revolutionary front had

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53 Flower: 1987:262.

54 Nilsson: 1990; Vines: 1991a:42-50.

55 Vines: 1991b; Machel: 1983b.

faced in the early sixties: conflicts over race, regional origin and ideology.[56] The evolution of RENAMO can be traced to the internal struggles of the Mozambican Nationalist Movements, between the "nationalistes cocardiers" (flag waivers) and the "revolutionary nationalists". RENAMO articulated political and social projects different from those of FRELIMO.

> "From 1962, when we created FRELIMO our struggle was always against armed bandits. Armed by the colonial army, armed by imperialism, always to destroy FRELIMO. (...) These are problems that FRELIMO faced until victory and they were developed by these "boçais" (bums) who lived here, by the ultra-racists who lived here".[57]

The conflicts that emerged within RENAMO show that institutionalising the counter-revolution ran into the same sort of contradictions which Mozambican nationalist parties had encountered earlier. Conflicts within the counter-revolutionary elite were similar to those within the revolutionary nationalist elite.[58]

Two themes dominated the conflict: i) who should be the leader of the organisation and later the president? and ii) what kind of state should exist in Mozambique - a unitary one or a federal republic?

Anti-Communists and those opposed to FRELIMO's socialist policies united around RENAMO. even when criticising its terrorist methods. As one trader said: If it was not for RENAMO we would be dressed today in blue denims and riding bicycles. The allusion was to China or North Korea.[59]

4.4 Ethnicity and the errors of the revolution

The other avenues used by RENAMO to obtain support were linked to "ethnicity". The problem was recognised by Machel in a 1983 speech in Zambézia province: "Our difficulty is that there are chuabos, who are in the minority, the senas, the nyanjas, the lomues, which are sub divided into at least three branches - marendje, lomue-macua, and the lomue-metho. (...) This is essentially the social base that the armed bandit uses to act. When he arrives in a region and says I am Lomue Macua, OK, he is already our son,

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56 Hoile: 1989:94.

57 Machel: 1982e:62; Johnson and Martin: 1986:7-9; Vines: 1991b:11-15; Taju: 1988a; Braganca: 1979; Isaacman: 1993.

58 Vines: 1991a:68; Oliveira: 1990.

59 For an analysis of the relation between FRELIMO's development strategies and the creation of a opposition see Chapter Four.

he is no longer an armed bandit. If he arrives in the zone of the nyanjas and says I am nyanja. OK, he is our son, he is no longer an armed bandit."[60]

In the initial stages of its implantation in Manica Province, where it began its operations, RENAMO acted to redress the wrongdoing of FRELIMO towards the local peasantry.[61]

The "MNR" paid for anything they received from the peasants at high prices, contrasting with FRELIMO "estruturas" (apparatchniks) who demanded free chickens and agricultural products from the peasants. RENAMO respected the elders and did not prohibit local religious cults. This honeymoon between RENAMO and the population only lasted some months and ended as soon as RENAMO started to use force to oblige the peasants to do what it wanted. The terrorist practice of these groups rapidly eliminated the support they initially enjoyed from certain strata of the local population.

A point in dispute between analysts of post-colonial Mozambique has been the relationship between RENAMO's growth and the errors of FRELIMO's development strategies. The errors of the revolution, especially towards the peasants, as a motor of rebellion, constitutes the basis of the argument presented by Geffray.

> "This wild army has succeeded in taking advantage of the crisis and the social disponibility of rural youth and it has succeeded in operating a systematic capture of this population on the scale of Mozambique. It has incorporated the young captives into its instituted hierarchical apparatus, it organised the conditions for their adherence to the social project of war which motivates it (...) It concomitantly succeeded in exploiting the crisis in rural areas and in gaining territorial pockets where the population placed itself under its vital dependency and thus submitted itself to the strategic exigencies of its reproduction".[62]

I have participated in research which according to one commentator, "although with different concerns and different language, reaches conclusions similar to those of the French anthropologist, Christian Geffray".[63]

While I agree with Geffray on identifying the problems that explain the dynamics of rural rebellion (forced villagisation, displacement of local élites

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60 Machel: 1983e.

61 For the evidence see Anon.: 1984a.

62 Geffray: 1990:75

63 Cahen: 1988:307.

who held political and religious power, land rights, integration of youth, prices of agricultural products), which have also been identified in other situations throughout the history of mankind, and on considering RENAMO as an outlet for frustrations against the government and its policies, some areas of disagreement remain. Geffray fails to relate to the internal differentiation of the peasantry which is seen as a homogeneous block only cut across by age.

But peasant communities are neither homogeneous nor without internal conflict. If youngsters were instrumental for RENAMO activity, which group inside peasant communities was responsible for supporting FRELIMO and villagisation? If the support for RENAMO was so internalised in local culture and society, legitimised by lineage structures, why did RENAMO use terror and violence in Nampula, to teach the peasants that they had to support the "matsangas" and not FRELIMO? Young people also played a role in mobilising support for FRELIMO in the post-colonial period in Nampula. Conflicts within the peasantry in Nampula have a historical dimension which was also expressed during Portuguese occupation. transcended lineage structures and had to do with existing polities. RENAMO and FRELIMO exploited differences within peasant communities to implement their policies.

O'Laughlin criticises the weakness of Geffray's theoretical tools "and his abstraction of the war of the secret services", which seems to O'Laughlin

> "a very dangerous abstraction to make, precisely because the development of class forces within Mozambique and their effect on FRELIMO ideology and practice are so intimately related to the dynamic of external aggression - economic and political as well as military (...).Foci of attack have been chosen precisely to exacerbate or create conflicts between the socialist government and the peasantry rather then to confront directly the power of the state or to construct a counter power". [64]

Geffray's findings for Nampula cannot be generalised for the rest of the country:

> "the nature of popular participation (in the war) was rather different in other parts of the country. As a political movement RENAMO would appear to have never succeeded in transcending its historical origins as an externally organised, ethnically based instrument of destabilisation. Its grassroots social character and praxis, and its tendencies to generate into warlordism, give it more the character of a predatory bandit band then a bona fide popular movement". [65]

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64 O'Laughlin: 1992:25-26.

65 Roesch: 1990b:13.

Whatever the discussions about the classes which existed, their relative strength and relation to power, no-one will deny that class differentiation were clear at independence and that the holders of state power - although a complicated mix - had their own class origin and class position. The case study of Mueda shows precisely the opposite of O'Laughlin's arguments, namely that class forces with perspectives different from those of FRELIMO developed even during the liberation war and continued after independence as a result of the contradictions between FRELIMO's development strategies on the one hand, and on the other, social reality, including the various classes present and their needs, values and projects. FRELIMO's discourse that the Mozambican bourgeoisie was very small, that Salazar, the Portuguese prime minister (a very important ally of FRELIMO because of his policies), had limited the expansion of this class. that Mozambican bourgeois were so few that they could be counted on the fingers of one hand - this discourse had the effect of effacing the class nature of the holders of state power and projecting the myth that they represented workers and peasants.[66]

O'Laughlin's argument can also be easily turned the other way round - foci of attack have been the point of tension between the peasantry and government policies.[67]

The extent of the war both temporally and spatially is explained by Government errors that created a favourable environment for insurgency:

> "we are led to believe that there is a set of situations in the process of creating the new society that objectively permitted the expansion of RENAMO. These are the illegalities, abuses of power, unbalanced social and economic development between the towns and the rural areas and between the North, the Centre and the South, some coercive practices in the implantation of communal villages even when the intentions were good, insufficient study and knowledge of the diverse modes of production coexisting in the Mozambican social formation (including the diversity of forms of the so-called "feudal traditional society") for a correct praxis in the construction of the new society".[68]

The failure of the social revolution has led to the phenomena which are described as destabilisation.

> "It is the failure of the social revolution which provokes increasing dangers of social implosion or ugandisation if one prefers. It is in that sense that, following Gramsci, one can talk of morbid phenomena, of

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66 See Chapter Three.

67 See the case study of Changara district, Chapter Six, and the case study of Sabié, Chapter Ten.

68 Taju: 1988a:33.

> the emergence of actions of society against itself as in the case of the increase of banditism not linked to RENAMO or the appearance of an extremely heterogeneous support base for the latter, a situation which is of course observed and exploited by South African imperialism."[69]

The complexities of the analysis of post-colonial Mozambique are raised by Derlugian. Opposing any unidimensional analysis of the war by trying to link the historical dimensions, the world system perspective and peasant studies, Derlugian considers that armed violence in Mozambique

> "[is] no talk of civil war for there are no civil conflicts and no class factions aspiring to power or defending their power" - should be conceptualised by the Russian word 'smuta', the time of destruction of the social carcass of society - all against all.(...) Due to the crisis of the world system and the destruction of the Portuguese colonial state the entire society tended to become "an historical black-hole, a temporary negative (toward the world-system) non-society. This non-society consisted of non-peasants, non workers and a non-elite, or rather, a lumpen-elite."[70]

4.5 RENAMO and the Mozambican class structure

The relation between RENAMO and classes in the various parts of Mozambique is a complex one. Nilsson sees a complex relationship between different groups of peasants, RENAMO and the government. The villagisation strategy followed by the post-colonial government imposed on communities sites for their villages, as well as the size and organisation of these settlements. He also shows that different strata of the peasantry in Homoine District behaved differently towards RENAMO. Peasants who had limited areas of "machongo" land (i.e. land which permitted a second crop every year and allowed for crops when rains failed) tended to stay longer in RENAMO areas. Nilsson questions the romanticising of the social bandit by Hobsbaum.[71]

The image of life in RENAMO controlled areas given by returnees who fled into government controlled areas or into neighbouring countries is of a very difficult situation, of hunger and sickness. But Dominic Gross of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) gave an image of a natural economy:

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69 Cahen: 1987:94.

70 Derlugian: 1990:451; Derlugian: 1990 :450. In 1992 I also had a long interview with Derlugian in Bissau.

71 Nilsson: 1991a .

C.E.A. DOC

"The people have found a balance with their natural environment. There is no rubbish, no paper, no cigarette buts. They are well-fed and they don't appear to be unhappy. It is a deep, traditional life that hasn't been touched by modern society".[72]

Gross paints a picture of the good and happy primitive, but declines to mention the methods[73] used to create this "deep traditional life" and whether this way of life corresponds to the needs and wishes of those he observed.

The relationship between RENAMO and the population varied from area to area, from period to period, and depending on the military situation, for instance, the level of challenge from the government army.

4.6 RENAMO's violence: Creating water for the fish

RENAMO also managed its support by using a mixture of violence and mobilisation, although the content of the mobilisation was different from that used by FRELIMO. RENAMO's mobilisation was achieved by using pre-independence power structures which still existed in rural areas as well as the local religions and ideological apparatus. The use of violence by RENAMO was integrated into peasant cultural and religious references as to gain legitimacy as the heirs to tradition.

Why the use of force towards the peasantry? To maintain its war, RENAMO depended on the local people supplying tribute in food and in labor. To extract the tribute RENAMO used force and a redistribution of looted goods.

The constant harassment of RENAMO areas by government forces and the need for the population to shift from one place to another did not create stable conditions for farming. The war helped increase the vulnerability of local agriculture to drought. The way to maintain the extraction of surplus from the peasantry was the use of force. [74] But on the ground, RENAMO developed ways of escaping from this vicious circle (a relationship with the peasantry based on force) by using other forms of legitimisation namely local religions and magical practices.

The political economy type of explanation for violence, while important, reduces the socialisation role of violence both for the population and for the

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72 Fauvet: 1991c,19

73 For a description of the methods see Gersony: 1988 and Magaia: 1987. See also McCamt: 1984.

74 K.Wilson: 1991; Gersony: 1988; Roesch: 1990a.

members of the group committing violence. Guerrilla movements create the water where they survive by various and contradictory means which can imply the use of violence against those they present as their main social base or those whom the movement is trying to liberate.

The location of RENAMO bases also took into consideration geo-ecological conditions. Food producing areas in some provinces (Alto Molocue in Zambézia province, for example) were not disturbed by RENAMO attacks.

RENAMO also used violence as an instrument to legitimise its army and as an instrument for recruitment. The practice is not new.

> "The group requires that each individual performs an irrevocable action. In Algeria, for example, where almost all the men who called on the people to join in the national struggle were condemned to death or searched for by the French police, confidence was proportional to the hopelessness of each case. You could be sure of a new recruit when he could no longer go back into the colonial system".[75]

Force is also part of the processes used by the guerrilla movement to create support. The extent of political violence in Mozambique is said to be comparatively higher than elsewhere, but the use of violence for political purposes is not a specific characteristic of RENAMO. "Historically, collective violence has been part of the process by which competing interest groups maintain power, gain power or lose power in the process of jockeying for influence and control over governmental and social institutions".[76] Force and torture have been used to oblige recruits to join and remain in the organisation and to set an example for the population. "When they were beating the people RENAMO men said: This is to show you that you don't have to say that we are bandits. You always say that the government is winning."[77] Studies have shown that the majority of RENAMO members were coerced into joining the organisation.[78]

The violence symbolises the crisis of legitimacy of the state. The existence of tribal feuds, local eruptions of military or criminal violence, vendettas of vengeance or cruel highwaymen is conditioned by the fact that the state's monopoly on violence is not recognised or respected.[79] In the

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75 Fanon: 1967:74; Wilkinson: 1975:113 . See also Alexander, Carlton and Wilkinson: 1979; Hirsch and Pery: 1973.

76 Feagin and Hahn: 1973:70.

77 Interview with Ferrão: 1989.

78 Minter: 1990; Nilsson: 1991a; Hall: 1990.

79 Nilsson: 1991b:21; Knauss and Stricklant: 1978; Knorr: 1962; Stohl and Lopez: 1984.

equation of violence in Mozambique the type and extent of state violence has to be considered. [80]

Violence has been seen both as a necessary condition for war and in terms of underlying social relations. Executions and mutilations are often described as sadistic operations. Accounts [81] concentrate on the horrific side of the incidents, which is important but amidst the blood the significance of the terror is lost. There is a logic to this kind of display of force (mutilation and execution of party officials, destruction of buildings and infra-structure) which are conducted against symbols of the state and of the party in power. Religion is also used to legitimise violence and to direct it. RENAMO gangs seem to be implementing orders from super-natural powers. Their actions are directed by a witch doctor, whose presence in always announced. [82]

4.7 RENAMO's genesis: abusive generalisations

Rhodesian and South African support for RENAMO are well known and documented facts that have been used to produce abusive generalisations transforming RENAMO into a proxy army.

RENAMO's genesis as a military artefact of the Rhodesians and its transfer to South African patronage at Zimbabwean independence in 1980[83] is widely interpreted within the literature as a sign of RENAMO's dependence on foreign interests and of its anti-national nature. To some of the foreign interventions, specially covert military actions, in the internal affairs of Mozambique, the Mozambican government replied in kind: the 2,000 Mozambican guerrillas sent into Zimbabwe and the support (political asylum) given to FP-25, a guerrilla group which operated in Portugal up to 1989. Some of leaders and contacts of the organisation were in Maputo. One of them has resurfaced in one of my case studies.

The use of military contingents by states in Southern Africa to operate within the borders of other states in covert operations has been a choice used both by Mozambique and South Africa.

I consider the existing versions of the history of RENAMO as reductionistic illustrations of a conspiracy theory resulting from an uncritical

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80 Amnesty International: 1989:7.

81 Magaia: 1987 and 1989.

82 See Changara case study, Chapter Seven.

83 Nilsson: 1991b; Hall: 1989:1.

reading of the sources. All analyses are based on the fact that Ken Flower, the chief of the Rhodesian CIO has taken credit in his autobiography for the creation of MNR. He published his proposal for the creation of the MNR.[84] Flower's memoirs do not reveal the MNR's process of creation. He takes responsibility but upholds information: " the tale of the conspirators will never be told".[85] Flower's account is a typical case of the midwife assuming the role of the parents. The co-ordination role of Rhodesian intelligence is important but other components involved in the operation cannot be obscured. [86]

5 Conclusions: punishing the post colonial holders of state power

At least four routes have been used by academics to portray the trajectory of RENAMO as an organisation:

i) an artificial insurgency, a confluence of intelligence and counter insurgency and counter-revolutionary actions organised by imperialism and its regional representatives (Rhodesia and South Africa);[87]
ii) a rebellion caused by the errors of the Revolution which fuelled peasant opposition in rural areas;
iii) the continuation of internal problems of the National Liberation movement;[88]
iv) the result of the crisis of the World System associated with the history of Mozambique.[89]

To these four types of analysis one should add RENAMO's own version of its creation and development: a popular organisation born to fight discrimination, and the government's version of RENAMO's history, trying to present the organisation as a offshoot of colonial interests. RENAMO's discourse about itself clearly shows the manipulation of the past in order to create legitimacy in the present. The well documented information about the

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84 Flower: 1987:300-303.

85 Flower: 1987:144.

86 Flower: 1987:136-146.

87 Ohlsson: 1990.

88 For a account of the internal struggles within the Nationalist Movement in Mozambique see Opello: 1974; Opello: 1975a,b; Opello: 1977; Alpers: 1983. A listing of the internal struggles within RENAMO can be found in Vines: 1991b and Taju: 1988a.

89 Interview with Derlugian: 1992.

evolution of the movement, and its terror tactics, are simply discarded as lies, as no more than FRELIMO propaganda. Government discourse about RENAMO shows an effort to force feed facts into a conspiracy theory.

All the analyses quoted above fall short of integrating RENAMO into a wider political economy analysis and reproduce parts of the myths of those involved in the conflict - the two strands of nationalism i.e. one which wanted a transfer of power from Portugal power and total restructuring of relations with the colonial power and the world system (the revolutionary nationalists), and those who wanted a process of decolonisation and integration into the existing world system and a reform in relations with the colonial power. These two strands cohabited inside FRELIMO but the revolutionary nationalists enjoyed hegemony inside the organisation. Some members of the nationalist or reformist elite left FRELIMO or were expelled during the organisation's development.

Because RENAMO was characterised in the official discourse and its media and academic reproductions solely as a pro apartheid, terrorist, anti-revolutionary movement (which was easily documented), other dimensions of the phenomenon have been disregarded. The tree of apartheid and imperialist "destabilisation" was hiding a forest of societal processes - the inter-elite struggle, the break-up of villages, the destruction of state structures in the rural areas, the crisis of reproduction of the peasantry, the struggle of the local capitalists, the dissatisfaction of religious leaders including the catholic church and its effort to regain its previous status, state attacks against peasant religious beliefs. The protest against the post-colonial regime was downplayed in the literature on post-colonial Mozambique.

A more encompassing analysis of the war in Mozambique has to consider a re-conceptualisation of insurgency, identifying the various components involved in challenging the post-colonial state and the holders of state power. Insurgency is a syncretic mix of peasant rebellion, intellectuals and their ideologies and technical knowledge of guerrilla warfare.[90] A confluence of social groups and different traditions of struggle or challenge against the state gives insurgencies their basic characteristic of a powerful revolt.[91]

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90 For a review of the literature on insurgencies and peasants rebellion see Desai and Ekstein: 1990. For theoretical debates, see Wolf: 1969:276-302; Mojekwu: 1978; Mazrui: 1970.

91 The recent insurgency in Mexico's Chiapas province drew these social groups together with a revivalism of the peasant wars of Emiliano Zapata. For the historical origins, see Wolf: 1969:348.

War in Mozambique has only been seen as a phenomenon of destruction and social decomposition.[92] The war - as elsewhere - has created new social classes and modified the relationship between the existing ones. The Second World War created social groups all over Europe: the Goulash Barons in Denmark, the "Richi de La Guerra" (War Rich) in Italy, the Bourgeoisie BOF (Boeuf Oeuf Fromage) in France. The Mozambican equivalent would be the bourgeoisie CCCC (Cunha Candonga Chapa Cem). This bourgeoisie has opposed government economic and social policies from within the borders of the country and in government controlled areas. It has pressed for change in development strategy from one where the state was the sole owner of means of production to one where private capital could be invested. It has criticised the government's arbitrary rule and has pressed for a more representative government, for changing the political system from a one-party to a pluralist state, to a state where legislative, judiciary and executive were distinct. It participated in changing the constitution.

Post-colonial development strategies in Mozambique, analysed in chapter four, were contested. This opposition, analysed in this chapter, has been called "destabilisation" under a conspiracy theory. In the opposition to the post colonial state and government in Mozambique internal and external sanctions have converged. This convergence does not mean that they had the same agenda or were struggling for the same objectives. However common ground existed: to change the political system in Mozambique. Aid, to which we turn in the next chapter, has been a vehicle for external sanctions.

[92] Geffray: 1990; Interview with Derlugian: 1992.

CHAPTER SIX

Aid as a tool for intervention

1 Introduction

This chapter contains two types of argument. The first refers to the relation between development aid and political intervention by the donor in the policy formulation process of the recipient state. I argue further that aid has influenced development strategies in three contradictory ways:

i) aid has fostered the formulation and implementation of unsustainable development strategies;
ii) it has made available resources for hunger stricken populations and
iii) it has pressured for the adoption of particular development strategies.

The second argument refers to the stabilising role of aid towards the recipient states or governments. Mozambique's case shows that aid has been an avenue for foreign intervention and part and parcel of the challenges to the post-colonial government.

Structurally, Mozambique has passed from an economy based on three legs (export of labour, services, and agricultural commodities) to a one-legged economy (based on aid donations).[1] The role of aid [2] in the context of the political economy of Mozambique is complex and contradictory.[3] Donor

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1 Hermele: 1990b.

2 Foreign aid is used to represent aid flows which stem from outside the borders of the national state. It refers to flows from bilateral and multilateral sources and grants from private agencies. Official flows are composed of: i) Official development assistance (ODA), grants and loans undertaken by the official sector, with promotion of economic development and welfare as main objectives; at concessional financial terms (if a loan, at least 25 per cent grant element); ii) Technical co-operation: grants or loans to nationals of developing countries receiving training abroad and to cover costs of developed country personnel serving abroad; and iii) other official (non-concessional) flows. For a discussion of the history of the concept of aid see Kitching: 1982. See also Meier: 1974.

3 A note on sources; A general picture of ODA and other forms of external assistance received by Mozambique from donors is very difficult to construct because of difficulties in obtaining data. The various sources consulted (the National Planning Commission, the Co-operation Ministry) did not have a table which could give an idea of flows of assistance, type, country of origin, amount disbursed, amount pledged, etc. This does not mean that the data does not exist and is not accessible. But to be of any use, this would require major and time-consuming research. The single most important source is the UNDP co-operation report published once a year from 1983 onwards. The 1989 report is under preparation. The UNDP reports have the following characteristics: I) due to lack of information from donors it does not cover all the donors active in Mozambique; ii) some of the donor offices are not capable of giving the data regarding total aid

positions towards the development policies of the post-colonial government in the 1975-1990 period varied between two extreme positions: support of government autonomous and self-reliant plans and socialist transition development strategies on the one hand, and, on the other, disapproval of socialist options and defence of a market economy and western style democracy. But the result of donor actions, regardless of their intentions and political preferences, have been similar. They have shaped the development options and oriented them in directions that the donors consider desirable.[4]

2 The myth of generosity

In the 1970s, African leaders had a notion of the role of aid in undermining political sovereignty and independence. "Many nationalists have believed that any aid - be it from the East or from the West - is at least by intention neo-colonialist".[5] Nyerere's position was contradictory because on the one hand he recognised this interventionist character of aid and on the other he welcomed it, demanding

> "that aid to small countries should come with no strings attached, then it is possible to receive aid and still remain politically independent. Yet, because the country needs aid it cannot claim full economic independence. It follows, therefore, that it is possible to be genuinely independent politically while remaining economically dependent". [6] The doctrine of balanced benefaction - the idea that the great defence against neo-colonialism is to diversify one's benefactors, justified the balancing act in which African regimes engaged. They criticised aid but welcomed it. [7]

Ideology prevails in the public records on aid or development co-operation. This posture masks conflict by giving an image of shared interests and efforts between donors and receivers of aid in promoting development. "The predominant discourse on development co-operation presumes that the

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because of their national aid set-up; iii) different donors use different systems for valuing, for example, aid in kind, or emergency aid; iv) aid which was not in fact disbursed frequently appears in the data. A further study initiated by the UNDP/Ministry of Co-operation under the NATCAP exercise concluded that the information collected on volumes of aid, number of projects, and Mozambican involvement did not produce data of any use because of the weak response to the questionnaires sent. Working from the existing information, it can be concluded that the data shows an increased amount of aid representing more than the total exports of the country, which is a third of the gross domestic product.

[4] Costa: 1992a. See also Galli: 1992. For a concrete analysis of Swiss development co-operation in Mozambique, see Wyss: 1992

[5] Mazrui: 1970a:1152.

[6] Mazrui: 1970a:1151.

[7] Mazrui: 1970a:1152.

mechanisms of the market economy have given place to the generosity of the donor economy".[8] Those who give aid tend to consider it a "gift".[9] Donors try to present their behaviour as acts of altruism,"(...) disposition (....) to further the welfare or happiness of other individuals or groups".[10] For the recipient, aid is a sign of recognition of difficulties which are not of his own making, a satisfaction of a need which has to be satisfied. Should a donor refuse support, this is seen by the would-be recipient as an act of egoism furthering their own welfare or happiness.

The discourse of the two sides represents an attempt to legitimate and maintain the relationship. The designation of the two sides in a aid relationship, as donors and recipients, highlights the asymmetry of their disparate status.[11] Whatever the ideological justifications for aid, it is an instrument for political intervention by the donor.

> "A policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armoury of the nation".[12]

All aid is political or operates within a political context performing a political function. [13]

3 Theories of aid and development

Three main theories, at least, can be distinguished on the relationship between aid and development.[14] They correspond to three political positions roughly defined as left, right and centre.[15]

Objections to aid from the right consider that it promotes egalitarianism between states and inside nation states, thus distorting the "naturally" hierarchical world order. Bauer considers aid to be a positive barrier to development which he equates with the free operation of market forces.[16]

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8 Hugon: 1983:180.

9 Healey: 1971:14.

10 Hawkins: 1970:16.

11 Hawkins: 1970:26.

12 Morgenthau: 1962:309.

13 Morgenthau: 1962:303.

14 An account on the various approaches to aid can be found in Imbeau: 1991 and Stokke: 1983.

15 Strange: 1990; Singer: 1984.

16 Bauer: 1984; Singer: 1984.

Approaches from the left characterise aid or development co-operation as ideological, trying to show that beyond the development co-operation agreements there are exploitative relations and class antagonisms. Hayter argues that aid promotes development options which are tuned to interests in the West or the North, or, as US President Richard Nixon said: "Let us remember that the main purpose of American aid is not to help others but to help ourselves".[17] Aid is presented as a form of imperialism, [18] or a component of an international neo-colonial system [19] based on a global international division of labor.[20]

Analysts [21] with a liberal viewpoint tend to regard aid as having mixed effects on development. A critical position is taken towards both Left and Right and a defence of aid is made. [22] The boundaries between moral and immoral uses of aid (Table 6.1) are considered as diffuse depending very much on the conditions at the receiving end. Aid resources tend to reach the most vulnerable sectors of the population at the receiving end, who would be in a worse situation than at present without aid.[23] Liberals tend to call attention to the fact that aid is a contradictory process that varies within a given time framework and according to the various forces and groupings inside the donor country or at the receiving end. Aid has different origins: states, local collectives, solidarity groups, churches, profitable and private organisations (PVO's), Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The reasons for giving aid are different for different organisations. They range from moral issues to self-interest or political reasons, as described in Table 6.1.

Most aid is given for a combination of these motives - self-interest, politics, global responsibility, charity, humanitarianism. Donors range from two extreme or

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17 Hayter: 1971.

18 Hayter and Watson: 1985; Sobhan: 1982; Hugon: 1983.

19 Seers: 1981.

20 Emmerij: 1989; Bobiash: 1992.

21 I have based my analysis partly in Imbeau: 1991 and Stokke: 1983. The methodological problems involved in the analysis of aid are illustrated by Hugon: 1983 and Morgenthau: 1962. Berg: 1986:525 says that "The political nature of aid and the multi-dimensions of the transfer of flows and assistance are not covered neither by the economic analysis nor by empirical testing methods. The knowledge gap on aid programs have obliged donors and recipients, which on their ignorance of local social conditions are very similar, to count on socio-historical scientists dealing with change at local level.(...)Donors and African states have better technical than social knowledge. Since the on-board strength of social scientists in donor and recipient governmental organisations is low to non-existent, a turn around in the mediocre social results of aided activities is not apt to come soon".

22 Singer: 1984.

23 Singer: 1984; Mosley: 1986a.

opposite positions in the same plane: promoters of self-interest and altruistic philanthropists.[24] The majority of donors occupy the centre of the continuum.

Most aid is given for a combination of these motives - self-interest, politics, global responsibility, charity, humanitarianism. Donors range from two extreme or opposite positions in the same plane: promoters of self-interest and altruistic philanthropists.[25] The majority of donors occupy the centre of the continuum.

Table 6.1. Aid and morals

Motives / Reasons	Effects	
Humanitarian charitable	Poverty reduction Hunger reduction Emergency Help a poor country	MORAL
Global responsibility Self intererest Politics	Vicious Government	IMMORAL

Source: Singer: 1984.

Some hypotheses proposed in earlier analyses of aid concerning donors' behaviour (use of aid as an instrument of political leverage, export promotion, charitable interests) have been tested by analysts. Macro economic indicators, voting patterns in the United Nations, voting patterns in the donor countries have been used in empirical tests. Mosley [26] tried directly to address the hypotheses put forward by Teresa Hayter [27] and Bauer[28]. Three main uses of aid are addressed: political leverage, export promotion and growth in the recipient countries. The results for growth are mixed, "this appears to be neutral: neither significantly and automatically positive, as many defenders of aid assume, nor negative, as argued both by Bauer and many writers on the extreme left."[29] The record of aid "as an instrument of export promotion" is not positive. As an instrument of political leverage, aid has been conspicuously unsuccessful". [30] Relating voting patterns in the UN to support from the USA and the USSR, Mosley tested the hypotheses of aid being used as political pressure to oblige the recipients to change their

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24 Mutahaba: 1987; Singer: 1984.

25 Mutahaba: 1987; Singer: 1984.

26 Mosley: 1986b.

27 Hayter: 1981; Mosley: 1986a.

28 Bauer: 1984.

29 Mosley: 1986a:233 .

30 Mosley: 1986a:233.

political choices. He concluded that the "mere existence of a socialist government is no barrier to concessional aid from the US and the World Bank ... as demonstrated by Burma, Mozambique, South Yemen, Yugoslavia, Hungary and most of all China (...)".[31]

This conclusion using the history of the relations between Mozambique and the US is debatable. The US did use aid as a lever to alter Mozambique's voting pattern at the UN, which did indeed change after 1984. Aid was used as a sanction in the normalisation of relations between the two countries which was conditional on changes in internal policies (adoption of a free market, elections, negotiations with RENAMO). Aid statistics do not tell us very much about the processes which lie behind aid. It is also quite difficult to document them in terms of oral interviews or written sources.

Imbeau used a similar methodology to Mosley. Numerical indicators were used to test theories on aid. Imbeau tried to reply to the question: "why is there a variation in aid-giving among donors?" He concluded that "four basic explanations account for the variations: inertia, donor interests, donor ideological orientation and the recipient's needs. These four explanations account for 85% to 96% of the variation in aid/GNP, and for 58 to 91% of the variation in aid as a percentage of government expenditures" [32]

Empirical analysis using indicators such as macro-economic data or indices for political behaviour are useful in understanding general impacts but do not permit an understanding of contradictory relationships such as aid or foreign relations. These characteristics of the object under study are the reason why the methodological approaches followed by Imbeau: 1991 and Mosley: 1986 have produced results which are not conclusive.

One of the main justifications for aid has been the idea of promoting self-reliance. Aid would prime the pump of development, making the recipient independent and self-reliant. Donors and recipients subscribe to the rhetoric that aid is a self-effacing process. "Aid is developmental only if it lays the foundation for its future rejection i.e. if it can be used in a manner that promises eventual self-reliance".[33] "A review of the aid scene, however, increasingly shows that, irrespective of whether the donor subscribes to altruism or self-interest in aid-giving, the end result has generally tended to reinforce the dependency relationship rather then to enhance the recipient country's self-reliance".[34] Aid

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31 Mosley: 1986b:43.

32 Imbeau: 1991:160.

33 Mutahaba: 1987:1.

34 For a similar type of analysis on Tanzania see Mutahaba: 1987 and Mushi and Kjekhus: 1982. See also Berg: 1989; Berg: 1991; Berg and Gordon: 1989.

maintains the position of the country within the world system i.e. more than being an instrument of change it is a instrument that preserves the existing world order.

These conclusions are consistent with findings pertaining to the role of gifts in societies. Although aid gained importance in the period after World War Two, it is neither a new phenomenon nor a new debate in the social sciences.[35] A very important exchange occurred in the 1920s between Marcel Mauss and Bronislaw Malinowsky about the importance of free gifts in societies. At that time, when the boundaries between sociology and anthropology were not yet drawn, the discussions centered on the importance of gifts. What was a gift?[36] Was there a free gift? What was the importance of a free gift in a given society? Would it help maintain the status quo or would it contribute to change? The old debate was diluted when participants failed to distinguish between the "intention of the givers" and the "results of the act of giving".

> "Bronislaw Malinowsky had, in his earlier work, spoken of gifts given by a husband to his wife as 'free' or 'pure' gifts. Mauss, however, in re-examining Malinowsky's own data, had noticed that '(...) some return was in fact given to the husband: women returned their husband's gifts with sexual favours'. Consequently, said Mauss, 'the husband's gift could not be called 'free' or pure because it did indeed bring a return(...)'. In the end the two agreed; the only party which might have suffered from this entente cordial was social theory (...) Basically Mauss has correctly sensed the functional interconnections between beneficence and reciprocity; but he had failed to see and to work out the conceptual distinctions between the two. (...) In particular Mauss had failed to distinguish the motivation for beneficent actions from their unanticipated consequences".[37]

The varied reasons for giving aid are embodied in the variety of aid organisations with profiles representing all types of ideology, religion, class and political goals.[38] Development Cooperation is not a homogenous whole. National aid agencies play a decisive role in shaping policies and practices. The aid bureaucracies have great latitude for decision making without being truly

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35 For a history of the evolution of aid see Hopkins: 1987 and Griffin: 1989.

36 Mauss in 1924 tried to explore the etymology of the word gift and the reasons why the word gift has two senses "cadeau" (present) and "poison" (poison). Mauss: 1968:243. See also Sahlins: 1974:149-183.

37 Gouldner. 1975:289.

38 Motivations for giving aid are complex. A survey of aid giving in the United States revealed that "three reasons stand out: (...) a conviction that haves should help have-nots; the feeling of personal satisfaction that accompanies good work; and religious beliefs.(...)The relation between wealth and aid giving shows that people with less give more". According to 1989 Gallup figures "...households earning under US 10 000 gave away 5.5 per cent of their incomes, households with 50 000 to 60 000 gave away 7 per cent; those earning between 75.000 and 100.000 donated 3.2 per cent". See Salholz; Beachy and Rosenberg: 1992.

accountable.[39] Donor aid policies change over time as does the relationship between donors and recipients. Development Co-operation gives preference to some countries and this relationship has to be seen within the historical framework in which it has developed. Development Co-operation or Aid is dispensed within state to state relations. Power to exercise negative or positive sanctions is present within the relationship. Whatever the intentions, there are no free gifts. The contradictions of the current aid regime have led to calls for change.[40] The most radical proposals have come from analysts working under a international political economy perspective. According to Susan Strange[41], aid has to be transformed from a mixture of business and solidarity into an international system of social security. It would be at the global level a replica of the social security systems which exist at national level. States would be taxed and the funds generated would be redistributed to cater for the requirements of the "needy". [42]

4 Aid flows to Mozambique

The evolution of aid received by Mozambique in the post-colonial period illustrates the limits of aid practices and the need to reform the system. In 1990 Mozambique was utterly dependent on aid to implement its development policies. The state is dependent on international aid even to finance government budget expenditures. Only a third of the state budget can be funded out of domestic sources. The aid received by Mozambique in 1989 amounted to 63 USD per capita. Expressed per capita, exports came to 7 USD, imports to 54 USD and Gross National Product to 93 USD. Foreign debt stood at 308 USD per capita.

The volume of aid received by Mozambique underwent a dramatic increase after 1983. [43]

From 1983 to 1987 aid grew by 263 per cent. The total volume of aid increased from 249 million dollars in 1983, to 952 million dollars in 1989. The value of total foreign aid received in 1989 amounted to nine times the total value of exports for the same year and to 66 per cent of the Gross Domestic

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39 Barnet et al: 1982:63.

40 Mosley: 1986b; Barnet et al: 1982; Singer: 1984; Strange: 1990; HIVOS: 1991.

41 Strange: 1990.

42 Strange: 1990; Mosley: 1986b:27.

43 The Mozambican government regards aid data given by the donors as unreliable and showing volumes far superior to the grants made in reality. However, government statistics on aid have not been published or are not publicly accessible.

Product. This shows the importance of foreign aid to the Mozambican economy and the weakness of that economy.[44]

Table 6.2. Aid received by Mozambique

Volumes of aid received by Mozambique (In millions of dollars)							
	1983	**1984**	**1985**	**1986**	**1987**	**1988**	**1989**
Total foreign aid	249	281	542	685	903	1011a	952b
Index Exports	100 132	96	77	97	97		105
GDP	1605	1414	1455	1481	1525		1430

Source: UNDP Co-operation Report
a) Government sources list different figures of aid in 1988 (766 US mil) and 1989 (1000 mil estimated).

In the evolution of aid since independence, three different periods can be distinguished:[45] In the first period, from 1974 to 1977, external financing for the Mozambican economy was done through bank borrowing and aid came from a restricted number of donors. The UN system also played a role since most of the aid was multilateral. [46]Mozambique was blacklisted by the US Congress and thus was not eligible for US aid.[47] West German co-operation was conditional on acceptance of the Berlin Clause which Mozambique did not judge acceptable.

In the second period, from 1977 to 1982, Mozambique diversified its foreign aid sources. A more important role began to be played by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other socialist countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and the USSR. Very important in this period was sporadic aid given by countries like Iran, Iraq and Algeria. The growth periods in the economy in 1980 and 1981 can be attributed to gifts of oil by Iraq and Algeria. 1982 was the last year in which Mozambique was able to service its foreign debt. As a result, it lost its credit worthiness. (Hermele: 1990) The only way of rescheduling the debt and ensuring more assistance on favourable terms was to pass through the London and Paris Clubs and become a member of the IMF and the World Bank. Mozambique became increasingly dependent on foreign aid to pursue its basic development goals. Until 1982 the country had borrowed heavily to meet its need in external finance. But in that year, domestic economic crisis meant it could not repay its debt.

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44 Adam: 1990b; HIVOS: 1992a,b.

45 For an analysis of Mozambique's development see Chapter Four.

46 Gustavsson and Rylander: 1989.

47 For a case of more conditionality for US aid see Hartrich: 1983, specially pages 102-103, for an analysis of Mozambique.

In the third period, from 1983 onwards, Mozambique accepted the conditionalities imposed by certain donors e.g. the USA, France, Britain. The principle of policy dialogue within the IMF and World Bank guidelines was accepted.[48] Until then, Mozambique had refused to implement policies based on models imposed by the IMF[49] - lifting of price controls, liberalisation of the market, devaluation of the Mozambican currency, the Metical.

Inability to service the debt led the government to enter into negotiations with its creditors. The reactions from the Banks and the governments concerned was that any debt rescheduling could only be negotiated in a joint exercise with all the creditors. The negotiations had to be conducted in the framework of the London (for the commercial loans) and Paris (for the state loans) Clubs. The precondition for these negotiations was that Mozambique should become a member of the IMF and the World Bank, an option that the government had been resisting until then. The government was interested in getting World Bank loans but not in complying with IMF directives on economic management.

Table 6.3. Evolution of aid to Mozambique: a schematic view

Years	Origin of aid	Type of arrangement	State position
1974-1977	Like Minded China	Multilateral	Total control
1977-1983	GDR/USSR Algeria/Iraq Nordic countries USSR/GDR	Bilateral Bilateral	Total control
1983-84	USA/World Bank		
1986	USA/Italy	Bilateral	Erosion of state control
1988	Sweden, USSR, EEC, USA, Italy	Bilateral	Erosion of state control
1989	Italy, FRG, Sweden, UK, EEC	Bilateral	

Sources: Interview with Osman: 1990; UNDP development Co-operation Reports.

[48] On policy dialogue see Lipton: 1987:48-49. For the concrete case of Mozambique see Horta: 1986 and Muyendji: 1986.

[49] Mittelman: 1988. For a government version of the relations with the World Bank see Ministério da Cooperação: 1990b.

Contacts started in 1983 and culminated in 1986. Mozambique joined the IMF and the World Bank and embarked upon an economic recovery program based on the structural adjustment model imposed by the multilateral financial institutions. The adoption of IMF guidelines was a "recommendation" by donors in the Mozambican government's efforts to renegotiate the debt in Paris and London.[50]

The acceptance of these preconditions saw an increase in the availability of foreign aid. The US made aid available as did other donors. Most aid was provided through bilateral arrangements which gave donors plenty of room for manoeuvre to impose their conditions.

The pattern of allocation of aid resources shows a concentration on the reproduction of a development model which has been criticised because of its bias towards capital intensive activities and lack of attention to the development of Mozambican human resources.[51] Projects directed towards women and other marginalised groups in society were very far from obtaining the desired results.[52]

Table 6.4 Composition of foreign aid in millions of dollars

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Bilateral	210	217	542	470	598		745
Multilateral donors	38	64	71	95	148		845
Bilateral percentage of total	84	77	85	87	80		75
Technical Assistance total value	65	54	74	113	168		264
Capital assistance	184	226	467	580	734		
Technical assistance from UN system	10	15	13	21	91		
Development assistance	219	209	437	563	554		
Emergency assistance	30	72	104	130	349		163
Aid from NGOs	6,8	11	11	11	39		42
Food aid							96

Source: UNDP Reports

50 For views on Mozambican foreign policy, se Henderson: 1978 and Vieira et al.: 1988.

51 Analysis of aid projects is complicated by lack of information. This also shows the problems related to project formulation, monitoring and evaluation. It illustrates the haphazard manner in which projects are initiated. For a debate see Centro de Estudos Africanos. Nucleo de Estudos da Mulher. 1991.

52 Projects concerning women show deficiencies in planning and in taking into consideration the social situation. See Centro de Estudos Africanos. Nucleo de Estudos da Mulher: 1991, a study which shows that of 77 projects listed which have a impact on women and gender, 34 (44%) are financed by NGOs.

But aid received by Mozambique in 1989 shows that the priority then was on emergency and humanitarian actions. 22 per cent of total aid was channelled for this purpose.

Agriculture, which in Mozambique's situation is a priority activity, received only 12 per cent of the aid funds. Industry received 22 per cent. Aid priorities are the priorities of a development strategy based on capital intensive activities, a model criticised by the donors themselves.

Capital assistance in aid flows is larger than technical assistance. Grants for emergency projects and activities underwent substantial growth from 1983 onwards. Resources spent on emergency needs tend to focus on solving such immediate problems as hunger, leaving aside the transformation of conditions that generate hunger. The Mozambican government developed an approach to emergency aimed at changing the situation in the countryside so as to eliminate the root causes of emergency e.g. coping with drought by investing in irrigation or by introducing drought resistant crop varieties.

5 Donor profiles and aid policies

The top five aid donors to Mozambique in 1989 were Sweden, the USSR, the EEC, the USA and Italy, in descending order of importance. In 1989 the most important multilateral sources of aid were the World Bank (50 per cent), the World Food Program (19 per cent) and the UNDP (12 per cent). Among the NGOs for the same year the most important were the ICRC (21%), CARE (12 %), the Lutheran World Federation (10%) and OXFAM-UK (9 %).

Table 6.5. Mozambique: donors importance

Ranking of largest donors							
	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
1	Sweden	Italy	USSR	USSR	Italy	Italy	Sweden
2	Italy	Sweden	Italy	Italy	USSR	FRG	USSR
3	Netherland	USA	USA	USA	USA	Sweden	EEC
4	France	France	Nordic	Nordic	Nordic	UK	USA
7	Norway	Norway	France	UK	Netherland	EEC	Italy
6					Finland		
					France		

Source: UNDP Reports

Italy and Sweden have been Mozambique's most important western partners. After 1984, an increased presence of the USA can be noted. The USSR has been one of the most important donors: if one includes military assistance in the aid calculations, then the USSR would rank as the most important donor.

The Mozambican government tried to develop a policy of concentrating donors in areas of the economy for which they possess expertise (e.g. Norway - fisheries, USSR -industry).

For the top ten donors the areas of concentration are as follows:

Table 6.6 - Areas of donor investment in Mozambique since Independence

Industry:	USSR, World Bank, Sweden, EEC, UK
Agriculture:	Sweden, USSR, Italy, USAID, Norway
Transport:	EEC, Netherlands, Norway, UK, Canada
Human Resources Development	Sweden, USSR, Norway, Netherlands, UK.

Source: UNDP Reports

Aid donors occupy a wide political spectrum.[53] One end is filled by donors who use aid as an instrument to press for political change and complement aid with other kinds of interventions (support for anti-government forces, political pressures). These donors advocate the development of the Mozambican economy along the general lines imposed by the IMF and the creation of a political regime based on the western model. This aid has overt political demands and acts to change recipient options. At the opposite end of the spectrum we find donors who accept the main thrust of the IMF proposals, but try to channel funds to areas where government policies are most affected: e.g. health and education. They try to promote an agricultural development model not so dependent on external factors (technology, inputs, assistance). Most of the donors are placed somewhere in the middle of this continuum.

5.1 US aid: reward for following the free market gospel

Mozambique illustrates US aid policies not only "directed towards aiding the underdeveloped nations which do not attack the fundamental international structural relations of underdevelopment"[54] but also of pushing

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53 For the use of aid by RENAMO supporters, see Almeida: 1987.

54 Pratt: 1975:362.

into the fold countries who tried an alternative development path intended to provide them with a different structural position within the system.[55]

Aid from the US was conditioned on policy changes not only at the domestic level (macro-economic policies, the role of the market, individual freedoms) but also at the international policy level (weaning from Moscow, change in voting patterns at the UN).[56] It is representative of the stance of donors who use aid conditionality to promote recipient government policy changes in the direction judged suitable by the donor. In the US case there has been a clear linkage between assistance flows and policy adjustments. The focal points for policy change were the following: producer prices, marketing policies, state farms, land redistribution, privatisation and market based allocations of foreign exchange.

During the 1964-1974 period when FRELIMO was engaged in an armed struggle for national liberation, the US government backed Portuguese colonialism although it voted for anti-colonial motions at the United Nations.[57] (....) Representative Charles C. Diggs, a Democrat from Michigan, resigned from the Official US delegation to the UN General Assembly to protest against White House African policy "to actively assist Portugal in waging wars against black people". He also noted that in general US votes in the United Nations support the South African, Rhodesian and Portuguese positions in Africa (...) [58]

The US represents those countries who denied aid and at the same time were involved in support for an alternative government to FRELIMO or in changing its fundamental political options. In 1975 USA was looking for a alternative to the FRELIMO government.[59] Six months after Independence a coup attempt took place in which the US, West Germany, and other governments were allegedly involved.[60]

The pattern of relations between the US and Mozambique underwent several changes in the 1975-1990 period.[61] The Mozambican government did not see the US as a block. It distinguished between the administration and

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55 For the global agenda of US aid in the post cold war era, see Nixon: 1992. See also Marshall: 1962.

56 For an idea of "the evolution and perpetuation of Development Assistance" in the US, see Hellinger; Hellinger and O'Reagan: 1989 specially chapter 3. For examples of aid on a political and security basis see Hellinger et al: 1989:54.

57 Smith: 1974:173. For a vision of US positions vis a vis the armed struggle in the Portuguese colonies and specially Mozambique see Smith: 1974.

58 Smith: 1974:173.

59 K.Maxwell: 1984.

60 Machel: 1982e.

61 Ministério da Cooperação: 1990a.

other groups. The US government was not invited to the independence celebrations because it had sided with the colonial power, but Americans who had supported the liberation struggle (congress representatives, scholars) were present.[62] The Mozambican government also reacted to US positions in the global (East-West Relations) and regional set-ups (support for apartheid). Considerable efforts (which ranged from invitations to US investors to visits by highest Mozambican officials including the President) were made to show positive action towards the US.[63]

Although Mozambique and the USA established diplomatic relations soon after independence, these relations were far from smooth. Thus Congress put Mozambique on its black list in 1977.[64] Relations improved after 1984. An indicator of this was the amount of development aid flowing from the USA. From 1984 onwards the volume of aid increased and in 1988 Mozambique was the biggest US aid receiver in sub-Saharan Africa. "The US has used its emergency aid to re-establish itself in Mozambique. The US held back until it was convinced that Mozambique was turning towards the West and then forced Mozambique to accept the presence of a series of right-wing Non-Governmental Organisations(..)."[65]

The USAID program in Mozambique is directed to emergency (food aid) and to supporting the rehabilitation of part of the private sector in agriculture.[66] The program has grown consistently from an initial grant of 19 million US dollars to 105 USD million in 1989. In the same year, 20 per cent of aid was targeted for railways system support, 3 per cent for Health, 13 per cent for private agriculture, 56 per cent for food aid (30 per cent for commercial food aid, 26 per cent for emergency food aid) and 8 per cent for NGO activities.

The reasons for US aid and its uses in the Mozambican case are clear. US aid flows are pre-determined by the political goals it is supposed to attain. By its nature it is a clear act of intervention destined to change existing options. When putting aid at Mozambique's disposal, "holding back" tactics have been consistently used. If the government did not take particular actions (e.g. changes in pricing policy, reducing linkages with the East), aid would be withheld.[67] In this sense it complements destabilisation.

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62 M.Santos: 1984.

63 Ministério da Cooperação: 1987a:1.

64 Seidman: 1984:128-132.

65 Hanlon: 1984b. See Schlotthauer: 1989 for concrete evidence of US pressures on the Mozambican government.

66 Armstrong: 1986; Cuellar: 1987 and Keeys: 1986.

67 Schlothauer: 1989. See also USAID: 1986a, 1989a,b,c and 1990.

There have been two contradictory effects of US aid on Mozambique. On the one hand it has stabilised the government, by contributing to the survival of thousands of victims of famine, mainly peasants in the rural areas, the support base of the post-colonial FRELIMO government. A report on RENAMO atrocities by a staff-researcher of the US State Department helped the government publicise its case against destabilisation.[68] On the other hand, the aid has supported sectors struggling for changes in government policies and in the political system. It strengthened the private sector in general, increased the amount of transport for private entrepreneurs, and supported economically and politically the sectors who were struggling against the government. US aid has been conditional on policy changes (both domestic and foreign) and sectors of the US political establishment have supported RENAMO activity. The two aspects, support to the government and to the forces challenging it, illustrate the US "carrot and stick" approach to relations with Mozambique.[69]

One theme under discussion in US/Mozambique relations was Mozambique's voting pattern at the United Nations. According to a 1987 US calculation, sent to the Mozambican government, Mozambique only voted the same way as the US in seven per cent of General Assembly votes. The difference of patterns was more evident on votes on ten key issues. The record shows 0 agreements, 4 disagreements, O abstentions and 6 absences. [70] This record shows why the US government was pressuring Mozambique: no votes in favour of US tabled resolutions.

Policy changes in Mozambique cannot be correlated only to pressures from the US, but ignoring the interventions referred to as "policy dialogue" would be too simplistic. The US Government has publicly taken credit for its role in changing Mozambican government policy options. "With US encouragement, Mozambique has liberalised its economy, opening it up to the private sector". [71]

US administration policies towards Mozambique were coined in "an approach to the third world (which) revolves around two interrelated policies: the Reagan Doctrine, which calls for support of governments and movements that fit the neo-conservatives' definition of democracy, and the doctrine of

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[68] Gersony: 1988. See also Anon.: 1988f.

[69] For a review of US covert actions strategy see Forsythe: 1992:385-395. For US aid see Mickelwait, Sweet and Morss: 1979 and Morss and Morss: 1982.

[70] US Government: 1987a,b,c; 1988a,b,c; US Embassy in Maputo (s.d.). Documents on US-Mozambique relations were found in the archives of the Ministry of Co-operation as Box US.

[71] Gist: 1988.

low-intensity conflict (LIC)" which argues that "the US military agenda should be reordered to give priority in aiding anti-Communist guerrillas".[72]

Mozambique-US relations illustrate the confluence between a foreign policy based on the Reagan Doctrine and a security policy based on LIC principles. One could say that the Reagan doctrine and LIC are "two sides of the same coin". Researchers have traced RENAMO links to DIA (Defence Intelligence Agency) and to the Heritage Foundation, which have been important supporters of the Reagan Doctrine. Other observers in 1989 were convinced that the Heritage Foundation and other right wing groups were acting alone without any involvement of the administration.

In 1992, the US government acted as a facilitator in the Mozambican peace process. Jeffrey Davidow, US deputy assistant secretary for African Affairs, met RENAMO president, Afonso Dhlakama and President Joaquim Chissano.[73]

5.2 The two faces of Swedish aid: solidarity and conditionality

Swedish aid, in common with other aid coming from the Like Minded Group[74], presented itself in 1975 as different from other flows of assistance due to its relative lack of conditionality: i) it was presented as continuing a relationship established during the armed struggle, ii) there were no manifest actions against Mozambican options, iii) solidarity for the socialist transition project was expressed iv) it gave general support to government decisions and programs v) there was a condemnation of apartheid and of South African attacks on the Mozambican government vi) foreign aid was given as a cash grant, not as a loan of any kind.

The expressed general aims of Swedish development co-operation are to promote economic growth, economic and social equality and political independence as well as the development of democracy. The planning of aid is based on the principle of country programming. The aim is to enable the recipient country to integrate the assistance into its overall development strategies rather

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72 Epstein: 1989. For the "double moral" of the American public vis-a-vis unconventional warfare, see William and Robin: 1981.

73 Radio Mozambique: Maputo, 0800 GMT 12 Feb. 1992. For an overview of US-Mozambique relations, see Fauvet: 1991b. For a wider analysis on differences on US policies, see Sewell, Feinberg and Kalab: 1985; Sewell and Contle: 1985.

74 This designation covers countries like Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Holland which follow similar policies. In my analysis I have concentrated on Sweden, although its policies are similar to those of the other Nordic Countries and other members of the Like Minded Group.

than support isolated projects. For Mozambique, agreements on a two year basis are normally negotiated.[75]

Sweden is one of Mozambique's traditional donors. The links between the Swedish government and FRELIMO started during the 1960's at the beginning of the armed struggle to free the Portuguese colonies. Swedish aid during the armed struggle was contradictory. The Swedish government did take a pro-independence and pro-decolonization position at the UN and in other international fora and did provide non-lethal support to FRELIMO, but also maintained some support for Portugal. In 1968 the Swedish government allowed the participation of Swedish companies in the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, despite a boycott requested by the Mozambican liberation movement. The relationship between FRELIMO and Sweden during the liberation struggle shows the importance of pressure group politics. ARO, the Africa Groups, was formed in the sixties, to channel support to the liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique.[76]

At independence, Mozambique received important Swedish and other Nordic support. A series of factors explain why Mozambique received a 50 million US dollar grant for the implementation of a joint Nordic agricultural development program - MONAP. Firstly, at the time, Sweden and the other Nordic countries had decided to raise the level of funding for international development and secondly, a tendency was gaining ground in the Nordic countries towards engaging in joint development projects.

Swedish aid in particular, and Nordic aid in general, also took into consideration the regional situation in Southern Africa and its impact on Mozambique. Sweden had taken an anti-apartheid stance and condemned South African destabilisation. To off-set the negative consequences of South African intervention Sweden donated to SADCC a "SEK 660 million package, (...) one of the most tangible measures that the Swedish government had taken in order to concretise its policy towards the region. (....) the biannual regular co-operation (was) only one element of Sweden's support to Mozambique. Others were disaster relief and support to a number of SADCC-projects in Mozambique".[77]

What is the logic behind the Swedish support of "policies which aim at greater social justice as well as economic and political independence?" (...) The support for national, anti-imperialist strategies in the third world is

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[75] SIDA: 1987a. A general description of Sweden-Mozambique relations can be found in SIDA: 1987b; SIDA: 1993.; Thumbo: 1986.

[76] For a deeper analysis of Swedish Jekyll and Hyde attitudes see Hermele: 1992b and Rudebeck: 1984; Akwetey: 1987; Anon.: 1989b.

[77] SIDA: 1986.

perceived as a means of restraining the process of internationalisation and retaining an element of control over domestic capital".[78]

Swedish aid has been the mainstay of government programs in industry, import support and agriculture.[79] The main donor in agriculture was the Nordic program MONAP, co-ordinated by SIDA, which was the major contributor. This aid package was implemented between 1977-1990. In the final evaluation of the project Mozambican officials considered that MONAP had given the government an instrument for carrying out its agricultural policies, it had permitted the establishment of projects and maintenance of activities which otherwise would not have been possible.[80] Optimizing results from the program, which comprised some 50 projects over its three phases, was hindered by its dispersed design (a very large number of activities and projects); inefficiency in contracting technical assistance; and poor integration into national structures. Due to the sheer size of its operations and financial capacity, MONAP became a foreign body inside the Ministry of Agriculture, giving program coordinators room for maneuver across the boundaries of their responsibility leading to the engagement of the program in areas which were beyond its scope. The nature of MONAP, with the involvement of various institutions in decision making, made coordination between different donors a difficult task.[81] The war of destabilisation posed a major problem for the program. Projects had to be withdrawn from their original location and re-started in more secure areas without major changes in the design of the activities. Activities were maintained because materials, equipment and personnel existed.

Rural development projects under the MONAP program constitute text-book examples of errors in project design and implementation. Wrong equipment and technology was introduced in areas where the pre-requisites did not exist. Animal traction was introduced into areas where the peasants had no tradition of raising cattle (Nampula). Poorly designed irrigation projects were set up in urban areas (Beira). The knowledge of the social systems where development activities were initiated was poor. The gender dimension was not taken into consideration (Beira).[82]

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78 Beckman: 1978:7. See also Haakon: 1991.

79 See Abrahamsson: 1984, 1988 and 1991. Sweden has also helped Mozambique to strengthen its relations with the US. Maurice Strong who organised the Rio Earth Summit, was called to help. See Strong: 1987.

80 Ferreira: 1991; Tesfai: 1991.

81 Andren: 1986; SIDA: 1977. For analyses on Swedish aid in other sector of Mozambican economy see Alberts, Bull and Myrseth: 1988 for fisheries, Abrahamsson: 1984; Abrahamsson: 1988; Bager et al.: 1989 for agricultural commercialisation, and Hermele: 1990c for NGO work and its impact.

82 Akesson: 1989; More et al: 1990.

MONAP showed a failure to use opportunities created by the war of destabilisation. Concentrating efforts on training and manpower development was not given priority as an alternative in a deteriorating security environment.

Reviews of Swedish aid after 1986, when IMF inspired programs were started, proposed the redirection of aid from areas like industry or agriculture to health or education, which would in the longer term guarantee independent development policy options for Mozambique. [83]

The reaction from Mozambican government officials to suggestions for redirecting Swedish aid have been: i) personnel involved in the areas which were going to receive aid saw it as a necessary move, because it gave them funds and means to develop their activities, ii) technicians involved in areas previously supported saw the redirection of aid as a process which undermined the possibility of sovereign and independent decision making and as an action which would increase the vulnerability of the sector to donors with more conditional aid. The co-ordination capacity of the ministries receiving Nordic aid was undermined due to the fact that in future there would be a need to co-ordinate with more than one donor.

> "Because of their gift characteristic, whatever the intentions and projects behind the aid flows from the Nordic countries, it also illuminates the contradictory nature of the aid relationship between donors and recipients. Gifts are not given completely altruistically. There are always objectives somewhere in mind and they are political. MONAP, the Mozambique Nordic Agricultural Program, is a good example of the limits of a solidarity project. Even if there was no pressure to buy from the Nordic countries there were obligations to follow formal bureaucratic structures, routines, to monitor and evaluate and report back. These institutional arrangements did put the recipient under permanent scrutiny and promoted constant intervention by the donor."[84]

When aid is seen as a free gift and is allocated politically, the pattern of allocation is influenced most by political forces active within the donor states. Three major sets of Nordic interests have influenced MONAP: i) solidarity interest or public opinion, ii) private business and iii) the national aid agencies. The gift relationship can always be modified at the will of the donor. When the donor is a coalition of highly pluralistic political institutions there are continual pressures from many groups to alter the relationship to serve a specific group. [85]

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83 Hermele: 1988:31-36.

84 More et al: 1990.

85 On the various pressures on SIDA in Sweden see Kallberg: 1993.

There were shifts in SIDA's policy orientation in the late seventies. Earlier SIDA had been reluctant to influence the policies of recipients and willing to support the policies they chose. Changes in SIDA policies were also associated with a decentralisation of decision making from Stockholm to SIDA-Maputo. The transformations gave the donor more influence in changing policies and more continuous control. These characteristics of donor policies became more established as a degree of sympathy for donor conditionality and preference for market oriented economic policies developed within donor agencies.

In 1986 the Mozambican government proposed to renegotiate the MONAP program. The government wanted a change in the program outlook derived from a critical analysis of the previous phases. Mozambique proposed concentration on activities previously omitted - training, family sector - and the elimination of past errors and faults in co-ordination and policy formulation. This does show that the Mozambican government tried to stick to its development credo and harness foreign aid to national needs. The response of the donors was that MONAP would be bilateralised.

The disintegration of the Nordic collective project gave each one of the donors more leverage over the Mozambican government.

SIDA complained that "changes in agricultural and rural development policy and shifts in the institutional set-up of importance for the MONAP program have not always been discussed with donors, and resources allocated for agreed purposes have at times found their way to new priority areas without proper consultations".[86] In 1991 the relationship between Mozambique and Sweden entered period of crisis. A Swedish diplomat was expelled from Mozambique and the Swedish government announced a cut in the aid budget. SIDA's official magazine, SIDA Rapport, published a story on RENAMO, which presented the organisation as a bona fide opposition in contrast with previous policy positions which portrayed RENAMO as a terrorist group.

The evolution of the aid relationship between Sweden and Mozambique illustrates the limits of a co-operation process based on a quasi gift relationship. The fact that aid is given as a grant does not change dramatically the asymmetrical relationship between the two sides. The donor can always alter the terms without agreement from the recipient. Sweden represents the countries that granted resources to the Mozambican government in support of its policy options both internally and regionally.

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[86] Andren: 1986:9.

An environment in which a government is under challenge from various groups, using various methods including war, tests the nature of aid. Sweden and the Like Minded Group illustrate the capacity of the donor to impose its will and exert negative sanctions on a recipient government. Swedish aid was affected by destabilisation. Projects were attacked by RENAMO groups. By supporting development initiatives which did not take into consideration the existing social and political reality, aid enhanced destabilisation. But by supporting emergency needs - transport, food, energy - Swedish aid did contribute towards an anti-destabilisation process.[87] Difficulties in obtaining aid from the LMG meant that the Mozambican government became more vulnerable to challenges or weaker in terms of choosing its own path and development policies. Inconsistencies in the aid from friendly countries increased Mozambique's vulnerability to destabilisation. The Mozambican government made several appeals to the Swedish government to support the military protection of projects and activities financed by SIDA which were under continuous RENAMO attack. The official justification was that military support was not part of Swedish aid policies.[88]

The end of a co-ordinated Nordic intervention in agriculture has further weakened the capacity of Mozambican organisations to resist pressures and forced the country into accepting aid from donors with high levels of conditionality.

5.3 The USSR: rewards for ideological propriety

The USSR was one of Mozambique's major aid donors. Soviet aid was prominent in agriculture, industry and defence. Soviet practice did not distinguish between the transfer of resources and purely commercial transactions, "including both under the all-embracing concept of economic co-operation ".[89]

Although the USSR supplied FRELIMO with weapons, ammunition and training during the liberation war, the relationship was difficult due to Soviet objections to the links between FRELIMO and China. At independence the USSR was not among the top ranks of FRELIMO's foreign friends. It was ranked at number 16 on the protocol list of delegations invited to the independence celebrations.[90]

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87 Edwards: 1988.

88 L.B.Honwana: 1987.

89 Graziani: 1990:16. See also Dominguez: 1991a,b.

90 Brito: 1990, personal communication; Vieira: 1988.

Mozambique and the USSR signed a twenty year trade and cooperation agreement in March 1977. Until the changes in Soviet government and policies from 1986 onwards, Soviet support was mainly directed to development projects initiated by the Mozambican government. Soviet support was channeled to the planning and implementation of large scale state farms, mining, training and manpower development, fisheries and commodity support. Soviet aid in oil was extremely important: Soviet donations alleviated Mozambique's needs in periods when traditional oil supplies were interrupted (mainly by the Iraq-Iran war and by Mozambique's financial problems). From 1985 to 1987 Mozambique received 1.2 per cent of estimated Soviet gross bilateral disbursements, and occupied 12th position in the ranking of Soviet aid receivers.[91]

Until the adoption of "Glasnost", Soviet aid to Mozambique was directed by ideological considerations. The People's Republic of Mozambique was regarded as a member of the socialist camp, and fulfilled the main requirements for receiving Soviet aid i.e. "the country should have a 'vanguard marxist-leninist party' and a 'revolutionary' army: that is, the government should have correct ideas and alignments, and be safe from military coups".[92] Although there were general declarations by the two sides about expanding common policies and purposes, Mozambique's positions on southern African politics did not coincide with Soviet interests e.g. over Zimbabwe, where Mozambique backed ZANU while the USSR supported ZAPU. The contradictory aspects of USSR-Mozambique relations "make it clear that there is little accuracy in the conventional picture of (Mozambique) as a Soviet 'client' and even less in the concept of a 'total onslaught' by the Soviet Union in Southern Africa (...)[93]

The situation changed when Gorbatchev became the Soviet leader and Soviet aid began to show concern for investment results and project performance. Factors not previously considered, such as results, institution building, local conditions, recipient government, policies, were taken into account in the formulation of aid policies "increasingly geared to win better economic returns for the USSR".[94]

The relationship was also scrutinized by the Mozambican government. Concern was shown about the role of Soviet aid and its efficiency. A high level delegation from the Mozambican government went to Moscow in 1985 to discuss Soviet aid performance. But in 1986 the Mozambican government still did not have any system for monitoring and controlling agreed cooperation projects. Evaluations of activities were prepared a month before joint commission

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91 Graziani: 1990:20.

92 Cassen: 1985:3.

93 Steele: 1985:285.

94 Graziani: 1990:28; Interview with Derlugian: 1992. Weitz: 1992 defends the opposite position arguing that Mozambique's relationship with the USSR shows a continuity under Gorbatchev.

meetings. The most important reasons for problems in implementing projects involving the USSR and other socialist bloc countries were lack of communication and financial constraints.[95]

Soviet aid interventions were coordinated within the COMECON group. 22 projects were considered of priority implementation in 1986, during the first session of the Joint Coordination committee between Mozambique and COMECON. Of the 22 projects listed 4 were in agriculture, 1 in construction, 4 in Education, 8 in Industry, 1 in fisheries, 1 in Mineral Resources, 1 in Health and 1 in the transport sector.[96]

Within COMECON the USSR was the most important participant with involvement in 14 projects, followed by Bulgaria (11), Czechoslovakia (9), Rumania (6), Cuba (5), GDR (4), Hungary (2) and Poland (2).[97]

Despite its cooperation with COMECON countries, Mozambique did not have full membership in the organization. Instead it was given observer status. Reports are that Mozambique's requests for COMECON membership were turned down "on the grounds that the country's economy was too far below the level of that of other members".[98]

After 1986, the USSR embarked on transforming its aid to Mozambique. Soviet technicians predicted a change in the coordination and assessment of development aid but not a change in the volumes nor in meeting the needs of partner countries. The tying of Soviet aid to policy adjustments was envisaged. Soviet aid recipients would have to conform to certain parameters (defense, replication, return of investments). Tripartite arrangements were also considered. In Mozambique projects in the mining sector were envisaged that would also involve Brazilian and Portuguese partners. The thinking behind the selection of Brazilian and Portuguese companies was that they had technology and know-how adapted to Mozambican conditions.

In the late eighties certain areas of traditional cooperation between Mozambique and the USSR were subject to major change. Mozambique was looking for military aid in other quarters: e.g. Britain, USA.

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95 Monteiro: 1987:10.

96 Monteiro: 1987:9

97 Monteiro: 1987.

98 Steele: 1985:294; Hermele: 1986.

C.E.A. DOC

Declining aid from the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, put added pressure on the government due to the blockage of financial and technical flows, and the need to procure oil on the world market.[99]

In 1990, Soviet aid to Mozambique suffered severe reductions. A five year cooperation agreement was under negotiation. Mozambique's accumulated debt to the USSR of 1 billion rubles (officially USD 1.75 billion) had to be paid. [100]

5.4 Portugal: re-negotiating the transfer of power

Portugal played an important role in cooperation with Mozambique not because of the amounts disbursed, but because it was the colonial master, most technical staff were of Portuguese origin, and various donors regarded Portugal as a point of reference in terms of knowledge about Mozambique, a partner for tripartite actions and a privileged milieu for training thanks to the language.[101]

The amount of Portuguese aid to Mozambique has not been disclosed. Portugal supplies technical support for areas such as industry, labor, cooperation etc. In terms of volume, the value of technical agreements between Mozambican and Portuguese companies is larger than that for companies of any other country.

Despite recognition of the importance of bilateral relations by both partners, these relations have proved difficult. A joint Portugal-Mozambique cooperation commission, though established in 1977 only began to function in 1982.

The root causes of the difficulties in the relationship go back to the decolonization process. In 1974 Portugal did not have any choice but to accept the principle of transferring power to FRELIMO. The original Portuguese proposal for decolonization envisaged a general election and the recognition of all political forces then existing in Mozambique. FRELIMO considered that, since decolonization resulted from an armed struggle, it had won the status of "the sole legitimate representative of the Mozambican people". The negotiations ended with the transfer of power to FRELIMO. As for the economic aspects of the affair, these were only solved later. These questions, referred to as the "contencioso" (dispute), concerned payment for investments made by the Portuguese state in Mozambique. Portugal wanted the independent state to assume liability for pre-independence Portuguese investments and enterprises. The Mozambican

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99 Mozambique Government: 1991:5.

100 African Business: 1990.

101 For the underlying logic of Portuguese foreign policy, see Maxwell: 1991.

government regarded the Portuguese demands as an attempt to dictate the type of post-independence government and the country's future development options.

In 1988, after a new visit from a Portuguese prime minister, there was a fresh start to the relationship. Portuguese cooperation with Mozambique faced the same dilemma that Portuguese companies faced. Projects depended on a third party willing to finance the activities.

Although official cooperation between Mozambique and Portugal had not developed, surveys conducted in 1985 and 1987 showed that Portugal was the most important source of technical assistance in terms of manpower. A total of 343.939 USD were transferred monthly by Portuguese nationals working in Mozambique.[102] This sum was covered by grants from various donors.[103] The Portuguese contingent included a number of individuals born in Mozambique who at independence had opted for Portuguese citizenship.

Table 6.7. Sources of technical assistance

Rank	1985	1987
1	Portugal	Portugal
2	USSR	USSR
3	Guinea (Conakry)	Pakistan
4	Tanzania	GDR
5	Italy	India
6	India	Sweden
7	GDR	Bulgaria

Source: UNDP: 1987

5.5 Aid arrangements and donor political influence

The pattern of aid in 1989 was representative of that which had prevailed from 1983 onwards. 75% of total aid received in 1989 came through bilateral arrangements, 20 per cent from multilateral ones and 5 per cent from NGOs.

After 1983 the largest share of aid came from bilateral arrangements (Table 6.2). This fact shows how the aid process was integrated into State to State relations, which offered the donor a greater possibility to exert negative sanctions and press for policy changes. The further increase registered after 1985 in bilateral aid indicates positive sanctions by donors due to the signing of

102 UNDP: 1987a:13; Ministeiro da Cooperação: 1989c.

103 Ministério da Cooperação: 1989a.

the Nkomati Accord and the government's negotiations with the World Bank and the IMF, which led to the acceptance of various policy conditionalities (reduced state controls over the market and prices, privatization of state companies).

An increase in aid channeled via NGOs shows a change in the relations between the donors and the state apparatus. Before 1983 NGOs were practically absent from the aid scene. From 1983 to 1989 the number of organizations present grew from 40 to 110. Aid was not channeled via the existing state agencies but through foreign NGOs which related directly to the target groups. This by-passing of state structures weakened the existing state-agencies and allowed development activities with a different focus from the ones defended by the state bodies in each sector.[104] Donors argued in favor of by-passing state structures on the grounds that corrupt officials were diverting goods away from the intended target groups.[105]

The NGOs operating with funds from governments and multi-lateral organizations have been present across the country and in all the sectors of the economy. It has been argued that donors deliberately used NGOs to bypass existing state structures and regulations, and to exert pressure for changes in government policies. The same author has argued that NGOs play the same role that missionaries played during the colonial occupation, paving the way for western intervention.

It is difficult to group all NGOs into the same category because of their diversity, type of options, type of projects and personnel involved. Organizations such as CARE, said to be involved in promoting US interests are operating under government invitation. The issues to consider, in evaluating NGO activity, are the capacity they have and the way they go about developing their projects. The 110 NGOs present in Mozambique in 1990 constituted a very differentiated body of institutions with varied ideologies, methods of work, objectives and funding. The Mozambican state had a deliberate policy of inviting NGOs to perform development tasks in certain regions because the state had no resources to accomplish these tasks itself.

In 1991, a new sector was established on the Mozambican aid scene, the local or national NGOs. They are a very varied group of institutions with heterogeneous histories, membership, aims, organizational capacities and objectives. Some of these new NGOs must be seen as alternative forms of employment and accumulation for members of the post-colonial elite. The NGO

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104 Hanlon: 1990b.

105 Aid goods were reportedly diverted by officials onto parallel marketing circuits. 75 % per cent of food aid was said to be sold on the parallel circuits (Gebauer: 1991 - though his conclusions were strongly contested) or smuggled to neighbouring countries. Donated powdered milk was smuggled to Swaziland. Southern African Economist: 1989:23.

format gives institutions which bear similarities to private companies, a better chance of access to aid funds for which otherwise they would be ineligible.

Donor positions can best be represented as a continuum with two extreme poles. At one end are those who conditioned their aid on a change in policies towards a western style of organization and the promotion of capitalism. The other end includes donors who granted aid to support government options and to create an environment for their application. The first group defended principles and objectives very similar to those expressed by the forces involved in destabilisation. The second group supported, in various degrees and by different means, the government's efforts to curb destabilization. But inconsistencies and contradictions in this support ended up by amplifying the government's vulnerability and the results of destabilisation.. In the first case the use of aid as a means of intervention was a goal. In the second case intervention was a result that was sometimes unintended.

Direct or indirect pressures from donors whose aid had earlier been regarded as coming without strings become more visible. The end result of the two types of aid has been: 1) a continual decline as shown by conventional development indicators e.g. growth, equity and institution building, and 2) continuous (successful) pressure to change government policies and priorities, and promote conformity to donor paradigms and priorities.

Donors have forced the government to change its policies by relating the allocation of funds to the adoption of policy prescriptions. Aid starts to flow only when donor conditions have been met or existing flows have been suspended or redirected according to donor judgments and options.

Aid has bypassed existing government structures and the priorities defined by local and national institutions. At the local level NGOs tend to decide on development priorities, and to set up parallel structures.[106] NGOs command resources and money, which they tend to put on any issue they judge important, becoming a kind of a "local fixer".[107] At national level donors often decide themselves on priorities and actions and impose their conditions on a needy and weakened government. The combined effect of this is to give aid donors power and leverage. This "fixers syndrome" is a specific type of destabilisation because it neutralizes existing state institutions by taking over some of their basic functions, notably policy formation.[108]

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106 HIVOS, a Dutch NGO, assessed the role of aid and NGOs in Southern Africa and sounded an alert "Taking too active a role in local initiatives, such as networks, in order to speed things up should be avoided. Southern Africa is becoming characterised by donor-inspired platforms, networks and other groupings of NGOs at the cost of more indigenous coalitions". For a discussion of the shortcoming of NGO activity see Rahnema: 1985 and Hanlon: 1990b.

107 O'Laughlin: 1988.

108 O'Laughlin: 1988; Hanlon: 1990b.

The specific impact of aid on Mozambique contradicts the argument that "development aid, emergency loans and military assistance are all essentially stabilization measures. So are large scale programs such as the Marshall Plan and the Brandt commission proposal for Massive transfer of Resources."[109]

The political nature of aid and its impact on the recipient are very visible in Mozambique due to the particular historical conditions under which it has been allocated. Aid in the concrete historical situation of an attempt at self-reliance, independence and destabilisation in Mozambique, has been intentionally given both as a stabilizing element (to reply to destabilisation in a positive way - creation of alternative government structures, adapting programs to national survival, reducing poverty) and a promoter of destabilisation by reducing the government's degree of control over its own political and development options.

Donors have used aid to the Mozambican government as a positive sanction (more aid or with less conditionality) or as a negative sanction (less aid, or aid of a different nature to the one demanded by the recipient, or aid tied to domestic policy changes). Aid was always given as a sign of positive recognition of the role played by Mozambican government in the international arena towards the donor. Giving aid appeared to be a distributive exercise by donors.[110] The fact that Mozambique depends on external assistance to finance over 50 per cent of its budget creates a problem for financial administration because

> the "use of the funds depends on actions to be undertaken by structures of the donor countries and (...) it is not always possible to respect internal priorities because it is necessary, some times, to compromise with the concerns of the donor countries".[111]

The Mozambican government has not played a passive role in the aid relationship. Its own capacity to exert sanctions was based on the country's privileged geo-strategical position in Southern Africa. Four main negative sanctions have been used in the relationship with donors:

i) change of alliances in the bi-polar world order (the USSR and the socialist bloc or the USA and the Western camp),
ii) consideration of the contradictory interests of different countries in the world system vis a vis Southern Africa (US, Britain, Germany, France, Sweden, Italy); iii) refusal to collaborate with plans for non-revolutionary change in Southern Africa and South Africa and
iii) alliance with forces inside the donor countries with different views from those of their own governments on change in Southern Africa.

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[109] Hettne: 1990:32. I am indebted to Bjorn Hettne for the authorisation to quote from the preliminary draft. I also owe to him a introduction to the theme of development and peace.

[110] Osman: 1991b.

[111] Osman: 1989a.

The positive sanction which the government had at its disposal was to implement policies proposed or favored by the donors.

Aid, whatever the intentions or results, is an act of intervention in the social and political milieu into which it is disbursed. The results of aid intervention depend on the nature of the aid (type, volumes), the nature of the donor (state, charity, NGO, PVO) and the nature of the recipient (state, NGO, PVO). The aid relationship - the relation or interaction between donor and recipient - determines the flow of aid, the type of aid disbursed, the conditionalities. The aid process - the mechanism through which any specific aid is given, or is transformed into an action or a development project - determines the effect of the aid. When aid is allocated in a way that includes the presence of the donor or its representatives in the decision making process (allocation, target group, sectorial policies) at the receiving end, the result depends very much on the individuals who are participating in the process.

6 The recipient and its strategies: the role of the Mozambican state

Given the dependence of the Mozambican economy on external factors and its vulnerability, the government opted to meet its external financial needs through international cooperation. Two processes were used to tap the necessary resources: borrowing and aid flows.

The process of obtaining aid was very pragmatic. It consisted of various levels of negotiations and communication. Assistance was sought from states with which FRELIMO had relations during the liberation war.

The processes leading to aid grants varied according to the regime and rules of the donor country. In states where an established aid agency existed, aid requests were presented through formal channels (Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Parliament-Aid Agency). With countries that had a very personalized type of rule, agreement was reached first between leaders (e.g. between Samora Machel and Saddam Hussein). After this agreement was reached technical aspects would be carried out by specialized state agencies or the ministries involved in specific projects.

The motives for giving aid varied among donors, but one of the main reasons was political.[112] Strategic considerations played a primary role. In the

[112] Various articles and positions have been published mainly on Southern Africa Report. Hermele: 1992a summarises some of the debate.

negotiations leading towards aid grants there was always a give and take element. Quite often the specific negotiation process was not fully spelled out in documents or texts.[113]

In 1975 the Mozambican government had a very cautious and pragmatic way of looking at aid. [114] It did not accept the idea of aid as a free gift. The dominant concept was that of cooperation. The Mozambican government engaged in a process which was also beneficial to the other partner. The Mozambican government was receiving something in exchange for something else which would benefit the donor.[115]

The government wanted to pursue its national policies in a sovereign fashion, defining its own options. Foreign aid was considered a necessity given the limits of the financial resources that could be mobilized internally. The availability of foreign resources on terms that could be met by Mozambique was regarded as aid.

The government divided the donors into two groups: those who were friends and those who were not. The degree of mutual sympathy did not play an excluding role. The government wanted to obtain assistance from both sides so as to pursue its national interests. The idea behind cooperation policy was that the relationship with partners, even friends and allies, should not be transformed into dependency. Aid was conceptualized as support, as help. The analysis behind this conception of aid, although considering both friends and foes, was ideologically biased. Aid was conceptualized within a cold war era vision of the world system formed by two blocs. The socialist countries and those who had supported the liberation war against Portugal were considered as friends. The non-friends were also easily identifiable because they had worked against independence, they did not approve the policies adopted by the post-independence government and were working, direct or indirectly, against it. The non-friends were not seen as a homogeneous bloc. Internal divisions within the bloc and within each country were considered.

In 1991, the Mozambican government was defending "an adjustment of the cooperation programs to national reality" and "the principle of sectorial and/or geographical concentration of bilateral projects". Priority areas were: support for the balance of payments, transport and security, funds for technical assistance, debt relief, institutional capacity building, emergency and humanitarian aid.[116]

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113 Interview with Ismail: 1992.

114 Ofstad: 1983.

115 Comissão Nacional do Plano: 1986.

116 Ministério da Cooperação: 1990b. For the general difficulties and problems on aid co-ordination in Mozambique see Disch: 1989a,b. For a debate about the same problem at the international level see Arkadie: 1986; Schultzes: 1987.

Whatever the conceptions behind aid negotiations, the relationship is an asymmetrical one. When the asymmetry is less accentuated, the recipient has a greater capacity to formulate, implement and coordinate its own aid and development policies and projects.

Mozambique's aid coordination institutions have evolved over the 1975-1990 period. In the first years of independence aid was coordinated by a "National Directorate of International Cooperation", within the Planning Ministry. In 1989 the government developed actions to coordinate international cooperation. Laws were passed institutionalizing a national system of international cooperation, defining the responsibilities of different sectors of the state apparatus in the aid process. In 1990, a separate Ministry of Cooperation was set up.[117] The new institution was created to deal with the increased volumes of aid and to promote better coordination of development efforts.

The system had two levels: coordination and implementation. The central or coordination level had responsibility for overall coordination, monitoring, management, planning and support for sectorial units, control and training. The implementation or executive level had to perform the activities, comply with the norms, generate and coordinate information and define training and education needs.[118]

The national aid and cooperation system, although it represented an attempt to rationalize the aid process and to maximize the results of foreign assistance, had many shortcomings. A formal structure with a clear definition of responsibilities and of subordination between sectorial and central units was lacking. In the particular situation of Mozambique, characterized by over-use of the limited number of trained personnel, an interrelationship based on principle and conviction was very difficult to establish. More than promoting cross-fertilization and genuine coordination the national cooperation system maintained the ever-present difficulties in aid evaluation and coordination.

Its sheer size meant that the aid sector was difficult to manage and coordinate. It involved about 180 institutions, ranging from donors (governments, NGOs, multilateral bodies) to state organizations with general supervisory functions and organs which processed and implemented actions of national cooperation. A second problem the diversity of the actions which had to be coordinated: projects dealing with emergency relief, development, investments, and scientific areas such as biology, agriculture, medicine and geology.

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[117] The increased capacity of the Ministry of Co-operation permitted a better preparation of negotiations with donors.

[118] Ministério da Cooperação: 1989b.

7 Conclusion

Aid as a flow of finance, goods and experts is a form of maintaining the world system. Its effects on the world system are similar to the effects of war which

> "is one way of exercising power (...) there is a strong correlation between structural top-dog/underdog relations and manifest overt conflicts. However, a situation of structural dependency and weak peripheral state structures can also be used to exercise power and influence without the use of direct violence. This method is called destabilisation".[119]

So far the aid received by Mozambique has allowed neither growth nor the creation of capacities permitting an independent development process. The adoption of PRE - the Mozambican variant of Structural Adjustment - is an example of the role of aid conditionality in determining the shape and contents of national development policies. Aid-induced or aid-supported development tends to promote an overlapping of national priorities with aid priorities. National development programs planned as a set of coherent activities are transformed into a patchwork of components, depending on aid sources, and on the wishes and whims of those who give the support.

A client-patron relationship has developed between the major partner groups involved in the aid process (private donors, North Atlantic PVO/NGOs, North Atlantic governments, Mozambican NGOs, the Mozambican state and its agencies, grass-root recipients). This network works operates both ways because both sides can benefit from the existing set-up. A project in Mozambique can mean a increase in the budget for an organization in the North Atlantic country, through funds allocated for overseas development, or it can mean a trip to foreign lands for a member of the intelligentsia of the recipient state. The other side of the development tourist industry has been established.

The private aid system has been regarded as "performing a system maintenance function, both at the international level among nations and within poor countries themselves. As currently constituted, it presents no major threat to nation-state sovereignty. It actually enhances the political and economic stability of both donor and recipient societies".[120]

In the case of Mozambique, there are NGOs/PVOs which have worked to enhance the government's capacities and others which have worked to change its policies. PVOs have also supported forces acting against the government. Theories which do not consider the hidden agendas of PVOs and NGOs - such

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[119] Hettne: 1990:63.

[120] Smith: 1990:282. See also Micksesell: 1986 and Ridell: 1987.

as the one formulated by Smith,[121] will only see the nation-state maintenance system. These organizations can erode the sovereignty of the existing states by bypassing state structures [122]. When addressing the system maintenance or stabilization function of aid, one has to ask which system one is talking about. Aid can destroy the culture of an indigenous group in a Latin American country, but can give additional impetus to the local intelligentsia and its efforts to build a unified and homogeneous nation-state. Aid, as it is dispensed now, does not pose a threat to the existing world system of states, but is an integral part of it: it creates opportunities for integration or for corrections i.e. pushing a government back into the fold, changing governments or their policies or feeding the hungry. It relieves pressures that could lead to the transformation of the present world system.

> But, as it has also been said:
> "(...) for all their excellence, War on Want and OXFAM are, in fact, latter day equivalents of Victorian organized charity, which in the end became a serious barrier to serious "welfare" reform, which only the state was fitted to undertake. The international attack on poverty, will equally have to be carried out, ultimately, by the collective, corporate action of the government, states, and international organizations. The lasting contribution of the charity organizations won't be their material contribution, but the awakening of the conscience of the rich." [123]

Whatever the results, and the reasons why it is given, aid will be a feature of the present world system and Mozambique will not be capable of living without it in the foreseeable future. An annual increase of 2.9 % per cent in foreign financing is envisaged for the 1992-2000 period.[124] But aid will only be developmental, i.e. permit the creation of capacities for autonomous development, if it corresponds to local realities. [125]

Aid, concessional transfers of financial grants, equipment and resources, and overt or covert use of force by the top-dogs of the existing World System directly or through regional gendarmes and internal groups left out of the development process, are two forms of intervention. The form is different: aid is an overt policy and does not violate international law, destabilisation is a covert

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121 Smith: 1990.

122 Hanlon: 1990a.

123 Worsley: 1964.

124 World Bank: 1990c.

125 Hellinger; Hellinger and O'Reagan: 1989.

policy and it violates norms of international law. But by their results aid and destabilisation are very similar: they change the policies of the recipient/destabilized. They are two forms of intervention to maintain the world system. The role of aid in the world system does illustrate the wisdom behind an Inuit saying: Gifts make slaves as whips make dogs.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Changara: war, hunger, aid and development

1 Introduction

The district of Changara[1], covering an area of 12.000 square kilometres, is located in the southern part of Tete Province, about 70 km from the provincial capital. According to the 1980 census, Changara then had a population of 86.500. But by 1985 the population of the district had fallen to half the 1980 figure. From then on the population fluctuated due to movement to and from Zimbabwe and other areas within Tete.[2]

The history of the district in the 1975-1990 period illustrates the complex relationship between government development strategies and associated policies, the role of foreign aid and destabilisation. The development strategies applied in Changara created an ambient propitious for the development of RENAMO. The development strategies and associated policies in post-colonial Changara were mainly focused on the establishment of communal villages and co-operatives. These policies (particularly villagization) consolidated differentiation among the peasantry and created a sense of denial among one group within the peasantry, which gave support (overt or covert) to RENAMO. RENAMO tried to tap this capital of resentment and put it at its own service, using it as an anchor for its claims to legitimacy as articulator and redresser of peasant grievances, and acting within peasant culture and values.

2 The colonial occupation

The territories of Changara were part of the "Prazos" (large areas of land administered by a "Prazeiro"). Changara, at least partially, fell within the Massangano prazo. [3]

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1 This case study was published in a different version in Arquivo No.10, a special issue on Tete province. See Adam: 1991. I also presented it as a paper at Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University in May 1991 on a one-day seminar on Mozambique organised by Professor Terrence Ranger.

2 Changara in the colonial period was an Administrative Post with 2285 square km.

3 For a description of "Prazo" and "prazeiros" see Isaacman: 1991.

The Portuguese only occupied Tete south of Zambezi, where Changara is situated, at the beginning of the twentieth century.[4] "To the south of the Zambezi, the Mutapa Chioco continued to resist in 1902, and we can consider that the Portuguese only managed to impose order after November 1904, when they defeated the Mwenemutapa and crushed a rebellion in Boroma".[5] After the Portuguese occupation in the early 20th century, Changara was included in Tete district and administered as part of the Circunscrição de Tete.

A Portuguese administrator ruled the territory where the population lived in villages. The villages were the basis of a system and each was ruled by a régulo or mambo. At the middle level there were the fumos. A Portuguese administrator ensured that the administration worked to defend Portuguese interests.

3 The political economy of colonial Changara

There were five characteristics of the political economy of Changara in the colonial period:

i) production of cereals for subsistence and for the market;
ii) migrant labour;
iii) social differentiation among the peasantry;
iv) population distribution according to soil and water conditions;
v) forced villagization.[6]

The nature of the political economy which evolved in Changara in the colonial period had features that can also be found in other labour reserve areas both in the North (Mueda) and in the South (Sabié).

Peasant agriculture in Changara during the colonial period was based on slash and burn techniques. Each plot was cultivated for four years and left fallow for the next twelve. Each peasant normally had two plots, one for rainfed crops and another one for irrigation. Irrigated agriculture was practised in the "baixas"

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[4] The complexities of the populations can be explored in Isaacman. Eliseu and Medeiros: 1991 present the complexities of the ethnic situation in Tete. Note that in Tete the population has been mixed, and bilingualism is frequent. For an historical exploration on the culture of the Zambezi see Isaacman and Isaacman:1983. Lobato gives a detailed account of the transformations of the prazo system, of the tactics used by the Portuguese occupation forces and the relationship between Portuguese strategies and contradictions amongst the local population and polities (Lobato: 1962 and Lobato: 1971). For details about the role of Macombe in the 19th century rebellion against the Portuguese see Isaacman: 1979.

[5] Coelho: 1991:104.

[6] The information found in Braga: 1971 on the colonial political economy is corroborated by oral sources collected by Akesson: 1985 and Teixeira: 1985a.

(low lying areas), areas that were flooded after the rains. Two rivers cross Changara, the Mazoe in the North and the Luenha in the South. Two tributaries of the Mazoe also cross Changara, the Djezi and the Nhazue. The Luenha has four tributaries in Changara: the Nhamitarara, the Caira, the Mudue and the Mudze.

The most common tool was the hoe. A small group of peasants used ploughs. A peasant managed to work between 1.5 and 2 hectares by hand. Those who had ploughs worked around 4 ha. A peasant in Caomba managed to work 3.5 ha with a plough drawn by donkeys. Production levels were quite low (around 400 kg per ha of maize, 300 kg of sorghum, 500 kg of millet, 200 kg of groundnuts), although peasants maximised the productive capacity of their soils by using a variety of strategies (e.g. intercropping, and use of lowlands which retained water for a second sowing). Production was affected by rats, insects and birds.[7] The grain conservation system was also defective. Seeds were stored at home in clay pots. Each family had a storehouse.

There was no shortage of land to hamper peasant agriculture in Changara during the colonial period. Appropriation of land by settlers was not a problem in Changara because only 200 ha had been granted to colonial farmers. The installation of colons along the Luenha River, planned for the beginning of the seventies as part of the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam never materialised.[8]

The 11 shops in the district survived on trade with the peasantry. Social and economic structures were not highly developed. The most important infrastructures in the district were the roads built at the beginning of the 70's: i) one North-South road linking Tete to Beira and ii) an East-West road linking Tete to Zimbabwe. These roads were built in response not to the needs of the district, but to the overall needs of the colony. A network of dirt roads served the interior of the district but they were unusable, even by four wheel drive vehicles, during the rainy season.

Family incomes generated by the sale of surplus crops had to be complemented with the sale of labour generally outside Changara.[9] Local employment opportunities were limited to jobs in the mission station, in the shops or in the houses of settlers and officials. There were two flows of labour migration from Changara: i) one to Beira and ii) another to Rhodesia. In 1972 it was estimated that 17% of the adult male population of working age was working

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7 Divisão de Promoção Social e Povoamento: [n.d.].

8 Akesson: 1985:4; Braga: 1971.

9 For migratory labour to Zimbabwe see Adam; Davies and Head: 1981; Rita-Ferreira: 1985; Neves: 1991.

outside the district.[10] The effects of migrant labour are shown by the masculinity ratio (number of men per 100 women) which, in 1972, was 89 for the adult population and 108 for the "menores" (minors).[11]

The Changara peasantry was not a homogeneous bloc. It was differentiated in terms of languages spoken, history and ethnic affiliation, ownership of land, means of production, and wealth, and access to political power. All these factors are significant for my analysis, because each of them interacted with the development strategies and associated policies.

The population considered itself Tonga in three regulados and Tauara in six regulados. The Tauara population spoke Nhungue and the Tonga spoke a Sena dialect.[12] Tauaras and Tongas are patrilinear and constitute an ethnic mix, that Rita Ferreira has called the Peoples of the Lower Zambezi.[13] The Tongas who inhabit the Changara district are part of a wider group which extends into Barue district in Manica province. Historically, the Tauaras had no political organisation, but the Tongas were part of the Kingdom of Barue. The difference in terms of language spoken (the Shona and non-Shona speakers) represented major cleavages in terms of access to wealth and government services. Shona speakers inhabited the more remote areas of the district.

Socio-economic differentiation is more coherently shown if we take as an indicator of household wealth the number of wives in each household. 71% of the adult males had one wife, 22% two wives and 6% three wives. Three socio economic groups or strata could be distinguished in peasant communities: i) a group of rich peasants with a large amount of livestock (goats and cattle). They tilled larger areas and produced more when compared with other groups. Access to large farms and irrigated areas provided a secure agricultural base both for sale and for consumption; ii) a group of middle peasants who worked as migrant labour from time to time. Their farms were smaller than those of the rich peasants, and their agricultural production did not constitute a secure base for the family, because they worked mainly on rain fed plots. The number of livestock owned was limited; iii) the poor peasant group consisting of peasant households who had neither enough land (size of farms and access to irrigation) nor labour to

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[10] The figures for the total population of Changara is 1972 are of 13.310 of which 6700 (50) are adults and 6610 (50) youth. Of the 6700 adults 3.037 are men and 3663 women. For the minors (less then 18 years) 3436 are masculine and 3174 feminine. The data was supplied to the GPZ by the administration of Changara in 1972.

[11] Braga: 1971. It is very difficult to understand what is meant by "minors" in the document. Under Portuguese law a minor would be a individual under 18 or 21 years of age but in local understanding a minor would be a individual younger than 14.

[12] Braga: 1971.

[13] Rita-Ferreira: 1974.

have a sound agricultural base. The number of animals they owned was the smallest.

A concentration of population along the roads, particularly the tarred road which linked Tete to Rhodesia, was noted in the 1970s. But most of the population lived in "small (...) villages concentrated in the river valleys which characterise hydrographically the zone of Changara".[14] The settlement pattern in Changara in 1972 was directly dependent on the existence of water and of appropriate soils for agriculture.[15]

The villages built by the peasants themselves without any state interference presented great frontages to the rivers. This was so as to allow use of the rich, humid alluvial soils on the river banks. In no way did this "natural distribution of the population" assured an idyllic situation for the peasants' food situation. But it was a logical response to existing environmental conditions.

Before the 1972 resettlement, the 11,642 inhabitants of Changara lived in nine regulados and 28 villages. The average number of inhabitants per village was 415.

Although the plan to set up strategic hamlets (aldeamentos) in the final years of colonialism in N'Temangau had both agricultural and military goals, the latter prevailed in 1972 when the population of Changara was put into villages. The main villagization operations took place along the Mazoe river in the colonial administrative post of N'Temangau. The first village to be established was Kapimbi. Another was set up in Gola/Caomba.[16]

Resettlement was rapid and carried out under duress. In less than 24 hours the peasants were forced to demolish their homes (in order to salvage as much material as possible from the previous buildings for the new ones), and were compelled to join the military escort which took them to the sites of the aldeamentos.[17]

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[14] Braga: 1971:16.

[15] My main source for Changara before the colonial resettlement is Braga: 1971. This unpublished report was found in the INIA library in Maputo. It constitutes a very good resumé of the information the Portuguese administration had at its disposal at the time. I have complemented it with the Hidrotécnica Portuguesa Reports. The information collected both by Teixeira: 1985a and Akesson: 1985 confirms the information provided by Braga: 1971.

[16] Akesson: 1985:6-7.

[17] A document, Camps de Regroupement dans la Zone de Changara, found in the archives of the Department Missionaire in Lausanne -Switzerland, 1605 A/22, describes the formation of the aldeamentos by the Portuguese army in July 1971. It describes the process and the use of force but shows that only a small fraction of the total population went to the aldeamentos. Of the 8,000 inhabitants of Chioco only 1,700 were put in the villages. From Magasso, Chuiguidene and Massanga only 500 persons were put into aldeamentos, which represented a tiny proportion of the inhabitants, since Magasso alone had 3,000 inhabitants. The

Life in the aldeamentos, or protected villages, was very harsh. Security was maintained by soldiers of the Portuguese army and of the paramilitary OPV (Provincial Organisation of Volunteers). Peasants were under guard at all times. On their way to their farms, and while they worked there, work groups were watched by armed militia. The composition of the groups who went to the river (usually all men or all women) changed (groups of both sexes). "Men and women were not allowed to go in separate groups to the river as they had done before the building of the aldeamentos. In the aldeamento we had to go together and were guarded by the soldiers".[18]

The aims of the aldeamentos were presented as a symbiosis of military and development goals, which were assumed to bolster support for the Portuguese government amongst the population and opposition to the FRELIMO guerrillas. The two pronged (production and security) strategy intended as an operation to win hearts and minds, ended up as a show of military might. The epilogue to the creation of the aldeamentos was an exercise in repression by an unpopular government facing the expansion of guerrilla operations. The aldeamento strategy ended up creating instruments for the administrative control of the population so as to limit their contact with FRELIMO guerrillas and by organising a defence system that used local militia.[19]

In their 1985 recollections of the 1972 formation of aldeamentos, local people overstressed the role of repression, and claimed that disagreement or opposition to Portuguese orders was not possible because those who challenged them would have to face the authorities.[20] The 1985 informants said that those who disobeyed orders were a small group, but documents from that period show that only a small percentage of the total population agreed to move into the villages. There seem to have been more people resisting the "aldeamentos" than obeying.[21] Those who agreed to live in aldeamentos were driven by fear, and 13 years after the event they are still trying to justify their actions. Naturally peasant fears in Tete in 1972 are quite understandable, if one takes into account the Portuguese record in the area. Wiriamu, where a major massacre occurred is located nearby.[22]

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document "Camp de Regroupment dans la Zone de Changara" is written in French and was probably sent to the Department Missionaire of the Swiss Mission by a priest. No author is mentioned in the text. I thank Eric Morier Genoud who supplied me with a photocopy of the document.

18 Akesson: 1985:6.

19 Braga: 1971, for the idea behind aldeamento strategy in Changara and Akesson: 1985 for the result and practical implementation.

20 Akesson: 1985:6.

21 Document from Tete priests. See note 16.

22 For the massacres in 1970 in Tete, see "A Guerra Colonial em Tete, Os Massacres de Wiryamu". A chilling account of the massacres by ex-PIDE and Portuguese commandos.

In 1972, the Portuguese carried out a psychological campaign to persuade peasants to enter aldeamentos. They held opinion polls on willingness to live in these villages. The aim of this exercise was two fold: a) psychological preparation for living in a village; b) adherence by the local people to programs of "community development", which would help reduce costs with the resettlement process, speed up the opening of new farms and the building of new houses by the villagers themselves.

Assessment of peasant receptivity to the aldeamentos revealed a refusal to move in two regulados, an indefinite response in one, "reasonable" in another and "good" in five regulados.[23]

The logic behind the peasants' positions and the reasons for opposition to the aldeamentos are worth going into since they reveal the rationale of peasant settlement patterns. Major opposition came from those who would be re-settled in aldeamentos geographically removed from the regulado of their origin e.g. Chinssoro which was to be transferred to the Regulado of Nachinanga and Chinanda which was to be transferred to the Regulado of N'Temangau. What was the basis for this refusal? Three main reasons should be noted: i) The distance of the peasants' farms from their new homes. The new villages were situated some 20 km from the residents' original farms (i.e. those established on land which they owned); ii) The quality of soil in the new location were not as good as in the places where they lived before; iii) Land tenure. Land in the new settlements had owners; iv) Ancestor worship. Cults in the region are territorial i.e. the ancestral spirits are related to a defined geographical area. The mhondoro spirits rule a particular region.

The new settlements, designated contemptuously by the peasants as the place where goats piss, made them paupers on other people's property, unprotected by the gods. The use of land owned by another person brings obligations with it: share of crops, disbursement of rent or limitation on the type of agriculture practised (e.g. a ban on planting trees which guarantee, according to customary law, ownership of land). Without the shelter of the spirits, it is believed, good rains and harvests are not guaranteed.

In the Changara aldeamentos agricultural production was poor. The soil of the plots allocated to the peasants was inappropriate. The fact that the peasants were transferred to the new aldeamentos in November, in the middle of the planting season, resulted in a bad agricultural season in 1972 and consequent food shortages and hunger later that year. Some residents managed

[23] The data supplied by the Portuguese authorities does not give details about the number of inhabitants who refused or the way the opinion poll was carried out.

to secure employment in the GPZ, as militia or labourers, using the money to buy food.[24]

4 The political economy of post-colonial Changara

After independence, the political economy of Changara was no longer characterised by labour migration and production of cereals for the market, in a environment of compulsion and intimidation. In the post-colonial period, Changara was characterised by forced migration and production of vegetables for the market, in a highly contradictory milieu where the creation of participatory structures coexisted with use and abuse of force. Social differentiation sharpened in the post-colonial period. Rich peasants have consolidated themselves and the communities living near the administrative posts have achieved greater rewards from the state than those living in more remote areas. The state gave less consideration to groups of peasants who lived a long way from the administrative posts.

After the Lusaka Agreement, signed in 1974 by FRELIMO and the Portuguese government, the peasants living in the Changara villages received orders to abandon the "goat pissoirs" and return to their old homes. This guidelines was different from that received by the inhabitants of the aldeamentos in Cabo Delgado (See chapter on Mueda). The peasants in the North were told to remain in the villages and in the areas where the Portuguese authorities had put them, or present themselves in the FRELIMO guerrilla bases.

The Changara population reacted in varying ways to the FRELIMO order. All those who had been shoved into aldeamentos removed from their regulados of origin left the aldeamentos and returned to their old homes and farms. All those living in aldeamentos situated in their regulados of origin remained in the aldeamentos, which became communal villages. Peasants used the change in the political situation to reverse the changes which the colonial administration had imposed by force.

In 1975, history confirmed the results of the Portuguese opinion poll. Peasant acceptance of change in their place residence depended on geography i.e. inside the boundaries of their regulado of origin or outside. The rationale of peasant settlement choices was shown once more.

Residents of the aldeamento located where the present village of Kapimbi stands, who did not live in the area of the village in the colonial

[24] Akesson: 1985:8.

C. E. A. DOC

period, left after FRELIMO's order to abandon the "goat pissoirs". One of the groups that previously lived in Gola returned to the site of the old village site. The new village was called Gola/Caomba. The reasons put forward by the peasants themselves to explain this return were concerned with the existence of good soils for agricultural production.[25]

The situation of the Changara peasant was already difficult in 1975. There was hunger in the district in 1975, immediately after Independence. Hunger also occurred in the district after the floods on the Luenha and Mazoe rivers in 1975. Changara-sede, N'Temangau, Mazoe and N'tchanga were affected.[26]

The rural development strategies advocated by FRELIMO and by the government after Independence included the establishment of state farms, formation of villages, development of co-operatives and provision of agricultural marketing, education and health services that would be accessible to the majority of the population.[27]

In Changara, the state farm component of the post colonial development strategies did not take off because no settler farms were nationalised. In Changara, development strategies emphasised villagization and co-operatives.

The application of government villagization policies in Changara between 1975 and 1981 seems to have been reasonable, without the use of force. But in 1981 the Changara administration re-launched the villagization campaign. All those who had left the "goat pissoirs" were forced to return to the villages they had abandoned.

Forced villagization, and the compulsory formation of co-operatives, were launched. Villages were formed in Capimbi, Gola, Chicompende, Cancune, Mitete, Cangololo, Chipembere, Nhacaomba and Nhapende.[28] The post-colonial state was re-creating, by coercion, the same pattern of settlement that the colonial state had tried to establish, also by force. The aldeamento program and the villagization strategy are two variants of forced resettlement programs. Forced collectivisation, started by the post-colonial government in 1981, led to conflicts between the peasants and the army. Struggles between soldiers were also reported as well as cases where peasants were punished. In the district headquarters between 24 and 27 September 1981 houses were burnt, a bar was closed and fighting between soldiers occurred.

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25 Akesson: 1985:8.

26 Changara, Administracao do Distrito: 1982.

27 For a analysis see O'Laughlin: 1986.

28 Changara, Administracao do Distrito: 1981.

In the wake of the second wave of villagization and the increased presence of the government army, peasants left Mozambique for Zimbabwe.[29]

The picture of villages in Changara in 1985 is very similar to the one described for Sabié: the settlements were very unstable, particularly in outlying areas, information was difficult to get, population movements were constant.

Socio-economic indicators on the villages which emerged from the government efforts show settlements which grouped households incapable of producing for their own subsistence. Studies which began in 1985 for the establishment of the UNICEF project in N'Temangau, a locality in Changara, show the situation in the area.[30]

Table 7.1. List of villages in N'Temangau administrative post

Village	Population	
	1980	1985
Campimbi sede	1246	1403
N'Temangau célula	356	NA
Gola/Caomba	810	832
Nachinanga	808	NA
Chiutumbo	NA	NA
Nachinanga	NA	NA
Nhampodzo	NA	NA
Nhacanga	NA	NA

Source: Changara district administration. (NA= data not available)

The villages were very vulnerable to famine. In 1984, in an inquiry into 208 families, 12% did not produce anything, 56 % worked rainfed plots, 2% worked only on irrigated land and 30% worked both irrigated and rainfed plots. Agricultural production was not sufficient to sustain families throughout the year. Furthermore, collective forms of production were not developed to the point that they could assure the necessities of reproduction for their members. Family farms were situated up to 15 km from residential areas.

In 1985, the average family in Changara had 8 members of whom 1.5 were children under five years old. Two children were of school age, of which 1.5 were actually in school. On average three children per family died before their fifth birthday. The average family owned 3 hoes, 2 axes and less than one machete. In terms of animals, the average family had six goats, 1.5 pigs and seven birds. The average family had two plots of land (including one in the low lying areas), and had one cegonha (shadouf) and 1-2 food stores. Half of the

29 Changara, Administracao do Distrito:1981.

30 Teixeira: 1985a:3-10.

average families grew tobacco and in 1984 each sold an average of 100 "cakes" of tobacco. [31]

Family agriculture was the most important economic activity. In 1985, out of the sample of 208, 85 per cent of the heads of households worked in an activity linked to agriculture. The indicators obtained five years earlier, during the General Population Census of 1980, revealed that 93% of the people working in the district were occupied in agriculture. Of the 37,829 individuals who worked, 35,316 were engaged in agriculture.

The most common commercial crop in Changara was tobacco, for which there was a ready market in Zimbabwe where a 900 gram cake sold for three Zimbabwe dollars. Onions and garlic were two horticultural products that constituted an important source of revenue for Changara farmers. Transport and the size of the local market, in Changara and in Tete, limited horticultural production. In 1983, 300 tons of onions rotted in Changara.[32]

The amount of grain marketed in Changara greatly declined. In 1979 and 1980 there was no agricultural marketing due to drought. Grain purchases by AGRICOM in 1981, 1982 and 1983 were small but started to pick up in 1985. (See table 3).

The struggle for land was very intense in Changara because of the resettlement. The development of co-operatives intensified this struggle. Co-operatives were forced to obtain land by "loaning" it from land owners. The loan conditions (share of crops, payment of rent, supply of labour to the land owner and planting trees) were kept secret due to the fact that the land law prohibited the sale or hire of land. In 1984 there were discussions in Changara about the application of the land law to discipline land use and distribution.

Table 7.2. Marketing of agricultural surplus in Changara (in tons)

Products	1981/1982	1983	1984
Dwarf sorghum			31
Millet	55	51	36
Maize	63	46	845
Onions		109	108
Garlic			437
Cotton		7	
Sunflower		540	360

Source: AGRICOM Changara report 14.01.1985

31 Tete, Governo Provincial: 1985:3-10

32 Teixeira: 1985a:16.

Drought also affected the pattern of livestock ownership. In 1985, 17% of the sample of 208 families did not have any type of livestock. The population census of 1980 reveals that of the total 18,638 households dwelling in the district, 20% owned cattle, 20% goats, 40% pigs and 20% did not possess any animals. In 1985 in N'Temangau only 5 families had any cattle left (an average of 10 head per family). In the village of Caomba no family had any cattle.[33]

The agricultural panorama we have depicted shows the limited transformation of agriculture as a food producing and income generating activity. Migrant labour continued to be important in this context. The local job market remained limited. From the 208 questionnaires collected in 1985, 70 per cent of heads of household had no waged jobs, 13 per cent had a permanent waged job and two per cent seasonal employment; 15 per cent of heads of household worked outside the district.

The existence of a migratory flux during the post-independence period is flagged by the masculinity ratio among the population in the 1980 census: 80 men per 100 women is the masculinity ratio for the entire Changara population. When considering the population in the 0-14 years age group it is 99 per 100. For the 15 to 24 years age group it drops to 69 men per 100 women. For the age groups 25 to 34 and 35 to 44 it is around 50 per 100. The disparity is larger in those age groups which provide the largest contingents of labour migrants. A survey, completed in Changara in 1988, showed that 60% of the 108 families interviewed did not produce food surplus, that 43% had produced enough but only 13% had adequate supplies to last until the next harvest. The socio-economic situation was unstable: in 23 per cent of families the father was absent and the work force was mainly (57 per cent) constituted by women. In general terms, the survey in Changara sede showed the same situation found in N'Temangau in 1985.

The Changara peasantry, who had a weak productive base, were affected by the Mozambican government's compliance with UN sanctions against Rhodesia in 1976. Sanctions blocked the movement of labour to Rhodesia and then to Beira. Employment on the railways and in Beira port was also dependent on the transit trade with Rhodesia. The remittances of migrant workers were essential to maintain the peasant family economy because they guaranteed the income necessary to begin new farms, to establish a family ("lobolo" bride price, housing, consumer goods, tools) or to maintain it during moments of crisis (hunger). Rhodesian military attacks disorganised what had remained of the transport and marketing networks, and deprived the region of the security necessary for its development.

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[33] Akesson: 1985:21.

To establish a viable economic base in the villages, the government initiated development projects in Changara. In 1982, a development project was set up in Changara, to support and develop co-operatives. Similar projects, known as CADECO, existed elsewhere in the country. They were the foundations of the CO1 project, which was part of the MONAP program. CO1's goals were to i) create conditions for the development of co-operatives, special pilot co-operatives; ii) provide incentives for small farmers to form co-operatives; iii) promote the integration of collective farms and communal villages in the co-operative sector; iv) support to co-operatives in the formation of general unions; v) educate and inform members of the government and of government structures about co-operative development; vi) and develop an animal traction program.[34]

In the new CADECO set up at the Changara locality of N'Temangau, where installations of the Gabinete do Plano do Zambezi existed, CO1 tried to translate its program and goals into reality. Three reasons led to the installation of CADECO in N'Temangau: i) installations existed; ii) It was a area in crisis where peasants needed state support; iii) Other areas had been covered by other projects namely CO2.

As soon as CADECO was installed in N'Temangau it was attacked by RENAMO which led to the closure of its activities between October 1982 and January 1983 (4 months).

When the military situation improved in 1983, the CO1 project no longer existed. It had been shelved in the Ministry of Agriculture. C01 was suspended and its activities integrated into a Department of Rural Development set up inside the Agriculture Ministry. The activities in Changara were relaunched as part of the Programa de Desenvolvimento Rural - a program established in Tete Province - to respond to the difficulties created by war and drought. The Changara CDR was integrated into provincial structures and financed by funds from various sources.

N'Temangau, as a CADECO and later as a CDR (Centro de Desenvolvimento Rural - Rural Development Centre), was a rural extension unit. The N'Temangau CDR tried to change the co-operatives' administration and management systems, and introduced literacy classes and co-operative education. The CDR intervened in the supply of inputs and consumer goods and in the transport of agricultural produce to markets in Tete .

Prior to 1981, five co-operatives existed in Changara. One of the co-operatives, Massacre de Wiriamu, was in Changara-sede and had 50 members, all men. It received pumps for irrigation and a maize mill, obtained through foreign donations. It received technical support from a local priest.

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[34] Tesfai: 1991:59-60.

The other four co-operatives were in N'Temangau and produced only rainfed crops - mainly maize and sorghum, and used hired tractors. The costs were very high due to mechanisation and the crops chosen - maize and cotton - did not permit good production given the lack of rain. Between 1975 and 1980 Changara was affected by the war with Rhodesia which hampered development activities in the area.

In 1981, the four co-operatives saw a change in their situation due to the supply of short growing cycle sorghum varieties and to the support received from the CO1 Project, which introduced cattle for animal traction. In 1984, the number of co-operatives rose from five to 20. This growth can be attributed to five factors: i) technical support in terms of seeds and technical assistance; ii) the absolute lack of rain which rendered useless individual non irrigated plots; iii) the supply of consumer goods to the co-operatives; iv) the supply of seeds, tools and agro-chemicals by the CO1 project; and v) the provision of transport.

In 1985, in a bid to internalise the co-operative movement among the peasantry and to ensure that the co-operatives solved their own common problems for themselves, the CDR created the União Geral das Cooperativas de Changara (Changara General Union of Co-operatives).[35]

By 1989 the União Geral had not managed to consolidate itself as a self-managed peasant organisation, and was largely dependent on the aid milieu and on the CDR.[36] In 1980, the proportion of the members of co-operatives in the total district population was very small. According to the Census, out of a total of 37,829 workers, there were only 97 co-operative members (0.25%). Of this total, 93 were members of agricultural co-operatives and four of handicraft co-operatives.[37] The situation in 1985 was quite changed. Practically all families in Kapimbi and Caomba villages had at least one member in co-operatives.[38]

A survey in 1985 showed that of the sample of 208 families in N'Temangau, 17% did not have anyone in the co-operatives, 27 % had only one member, 50% had two members, 4 % had three and 1% had five members.

The growth in membership from the 1980 census to the 1985 survey shows the results of the policy of promoting co-operatives which followed by the development projects in the region. However the mobilisation technique

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35 Teixeira: 1985a:3-5.

36 Tanner: 1989a; Tanner: 1989b.

37 Comissão Nacional do Plano: 1984.

38 Akesson: 1985:24.

used had a carrot and stick element. The carrot was the supply of seeds, extension advice and equipment, and the payment of a daily wage for each day worked in the co-operative. The stick was the linkage between supply of consumer goods, and membership of co-operatives. To gain access to consumer goods, residents of the villages had to work on the co-operative farms and fulfil labour targets, participate in village activities and attend literacy classes. Failure to comply with any of these obligations implied loss of salary and of access to the consumer goods.[39] Child labour was used by the co-operatives during the harvest.[40] In 1984-85, the daily wage in N'Temangau was 150 Meticais when the official wage should have been 300 Meticais per working day.

In this situation (use of coercion, and a situation of hunger where access to food and supplies is linked to membership of co-operatives) the number of members is not a good measure of co-operative implantation and development. The figures for production in the co-operatives show they had only a limited impact on production.

Despite the efforts made, the co-operative movement remained very weak. In 1983 the co-operatives planned to produce an average of 40 kg of grain per peasant. This quantity was equivalent to 0.5 per cent of the total grain produced by a peasant family for each agricultural season. (See table 2)

Table 7.3.- Co-operative movement in Changara district

	1982	1983
Agricultural Co-operatives	9	9
Existing members	614	715
Production planned	16075	31015
Production per person	45,5	43,5
Production of cereals in a family farm	1100 kg	

Source: Territorial plan 1983 and Three year Plan 1983/1985 (10 July 1983).Tete Provincial Planning Commission.

Collective forms of production did not develop to a point where they could become a alternative to individual family plots. The revenue from the co-operatives never became a substitute for wages earned through migrant labour or for revenue from peasant production on individual plots. Each

39 Teixeira:1985a:24.

40 Mahumane: 1985:12.

member of a co-operative produced 42 kg of grain a year compared to the average of 1,100 kg produced per agricultural season on an individual farm.

More women than men were members of the co-operatives, and the area cultivated per member was very small. Most of the co-operatives did not cultivate their total area of land. In 1989, the União Geral das Cooperativas de Changara was looking for funds to support its activities and hoped to obtain some project support to develop its programs.[41]

Despite the great capacity for self-organisation shown by the peasants in the 1983-84 drought when they organised a scheme to buy and transport maize from Angonia to Changara[42], the Changara co-operatives showed the problems of co-operatives organised from the top down, as also illustrated by the cases of Boane, Sabié and Mueda.

By 1986, the co-operative movement had lost the momentum it had gained in 1984-85, and in 1989-1990 it was in a poor state. According to the Union President, the number of active units had declined from 13 (in December 1988) to six, three in Changara-sede and three in N'Temangau (April 1989). The area for grain production formally covered 18 hectares. "but several plots are less than 0.5 hectares and the real figure must be much lower".[43]

The evolution of the co-operative movement in Changara was consistent with the characteristic that marked its development and the type of support it received.

> "Co-operatives are a movement of those who intend to co-operate and use their institutions as a means (not as an end) to improve their socio-economic status in society. Though historical experience shows that co-operatives were organised by those who need them independent of existing state intervention, experiences from post Independent Africa demonstrate that governments took the promotion and organisation of such institutions as a strategy to organise production and to facilitate state intervention and control in the rural areas. (...) the independent organisational development of peasant institutions has been thwarted by various state measures consciously devised to control such institutions. The intervention of the state in the promotion of peasant institutions is theoretically justified by the objective situation that obtains in the set-up: lack of resources and opportunities, questions of economics of scale, low labour/output ratio, low level of productivity and production, in short, under-developed socio-economic infrastructure. However, the tendency to

41 Tanner. 1989b.

42 Teixeira: 1985a:25-27.

43 Tanner. 1989a:9.

promote such institutions or other specialised institutions by decree whereby types of co-operatives and methods of organisation are defined as a recipe for organisation and development in line with political currents/ideology without responding to the basic socio-economic conditions of a specific area has invariably resulted in the organisation of bogus institutions, and worse, has become counter productive to the movement and its future appreciation by would be participants".[44]

The top down approach serves state interests but also serves the interests of certain groups among the peasantry who are the social carriers[45] for this kind of co-operatives which is not set up as a means to promote self-reliance and autonomy but as a relay for state policies and projects. Changara shows that co-operatives have helped to remove constraints on production for rich farmers and has helped them modernise - new water pumps, although hand operated, animal traction as opposed to hoes, goods at subsidised prices. Poor peasants were forced into the scheme for two reasons: it was state policy, and the only way to obtain consumer goods in a situation where the distribution and marketing networks were paralysed and the state gave co-operatives a privileged status. These poor peasants tried to supply as little labour as possible, and to obtain goods and services which were otherwise unavailable. The linkage between co-operatives and the village political structures and their occupation by rich farmers has helped the development of this kind of rural institution. Although called co-operatives for ideological reasons, they are, in practice, private farms or enterprises. In a situation where private economic activities were regarded as illicit, they were the most appropriate ways of promoting private accumulation and to attract foreign aid by legitimising a collective transformation role.

In the post-colonial period a literacy program was also started. The illiteracy rate, which in 1974 reached 99 per cent in Changara, was cut to 79% by 1980. The data show that in the five years following the 1980 census the illiteracy rate continued to drop. In 1985, only 35 per cent of a total of 208 heads of household interrogated were illiterate.

But the positive results, although showing an effort in the education sector, do not mean that the system had no shortcomings and limitations.

Despite the political declarations by the state and party leaders, the education system was affected by several problems: lack of resources, low level of training of the teaching staff, hunger, war, shortages of teaching materials. The pass rate has been very low. Only 54 per cent of the students which began the year in 1983 passed.

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44 Seyoum: 1990:13.

45 For the concept of social carrier see Edquist and Edqvist: 1979.

In the locality of N'Temangau, of the four schools, only one - situated in the main village in N'Temangau-sede - offered all four grades of primary education. In Caomba, Nachinanga and Capimbi only the pre-school and the first grade were taught. In Nachinanga, in 1984, the teacher taught two grades, first grade in the morning and second grade in the afternoon because the village promised to pay him a subsidy of 1,500 MT. As the money was not paid he stopped teaching. In Nachinanga, the students who studied for first grade in 1984 did not stay at school in 1985 because there were no teachers.[46]

War also affected the health system in Changara. The Changara health and sanitation network was strengthened after Independence. The number of health units rose from 4 in 1972 to 8 in 1984. The number of health workers in 1985 stood at 22 persons, of whom 18 had some kind of training. There was no medical doctor or health technician with an academic degree. In 1972 there was a Portuguese military doctor in the area. The head of the Changara health services is a technician in preventive medicine.

Despite extensions to the health network in Changara, and despite programs to improve the health situation (such as the Mother and Child Health Care and the Expanded Vaccination Programs,) the health status of the population is not very good. Nor does the health network cover the district in a satisfactory way.[47] Vaccination campaign rests were affected by shortage of fuel for the cars. constant population movements, difficulties in reaching some populated areas due to the war and RENAMO attacks against health posts and personnel. But despite all difficulties, the results obtained were very good. The 1985 UNICEF study showed that of the 208 children interviewed only 6% had not been inoculated against tuberculosis, only 7% had not received vaccination against Polio and only 12% had missed the measles vaccination.

5 War: FRELIMO, the Portuguese, Rhodesians, Zimbabweans and RENAMO

Changara district has witnessed three wars. In the late sixties FRELIMO guerrilla units set themselves up in the northern areas of Chioco. At the same time the first ZANU units circulated in the area. After independence Zimbabwean nationalists increasingly used the area to penetrate into Rhodesia. The Rhodesian army conducted various military

[46] Mahumane: 1985:11.

[47] Mahumane: 1985:15-21.

operations in the area, particularly in the mountainous areas of Chiguidene and Magaco and in the Chioco and Chitima areas to the North of Changara.

Just before the end of the war with Rhodesia in 1978-79 government forces jailed some youngsters accused of collaborating with the Rhodesian army and with RENAMO, which at that time worked in tandem with the Rhodesian forces. One of the individuals captured by the government army in 1979 was the OJM (Mozambican Youth Organisation) district secretary, who was accused of being a Rhodesian spy. It was claimed that he maintained radio communication with the Rhodesians and helped them recruit several OJM members.

In the wake of the second wave of villagization and the increased presence of the government army, peasants left Mozambique for Zimbabwe.[48]

At the same time that the government was establishing villages in a process very similar and with the same aim as the aldeamentos (herd the population together for military purposes), RENAMO bands made their presence felt.

RENAMO's actions in Changara gained new momentum in the second half of 1981. The "Matsangaizas" in Changara came from Barue district in Manica which is inhabited by Shona or Ndau speakers. They received overt or covert support from the villages which had been affected negatively by collectivisation. During the Zimbabwe liberation struggle the Rhodesian army had conducted operations in the region, notably in the mountainous areas on the border. RENAMO units, in 1981, attacked existing villages, burning houses and forcing the population to abandon the newly formed villages. Party secretaries and members of the people's assemblies were menaced. No effective opposition by local militia to RENAMO units could be mounted because of the shortage of guns and ammunition.[49] Of the four villages in N'Temangau locality, the village of Nhampodzo (the main village) and the settlement of Nhacanga were outside government control. Gola/Caomba was accessible but relations with the government and the local development project were very difficult.[50] Project workers were afraid of the villagers because they had the habit of following bandit gangs and recovering whatever was left behind.[51] In 1983, the peasants living in the area of Gola/Caomba refused to participate in literacy classes and

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48 Changara, Administracao do Distrito: 1981.

49 Changara, Administracao do Distrito: 1982b.

50 Teixeira: 1985a:12.

51 Interview with Mandito: 1985.

resisted the formation of co-operatives. In 1984-1985 project personnel barely visited the area because they were afraid of those "complicated peasants".[52]

RENAMO received some support from the dissatisfied villages. Peasants from Gola/Caomba were said to follow RENAMO units and collect the booty they abandoned. It was also reported that RENAMO commanders distributed loot purposefully like modern Robin Hoods.[53] RENAMO had contacts specially among disaffected youngsters in the area. A network had been organised with the collaboration of the Changara OJM secretary for Changara who was taken prisoner in 1981.[54]

Staff at the CDR kept information about contradictions among the population secret. The CDR did not inform the research teams who drew up preliminary studies for the UNICEF project about the problems (e.g. the antagonism of inhabitants of Gola/Caomba to the CDR, the habit of collecting the rest of the looted booty). Only after the attack in which the CDR director was killed were some of these issues raised.

The existing information showed a picture of RENAMO in this first period as a military organisation attacking government and party structures and also the villages. What was the relationship between peasants and RENAMO in 1981-1982 ? There is no clear data on this relationship, but the pattern of military attacks and the type of targets shows careful planning where RENAMO was trying to mobilise for itself the capital of resentment which existed in the peasantry against the state. By attacking the new "goat pissoirs" RENAMO presented itself as the protector of peasant interests, and punishers of those who offended them.

RENAMO targets also included development projects and staff. In 1985, the CDR's activities were again stopped by war. RENAMO attacked the CDR headquarters on 5 April 1985. The premises were looted, the CDR director was killed, and his wife wounded. This attack also interrupted the socio-economic research underway.

The RENAMO attack was carried out by a group of one hundred well armed men. The attackers had also aimed to attack a team of researchers who had been working in the area, preparing a baseline study for UNICEF.[55] The UNICEF team had abandoned the N'Temangau CDR 12 hours before

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52 Interview with Mandito: 1985.

53 Interview with Derlugian: 1992.

54 The ex-secretary of OJM after having been detained by the government between 1980 and 1990 was freed. He was in Tete but it was not possible to talk to him because he had become psychologically affected by torture in the jail. Interview with D.P.W., Chitima Sede, 15th-20th June 1994.

55 Teixeira: 1985a; Teixeira: 1985b, interview.

the attack. A FAM (Mozambique Armed Forces) company protected the CDR installations. RENAMO units were said to have been guided by a peasant from the Gola-Caomba village. The RENAMO units who attacked the CDR were later expelled from N'Temangau by militia from Kapimbi village. Later a FAM counter-offensive engaged the RENAMO units in combat, killed several RENAMO members and captured 20 of them.[56]

During the attack RENAMO elements cut off the CDR director's head with a "gano" (a ritual axe).[57] "The attack had been carefully planned by persons who had come from afar and who belonged to a different ethnic group, in order to hinder a promising rural development project, that enjoyed community support. The attackers were pursued half an hour later by villagers from the nearby village of Capimbi".[58] The staff working at the Changara CDR did not have much contact with the inhabitants of Gola/Caomba, a village inhabited by peasants forced to remain in it or brought back to the village at gun-point. CDR technicians were afraid of the people at Gola whom they regarded as troublemakers collaborating with RENAMO. Inhabitants of Gola would follow RENAMO bands and seize goods left behind by those units pursued by government forces.

During the attack on N'Temangau, voices were heard saying: "Mr Castro why do you refuse to give us (vegetable) oil ? We also want things that come to the centre".[59] Such questions were constantly posed by residents of Gola-Caomba.

The RENAMO attack, on 5 April 1985, against the project headquarters in N'Temangau-sede showed: i) the weakness of the Changara military defence positions, ii) the contradictions among different population groups, iii) the contradictions in state intervention and in development activities which had difficulty in relating with the Shona speaking peasants living in Gola-Caomba and on the western edge of the district, iv) contradictions in the development projects which did not respect the culture and will of the local people and which did not build bridges with peasants who complained of discrimination.

Tables 7.4 and 7.5 show some characteristics of three villages in N'Temangau. Table 7.4 concentrates on general characteristics, appearance of the villages, level of education, use of Portuguese, distance from the administrative posts. The Shona speaking village, Caomba is located farthest from the administration, with farm lands situated at longer distance from the villagers homes, and where the functioning of institutions linked to the state

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56 Declaration of the Governor of Tete. See Tete, Governo Provincial: 1985.

57 Interview with Mandito: 1985.

58 Teixeira: 1985a.

59 Interview with Mandito: 1985.

are less established (the school is not working). The general outlay of the village is more similar to traditional villages i.e. no respect for characteristics of state designed villages, such as houses in lines, and clear cut rectangular plots.

Table 7.4 Characteristics of three Changara villages

VILLAGE	N'TEMANGAU	KAPIMBI	CAOMBA
Ethnic group	Nhungwe	Nhungwe	Tawara/Tonga
Language spoken		Shona Tawara Portuguese English	Shona Xitonga Portuguese English
School	Functioning	Functioning Kids in school	Not functioning No kids in school
Distance from CDR (Km)	0	2	8
Inhabitants 1985	322	1403	832
Post Independece	Majority stayed	Majority stayed	Majority left Forced to return 1982
Distance of farms (Km)	1	3	11
Physical aspect	Regular lines	Regular lines	Traditional

Source: Akesson: 1985.

The other two settlements, N'Temangau and Kapimbi, illustrate in their organisation and physical design the "orientações" (guidelines) from the government. The school functions better than in Caomba and health services are available. N'Temangau is a focal point for government activities because the headquarters of the local administration ("Administração de posto") are situated there. Kapimbi is similar to N'Temangau with which it has a privileged relationship, because state services such as the development project concentrate their work in Kapimbi which supposedly is the most co-operative of the villages.

The socio-economic indicators obtained from a 1985 survey (Tab.7.5) portrays Caomba as a village in crisis. Health and socio-economic indicators show a population submitted to the stresses of hunger and disease. The other two villages, Kapimbi and N'Temangau, are comparatively better off.

Gola/Caomba, the village which supported the RENAMO attackers, or, more precisely, the one which the individual guiding the group came from, had received least support from the state. It was inhabited by people who were forced to return to lands they did not want and where socio-economic differences among the population were sharper.

Table 7.5 - Indicators of socio-economic discrimination in three Changara villages (Percentage of households)

	VILLAGES		
	N'TEMANGAU	KAPIMBI	CAOMBA
Ethnic groups	Nhungwe	Nhungwe	Tawara/Tonga
Youth 18-25			25
Food aid zero	12	19	87
Waged	59	85	91
Unwaged	28	15	9
Permanent migrant	0	4	0
Migrants/seasonal	32	7	10
No production 1984	22	13	4
Rainfed crops	41	58	61
Irrigated	3	1	3
Rain + irrig.	34	28	32
No food prod.	28	20	10
Insufficient	19	28	40
Sufficient	50	44	47
More than sufficient	3	7	3
Without livestock	12	17	17
Cattle	0	0	0
Goats	3	6	1
Pigs	7	9	13
Poultry	16	3	4
Goats-pigs	3	13	9
Goats-pigs-poultry	37	34	29
Goats-poultry	6	9	11
Pigs-poultry	16	7	15
No milk consumption.	50	63	85
Milk	50	36	50
No sale of animals	62	62	64
Sale of animals	38	38	35
Vaccinations: BCG	56	54	61
Polio	17	50	33
Measles	12	58	29
Number of questionnaires	64	107	37

Source: Health Ministry Nutrition Department, Socio-economic survey in Changara - Computer print-outs of the Changara Data base and the survey conducted in N'Temangau in April 1985, 100 tables. Data for food aid: Akesson: 1985:14

Most of the state intervention and foreign aid arriving in the area did not go to Gola, and was distributed elsewhere. Food aid hardly ever reached Gola, not to mention the villages in the western parts of Changara.

The state's use of force was mainly directed against Shona speakers who refused to live in the goat pissoirs. A cattle pen was built by the development project beneath the tree which belonged to the mhondoros (spirit mediums).[60]

War in Changara affected state intervention in rural development because it did not permit the operation of a project which had aimed at providing technical support and advice to peasant farmers. War also did not permit the implementation of reformed government development strategies, as the priority switched from development to war. Efforts had been made from 1981 onwards to promote the people's participation and a re-orientation of activities in order to correct past errors (use of force, relocation of villages and population), but war blocked these efforts by changing the priorities.

The RENAMO attack on the CDR changed the nature of the planned development intervention. Expatriate technicians were not posted to N'Temangau but lived in Tete city. The UNICEF project was directed from the city where a warehouse and project headquarters were installed. In 1986, during a visit to Tete, I noted that equipment was stored in the city to prevent it from being destroyed in the war. Communications with the area and visits by project officials were very difficult, and could only be achieved by using the armed convoys which circulated along the road to Changara and Zimbabwe. The provincial government decided to give priority to its actions in Changara by supporting the villages which had been attacked and the technicians who had suffered. It was also decided to train local people in order to solve the problems which had occurred. Three areas were defined for priority action: health, water and the struggle against hunger. Permanent monitoring of the nutrition situation in Changara began in 1985.[61]

6 Aid in Changara

Aid made its presence felt in Changara via projects set up by the state to help implement its policies of villagization and cooperativization. The first project, begun in 1981, was supposed to eliminate previous contradictions.

Aid entered the district through existing government channels with no attempt to analyse previous interventions. UNICEF support for the CDR did not involve a thorough evaluation of the CO1 intervention. Questions linked to the integration of the project into provincial structures and to the

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[60] Interview with J.P.Graça: 1986.

[61] Teixeira: 1985a. For a description of the nutritional situation in Changara see, Tete, Governo Provincial: 1985.

supervisory role of the local authorities were among UNICEF's concerns, but there was very little advocacy to integrate the Changara development efforts into other projects to support Tete agricultural development.

In April 1985 project preparatory activities were developed. But at the same time that the preparatory work (the baseline study) for the UNICEF financed project was carried out RENAMO attacked N'Temangau killing the Mozambican project head.

The UNICEF project in 1985 was defined by taking into consideration the need to change the style of intervention and promote people's participation. This was why it was decided that UNICEF's counterpart in Changara would be the Union of Co-operatives and not the Green Zones Office - the state body which was co-ordinating rural development in Tete. Initial studies for the UNICEF project in Changara made great efforts to bring to the attention of technicians and decision makers the need to consider current social reality, and the differentiation among the peasantry,[62] "to avoid creating parallel structures and the need to strengthen local capacities"[63] to plan in a way that when the project ended in 1989 conditions would have been created for the activities to continue[64]. The UNICEF study went to great lengths to make the authorities understand that hunger in Changara was man made, that government villagization policies played a role by disturbing the peasants' relations to the land and their use of natural resources, that war was a factor but not the only one, and that the peasants had done everything they could to offset the negative effects of hunger - which did not arise because the peasants were ignorant or suffered some kind of traditional lack of knowledge.[65]

This change of dynamics never happened. In an emergency situation, UNICEF intervention became an intervention co-ordinated at a distance.[66] Military attacks on N'Temangau continued. The CDR was attacked eight times between 1985 and 1989. But the district capital, Changara-sede, was well protected by a Mozambican and Zimbabwean garrison. Movement along the Tete-Zimbabwe road was guaranteed by Zimbabwean armed convoys.

The Rural Development Programme (PDR) became essentially a rural extension network supplying technical support to the union of co-operatives and to the peasants in general. The planned activities envisaged continuing to

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62 Teixeira: 1985a:4.

63 Teixeira: 1985a:5.

64 Teixeira: 1985a:5.

65 Teixeira: 1985a.

66 Tanner: 1989b.

popularise animal traction, the introduction of drought-resistant crops, the planting of trees, vegetable production, and adult literacy. The approach was that of an integrated rural development project. Rather than focus on the main problems (people's participation, reform of the villages) the CDR increasingly extended its own activities. Investment was planned on the CDR premises with the installation of new electricity generators, and a veterinary laboratory. In the villages the main activities planned were the opening up of boreholes, and the upgrading of health posts and schools.[67]

The official review of the UNICEF project, written by a consultant who did not visit the project site, listed 11 main achievements in 1989. These achievements fall into the following categories: construction in Tete (warehouses, project office), construction activities in the N'Temangau CDR (dip tanks, wind driven water pumps), supply of inputs (Bumi pumps, oil), strengthening of the marketing and consumption functions of co-operatives, the health service network and training and deployment of technicians. The UNICEF consultant also claimed as a project achievement the "implantation of an integrated rural planning perspective at provincial level, co-ordinated by the directorate of agriculture and directed through an inter-sectorial committee.[68] During the work which I did in Tete and through interviews in Maputo and elsewhere, this perspective was nowhere to be seen.[69]

Problems of a political and strategic nature were approached technically. The team which had drawn up the 1985 base-line study struggled to prepare a project that responded to peasant needs and which took care of the contradictions of the previous projects and of government development strategies. Military pressure created a situation where all the negative aspects, which the 1985 project tried to counteract, happened again: the bureaucratisation of the co-operatives, the dependence on external aid, further development of a strata of rich peasants through the use of project inputs plus political power, extracted labour, and a surplus of poor peasants and of displaced people (those who had to change their place of residence because of the war).

After 1986 Changara received emergency support not only from UNICEF, but also from the United States Private Voluntary Organisation, World Vision. UNICEF helped build new schools and repair existing ones. UNICEF staff in charge of the building project visited Changara by plane staying for a day. This way of working, according to a technician, was very costly - travel had to be by air - and did not allow for effective supervision.

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67 Teixeira: 1985a:7-37.

68 Tanner: 1989b:5-6.

69 See Adam: 1988 for a discussion of the functioning of Zonas Verdes de Tete and different perspective from that of Tanner: 1989a

The Changara CDR maintained itself up to 1991 when the UNICEF project came to an end. In 1989, during discussions about the end of the UNICEF project, it was noted that government agencies in Tete were looking for a new project to intervene in Tete without making a proper assessment of what had already been done, and without considering the activities already undertaken. This was described as "a collective attitude, shaped by several years of emergency related thinking, and by seeing each donor input as a discrete package, which once used up leaves the way clear for another one to come in, complete with more high-cost inputs, specially vehicles."[70]

Aid was transformed, from aid for production and for the creation of a more stable environment for development, into emergency aid. Health and education activities were also affected. After independence, the school network expanded, rising from 10 schools and 700 students in 1972 (20% of the children of school age) to 67 schools and 12,570 students in 1980 (50 per cent of the children of school age).

In 1991, the UNICEF project came to an end. Between 1985 and 1989 the project developed in a war situation. Monitoring the project was done from Tete without travelling to the project areas. Field work was impossible.

Discussions were underway to locate the Changara project within existing rural development projects, covering the whole of Tete province.

7 The relationship between aid, destabilisation and government development policies in Changara

The development strategies applied after independence were not an alternative to the situation inherited from colonialism. They sharpened existing contradictions by emphasising resettlement and cooperativization. Reformulation of state development strategies took place but was limited by the narrow confines of the ideological choices, i.e. socialisation by creation of collective property and collective villages. But even the limited policy reformulations ran into the bottleneck of "destabilisation". RENAMO actions in Changara benefited from the contradictions in government policies.

Government development strategies and associated policies maintained the crisis in peasant production systems, created by the colonial

[70] Tanner: 1989a; Tanner: 1989b.

government. The post-colonial government acted towards the peasantry in Changara in the same way as its colonial predecessor, through the use of force in resettlement and villagization programs. In short, the development strategies (and their particular application in Changara) were not sustainable in the social, political and economic sense. State intervention and aid projects, favoured some groups of peasants and not others. The favoured groups became dominant by monopolising land and support from the state and the aid agencies.

From 1975 to 1990, the development strategies and associated policies were not able to change the political economy of Changara. The profile of a district which exported labour and where agricultural production was unable to guarantee peasant families' production and reproduction needs continued. The main development policies attempted to collectivise peasant households in terms both of where they lived and how they produced.

Policies were implemented in a rush without taking existing realities into consideration. Villagization that involved the removal of peasants from their homes and farms to other areas without meeting their needs, inevitably faced a response from the villagers. The contradictions which peasant agriculture in the region faced (lack of seeds, irrigation, technical advice) continued, despite the development projects set up in the area. Some results from the policies applied are evident, but they only benefited a small percentage of the peasant population and the villages which had not been affected deeply by forced removals.

The resettlement of the Changara peasants in 1972 and 1981 affected most of the peasants who lived a long way from the administrative posts. They suffered the most because they were removed from their homes and from the areas where they had their own land and conditions appropriate for production. In the resettlement and in other interventions among the peasantry state officials did not respect local religious beliefs. In N'Temangau a cattle pen was built under the tree of the mhondoros without their permission. Action like this amounts to the desecration of a sacred place. The GPZ (the colonial Zambezi Basin Planning Office) built N'Temangau in an area where there was another Mhondoro tree. The Portuguese technicians asked for permission, and obtained it, to install their building. But the post-colonial cadres of the Ministry of Agriculture considered these practices as superstitious and obscurantist and ignored them.

The policies of cooperativization did not promote peasant choices in production which would reduce the bottlenecks that each individual farmer faced. It was a group of producers formed to receive state support in terms of goods and services. Cooperativization of production was also linked to the

supply of consumer goods essential for the survival of each family - salt, vegetable oil, kerosene, clothes. Rather than co-operatives, the collective units in Changara are agricultural plots called co-operatives but owned by a small group among the members. The membership is a captive membership because of the impossibility of obtaining consumer goods and state support if one is outside these institutions.

The development projects installed in Changara - the CO1 CADECO and the CDR later - were very similar to an Integrated Rural Development Project. But resources to develop such activities over an extensive area were scarce. Knowledge of social and political conditions and a strategy to address them did not exist. The development projects also deepened divisions among the peasantry in the area, and contributed to further isolating peasants from the villages which suffered the worst effects of forced collectivisation.

Whatever the limitations of the CDR, it also showed that some of the options and activities, mainly the introduction of new crops and technologies, were successful. The dwarf sorghum varieties increased grain production and the shadouf permitted more regular irrigation of peasant fields. In 1985, 500 shadoufs were operating in Changara.

The development projects presented themselves as technical, i.e. concerned with solving problems of irrigation, agricultural techniques, supply of consumer goods. This very reductionist conception does not transform a very complex and multidimensional problem (irrigation) into a simple technical one. Land to be irrigated has owners and owners have their interests, their beliefs, their values. The CDR technicians addressed the problems of divisions among the Changara peasants by ignoring them. Peasants from Gola/Caomba - the village which was formed by force - did not support the project activity and did not comply with the norms of co-operative production. Those who had already been punished were punished again by a cut in their quotas of consumer goods. Peasants from this village refused to co-operate with the CDR and supported RENAMO - overtly or covertly.

In Changara there is a division among the villages in ethic and socio-economic terms. The Shona speaking villages - Gola Caomba - are those which were formed by force in 1981, and where peasants were removed from their original homes. They are also the least developed villages (lower literacy rates, less emergency support, less capacity to produce agricultural goods). Development activities and aid were distributed in a pattern, such that the intensity and extent of support was greater in villages nearest to the administrative post. Such privileged villages received more privileges.

The development strategies applied, i.e. forced villagization, repression of communities opposed to state strategies and policies,

increased the vulnerability of the peasantry to hunger and created space for the entry of RENAMO.

Government development strategies were supported by aid agencies who supplied the material, human and financial backing for their implementation. Aid contributed to a critique and an attempt to change these policies, but war prevented the changes from happening. Because of the war, aid changed from development to emergency aid, while government policies changed from a concentration on development to a concentration on defence.

RENAMO strategies in Changara combined military actions - which gained the upper hand - with attempts to legitimise its actions by appealing to cultural symbols rooted in the history of some of the people in the area. RENAMO also tried to redress for itself the capital of resentment among the Shona speakers. It presented itself as taking revenge for those who had been abandoned or punished by the state and the development projects. RENAMO activities in Changara can be characterised as based on the use of force and terror, but RENAMO also exploited the contradictions of government actions and tried to anchor its terrorist practices in the culture and history of at least some of the people of the region.

Changara shows a pattern of RENAMO terror. The technician killed by RENAMO in the attack against the N'Temangau CDR was decapitated with a ritual axe.

> "Among the Shona speaking people, killing in defence of their descendants or their established territory is a long ancestral tradition. One way this is expressed is by the use of the ritual axe or gano which all mhondoro mediums carry. The present day version has a blunt edge but in its practical form it was a battle axe, a weapon of war".[71]

In areas where Shona speakers live and where resentment against the government ran high, RENAMO left the villages relatively unscathed and allowed the villagers to collect loot left behind.[72] In at least one of the attacks, for which a comprehensive record exists, some of these ritual symbols - the use of the gano - were present. RENAMO also exploited the contradictions of government development strategies and particularly errors in implementation - e.g. the suspension or reduction of support to Shona speaking villages.

Foreign aid in Changara initially supported government actions and in a second phase acquired a logic of its own. In both cases aid helped reproduce the shortcomings of the development strategies and did not allow

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71 Lan: 1985.

72 Interview with Mandito: 1985; Interview with Derlugian: 1992.

them to be reformed so that those strategies could become sustainable and take into consideration existing socio-economic reality.

RENAMO's actions had an influence on aid. Military attacks helped eliminate the presence of technical staff from the aid agencies in the interior of the district. Even the presence of foreign technicians in Changara-sede was not permitted. Technical advice was given by people who visited the district headquarters for a day on a plane. The need to use planes made the costs of assistance very high and the level of supervision low. Local project workers were able to use project resources for their own purposes. Support did not reach the intended target group - the poor peasants - but nurtured the businesses of administrators and local project officials. Infrastructure and resources (cars, equipment) were destroyed. RENAMO transformed development aid into emergency aid and this happened in a haphazard manner, without proper planning and supervision.

I have used the post-colonial history of Changara to make a number of points that can be summarized as follows:

i) Post-colonial development strategies used forced villagization in the same way as the colonial government.
ii) Ethnic differences among the population were worsened by the implementation of development policies.
iii) The combination of war, development and aid resulted in a man-made famine.
iv) Aid supported government development strategies up to 1984 and afterwards it transformed Changara into an emergency district, pouring thousands of tons of grain into the district.
v) RENAMO, although in a fertile local breeding ground, was an army which arrived from areas outside the district.
vi) RENAMO benefited from a capital of resentment created by the government development strategies (villagization, ethnic discrimination).
vii) RENAMO used local ideology to transform its violence into legitimised violence (use of the gano to behead a government official).[73]

[73] For a discussion of local ideology see Marvick: 1965 and Mauss: 1968.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Boane: state farms, peasant production and private farmers

1 Introduction

The district of Boane[1] borders Moamba district to the north and the west, to Namaacha district to the east, and the city of Maputo to the south. First class district status, in the current administrative scheme, was conferred on Boane in 1980. Previously it was an administrative post in the district of Matola, which was itself upgraded to a city.[2] The region under study in this chapter is restricted to the area under government control during the period 1984-1990.

The study of Boane epitomises the effects and inter-relationships between aid, destabilisation and government policies in a district with socio-economic characteristics similar to an urban zone.

2 Boane before the colonial occupation

There is in fact no traditional political unit called Boane: the designation derives from the name of M'Boana, a worker of the first farm in the region, which belonged to Mutsonisse (the local name given to the settler owner of the farm). Before 1895, the Kingdom of Matola had jurisdiction over the territory which is today part of Boane district. The territories of the Kingdom included the present district of Boane, part of the present district of Machava and part of the district of Namaacha, the "regedoria" Mafuiane.

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[1] Sometimes the area of Boane is also called Umbeluzi, Lower or High, taking as a reference the River Umbeluzi, which rises in Swaziland and flows into Maputo Bay. The region has also been referred to as the Upper and Lower Umbeluzi.

[2] The administrative classification of a region (circumscription, administrative post) in colonial Mozambique was linked to its economic importance. The more significant the region in the economy of the colony, the more prominent its administrative categorisation. The relationship between economic importance and administrative classification was also maintained in the post-colonial period, according to criteria weighing the level of development of the productive forces, the size of the population and the importance of the district in the national economy.

Portuguese occupation saw the reorganisation of political units. With the colonial occupation the three sections of the Matola Kingdom were turned into regulados, the existing chiefs becoming subordinates of the Portuguese administration which also redefined the territorial limits of each chiefdom. The population composition was altered: Si-swati and Ronga speakers were mixed inside one political unit when the language barriers corresponded to political borders of a state i.e. Mafuiane became part of the Council of Namaacha.

3 The political economy of colonial Boane

The political economy of Boane presented three major characteristics: i) settler farms, with developed infrastructure and importing of labour, ii) export of migrant labour and iii) peasant production for the market.

The established settler farms produced grain, vegetables, poultry and milk for the local market and citrus for export. Specialisation occurred in the final period of colonial presence. The colonial farms were complex production units whose profitability was linked not only to cheap labour costs but also to a very intensive and diversified cropping pattern. The settler farms employed both local and migrant labour. This strategy met the needs of the colonial farmers, by providing an ample and secure supply of labour and allowing them to counteract high rates of absenteeism and migration to Swaziland, South Africa and to Lourenço Marques town amongst the population born in Boane.

The Portuguese government built some infrastructure in Boane, the water works, military barracks, railways. A plan existed to develop this infrastructure by building a dam which would be useful both for agriculture in the region (irrigation) and for the capital city's water supply. The main water captation for Maputo was situated near Boane, at Umbeluzi, in the beginning of the century.

Boane had three contradictory characteristics as far as labor was concerned. It was both a labor exporting and importing area and a sector of the population was always fixed. "Magaizas" left the region (the local name for migrants) left the region to work in South Africa (to plantations in Natal) and to Swaziland. Chibalo workers (forced labourers) and contratados (internal migrants also recruited with the intervention of the administration) arrived from Gaza and Inhambane, and worked not only on farms but also in industries, quarries and at a brick factory. The existence of a military training centre at Boane from the 1940s onward also contributed to the flow of immigrants to Boane. After military service, many stayed working as household labor for the Portuguese servicemen (as cocks, or house servants).

In Boane district the Masculinity ratio (Number of men per hundred women) was 130 according to the 1980 census. This showed an overall labour flow into the district because there was employment to be found on the colonial farms and other economic activities.

The contradictory characteristics of the labour flows in Boane and the type of settlement it led to, are reflected in the composition of the population. It is possible to distinguish two groups: the owners of the land and the outsiders. The outsiders were dependent on the settlers for their wages and also on the owners of land to obtain authorisation to use land which was not owned by the settlers. They were also dependent on the local population for the magic-religious rites (which could only be performed by locals) and for marriages.

Peasant production in colonial Boane was very similar to that which could and still can be found in the same type of ecological area in southern Mozambique.

Geographical differentiation existed due to the nature of soil and availability of water. Farms on the banks of the Umbeluzi were different from those near Pessene, the border between Boane and Moamba districts.

In 1962 the colonial administration regarded peasant agricultural production to be mainly for subsistence. Livestock was an important activity but not accessible to all peasants. Hunger, low living standards and tuberculosis were considered the most important problems facing the peasants of the district.[3]

The settlement pattern was one of dispersion. There were no villages in Boane. During the colonial period the Portuguese did not attempt to create concentrated patterns of development. In some places the state invested in a watering system for cattle. Peasant land tenure was very insecure. Under colonialism no peasant had title deeds or property in land. Only houses built with cement blocks or bricks were regarded as property. At any moment a peasant farmer could be thrown off his land.

The peasant population, like the "indigenas" (natives) in general, was administered by the Portuguese colonial state through a system which included a mix of Portuguese administrators and officials (indirect rule) and the transformed remnants of pre-colonial structures.

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[3] Matola: 1962.

4 The political economy of post-colonial Boane

After independence, the political economy of Boane was characterised by i) state farms and infrastructure development projects, ii) peasant production both for consumption and the market, iii) private farms and iv) and import and export of labor.[4]

The settler farms operated up to Independence. But immediately after the formal transmission of political power from Portugal to FRELIMO some of the owners left the country. Land and property was considered abandoned if the owner was absent from Mozambique for more than 90 days. In the first instance these abandoned premises were run by workers' commissions which demanded and obtained some state support. In a second stage some of the enterprises were intervened by the state and later nationalised.

In 1989, a list produced by the District Agriculture Directorate listed 11 agricultural units as state property. These were 5 farms, 2 research units, 2 military production units and two livestock units.[5] In 1989 it was proposed that four of the five units be privatised and only one, Agro-Pecuária de Boane, remained a state farm.

The fate of these enterprises was the result of choices made for the transformation of the settler farms. These units had been established in a specific economic and political context and were profitable due to the existence of support services, technical know-how, a pool of cheap labour and the use of force by the colonial state. In the post-Independence period the emphasis was on the construction of enterprises which aggregated activities without due

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[4] To complement my field work I have used government documents. In 1987 the problems identified in the second ordinary session of the district assembly were the following: i) Continued thefts on the Railways; ii) the agricultural statistics did not correspond to real production; iii) seeds arrived late and were of bad quality; iv) the supply of consumer goods to the population had not been fulfilled; v) most of the co-operatives were at risk of bankruptcy and the inter-co-operative commission was not working; vi) lack of water in the district; vi) the targets for the education sector had been attained but the education was of very low quality. (Comunicado final da II sessão ordinária do Assembleia distrital 1987. 01. 31).These problems were in a way recurrent in the district and have been regularly denounced in various reports and public meeting, see Boane: 1987c and Boane, CDE: 1986.

[5] EE Agrícola 25 de Junho, ii) EE 3 de Fevereiro, iii) EE Agro Pecuária de Boane, iv) EE 10 de Novembro, v) EE de Suínos, vi) EE. Terceiro Congresso, vii) Centro de Aplicação Militar, viii) INIA, ix) Estação Agrária, x) Ministério de Defesa, xi) Pequenas Espécies. Two of these 11 units, EE Agro Pecuária de Boane and Centro de Aplicação Militar, were production sections of the Boane military barracks. Two units, INIA and Estação Agrária, are research farms, already established in the colonial period. The remaining seven agricultural units followed different trajectories of creation and development. Pequenas Espécies, a centre for the promotion of production of rabbits was, at the beginning, dependent of the FRELIMO party. EE Suínos produced pigs and was practically abandoned in 1991. Five units evolved from existing colonial farms - 25 de Junho (pineapple and citrus), EE 3 de Fevereiro (citrus), Agro-Pecuária de Boane (cattle, milk, vegetables), EE Terceiro Congresso (cattle and milk).

consideration for existing management capacities and costs. The existence of aid funds allowed some of these developments.

The citrus state enterprise, Empresa Estatal de Citrinos, shows the specific problems of state enterprises in Boane. Total citrus production, calculated at some 20 000 tons at independence, declined gradually over the years and was down to 3,000 tons by 1977. In 1978, investments were made by the state in the production units and, as a result production increased to 12,000 tons, of which 6,000 tons of oranges were exported. The upward trend continued thanks to State investment in the sector. In 1980, total production reached 24,000 tons of which 11,500 tons were exported.

Citrus was exported mainly to the German Democratic Republic under a barter agreement. This arrangement had a positive aspect because it offered a secure export market, and a negative aspect in that no hard currency was generated for the enterprise. The lack of hard currency created problems for acquiring spare parts, pesticides and fertilisers. Lack of hard currency reduced investment in the farms and between 1980 and 1983 the production of these units declined.

Up to 1986, the enterprise had difficulty in recruiting labor. After 1986 recruitment ceased to be a problem because PRE (Programa de Reabilitação Económica, the Mozambican variant of Structural Adjustment Programs) brought about changes in the labor force. Young women with secondary education were employed as casual labor for the fruit picking. But in 1986 the labor situation was so difficult that workers constantly abandoned their jobs, opting instead to produce charcoal and cut wood. Earnings from these activities were far higher then the wages paid at the farm. Many workers abandoned the farms to migrate clandestinely to South Africa and Swaziland.[6] Problems in the labor force were also created by the fact that workers who lost their jobs under the redundancy control program (office clerks, messengers) were incorporated into the production sectors. Their productivity was very low. [7] Workers also abandoned the companies due to systematic attacks by RENAMO/MNR throughout 1986.[8] In 1988 the citrus enterprise had 572 labourers, working in six blocks.

The end of the state farm policies saw their land transferred to private farmers and multinationals. Boane illustrates the development of private farmers and the processes used to obtain land (in an area where land shortages were noted) and the state's support.

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6 Boane: 1987c; Interview with João: 1989.

7 Citrinos de Maputo: 1986.

8 Cau: 1987

Up to 1985-86 the private farm sector in Boane was very small. It included remnants of the colonial farms and some new Mozambican farmers who had established themselves after independence. A list of private farmers in Boane in 1983 records five farms. In 1985, seven private farms existed. In 1989, the register in Boane listed 129 private farmers. Detailed information existed on the activities of 44 farmers. Of these 38 had motor-pumps, 12 tractors, 2 trucks (more then 7 tons payloads) and 10 small trucks. The areas of these 44 farms varied between 1 and 50 hectares.[9] 10 farms had areas up to 5 ha, 14 between 5 and 10, 32 between 10-20 hectares and 5, fifty hectares or more.[10]

The private sector had been the object of controversy. State officials were accused of using contacts to establish their own farms, expelling peasants from their old holdings. But if obtaining land was not difficult, its registration and acquiring title to the land was a problem. Under the present land law all ownership of land vests in the state.

Labor was a problem for private farmers in 1988 due to war and the obligation to pay in food. [11] The only people willing to work on the private farms were the "deslocados" (displaced), who wanted to be paid in food (mainly maize) for their work. Local people preferred to work as charcoal producers because income was higher, despite the risks involved in working in the bush and perhaps encountering RENAMO.

The economic activities of the Boane private farmers were diversified. Those who had their own vehicles had three activities: farming, transport and trade. Trade involved buying charcoal, wood, fruit and vegetables in Boane in order to sell them in Maputo. I have called this group the CCCC bourgeoisie. C for candonga (profiteering), C "for chapa cem" (private goods or passenger transport) and C for cunha (connections). The underlying pattern how these entrepreneurs functioned is very similar to that of the "cantineiros" of the colonial period (Cantina, Camião, Machamba - shop, truck and farm).

The post-colonial state applied a two pronged strategy to the peasantry: villagisation and co-operativisation.[12] The Boane administration in 1988-89 recognised 18 human settlements which had some sort of population concentration. Of these settlements, which in the local parlance were called

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9 The control of the farms was quite incomplete because the register did not comprise the areas conceded, areas worked, the type of equipment, production.

10 Boane, 1989c.

11 Amiller and Diogo: 1988:11-12.

12 In Boane, the problem of the designation of settlements persists as elsewhere in the areas studied. These settlements are designated sometimes as villages, as "povoações" and as "povoados". Gueguegue in the neighbourhood of Boane-sede, is sometimes called a village and sometimes a bairro (neighbourhood). Different settlements with the same name occur.

villages, only 10 were under government control in 1989. Thus 55 per cent of the villages were under government control. The population of the other eight villages, which were attacked and destroyed, moved to the following destination: i) RENAMO zones, ii) neighbouring countries (Swaziland or South Africa), iii) safer areas inside Mozambique, iv) more secure villages within Boane.

Nine settlements[13], one refugee camp, Massaca II,[14] and eight villages - Paulo Samuel Kankhomba (PSK), Marien Ngouabi (MNG), Campoane (C1), Massaca 1 (M1), 7 de Setembro (7/9), 25 de Junho (25/6), Rádio Marconi (RM) and Mafuyane (MF)[15] (Abbreviations are mine) - were situated in those parts of the district accessible between 1986 and 1991, a region relatively secure militarily and enclosed in a defence perimeter. But RENAMO incursions took place and some of the villages were abandoned by the population after dusk or were circled by minefields.[16]

Four trajectories can be distinguished for village formation in Boane: i) defence villages or settlements of ex-FRELIMO guerrillas; ii) flood villages; iii) dam resettlement villages; and iv) military resettlement villages.

Defence Villages or settlements of ex-FRELIMO guerrillas, such as PSK and RM, were established as early as 1976, at points that were militarily strategic. The first inhabitants were FRELIMO guerrillas who had fought in the war of liberation and were demobilised in 1976. In the case of PSK, the ex-combatants were installed on an abandoned settler farm, located at a crucial point where the River Matola can easily be crossed towards Maputo. PSK received support from the Ministry of Defence. In 1989 and 1990 the farm was not functioning and the remnants of the citrus plantation showed signs of neglect. RM village was installed near the Boane Military Barracks surrounding a civilian communications centre and near the convergence of two main roads - the Namaacha road, which links Maputo to Swaziland, and the Ressano Garcia road which runs from Maputo to South Africa.

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[13] In 1988 a survey was undertaken by HELVETAS, the Região Agrária do Umbeluzi, the Provincial Committee of the Party, and the Boane administration in eight Boane villages. These were those which were accessible in the period and where it was possible to work during the day, because of their geographical position within the security area. I used the survey material and complemented it with life stories, documental work and observations in the villages.

[14] Of these settlements, one, Massaca II, was a refugee camp were persons repatriated from South Africa were installed. The population up to 1990 was not stabilised. Houses were still not consolidated. It was more of a transit camp.

[15] Mafuyane, situated to the Northeast, was considered part of Namaacha district though administered from Boane. Mafuyane does not appear in the lists of Boane villages because administratively it belongs to Namaacha. But after 1986 the village was governed through the Boane Administration because the security situation did not permit normal functioning of the Namaacha administration. Interview with João: 1988.

[16] Research work in the field could only be carried between seven or eight o'clock in the morning up to four o'clock when practically all activities ceased in the district.

Flood, or Demoina, villages were built in 1984: when a flood occurred in the region as a consequence of cyclone Demoina, the government launched a mobilisation campaign to concentrate the dispersed population into areas which, due to their high altitude, were safe from flooding. Four villages were formed for people affected by the floods: Umpala, Campoane, 25 June and 31 January.

Dam resettlement villages - Mafuyane and Massaca I - were formed by people expelled from the area flooded by the Pequenos Libombos Dam. These two villages, which had been built with participation from the dam constructors, also had military objectives. They were regarded as outposts against RENAMO infiltration: as the President of Massaca I put it: "we are the first line of defence for the Pequenos Libombos Dam".

Military resettlement villages were built in 1985 when the Mozambican government, the party and the army, were engaged in Operação Cabana, a military or counter-guerrilla resettlement. The Operação Cabana villages hardly sustained themselves because peasants were afraid to live there.

> "People are afraid to live in the villages. The politics of the man from South Africa is to destroy the villages. People try to leave the villages and live in the bush thinking that (....) they will not be attacked. The politics of the population is (....) to live isolated in the bush".

Villages constructed solely for military reasons, Mulotane and Tchonissa, in 1985 had FPLM units defending them. But in 1988 the army left, the military situation deteriorated and people abandoned the two villages. In 1989 they were empty.

The Boane villages resulted from a state decision to promote village formation. The logic behind village formation programs in the various stages included a mix of arguments that stressed ideological reasons, security and defence needs and development goals ranging from the supply of basic services - health, education, agricultural extension - to the creation of co-operatives and the establishment of people's power and participative institutions. But the concentration of people in villages, particularly after 1985, had its major *raison d'être* in administrative and military purposes, without no concern for family agricultural production or the logic behind peasants' own settlement patterns, their choices and preferences.

The administrative resettlement of the villagers led to the formation of villages similar to settlements inhabited by displaced people. With the exceptions of ACE Mondlane and Marien Ngouabi, all the other villages are regarded as formed by "deslocados", displaced people.[17] The population occupying the villages thought of them as transit settlements, and as soon as the war ended,

[17] Amiller and Diogo: 1988:19.

they returned to the areas where they used to live in the interior - Changalane, Casalinho, Namaacha. Some peasants left villages where they had initially settled to live in Boane-sede especially in Gueguegue and Picoco.

The socio-economic characteristics of the eight villages reflect the historical process of their formation and the political economy of Boane - a district characterised by import of labor for settler farms in the colonial period and for state farms in the post-colonial period.

After RENAMO actions began in Boane in 1983-1984, population movement was so high that the number of residents in each village changed from month to month and sometimes from day to day. When attacks occurred, residents of the Boane villages left for more secure zones e.g. Boane town, or crossed the bridge to the relative safety of Matola (which had also been attacked several times in 1984 and 1985). The pattern of population distribution in the villages studied is also to do with security. In 1988, the biggest villages were also the best defended ones.[18] The villages containing the largest percentage of the population are those with or near an important military unit. PSK (22% of the population) had a well organised militia, R. M (14%) was defended by the Boane army barracks. Massaca I (18% of the population) and 25/6 (14%) are well within the security perimeter of the Pequenos Libombos Dam.

The physical layout of the villages was very different. Some, like Massaca I, had lines well established with individual plots demarcated. Farming areas were also well defined. The quarteirões (blocks) had their own internal organisation which was the following: chief of the quarteirão and chief of "the group of 10 houses".

The villages with the highest percentage of workers with a regular wage and employment were those situated near a state farm or company. This was the case with Massaca, near the dam and citrus farms, C1 near the industries of Matola, a nearby state farm nearby and the water works, and Marien Ngouabi, near the citrus estates. The highest percentage of households with employment/waged work was to be found in the village of Campoane (51%). Massaca I residents worked at the Pequenos Libombos Dam, on the LOMACO and 25 June farms (44%) and Umpala inhabitants on the brick factory and state farms (32%).

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[18] The population of each village is indicated under brackets. PSK (2071), M1 (2071), RM (1587), C1 (1028), 7 Setembro (1003) and 25 de Junho (603).

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Table 8.1. Villages in Boane: Dates of foundation and evolution of population

Village	Foundation year	Population		
		1986	1987	1989
E.Mondlane	1977	1775	1775	1045
M.Ngouabi	1976	1047	1051	1500
Umpala	1978	1475	1475	
PSK	1984	2091	2548	2548
30 de Janeiro	1970	1568		
25 de Junho	1984	992	1293	1640
Mulotane	1985	1250	1250	980
Massaca 1	1985	1568		2114
Tchonissa	1985	1145	1021	785
Campoane	1984		1569	1569
Massaca 2	1984			617

Source: Official reports of Boane District

The type of households in each village have been presented as nuclear. The registers consider a household as consisting of those who eat their meals together. But sometimes a household is part of a family. Two women are married to the same man. As for family size the village with the largest number of persons

[19] The data used in my analysis was collected from a survey run by the Swiss NGO HELVETAS and the Região Agrária de Umbeluzi. See Misteli: 1989.

per family is 7 Setembro with 4.7, followed by PSK with 4. Of the remainder, UM and C1 have 3.9 and M1 and MNG have 3.8 persons per family. In terms of children per family the biggest is 7 Setembro with 2.8 followed by MNG with 2.4. PSK and C1 have 2.1 and M1 1.9. Radio Marconi has 1 child per family. Villages like 7 Setembro and PSK, situated in the interior, have bigger families. Villages situated in urban or semi-urban settings have smaller families.

The economy of the Boane households also depends on agricultural production. In each village each family has several plots. What varies is the size of the plot, the quality of land and the distance from the home. Long established families have a plot near the river and another one for rain-fed cultivation. All families in all villages asked had some type of agricultural production although they faced serious difficulties in access to land.

From 1988 to 1990 Boane was said to be a district with constant land problems. Villagers maintained that the land reserves established for the villages were not constantly respected. In 1989, in Massaca I, plots of land were taken by LOMACO, creating a problem which was resolved later. In PSK, constant tensions existed between the land which belonged to the Village and land which was part of the Bom Pastor farm and the FRETILIN farm.

Most families in the villages owned poultry - chickens and some ducks. There were difficulties in keeping poultry due to the type of housing and theft. Livestock ownership was higher in villages where peasants formerly living in areas inside the district had concentrated. The number of owners of cattle and donkeys was highest in RM with 45 owners, in 25 June with 24, MNG and 7 Setembro respectively 12 and eight. The remaining three villages had an insignificant number of livestock owners. M1 had two owners, UMP two and C1 one. During the war livestock was were often stolen.

Cattle were used in agriculture by those who had ploughs. Donkeys were used mainly to pull transport carts. The highest occurrence of ploughs was in RM with 45, 25 June with 26, MNG with 12 and 7 Setembro with eight. M1, UMP and C1 had respectively two, two, and one, the same as the number of cattle owners. Differentiation among the households is further indicated by the ownership of means of transport, ranging from bicycles to tractors and "carrinhas", small trucks and pick-ups. Tractors existed in three villages. The different forms of transport registered gave an indication of the vehicles existing in the villages, but in the case of RM some of the tractors were owned by non-villagers.

The livelihood of most families derived from various sources ranging from the sale of agricultural products, regular waged work or some occasional labor, production of charcoal for sale in Maputo and commerce.

The masculinity ratio (men per 100 women) is highest in the villages of Massaca.I (102) and Radio Marconi (113) and lowest in Marien Ngouabi (42). In the remaining villages the average is 80 men per 100 women.

Women in Boane play an important role because they do most of the agricultural work. In some settlements, the percentage of women headed-households is around 20 per cent of all households. The number of women who are not married but are heads of households is also significant. The highest percentages of women-headed households are found in C1 with 20 per cent, followed by 25 June with 18 per cent. Umpala has 16 per cent, 7 Setembro 15 per cent M1 1, 13 per cent, and MNG 10 per cent. Radio Marconi has the lowest percentage with only seven per cent of all households headed by women.

Villages had different infrastructures and were developed differently. Villages like Campoane received important infrastructural support after 1984. Paulo Samuel Kankhomba, Marien Ngouabi, Umpala and Campoane have water in the centre of the villages, pumped from the river. Maintenance of pumps and equipment is a problem.

One characteristic of the post-colonial economy was a shortage of consumer goods and food. The situation in Boane was not very different from other parts of Mozambique. The amount attributed in quotas was insufficient for the total population. Goods would be acquired in Maputo by the "armazenista distrital" (wholesaler) who then attributed quotas to retailers. The retail network in Boane consisted, up to 1988, of several kinds of shop: shops, restaurants, co-operatives and stalls. The situation changed radically in 1986, when licenses to establish markets and stalls were given. Even in Boane-sede, stalls (tendas) owned by traders and members of government emerged. In the villages all sorts of retail businesses started to crop up.

The villages of Boane were different from those of Changara, Mueda or Sabié in terms of religion. In each village there were churches of various denominations built with local materials.

One activity of the post-colonial state was the promotion of collective production units, which constituted the other side of the coin of collectivisation.

In Boane district in 1991, there were three co-operatives, C. Josina Machel (Chinonanquila), 25 June (Antigos Combatentes) and Cooperativa Agro-Pecuária de Campoane. There were also 10 peasants associations. Each village had an association with the exception of Radio Marconi, which had two Associations (19 October and 3 February). Above the village level organisations - the village associations and co-operatives - there were two unions, the União das Cinco Aldeias da Localidade Eduardo Mondlane, set up in 1985, and the General Union of Boane Agricultural Co-operatives and Associations,

established in 1989 to replace the first union, in which all collective production units were affiliated as members. In 1988, three co-operatives (the same as those listed above) and five associations existed.

All these units began as collective farms, organised in the independence period, where collective work as a sign of ideological purity was promoted. Collective fields were tilled by village residents, workers, and officials. In the case of Boane, the fields were tilled by residents of the area incorporated in Grupos Dinamizadores. To deal with low levels of participation by the population, caused by the facts that i) they did not receive any benefit from their work and ii) the farms were not theirs, the three co-operatives were formed.

25 June was set up on an abandoned settler farm and its membership consisted of ex-FRELIMO guerrillas and local peasants. Most of the members of the Chinonanquila (Josina Machel) and Campoane co-operatives were women.

Problems faced by the associations usually concerned the lack of resources and infrastructures. Although support was provided for building warehouses in some villages, they were not completed because none of the villagers were interested. Two years after the start the walls of some warehouses were not even a meter above ground level.

Each association was part of the structure of the village. Even when distinctions were maintained the secretary of the village was part of the ruling body: decisions had to be discussed with him or simply approved by him (Umpala) When the association refused, permanent tension existed between the president of the village and the president of the Union.

In 1985, a Union of five communal villages in the Eduardo Mondlane locality was set up by the Boane committee and the DDCA. The Boane Committee comprised representatives of two international NGOs who were supporting development activities in Boane - CUSO-SUCO and HELVETAS. HELVETAS was the implementing organisation of the partnership because it had field experience and was specialised in the area. CUSO-SUCO acted mainly as a financier. Co-ordination between the two organisations in 1988-1989 was non-existent. A silent conflict was easy to note in the field and in positions towards the Union of Five Villages.

The Union was not fulfilling its tasks of addressing the problems of the associations and promoting more efficiency. In 1988 HELVETAS, and FRELIMO in Boane and at Provincial level made a "levantamento" (survey) of the situation. Meetings were held in each village and association, and the opinion of the members was sought. At the end of this process a new president for the Union was elected and the Union was transformed from covering just 5 Villages to a Union of all existing associations.

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The members of the 11 associations and three co-operatives were very diverse in social origins, age and sex.[22] Some of the co-operatives had only women members. In others, although the registered member was a man, the person who did the work was in fact his wife or in some cases a hired labourer. Of the 50 members of the 3/3 Association in Radio Marconi Village, 12 were stone quarry workers, one a hunter, one an office clerk, and 29 were peasants. Four members gave no information. The age composition of the membership shows very few young people (under 21 years old). Only one member was younger then 20. In the 21 to 50 age group, there were 35 individuals. This age composition shows that in Boane the membership of co-operatives was different from other rural areas, where poor households are more present (young or very old, without waged work). Old and poor members were more present in the 25 June Co-operative where they did not have full membership rights, and land was loaned to them in exchange for labor on the co-operative plots.

The fact that most of the Boane associations wanted each plot to be registered in the name of its present owner shows why these units existed and their function in an area where land struggles are very acute.

The Mozambican state made infrastructural investments in Boane to development both the Boane region and other areas, such as Maputo city. After 1986, the Pequenos Libombos dam became a central government response to the problems of the region.[23] The dam's central logic was to regulate the supply of water to Maputo and to other state initiatives. In 1988 peripheral projects were emerging to use the capacities created by the dam.

The creation of infrastructures was linked to state investment in building the Pequenos Libombos Dam. After the dam was built, investments were planned to set up social services (health, education), to develop the transport and communication network and to establish irrigated agriculture.[24]

The village of Massaca exhibits the failure to deliver benefits promised to the peasants by the authorities and the dam builders. The Dam personnel, although concerned with the fate of the peasants, would pass the responsibility on to the political structures - namely the state administration and FRELIMO Party structures in Boane. The party and politicians were responsible for the population. It was very interesting to note how the staff at the dam, although they were part of the state and party structures, washed their hands of responsibility.

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22 The data collected does not address the real functioning of the units and the aspirations of each member. A picture closer to reality is found looking at the economic activities of the co-operative, which show that it functions more like an agglomerate of individual private farms.

23 Tipoteh: 1986:23.

24 For a description of government actions and plans see: SEHA: 1980, 1984, 1986,a,b; 1988b,c; Serra: 1980. See also SOGREAH: 1981a,b, 1982a,b. Post-independence plans rested on colonial identified projects. See Serra: 1966; Serviços de Hidraulica: 1970a,b. See also Watermeyer: 1972.

The members of the 11 associations and three co-operatives were very diverse in social origins, age and sex.[22] Some of the co-operatives had only women members. In others, although the registered member was a man, the person who did the work was in fact his wife or in some cases a hired labourer. Of the 50 members of the 3/3 Association in Radio Marconi Village, 12 were stone quarry workers, one a hunter, one an office clerk, and 29 were peasants. Four members gave no information. The age composition of the membership shows very few young people (under 21 years old). Only one member was younger then 20. In the 21 to 50 age group, there were 35 individuals. This age composition shows that in Boane the membership of co-operatives was different from other rural areas, where poor households are more present (young or very old, without waged work). Old and poor members were more present in the 25 June Co-operative where they did not have full membership rights, and land was loaned to them in exchange for labor on the co-operative plots.

The fact that most of the Boane associations wanted each plot to be registered in the name of its present owner shows why these units existed and their function in an area where land struggles are very acute.

The Mozambican state made infrastructural investments in Boane to development both the Boane region and other areas, such as Maputo city. After 1986, the Pequenos Libombos dam became a central government response to the problems of the region.[23] The dam's central logic was to regulate the supply of water to Maputo and to other state initiatives. In 1988 peripheral projects were emerging to use the capacities created by the dam.

The creation of infrastructures was linked to state investment in building the Pequenos Libombos Dam. After the dam was built, investments were planned to set up social services (health, education), to develop the transport and communication network and to establish irrigated agriculture.[24]

The village of Massaca exhibits the failure to deliver benefits promised to the peasants by the authorities and the dam builders. The Dam personnel, although concerned with the fate of the peasants, would pass the responsibility on to the political structures - namely the state administration and FRELIMO Party structures in Boane. The party and politicians were responsible for the population. It was very interesting to note how the staff at the dam, although they were part of the state and party structures, washed their hands of responsibility.

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22 The data collected does not address the real functioning of the units and the aspirations of each member. A picture closer to reality is found looking at the economic activities of the co-operative, which show that it functions more like an agglomerate of individual private farms.

23 Tipoteh: 1986:23.

24 For a description of government actions and plans see: SEHA: 1980, 1984, 1986,a,b, 1988b,c; Serra: 1980. See also SOGREAH: 1981a,b, 1982a,b. Post-independence plans rested on colonial identified projects. See Serra: 1966; Serviços de Hidraulica: 1970a,b. See also Watermeyer: 1972.

actions in 12,000 has, 11 kilometres of water piping, investment in communications, support for health and education infrastructures, factories and transformation of agricultural products. Project philosophy was based on the concept of integrated development.

5 Foreign aid in Boane

Since Boane is very near Maputo, the capital, flows of aid to the district were very difficult to monitor. In the local administration in 1988, 1989 and 1990, there was no idea of the volume of aid entering the district. The Rural extension program under implementation in Boane received funding from IFAD and a contract was signed between IFAD, the People's Development Bank and the Ministry of Agriculture. PRORURAL was funded by Italy in a contract negotiated at central level (Secretaria de Estado de Hidráulica Agricola, Council of Ministers). Boane had no information on this.

In Boane all kinds of institutions which sent aid to Mozambique were present - multilateral (FAO, UNDP), bilateral (Italian Co-operation, Finnish Co-operation, Nordic aid -MONAP-, South African aid, USSR, Sweden) NGOs (HELVETAS, CUSO-SUCO) various churches. HELVETAS in Boane acted as an implementing agency for CUSO-SUCO (Canadian) and HIVOS (Dutch) and for a number of small solidarity organisations which did not have offices in the field (Austria Mozambique Solidarity, German Solidarity).

Italian government aid went to the construction of the Pequenos Libombos dam as did financing from the Arab Development Bank for Africa. United Nations aid went to projects in the area such as FAO support for the agricultural school. Nordic aid, particularly MONAP and later Finnish aid, when MONAP was bilateralised, went to the agricultural school. South African aid went to the state farm sector where some arrangement existed for the export of oranges. None of these organisations gave any direct aid to the villages. Villagers regarded only activities directly implemented in their area of residence, or products directly distributed to them, as aid.

There was no meaningful way to monitor the impact of each organisation in Boane. The major funders of development activities in Boane were practically impenetrable. The Italian companies did not have data at hand in Mozambique, only in their Rome head offices. Co-operation between Mozambique and Italy underwent periods of upheaval when the government in Rome changed or co-operation with Mozambique featured in some Italian scandal. The use of aid funds for the defence of the Pequenos Libombos dam, was among the problems raised. Links between the projects and other activities are sometimes very difficult to establish. Sometimes the same activity was presented as being

implemented by two different organisations. Where aid was used to finance the activities of state bodies one has difficulties in finding out what is what.

If there are difficulties in studying the impact of aid from bilateral or multilateral donors in Boane in its various aspects (cultural, political, production) the same is true of the NGOs who were directly present in the field.

A sense of urgent need, of emergency, characterised aid in Boane. The NGOs' operations illustrates this tendency. Initially NGO activities developed in a militant and friendly way. The task was defined as simply doing things. No rules were clearly spelled out. The activities did not have a project, there was no investment plan, no indicators to assess results were defined. The key word was support. No plans were drafted.[30] Sustainability of the activities was not considered. Three years after HELVETAS and CUSO-SUCO had begun work in Boane, a revision of plans and programs was initiated. But work had already started and resources were already committed. Tractors, tools, water supply systems were in place. In 1988 HELVETAS decided to start a planning process and to draw up a plan for supporting Boane district. A base line survey was carried out in the eight existing villages and support was given to the "Região Agrária do Umbeluzi". A series of actions began which culminated in the creation of the Union of Co-operatives and Associations, an interface between the aid agencies and the villages.

After 1989, HELVETAS re-assessed its activities and changed its program and perspectives so as to give support directly to the various groups on the ground.[31]

HELVETAS support for Boane was articulated through state bodies because the assumption was that the state had to be strengthened and any effort to undermine it, through the creation of a parallel structure, or by-passing the state, would merely enhance the effects of destabilisation. This seems a correct assumption within a strategy of reducing interferences in policy making processes. But the decision to go through the state apparatus was already an intervention and would have results, regardless of the donor's wishes. There was no clear thinking as to the direction of development. Questions about the direction of development, the nature of the strategies, were only raised when the Mozambican state changed its policies from a socialist transition to a market economy.

HELVETAS constantly faced problems in the villages, where building activities were never carried out by the peasants, and with the state structures, which used for their own purposes some of the material donated.

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30 Fernandes: 1984.

31 Misteli: 1989.

Results of NGO intervention are easily observable as far as the schools and water supply system are concerned. In some areas the water supply - i.e. in Gueguegue - considerably improved living standards, for the short period when the system was in working order, by eliminating the two or three hour long walk to the river. In other villages such as Umpala, the water system suffered constant breakdowns and repairs have not been carried out. Local participation in the building of stores was minimal.

The efforts by HELVETAS to push for the strengthening of state interventions (clarity of plans, consultation with villages, co-ordination) was also perceived, by state officials in the beginning, as violations of the state's autonomy: they are telling us what to do. In 1991, I observed the functioning of the NGO team in Boane and its relationships with the peasant associations. The project staff in the field did not have a clear cut idea of the general orientation of their activities. A client-patron relationship was developing between project employees and peasant associations, particularly the Boane General Union. The Union leadership put pressure on the project to continue supplying resources (money for wages, and for the acquisition of goods).

The relations between foreign NGOs and the local institutions they helped create. led to the existence of two separate unions of co-operatives - one with the tractor bought with CUSO-SUCO aid and other bought with HELVETAS aid. Even when the majority of the membership of the two unions voted in a general assembly for the creation of a unified new union, the leadership of the Manguiça Union decided to continue independently. The leader of the Manguica Union of co-operatives was a teacher, son of a régulo, and the leader of the General Union was an immigrant from Tete Province.

6 FRELIMO, the state and development in Boane

State structures in Boane District consisted of three major institutions in the 1975-1990 period: the FRELIMO party, the state administration and the people's assemblies.

The district administrator was at the same time the party first secretary and the chairman of the Peoples Assembly. This wearing of three hats persisted up to the 1990 constitution when the system was changed, although in 1989 the chairman of the district assembly was elected. The district administration had various departments - reproducing those existing at provincial and national levels (Agriculture, Water and Construction, Trade etc.). The district party committee also had a departmental structure modelled on the central one - secretaries for ideological work, for defence, for the economy.

The efficiency of the various structures was minimal, not only due to lack of technical and professional capacity, but also because of a shortage of resources and the nature of the tasks themselves. Tasks and structures were so fused together that the best description of the political leaders (state, party, assembly) is given by the popular designation of these posts - the estruturas, the Mozambican equivalent of the eastern European term, "Nomenklatura". The superimposition of party and state tasks on the one hand gave too much power to a small group of individuals, and on the other dispersed their activities. "One day we have to go and organise defence. The next it's some visit from Maputo. What can one do?" [32]

The working of "Grupos Dinamizadores" and party branches in Boane ran into the same problems as elsewhere. The members met regularly to discuss guidelines, but party members with higher education were either marginalised or marginalised themselves. Discussion of the district's development problems or those of their place of residence was not followed by responses from the district or central government. Party work was mainly regarded as mobilisation i.e. the popularisation of guidelines and organisation to materialise the party slogans. If the party structure was disorganised the same was true of the People's Assembly.

In Boane there were three people's assemblies: one at district level and others at locality level. The district assembly, at least in the 1987-1990 period, did not function regularly. Difficulties were attributed to the war and to the kind of members who had been chosen. In 1988 the Boane District people's assembly had 30 members and 5 alternates; the Assembly of the Locality of Guegue had 24 members and 5 alternates, and the Assembly of the Eduardo Mondlane locality had 24 members and 5 alternates. The assemblies did not work in 1989-1990, because their members did not call for meetings and the new district chairman was also the district director of education.

Of the 35 individuals elected to the Boane district assembly in 1986, 20 were state officials, four were members of the defence and security, five were workers, and there were two peasants, two housewives, one photographer and one agricultural technician.

The district assembly was mainly filled with educated individuals. Of the 35 assembly members, 4 had less then 4 years of primary education, 10 had 4 years of education, 14 had 5-6 years of schooling, 5 had 7-9 years and 2 had 10-11 years of education.[33]

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[32] Interview with Chivengue: 1989. FRELIMO Party secretary in Boane.

[33] Boane, CDE: 1986c; Interview with Director Distrital de Apoio e Controlo, see Boane.DDAC: 1989.

A short profile of one member of the Party leadership will show the type of individual who filled the social structures in Boane after independence. This type of personal history is the most common trajectory amongst party and state officials in Boane. In 1948 he was born in Guijá. In 1962 he finished 4th grade, concluding his primary education in Caniçado. In 1964 he emigrated to Lourenço Marques where he found a job as a shop cleaner/porter. In 1964/5 he took part in nationalist political activities. He was detained in 1965/6 by the Polícia Judiciaria (Portuguese criminal police) for nationalist liaisons and was tortured in jail. In 1967 he returned to his home area. He was recruited into the Portuguese army and in 1968 was trained at the Boane barracks. After 1969 he left the army, but stayed in Boane working as a cook for Portuguese officers. In 1974 when the Transitional Government was established he took up political activities again. In 1974/5 he was in charge of the Department of Ideological Work (DTIP) in the Povoação Pacheco, later renamed Gueguegue. In 1977 he became responsible for mobilisation. In 1978 he was transferred to Boane-sede and in 1979 became head of the Boane-sede Grupo Dinamizador. In 1984 he became a member of the District Assembly. In 1988/89 he became the party's secretary for economic policy. In June 1991 he had been six months without his wages due to a party financial crisis. He was looking for a job, bank credit or a farm.[34]

After 1988, when Mozambique started to shift from a one party to a multi-party state, the district structures went into crisis. The district chiefs who had been drawing a regular wage and other benefits from the party suddenly found they were no longer being paid. Some of the party cadres did not receive wages for most of 1989 and 1990.

While party members were looking for a job or an economic activity to make a living, régulos were being recognised by the state. At independence, a sharp distinction was made between collaborators and resistors to colonialism. Everyone who was pro-FRELIMO was a revolutionary, a comrade, whatever his/her social origin or political project. Collaborators or reactionaries were those who had supported colonialism. In Boane a sharp struggle emerged against those who had been in the Portuguese army (especially the commando or specialised units, and the OPV or other paramilitary units), and holders of office in the traditional political structures - régulos, chefes de terras, madodas and indunas.

Though régulos lost their official posts as collectors of taxes, their role in the distribution of land, and in rain and fertility cults continued in certain areas. In the colonial period the role played by régulos in land distribution was also contradictory. In some places people asked the régulos to open farms, in other

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[34] Interview with Chivengue: 1989; 1990 and 1991.

areas authorisation was given by the owner of the land who was the individual who had settled first in the area. In the post-independence period customary practices, as far as land goes, were maintained. The problem re-emerged when massive displacement of the population occurred. Chefes de terra wanted to control the influx of immigrants and the distribution of abandoned land.

In the post-colonial period contradictions existed between those who had held state or political power and hence land rights under customary law, and those who occupied political positions after independence. In 1974-75 during the transition to Independence the system of regulados was abolished because régulos were regarded as collaborators with the Portuguese colonialists. Mouzinho Muchambo left the regulado in 1974-75, accused of being a colonialist by those who had elected him. In 1989, when I interviewed him in Boane, he had been asked to resume his post by the local people. He said:

> "The population wants me to assume the seat of régulo today. They want me to lead the rain ceremonies. I am not going to do it because they behaved improperly. They expelled me after they themselves had elected me. Previously we never had these long periods without rain. When there was drought I went to the lagoon and held a ceremony. Next day it was raining. Now I will not do it." [35]

In 1991 the Boane administration started to work more with the régulos. Administrator Eliado invited the régulos to the administration where a mamba (ritual) was organised. When some villagers from Massaca 1 found a "Alacavuma" (a pangolin, regarded as a sacred animal), they took it to Antonio Matola in the village and said he was one of the régulos of the area. Then he took the Alacavuma to the administration. The administrator organised all the appropriate ceremonies.[36] It is very difficult to say that the official FRELIMO line of considering régulos as collaborators was fully maintained. Party officials claimed they had always consulted the régulos on matters of a spiritual nature, but drew a distinction between this and interference in political matters. [37] The problem with the régulos was that they wanted to be considered part of the government, of the administration, of the estruturas with the full benefits flowing from this - including salary and status.[38]

The reasons for the attacks on the regulado system are very narrowly seen as resulting from FRELIMO's ideology. But in Boane, at least, the regulados were attacked because of their internal contradictions and the opposition of the people in the area.

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35 Interview with Régulo Mazinho: 1989.

36 Interview with Head of Village Massaca 1: 1991.

37 Interview with João: 1991.

38 Interview with Secretary of the FRELIMO Party for Ideological work: 1991.

In 1991 efforts to (re)create the regulados were underway. The justification given by state officials was that regulados are a traditional form of organisation and not to recreate them would be living like foreigners in our own land or alternatively that the Portuguese knew how do it because they stayed 500 years. This common sense appraisal of the regulado system does not hold in historical terms, but it shows how the present administration felt a need to find instruments and institutions to legitimise itself.

The Boane régulos did not enjoy universal legitimacy. They faced opposition because of the taxes that had to be paid to them (in goods and work) and the repression they exercised. This opposition at independence was widespread, and in 1991 the return, proposed in some villages, was just to their religious and spiritual duties. Régulos were regarded as priests and they had the power to appease the spirits. The religious ceremonies (Alacavuma, drinking of ucanhe and others) assured peace and the reproduction of the peasantry. In 1991 what was being demanded was that the relations with gods and spirits be established. But why did those who demanded the régulos' expulsion, now ask for their return ? "We have suffered very much. We were right when we said that we did not want régulos to beat us and to send us to forced labor. And we still don't want that today".[39]

Government and party structures expressed the differentiation among the Boane population, between the locals, Ronga-speakers, and the migrants, Shangaan speakers from Gaza and Xitswa speakers from Inhambane. The migrant workers had assumed leadership positions in the party and state and were heading the most important economic enterprises.

If the situation was clearly demarcated at district level, in village structures and in the co-operatives individuals linked to the Matola clan, the pre-colonial holders of political power, and those who had worked in the Portuguese administration were present. They controlled activities linked to economic control of the co-operatives (chefes de produção) and were also responsible for land allocation.

The development strategy that the government and party structures, described and analysed above, tried to implement in the 1975-1986 period, was one based on villagisation, co-operativisation and the establishment of state farms. The abandoned settler farms were nationalised and transformed into large scale farming units which were not efficiently run. In the villages most of the households lived in poverty and issues of production, wages, health and sanitation remained unsolved despite policies on paper. The co-operatives show

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39 Interview with President Village of Massaca 1: 1991.

the persistence of production relations that they were supposed to transform. Rather than collective enterprises, they were private units.

7 RENAMO activities

The first military attacks by RENAMO in Boane took place in 1984 and the targets were the Pequenos Libombos Dam and the state farm located near the dam in the region of Mahubo, on the border with Namaacha. The RENAMO units established themselves in the eastern areas of Boane on the border with Namaacha and Moamba districts, which in turn bordered South Africa and Swaziland. Two main bases were reported, one in Macuácua and the other in Matsaquenha, considered to be the central base for the area.[40]

RENAMO bands crossed the district at the Umbeluzi river near the village of Massaca II (where it is possible walk over) and the Tembe River in the southern part of Boane, using boats. Two main infiltration routes were used by RENAMO in the secure areas of Boane. One from Namaacha and Matsaquenha and another from Moamba, over the River Matola.[41]

RENAMO activities in Boane in the 1984-1990 period were of three types: attacks against the Pequenos Libombos Dam and other economic targets (farms, shops), attacks on villages, and interruption of traffic on the roads and railways linking Mozambique to South Africa and Swaziland.

The road from Maputo to Ressano Garcia and Komatipoort was not passable after 1984. Despite frequent attacks, the road to Namaacha and Swaziland was constantly used. RENAMO attacks against the villages involved the theft of property and food, abducting people and destroying houses.

The villages more open to attack were those on the outskirts of the security area which was roughly a triangle based on the Pequenos Libombos Dam, the army barracks at Boane and the Bridge over the Rio Matola.

The Mozambican army positions controlled infrastructure like the Radio Marconi satellite communications and the dam. Important support for the district came from units of the 5th brigade based at the Boane barracks.[42]

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[40] For a description of the base see Manhique: 1994.

[41] Manhique: 1994, mentions two bases - Matsequenha and Kwahla, located in the district of Matutuine.

[42] Interview with Ndimene: 1989.

In each village a militia group existed, organised to defend residential areas. Despite this security system, there were constant difficulties. In 1987, 14 persons were killed in the AC Marien Ngouabi. The RENAMO units consisted of 7 to 10 men who looted villages at night. [43]

The security situation - as far as I was able to observe - changed from day to day and during the day. The impression was that after dark the army and RENAMO were circulating in their own areas. Areas of major RENAMO attacks were situated in the northern part of Boane district. The villages of Mulotane and Tchonissa suffered more attacks than those in the south, the region of Mahubo.[44] The army had secure positions and controlled well defined perimeters and RENAMO circulated at will in the less populated regions.

The army was accused of regularly stealing goods from state farms. Tanks and heavy vehicles were used to steal fruit from orchards of the state-owned citrus company, which was later sold in Maputo.[45] The army was also accused of cattle rustling in the area of the state dairy farm.

At the various checkpoints set up in the district, the behaviour of members of the FDS (police, army and militias) was feared by the population. "The people's goods were confiscated, corporal punishment was administered to citizens who were not carrying identification, miners returning from South Africa were constantly victimised".[46]

Problems with the police were constant over the period when I worked in the district. The situation at the checkpoints had not changed despite efforts by the state to eliminate corrupt behaviour.

What were the links between the local population and RENAMO? Working in areas under government control it was very difficult to find any evidence of RENAMO mobilisation or politicisation. In the villages attacked - e.g. Massaca I - the bandits just killed everyone who was in the fields. The government suspected that villages like Estevel, inhabited only by older people were collaborating with RENAMO.

The best way to describe the relationship between the population and RENAMO in Boane is to use local concepts to characterise the war. Three concepts are generally presented in official documents and in interviews. One is displaced (deslocado) and refers to everyone who had been forced to change his/her place of residence due to the war and was leaving in under government

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43 FRELIMO: 1987a

44 FRELIMO: 1987a

45 Interview with A.Cabral: 1989.

46 Boane, DDAC: 1987.

control. Another is "afectado" (affected), referring to someone affected by the war but to whom there is no direct access. Ten thousand people, out of 40,000, were considered to be affected and the zones of Wacambo,. Tchonissa, Mulotane were described as affected.

In the first RENAMO attacks against Block 2 of the Citrus state farm, the RENAMO members who participated came from Gaza. Some of the women of the RENAMO commanders had lived in Boane and had deserted tc RENAMO. Some were students.

For district officials banditry was not important in the district because RENAMO had no bases there. The only important base was at Matsaquenha, which was in Namaacha. Normally the raiding parties came through the Matola regulado to reach Boane.

The Boane government thought that Boane town was safe from attack because of a secure defensive system. What it was more afraid of was an attack from within. In 1988 a network of collaborators was discovered inside Boane.[47]

Who were the RENAMO members? When an amnesty was declared in 1988 some 20 members of RENAMO gave themselves up. Most of these individuals were not from Boane. They had been kidnapped elsewhere and forcefully recruited into RENAMO. The first RENAMO groups who entered Boane were said to be from other parts of Mozambique. In following years it was said that locals, especially young people, collaborated with RENAMO.[48] The head of the militia in the village of Mulotana deserted and joined RENAMO. RENAMO tried overtly to recruit some of the régulos including Mazinho Matola who refused. He said; "When they attacked 25 de Julho, RENAMO people were crying out from the hill: 'come and join us'. I just run away to Boane because I am afraid of them".[49]

I did not find evidence to substantiate the claim that the division between RENAMO and FRELIMO can be correlated with divisions between Ronga speakers and Xitswa speakers or between locals and immigrants.

In 1987 there were five attacks with 3 civilians killed. In 1987 a RENAMO member was captured when reconnoitring the Umbeluzi area. [50]

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47 Boane, DDD: 1988a,b,c,d.

48 Manhique: 1994.

49 Interview with Mazinho Matola: 1991.

50 Boane, DDD: 1988d

In October/November 1988 RENAMO stepped up its actions in the district. Six people were killed. In one attacks, against Block 2 of the state dairy farm, 186 heads of cattle were stolen. In follow-up operations government forces recovered all the cattle and some RENAMO fighters were killed. [51]

In the outlying areas of the district bordering Moamba militia chiefs deserted from the army and joined RENAMO. [52]

In 1989 Boane was said to be a area without any fixed RENAMO camps, but in 1992, when the cease fire was signed, the press revealed a military position near the Radio Marconi Village.

The government's anti-RENAMO strategy was based on military action and resettlement of the peasants: i) strengthening military defence through the Boane barracks; ii) training local militia; iii) establishment of special defence systems at projects such as the Pequenos Libombos Dam; iv) arming and training militia at existing production units; v) villagisation or as the official jargon put it "organising the population into collective moulds for self-defence". [53]

The militia were formed by villagers, workers from state units or ordinary citizens who received basic military training and were given army equipment. There were several difficulties with the militia: i) members of the local militia command worked on a voluntary basis and were not paid ii) some militia members were recruited among the unemployed or displaced population.

The militia did not constitute a very useful group of soldiers. Under attack the militia ran away from their positions to Maputo. Nevertheless they were main group killed by RENAMO.

Relations between militia and population varied. In the places where the militia belonged to the community the relationship was good. But in the cases where they were professionals, the situation was more complicated. The militia units faced several difficulties. "Equipment and weaponry was insufficient, in some areas there were food shortages especially for those working in the district militia command and in the administrative posts.[54] In the affected zones the government tried to channel food and goods through the emergency program.

The district command of the armed forces had difficulties in functioning. The provincial command controlled its units.

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51 Boane, DDD: 1988c.

52 Interview with P.Sabie: 1991.

53 Boane, DDD: 1988b.

54 Boane, DDD: 1988a.

The Railways had their own military units. A variety of military units each with their own command makes for difficulties in control. Some of the railway militia were said to be collaborating with RENAMO, in zone 24, only 5 kilometres from Boane along the railway. Boane is an important railway centre because the railway from Maputo Port to Swaziland passes through Boane. Swaziland used the route to export sugar and iron ore. After 1984 the line was the target of constant RENAMO attacks which damaged sections of the track. Security problems led to difficulties in maintaining the line. Railway workers did not carry out their duties and often abandoned work because of food shortages.

In 1986, a train was totally paralysed on the line due to various accidents and ambushes. That year five mines exploded on the line, and there were numerous other incidents of RENAMO sabotage. The situation continued to deteriorate and by 1990 the line was practically inoperational.

Thefts of sugar on the trains, although risky, took place continually. I saw sugar marketed in Boane which had been stolen from trains. Looting the trains was a constant activity carried out both by soldiers and by local people.

Swaziland preferred to use the Komatipoort-Ressano Garcia line to export its sugar. But in the 1980s, Swaziland also used South African ports due to the insecurity in Mozambique. [55]

8 The relationship between aid, destabilisation and development strategies in Boane

War, which began in the district as an activity imported by armed groups coming from outside, was a process that paralysed and influenced state action, but was also supported by state action e.g. villagisation. Defence became the top priority and all development efforts were marked by the war.

The focal points of development strategies in Boane were the state farms, the building of the dam, and later, the communal villages.

Efforts were made to change the pattern of development - changing the direction of investment from infrastructure and state farms to peasant production. But these were soon paralysed by the war. The Região Agrária do Umbeluzi conceived as a way of achieving the redirection never became a reality. The proposed plan for the Região Agrária do Umbeluzi was intended to correct the course of development by adopting activities which would "make changes in the

[55] Boane, DDAC: 1987c.

social structure, in power relations, so that the family sector, now at the bottom level, becomes powerful enough to make decisions that affect at least the majority of peasant farmers" [56]

The co-operatives, producer associations, and the villages as projects to support the development of peasant production, were no more than ideological discourses. The size of land holdings, the way villages are scattered around the farmland, will make the peasants/migrant workers of Boane an accessible source of cheap labor for industries and commercial farms, be they private, state or multinational. In terms of the working class this pattern of settlement will leave part of the reproduction costs of workers in their own hands i.e. in their family plots. Boane will be a modernised labor reserve.

Efforts to develop education at village level were left in the hand of the villagers themselves and the NGOs. Infrastructure has been built but the quality of teaching and working conditions for teachers will ensure a continued high level of failures. Health received attention in Boane with the building of a hospital in Boane-sede (Italian aid) and a maternity in Campoane (CUSO-SUCO). Health posts existed at the Pequenos Libombos Dam and on some of the citrus farms. But conditions did not exist to settle health staff in the district and so they left every day for Maputo. The hospital in Boane had insufficient food for the patients and shortages of medicine, soap and other cleaning products. There was no kitchen and water was unavailable for long periods. There was no mortuary.

Throughout the post-independence period the district suffered a shortage of consumer goods as basic as cooking oil, sugar and soap. Although the problem was widely known in 1986 supplies for the district that year declined by 35 per cent when compared to the plan drawn up in 1985. The goods which suffered the major cuts were maize meal, wheat flour, rice, sugar, fish, sugar, oil and soap. [57] With price liberalisation the quantity of goods available has not increased but they are sold openly rather than on the black market. There is intense commercial activity in the villages with goods brought from Swaziland and elsewhere. The stalls in Boane are owned by "estruturas".

Aid in Boane had two roles. The first was to support the state's development strategies and the second, left to NGOs and humanitarian aid, was to cover the gaps left by the first process. The aid relationship between the NGOs and their beneficiaries was changing into a client-patron relationship. [58]

Aid financed the Pequenos Libombos Dam and villagisation. The effect of aid on development strategies was that it made them applicable. Development

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[56] Tipoteh: 1988b:29.

[57] Boane, DDAC: 1987c

[58] For a wider discussion on client-patron relationship, see Maxwell: 1987.

strategies had a impact on aid. The dam and other rural development projects attracted aid because donors saw them as feasible projects.

Development strategies had an effect on the social structure in the district. The social structure which evolved can best be described as three layered pyramid. The top layer was occupied by the party and state bureaucrats, hand in hand with large private accumulators. The middle layer consisted of national and state technocrats, village "estruturas", rich peasants and army officers. On the bottom were migrants to Boane, and middle and poor peasants.

The social structure changed so that those groups at the top, whose advancement had been blocked by the Portuguese colonial state, had the possibility to develop themselves. This social structure as strengthened by the joint effects of development strategies, foreign aid and destabilisation i.e. internal and external sanctions against the government in power. The changes reinforced the existing social structure. In 1990 when FRELIMO was no longer a 'vanguard party' the party's cadres were looking for ways to set up their own businesses. "Now we don't have anything. I was a cook and now a party bureaucrat. What am I am going to do next?". [59]

Challenges to development policies put pressure for change in development strategies. They also affected aid by transforming the projects into military targets. Development projects were changed also with the interference of the donors so as to include defence. Italian aid financed the militias which defended the Pequenos Libombos Dam and the expatriates working on its construction.

[59] Interview with Chivengue: 1989 and 1991.

CHAPTER NINE

Mueda: Myths of origin, resistance, occupation and liberation

1 Introduction

Mueda occupies a mythical position in the history of Mozambique due to its late colonial occupation and its subsequent role as a liberated area, controlled by FRELIMO[1]. Accounts of Mueda confront any contemporary historian with a rare assemblage of myths about Mozambique. The Maconde, those who speak KiMaconde, form the majority of the population on the Mueda plateau, and have managed to preserve the image of a fierce, innate spirit of resistance, opposed to Portuguese rule right from the start. The ritual scarring of body and face and the filed teeth of the Maconde have helped consolidate the image they wanted to transmit of brave, fierce and intimidating warriors. The invention of an identity and of a tradition was quite successful.[2] In 1989 a new step was taken by young Maconde intellectuals: the claim of dominance over all of northern Cabo Delgado. A map published in the literary review "Liswhalelu" regarded as Maconde territory the whole region from the Rovuma to the Messalo rivers.[3]

Rather than just a Maconde plateau, a geographical area occupied by a historically and culturally homogeneous population, Mueda presents a mosaic of different populations. The area is inhabited by groups speaking Macua, Maconde and Ngoni. Neither Mueda, Muidumbe, Nangade (the three districts which occupy the Plateau), Mocimboa da Praia or Palma are "ethnically" homogeneous.

Mueda is both typical and atypical of Mozambican districts. It is typical because its political economy is similar to most labor reserve areas of Mozambique where settler farmers did not occupy extensive areas of land. It

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1 This chapter has been translated to Portuguese, edited and published (Adam: 1993) in Arquivo No.14, a special issue on Cabo Delgado. My thanks to João Paulo Borges Coelho for the Portuguese version.

2 Conceição: 1988:35-36 and Conceição. 1989.

3 Roughly the new map comprises the territory of Cabo Delgado province between the River Rovuma in the North and the Messalo in the South. This territory was also claimed as an independent state by Lázaro Nkavandame in 1968-1969. Anon.: 1989a.

is atypical because the region was an important battleground during the struggle for Independence.

2 Mueda and the colonial occupation

The Portuguese occupation of Mueda did not take place until 1924. It was the work of a military column headed by Neutel de Abreu, the Portuguese hero of the "occupation and pacification campaigns" in Northern Mozambique.[4] The military occupation of the uplands of northern Cabo Delgado occurred 29 years after the same process in southern Mozambique - Portugal occupied Boane and Sabié in 1895-1896.

The occupation of the highlands was the work of Portuguese expeditionary forces helped by people who inhabited the eastern edge of the plateau and by Maconde chiefs such as Nkapoka who had already entered the commercial networks.[5]

Preceding the Portuguese presence on the plateau were the traders. Indians came from Mocímboa da Praia or from Ibo to sell guns and gunpowder and buy ivory, or to conclude deals on various merchandise ranging from copal gum to Landholphia rubber. Maconde chiefs went regularly to the coast to trade.[6]

The Mueda area was integrated into the world economy long before the Portuguese occupation. Macomia and the Mueda plateau had significant agricultural production, and these agricultural goods reached the traders in the coast. The Maconde were also involved in the slave trade. The capture of individuals in the bush was a frequent activity before the arrival of the Portuguese. Some of the captives were incorporated into the existing villages and others were sold.[7]

Before Portuguese occupation each village in Mueda was a "kingdom". The village head, Nangolo, was the highest political authority for the inhabitants. He distributed land, arbitrated in conflicts, conducted trade and

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4 Lobato: 1971. For the Portuguese occupation of the Maconde plateau see Pires: 1924; Martins: 1935; Ferreira and Abreu: 1946. A synthesis of this documentation can be found in Dias: 1964a:92-94. For a detailed analysis see Pelissier: 1984:255, 265-268, 303.

5 Interview with Xadelelo Limbambo Nkuemba: 1981.

6 Interview with Joaquina Nhole and Malidade Mapalakele: 1981; Thompson: 1983:79.

7 Interview with Valakatene Mangundu: 1981, Interview with Rafael Aculuende: 1981.

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religious ceremonies. The residents were his kith and kin. Villages with 50 to 100 houses were already common on the plateau in the 19th century. [8]

3 The political economy of colonial Mueda

The Portuguese occupation of Mueda led to the transformation of the political economy of the area and of the African polities there. Portuguese rule was imposed through taxation, forced labor, and the introduction of cash crops. The political economy of Mueda in the colonial period can be characterised as peasant production for the market plus the export of labor.

The Niassa Company (which was responsible for the administration of the territory) reorganised the existing polities on a hierarchical principle, "joining together several villages, whose chiefs became subordinate to the chief of the group of villages who was called 'capitão-mor'".[9] In their turn, a certain number of 'capitães-mor' were under a régulo or a regedor (in KiMaconde, Nkulungua). This post was handed down from uncle to nephew. In 1964 there were 23 regulados and 134 capitães-mor in the Circunscrição dos Macondes.[10]

Despite the craftsmanship shown by the Portuguese administration in the creation and administration of the regulados, by 1957, almost 27 years after its creation, the system was showing signs of stress. It was not the individual qualities of the régulos which were significant in explaining the crisis. The régulos were displaced, amongst other factors, by the transformations in the colonial political economy (a sign that the colleague of the Mueda administrator in another Circunscrição, Zavala, had noted in 1955) and by a critique of it by those who had acquired economic power, literacy and Catholicism.[11] Challenges to the colonial state in Mueda were regularly reported. Several acts of peasant resistance were documented including destruction of the cotton crop, refusal to supply labor under the forced labor system, and emigration to Tanganyika.[12] But none of these peasant actions

8 Interview with Valakatene Mangundu: 1981.

9 Interview with Alabi Vakanga: 1982.

10 Dias: 1970; Interview with Chikoa Namva: 1980.

11 See Adam: 1986. For an analysis of the régulos' loss of legitimacy, see Rita-Ferreira: 1964:18-19.

12 See Rodney, Tambila and Sago: 1993; Wanambisi: [s.d.].

ever reached such levels as to challenge the very existence of the Portuguese colonial administration.[13]

In the second half of the fifties and beginning of the sixties, important institutions emerged both inside the Mueda area and outside in Tanzania. These were two co-operatives inside Mozambique (SAAVM, Machamba 25) and three parties in Tanganyika - Associação dos Macondes, Macua-Maconde Mozambique Union and Maconde (later Mozambique) African National Union (MANU) - with the explicit aim of challenging colonial rule.

The inhabitants of the plateau were not a homogeneous group. Differentiation was expressed not in the ownership of land (which was plentiful) but in the accumulation of wealth. The rich were "those who had bred many goats, those who had many guns and those who went regularly to Mocímboa da Praia to sell rubber".[14]

After the colonial occupation Mueda became an area of migration. Migration in Mueda shows the thin distinction between forced and voluntary migration. Forced migration in Mueda included flight from Chibalo (forced labour) or other colonial practices. Voluntary migration, expressed as migrant labour to Tanganyika, was also a response to the policies of the colonial state. In this sense the distinction between forced and voluntary migration becomes very blurred. The most common explanations and theories for the migration of Macondes to Tanzania stress its political nature as a rejection of the Portuguese system and at the same time an act of resistance against forced cotton cultivation and forced labor. Working conditions on the Tanganyikan sisal plantations, where the Mozambican migrants worked, were also harsh, and very similar to the situation on the Portuguese plantations: a high incidence of work related injuries, strikes and evasion of labor.[15] But economically the Mozambican workers were better off in Tanganyika than in Mozambique.

Peasant agricultural production in Mueda did not suffer from constant drought since rainfall on the plateau is very regular. Mueda agriculture centres around two staple crops, cassava and maize.

In the 1940-1974 period, marketed agricultural production reached an average of 3,000 tons a year with regular peaks in maize production.[16] Cotton

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13 Isaacman et al: 1980.

14 Interview with Aculuende: 1981

15 Tambila: 1983:34-44; Wanambisi: [1989]

16 See Jeldres: 1986.

production, organised through forced cultivation, increased in the late fifties and early sixties when two measures were introduced: a concentration of cotton production in areas with favourable soils and rainfall and a relaxation in the methods of control and in the use of force.

Other agricultural products were bought by traders (cantineiros) established all over the area. There was a large grid of shops in Mueda with several commercial settlements and other shops scattered through the countryside. By law each shop in the latter category had to be at least 10 kilometres from any other shop. Mission stations also maintained shops of their own.

Peasant production on the plateau, although restricted by Portuguese state policies, displayed remarkable growth. A stratum of rich peasants appeared in the 1940s and 1950s, accumulating, by virtue of their access to land, agricultural production, waged work and trade.

In 1960 the Mueda massacre occurred. Nationalist accounts have used the massacre as evidence that dialogue with the Portuguese authorities was not possible. Trying to counteract the revolutionary mobilisation, the Portuguese responded to the long expressed grievances of the population of Mueda (over water, prices and organisation). Three concrete measures which had already been recommended by the Portuguese anthropologists Jorge and Margot Dias were applied: increased wages for plantation workers, no land concessions to whites, construction of the water system. [17]

4 The political economy of the liberated zones in Mueda

The political economy of Mueda during the liberation struggle was characterised by the production of agricultural commodities, both for consumption and export. Migratory labour movements almost stopped.

On 25 September 1964, the first FRELIMO attack took place at Chai near Macomia. The FRELIMO units were guided by locals like Lukas Ngavanga, who participated in the attack.[18] After a year, by late 1965, the guerrillas already had well established bases in the northern part of Mueda. Units were established in remote areas, difficult access for the Portuguese to reach. The Portuguese counter-guerrilla strategy, at that period, was to

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17 Gubler and Teles: 1983.

18 Interview with Lucas Ngavanga: 1981.

remove the population from the interior and establish garrisons all over the plateau, mainly where old mission stations or shops existed. The population who had scattered in the bush was seized by Portuguese army units and pushed into aldeamentos (protected villages), which were organised around the main administrative posts of Mueda, Mocimboa do Rovuma (N'Gapa), Nangade, and Nangololo.[19] The Portuguese also adopted an "ethnic strategy", concentrating their activities mainly against the Maconde population, while trying to win the support of the Yao, Macuas and Matambwes. In 1964, the Portuguese replaced régulos all over the Macua areas of Cabo Delgado.[20]

In remote zones that were now sparsely populated because of the formation of aldeamentos in order to "remove the water (people) from the fish (guerrilla)", but where FRELIMO was promoting a dispersed pattern of settlement so as to "create the water (people) where the fish (guerrilla) could survive", the guerrilla forces started to organise civilian life: production, supply, transport. The institutions which emerged in the first year were manned by notables - régulos, capitães-mor, elders, mission station teachers - administering the territory where FRELIMO started its operations. These institutions, province, district and branch, were part of FRELIMO's administrative set-up and their boundaries corresponded with units of the Portuguese administrative system - regulado, Circunscrição and distrito.

The branches performed tasks such as issuing membership cards, controlling the population, issuing "guias de marcha" (travel permits - xitambulishu in KiMaconde), drawing up lists of people who should take part in transport duties. In these branches two types of committee were established - committees of five and committees of seven.[21]

The committees of five were organisational and administrative units. They collected food, organised a roster for participation in transport duties both for Tanzania or for the bases, and supplied men and women demanded by the military bases. The committees of seven acted as courts to solve community problems (e.g. theft, divorce, witchcraft), resorting to peasant values when judging cases. Compromise in the name of national unity and of the war was their main watchword. Ideological guidelines from the FRELIMO leadership were taken into consideration but there was no rigid attachment to them. A compromise was found in order to maintain a certain balance between the guidelines and the wishes of the local people. For example, the FRELIMO guidelines stated that private propriety in land was abolished, but

19 See Coelho: 1986.

20 Interview with Padre Pedro and Padre Teodoro: 1981.

21 Interview with Cesário Tomás Pinda: 1981.

Complementing the fixed yearly contributions in grain mentioned above, peasants had to supply food to the guerrillas every time the need arose. Hardly any collectivisation of production took place. Most farms were individual plots. The participation of soldiers in production also was very difficult and sparse.[25]

The co-operatives set up during the war were marketing co-operatives. The existing sculptors' co-operatives also took part in trade. These groups called co-operatives, chipinga xa cooperativa in Ki Maconde, collected some agricultural products (cashew nuts, sesame seeds, groundnuts) that they took to Tanzania, where they were bartered for salt, sugar, oil, clothes, files, hoes. On their return, the stock of goods would be bartered again with the peasants. In this operation the traders made a profit. They ended up with a surplus of agricultural produce plus the goods they used for their families. Those who did not have agricultural products to barter would supply the co-operatives with their labor (e.g. for transport to Tanzania) and, in payment, received goods. Someone carrying a bag of cashew nuts from Nangade over the Rovuma would receive on the way back home a "capulana" (piece of printed cloth).[26]

In Mueda, visions of the armed struggle and of FRELIMO differed geographically and between different groups of peasants. The division was between the consolidated liberated zones and the "avanços" (forward positions). Here peasants saw that FRELIMO's force tactics took precedence over democracy and mobilisation. Those who were captured from the aldeamentos (the Portuguese settlements) were treated with suspicion and were punished for some time. They were sent to the First Sector, near the Rovuma River, for a period.[27] Those coming from abroad were also treated with suspicion and kept under surveillance for some time. There were also differences between peasants from areas where the liberation forces had bases, and people from other areas.

FRELIMO maintained a health system inside Mozambique, where guerrilla operations were carried out, to treat minor illnesses and administer first aid to war related casualties. Wounded guerrillas were taken to Tanzania where FRELIMO had a hospital. The wounded were carried on stretchers in

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25 Interview with Kabissa Simba: 1981.

26 Mueda: 1981. Collective interviews with members of the co-operatives Magaia; Moçambique and Nastenge. Interview with Mpembo: 1981, president of Cooperativa Moçambique, who has been my key informant in the district for many years.

27 Nkumi: 1989, interviewed in C.P. Bravo, Mocimboa da Praia. When captured, people who had lived in Portuguese aldeamentos were taken to the FRELIMO First Sector, the region of the Mueda Plateau between the Rovuma River and the Mueda-Mocimboa road, to be re-educated.

columns which went from the Mueda interior to Tanzania. The hospital and health posts were constantly moved due to Portuguese attacks.[28]

One of the key problems in Mueda during the war was water supply. It was difficult to go to wells and to other places where water was available, because there were mines and these places could be attacked. So women went to fetch water while guerrillas and militia maintained a constant watch. When they came back the women each left a litre of water in cans for the guerrillas. Thus the army provided security in exchange for water.[29]

In some places, like Nangade, the Portuguese garrison and the FRELIMO units based near by used the same places for water supply. In 1969 a secret agreement on water was reached between the two sides. The Portuguese garrison would fetch water in the mornings and the guerrillas in the afternoons. FRELIMO believed that "ethnic" and religious divisions among the population of Cabo Delgado hampered the extension of the war to south of the Messalo River. The task in Cabo Delgado was to expand the liberation war up to the River Lúrio and create a basis for the guerrilla forces to enter Nampula province. The advance was slowed down partly by the reaction of the Portuguese authorities with their creation of strategic hamlets (aldeamentos), but also because of the conflict between Macuas and Macondes.[30]

FRELIMO's own accounts of its history regard 1968 as a turning point in its evolution from a nationalist front into a revolutionary organisation. The indicators presented for this change are the modifications in property relations inside the liberated zones (abandonment of individual farms for collective plots) and changes in practices like lobolo (bride price), "ritos de iniciação" (initiation rites), and "obscurantismo" (obscurantism - witchcraft and sorcery).[31] The struggle against these practices, considered as the negative side of traditional values which should be opposed, was part of FRELIMO ideology but there was scarcely any evidence that FRELIMO succeeded in this combat. In fact these practices continued up to the end of the war and after. The struggle between the Department of Defence and the Department of Interior Organisation, or between the revolutionaries and Nkavandame, was felt differently in the liberated zones: in the northern areas near the Rovuma it was directly felt and witnessed but in the southern and central parts of the plateau the information only arrived after the event.

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28 Interview with Ramos: 1981.

29 Sidjene: 1981.

30 Machel: 1983h.

31 FRELIMO: 1975a.

The changes inside FRELIMO in 1968-1969 were perceived in the Mueda liberated zones not as changes in ideology, politics or in the aims of the struggle, but as a change in the names of the structures and in the style of the organisation. "Then (in 1969) we all became like soldiers".[32] Previous divisions between civilians and the army within FRELIMO disappeared.

Desertions from FRELIMO to the Portuguese were not rare. "Members of the population, militia and soldiers ran away to the Portuguese but in small numbers. There was also desertion en masse, in some districts, especially those districts inhabited by the Macuas. But it was not an alarming situation because even the colonialists recognised that the majority of the population was still in the bush".[33]

Guerrilla military bases, although dependent on taxing the peasants, had their own production. Bases were highly organised.[34] They had units of soldiers to collect water, to cut wood and to hunt.[35] Production teams were organised among the soldiers. [36]

To sum up: I have objected to the common sense views of the liberation war and to ideological and romanticised visions of the war and of the liberated zones, prevalent both among those who took part in the war and the analysts.[37] The transformations which occurred were very limited. Force was used all along the way. The liberated areas were far from the pure society that some students from Dar-es-Salaam reported seeing or where they found evidence to support Fanon's theories about the purification of the colonised by violence.[38]

The Liberated Zones were very much a utopia, which supplied guidelines for mobilisation, especially for the future. The relationship between FRELIMO guerrillas and the inhabitants developed along an axis limited by repression on one side and mobilisation on the other. The balance was kept because the population needed the army for its defence and the army needed the population for its survival.

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32 Interview with Muanino: 1982.

33 Interview with João Paulo Namalia: 1981.

34 Interview with Martins Nkuemba: 1982.

35 Interview with Chongo: 1982.

36 Interview with André Joaquim Kananguça: [n.d.].

37 Interview with Samora Machel: 1972a,b,c.

38 Museweny: 1973.

Whatever the reading of social transformations by those in power then and after independence, the reality was much more nuanced. Rich peasants continued to broaden their accumulation during and after the war. The goods they produced were exchanged for a quantity of manufactured goods, which were later retailed inside the liberated zones at a profit. Peasants living in the border areas near Nacatar felt that military units used a great deal of force against the population.[39] In 1974 when the war ended the situation of the liberated zones - seen by the early visitors - was of very poor zones but with a very high level of political consciousness.[40]

5 The political economy of post-colonial Mueda

The political economy of Mueda in the post-colonial period can be characterised as based on peasant agricultural production, both of food and export products, and a reserve of migrant labour.

Mueda's rainfall levels provide good conditions for agriculture. The problems caused in Boane and Changara by periodic droughts are not common in Mueda. The rains are very regular. One of the main limitations on agricultural production and human settlement is the availability of drinking water. The water collection points are situated in the baixas (lowlands) or in ravines, approximately 800 m below the villages. Villages are located a long way above both their water supply, and the peasants' farms.

Due to the high population density, most agricultural areas on the plateau have been worked continuously and the land rotation scheme used by the peasants has been altered. The fallow periods have been cut short in some areas and in other areas have practically disappeared. No tillage cultivation methods are frequent near Muatide.

Mueda has been a district usually producing a fair amount of marketed agricultural produce grown by peasant farmers. The marketed crop has been calculated at less than 5 per cent of the total agricultural production.[41]

Up to 1986 there were no private commercial farmers, registered as such, in the district. The main form of agricultural production was the family or peasant farm, among which some large farmers were included.

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39 Interviews with Tadeu; Lukanga; Akupela and Intachi: [n.d.].

40 Meyns and Lohman: 1976.

41 Jara: 1984.

The capitalist farms, established after 1986, belonged to Mueda traders, who were trying to diversify their economic activities, and to army officials, who had benefited from bank credits given by the CCADR (the Agriculture and Rural Development Credit scheme).

After 1986 Mueda began to feel the PRE/Structural Adjustment policies. What were the signs in the district?

The shops began to fill with consumer goods, prices of commodities shot up, the Lojas do povo were sold to private traders, private farms began to be opened.

Mueda also registered an increase in the volume of marketed agricultural production, rising from a yearly average of 600 tons of maize to 8,000 tons.

The effects of the PRE in Mueda were monitored from 1991 onwards by a Swiss research project. Relying on questionnaires, interviews, and price monitoring, the team following the effects of PRE pointed to the following, for a region which encompasses Mocimboa da Praia, Mueda, Nangade and Palma: increased prices of agricultural products and consumer goods; deteriorating terms of trade for farmers; traders set the prices as in a cartel as a way of maximising their own profits; the market structures were monopolistic favouring existing traders. Although the resources for health and education were cut in rural areas, the prices of health care supplied by the state remained accessible even to the poor. [42]

The PRE in Mueda meant the state abandoned administrative control over production, producers, traders and trade. Market mechanisms were left to work unhampered. The situation contrasted with what happened in previous periods, when FRELIMO and the state tried to promote increased production, by using coercion.[43]

State development strategies in Mueda for the peasant sector concentrated on developing co-operatives both for marketing (consumer co-operatives), handicraft production and agriculture.

In 1974, when the war ended, the Portuguese left the military positions they occupied in Mueda, and FRELIMO moved in. A cornerstone of FRELIMO strategy for the socialist transformation of the rural areas, was the formation

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42 Kappel: 1991; Wigglesworth: 1991.

43 Interview with Conselho Executivo da Aldeia N'Gapa (N'Gapa: 1983)

of villages, thus altering a pattern of scattered settlement into one of guided settlement.[44] The peasants' move to install themselves where they had lived before was regarded as irrational and wild.

Peasants in Mueda wanted to live in their places of traditional residence and wanted to create the traditional Maconde village in which a family group lived. [45]

As the party and the government were pushing for the formation of villages, peasants were moving to install themselves in places of their own choice, in a process that has been described as the "dismembering" or "break-up" of villages.[46] The instability of existing villages, the struggle by peasants to live where they wanted, was a constant feature of Mueda's history after 1975. The movement to break away from the villages created by the administration, can best be described as a continuous process with some flare-ups. At least three such flare-ups can be noted: one was in 1974-1975 at the moment when the villages were established, a second was around 1984-85 and a third in 1990-1991, when RENAMO activities in the plateau gained a new momentum.

The break-up of villages is related to the choice of village sites. In the village of Mtamba, peasants argued against the place where the village was being put. "The political commissars said that we had to come and live here, but others said that they would stay where there was food. You can stay with your water, we will stay where we have food".[47] In peasant decisions about the location of their settlements, land ownership also played a role. On the sites of the old Maconde villages, the original inhabitants were the owners of the land. In the new villages the owners were those who lived there during the colonial occupation and the armed struggle, thus making the new arrivals landless.[48]

The government, when faced with cases of village disintegration, maintained the line that everyone had to live in an existing village. Force was used in 1974-75 against those considered ring-leaders of movements away from villages (e.g. Namaua). But the position then softened until 1984. The hardening of the government position towards the break-up of villages has to do more with the crisis the government was facing than with the villages

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44 Ferreira: 1979:5.

45 Interview with Kundjula: 1981.

46 Interview with Bernardo Vitor: 1981.

47 Interview with Mualimu Nkuluma: 1981.

48 Interview with Bernardo Vitor: 1981.

themselves. In 1984, orders were given to neutralise "the situation created in Nambawala, Nanenda, Chudi, Lipelua", sites where break-away villages had erupted.[49]

Whatever the intentions, the villagisation process did not affect the whole population of Mueda in the same way. Only 22% of the population were obliged to settle on sites chosen by the government or by the party. A survey made in 1980 shows the pattern of population displacement in the district after independence. It is estimated that 28% of the population of Mueda did not move due either to the war of liberation or to the post-independence villagization programs. But 72% of the plateau's population did move home in 1975: 40% returned to their old family sites and 22% had to settle in sites chosen by the government (data is not available for the other 10%). The 22% included returnees from Tanzania.

The returnees (retornados). Mozambicans who had sought refuge in Tanzania during the liberation war, were treated with a certain distrust. In 1981-82 they were accused of counter-revolutionary behaviour "because they had not been politicised by the war, and in Tanzania they had access to better living conditions than the peasants inside Mozambique."[50]

In 1991, there were 65 villages in Mueda. The villagization process promoted settlements that were unstable, with peasants constantly leaving the villages to live elsewhere.

The Mueda communal villages never became settlements where the peasants found alternative health, education and marketing structures. The structures created to implement people's power also did not consolidate themselves.

The "ethnic" problems designate the fact that peasants who left certain villages stressed their cultural differences from the Maconde population, and the fact that they were discriminated against as a group in the existing villages. The conflicts reported set Ngonis, Yaos and Macuas against Macondes. In Mapate, in 1982 the entire Macua population left the district for Macomia. In N'Gapa, the Yao population left for new villages.

The executive councils, which had the responsibility for political and administrative matters in the villages, were constantly under challenge.[51] In

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49 Mueda. Assembleia Popular: 1984.

50 Interview with Chunica Felipe Kundjula: 1981.

51 Mueda, DDAC: 1982, reports by Gerónimo Sabonete of the DDAC, sector de Assistência às Localidades (DDAC.SAL) 24/Fevereiro de 1982 of a visit made in 31 January 1982 to the Village of

1982, in some villages, problems between the people's power structures and the traditional lineage structure were being posed. Faced with an increasing lack of legitimacy, the Executive Councils in each village went to consult the régulo about what to do.[52] Members of the executive councils who did not come from families which held power under the traditional system, were not considered as real leaders.[53] In order to implement their decisions, the Executive Councils resorted increasingly to violence.[54]

The Executive Councils and the party structures also faced opposition from peasants when they tried to ban traditional practices such as initiation rites.[55] Disputes over religion were not limited to problems with traditional beliefs and magic-religious practices. Christians were compelled to obey party and government orders on religious practices in the villages. Chapels in the villages of Lutete and Wawi were removed from the centre of the village because this was reserved for the party and administrative structures. Chapels were authorised in some villages if they were built in the last line of houses and never in the main centre. Priests who wanted to work on the villages up to 1984/85, had to request written permission from the district administrator, but some of them visited the villages without any "guia de marcha" (travel permit) and this created problems.[56]

Alcohol consumption in the villages was said to be very high. Conflicts broke out between peasants when they were drunk.[57] After heavy drinking, arguments followed and ended in a panga fight. The incident in Nanenda in 1981, is typical: "After drinking they fought with catanas (machetes). Daniel burnt the house of Atanasio damaging the bicycle, radio, rice and money."[58]

Nanhamba Reports of Sector de Apoio as Localidades, the same type of problems for Magogo - report of 24/02/1983; Namacule (12.02.82); Imbuhu (7.03.1982); Nimu (30.04.82); Nampanha (24.02.1982).

52 Interview with Bombina Assumani: 1983.

53 Mueda, DDAC: 1982. Report from a Brigade of Direcção Distrital de Apoio e Controlo, Distrito de Mueda: 30/04/1982.

54 Report of Communal Village Matambalale on the session of the Peoples Assembly in the village 26/02/1982. In Matambalale the village Executive Council decided on 26 February 1982 that certain crimes would be punished by chicotada, "lashings with a sjambok". 4. "He who cuts another with a panga, first should receive 30 chicotadas (lashes) in the village and later be sent to the district". 7. He who beats another with a stick should remain for reeducation and receive 2 beatings each day in the mornings in the village.

55 Interview with Bento Tiago Mualiua: 1981.

56 Mueda, CDP: 1984. Report of the III session of the Comité Distrital do Partido - 19 de Junho de 1984.

57 See reference 13.

58 Interview with Bernardo Vitor: 1981.

Villagers complained of all sorts of abuses by members of the administration. Swindling in marketing was a common concern. In Matio, in 1983, peasants found that for every capulana they bought, they were also obliged to purchase a litre of hair oil. When they applied the hair oil they had headaches. So they used the oil in their lamps instead. The head of the marketing brigade in Matio was an official of the administration.[59]

Robberies were reported by militiamen from Matio and other villages in N'Gapa: when they travel to other Mueda villages the peasants found that the militia confiscated their goods - tobacco, nipa (traditional brandy) etc. They were travelling legally, with a guia de marcha issued in N'Gapa: but the militia argued that the guia was false because it bore a colonial stamp with the words "Concelho dos Macondes". This was the official seal since no one had produced a more up-to-date one.

Peasants showed their discontent with the administration in various ways. A common form was the refusal to participate in communal work - cleaning, farming - and to occupy state and party posts. In Lutete, peasants refused to work in the collective cleaning of the village: they said "you are the ones who buy clothes, you should clean the village".[60]

A general refusal to hold posts in the state could be seen all over Mueda. In the villages, members of the elected bodies in the assemblies did not turn up for meetings, and presidents of the communal villages did not want to do their jobs. In N'Gapa the situation was worse. "In our area all the cadres residing in the villages abandon their duties and spend their time on individual business. When we ask why they have abandoned their responsibilities, the reply is always the same: we are not paid for our work".[61] The crisis of the state also shown by the refusal of young people to participate in military activities. "We formed the OJM but what we see is that youngsters aren't interested in the organisation, they run away when the military recruitment vehicle arrives and they sleep in the bush".[62]

After independence, Mueda again became a labour exporting area. In 1981, it was estimated that out of 100 families, four would have a member working as a migrant in Tanzania. The 1980 census indicates that there were 80 men per 100 women in Mueda, which is an indication of labor export. The

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59 N'Gapa, Administração: 1983. Relatório do Gabinete do Administrador da Localidade de N'Gapa para o Administrador do distrito de Mueda, Abril e Maio de 1983.

60 Interview with President Village Lutete: 1984 .

61 N'Gapa, Administração: 1983b. Report of the administrator of N'Gapa for the month of October 1983.

62 Mueda, Administração do Distrito: 1983. Annual Report of the administrator of Mueda for 1983.

present migration waves are generally towards the areas where there is work (Dar-es-Salaam, Lindi) and towards areas where Maconde communities are established. A significant number of Maconde males were in the armed forces.

Although in Mueda the amount of land occupied by settler farms was not large and there were no state farms, there was still a land problem. In the distant past land on the plateau was distributed according to Likolas (clans - a group of people with a common ancestor). The Likola was the unit which conserved the propriety and used land rights. Access to land was guaranteed within the Likola. A study of the likolas, their organisation, and the control of land, was opposed by the administration. But as early as the 1930s the tendency towards privatisation was established. Land was no longer distributed within the Likola. Land was owned by individuals who could rent it to people who needed it. Lending land as an act of solidarity, without any obligations from the recipient, virtually did not exist in Mueda. What was called lending was a type of hiring out of plots of land. From 1981 onwards we have collected testimonies on the sale and hiring out of land which denotes private land ownership. Increasingly people experienced difficulties in access to land, particularly on the Plateau. Private property was not limited to land but spilled over to other natural resources. "In Litapata there is a great problem of land. There are owners of land, owners of trees, owners of wood fuel, owners of water. The village president agrees with them".[63]

Owners were not an isolated phenomenon but had links with political power in the villages, with the executive councils, the people's assemblies and the party branches. "Mwene muytos" (landowners) were powerful and opposed to any individual and group which opposed them. At the Muera river, the Muatide Agricultural Co-operative had its "armazém" (store) burnt down. There was also an attempt to burn down the house where the co-operative's guard lived while he and his family were inside. The attack was the work of the "Mwene muyto", Jumbe Bakari. His father, Bakari Tumica tried to attack the president of the Muatide village with a knife.[64]

Land was being sold and various other arrangements were being made. As the land law prohibited these practices, nothing was done very publicly, and no-one wanted to discuss it.[65]

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[63] Intervention of a co-operative member in the Seminar on Co-operatives of the district of Mueda. See Nimpachula: 1984.

[64] Intervention, President of Co-operative Muatide, Seminar of Co-operatives Namaua: 1983. See Nimpachula: 1984.

[65] Interviews in the villages Miteda, Nanhala and Chapa. Because of the nature of the issues discussed, we were asked not to take notes nor quote names.

Over the years, the size of the farms grew. In 1962/63 the average size of a family farm was calculated at 0.9 hectares, in 1981 it was calculated at 2.02 hectares and in 1983 at 2.5 hectares.

The post-colonial villagization process created villages full of contradictions, deriving from access to land, the relationship between different political structures, the modern ones and their precursors, the clash between the laws of the post-colonial state and customary law, the various classes and their struggles. These multifaceted conflicts had a magic-religious dimension, which was kept very secret. The reason for this secrecy concerns both the nature of the process and the open opposition of the party and government to sorcery, described as obscurantism. Mueda, as a liberated zone, was presented as an area where the struggle against obscurantism, initiation rites and "lobolo" (bride-price) had been successful. During the armed struggle, although it is not mentioned in FRELIMO's public discourse or in official documents, FRELIMO political commissars had a dual position regarding sorcery and initiation rites. Sometimes they spoke against them, but they also regarded them as "usos e costumes" (customary). Occasionally, when there was some incident, they interfered taking the sorcerer for reeducation to a military base. When the peasants realised that the sorcerers would be punished if caught, they stopped denouncing them to the guerrillas.

In 1981 magic-religious aspects of the conflicts came into the open, first with the public trial of a man who claimed to be "a lion maker" (someone who can magically make lions appear) and later, in 1983, with the "Muave" ceremonies (trial by ordeal) practised by Njawa-Njawa.

This latter case made the problem of sorcery common knowledge across the entire district. A sorcerer named Njawa-Njawa came from Tanzania and roamed all over Mueda vaccinating villagers against "lion makers". The trial by ordeal which Njawa-Njawa practised, and which would supposedly expose "lion makers" (because they would die of his concoctions) is called Muabwe in other parts of Mozambique and Africa. He visited the villages with four helpers, and local people presented him with "suspects" who would be tested to see if they were indeed "lion makers".[66] Njawa-Njawa entered Mueda through N'Gapa Village where he was received by the locality administrator. There he performed the ceremonies and received a "guia de marcha" to come to Mueda town. Since his treatments were killing people, the administration in Mueda decided to arrest him, but he escaped before he could be brought to trial.

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[66] See Dias: 1964b:341-343.

The peasants presented the problems they faced in magic-religious terms. The underlying conflict was over access to land. The alleged "lion makers" - accused of sorcery - were in fact landowners. In Mpeme and in the villages on the northern rim of the plateau, they were the structures of the villages, members of the party, executive council etc.

After independence the co-operatives set up during the war continued to develop, mainly in the northern part of the plateau. Two types of co-operatives were officially recognised, agricultural and commercial. In 1981 the government started a drive to allow the existence of only one co-operative in each village. This led to difficulties in the relationships between the agricultural and consumer co-operatives.

While the arguments by government and by development projects in favour of co-operatives stressed egalitarian principles and the maximisation of resources, the reasons for peasant acceptance varied according to their role in such organisations. For the rank and file of the co-operatives these institutions guaranteed state support and the maximisation of profits from an activity judged to be of national interest. For them Co-operatives were a way of producing a common fund of goods or of money which in turn would be exchanged for consumer goods which latter would be distributed (sold or bartered) by the members.[67] In this circuit the leadership of the co-operatives made a profit and established a business. For ordinary members the co-operatives were the only way of obtaining consumer goods which were not sold freely on the market.

The co-operatives which developed in Mueda, a symbiosis of marketing and production co-operatives, inspired models for the cooperativization of peasant production in Mozambique. In Cabo Delgado a struggle between those who defended full cooperativization, and those who wanted to retain family farms, sparked off a debate. The local authorities favoured the establishment of farms in blocks, where a socialisation of some activities would be developed - like weeding, pest control and other agricultural activities. The individual plots within the blocks would be owned by the individual farmers and so would the crops produced on each plot. The opposing argument, favoured by the provincial governor, was that this was a way of saying that African peasants were adverse to cooperativization and collectivisation.

The policy of forming blocks, which the local agricultural authorities supported, continued a practice which had existed in the liberated zones and in Namuno. The grouping of peasant farms had to with the existence of good soils for agriculture. Natural conditions obliged peasants to concentrate their

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67 Interview with Baissone Laissone: 1984.

farms. The pattern of concentration was also a result of colonial state policies, as in Namuno, and of military conditions, as in Mueda.

The cooperativization policies applied in Mueda were based on modern principles of cooperativization and did not take as their starting point the forms of co-operation practised by the peasants. These were regarded as disguised forms of waged work which led to the super-exploitation of peasant farmers. The agricultural co-operatives created were not in any sense seen as a continuation of traditional forms of co-operation.

The forms of co-operation practised by Mueda peasants varied from a waged or quasi-waged situation to work exchanges in agreements which promoted reciprocity between individuals or within a clan group.

Table 9.1. *Labour services in Mueda*

Mukumi	Work which is done in a likola by likola members
Mole	Agreement between two individuals to exchange work
Chibalugua	Waged work for a boss.
Kipande	Piece work.

Source: Interview with CE Aldeia Namacule April 1982

The new co-operatives can be regarded as old wine in new bottles because the logic of internal organisation was submitted to the traditional forms of co-operation. The old forms were disguised with the ideology of modern co-operatives defending the equality of members and collective ownership of the means of production.

The inability of the post-colonial state to supply commercial networks with goods created shortages of essentials such as salt, sugar ,oil and soap. The lack of consumer goods strained the capacity of peasant families to reproduce themselves. In the village of Micalale in 1983 peasants still had stored maize from the 1981 and 1982 agricultural seasons.[68]

Mueda illustrates changes in state policies towards agricultural marketing and their shortcomings. Mueda illustrates the problems of the way in which the Mozambican state intervened in the market. Shortages of consumer goods plus controlled prices provided fertile ground for a flourishing parallel economy. The development of marketing in Mueda from 1983 onwards shows that, as soon as goods were available in the market,

68 Interview with Max Honneger and Gary Littlejohn: 1983.

marketed production rose from 800 to 2,000 tons in 1986. State intervention had favoured the parallel economy. The duality of the post-colonial state's position towards traders - our class enemies with whom we have to work - greatly complicated the situation.[69] The problems of marketing in Mueda reflected problems throughout Mozambique.[70]

Consumer goods were very scarce, their price was high, and the price of grain in the official system was low. The only reason peasants sold their crops was because the state controlled the supply of consumer goods and the marketing of agricultural production.[71] All agents involved in the marketing process took their own cut, thus making the terms of trade very unfavourable for the peasants.[72]

Agricultural marketing policies underwent change throughout this period. Mueda illustrates both the organisational and policy changes at AGRICOM, the state agricultural marketing board, the heir to the colonial marketing network of the Instituto de Cereais de Moçambique. In 1986, AGRICOM was the buyer in all villages but afterwards it began to withdraw from direct buying and became a buyer of last resort. Traders said they would only buy what they could because of lack of finance and markets. They were prepared to buy if they could sell to the state. AGRICOM had delegations in Mueda and in other parts of the district and province.

To sum up: the institutions created by the state in the district neither delivered the goods that peasants were expecting, nor took into consideration the needs of the majority of peasants. A small group of peasants - those already rich - benefited from state policies as did the traders, who benefited from a market based on scarcity of consumer goods. Now they have expanded their business and bought the companies once owned by the state.

The post-Independence development projects were not installed in a "vacuum". In the colonial period - 1961 - the government set up a water supply system, which supplied water to the Mueda Plateau.

In 1974-75 several development actions were implemented by the Mozambican government through its own efforts, notably the construction of rural shops and storage facilities. These shops were later turned into Lojas do Povo.

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69 For an archi-Marxist view see Centro de Estudos Africanos: 1985a.

70 Interview with Giramo: 1984.

71 Interview with Chambone: 1984.

72 Aldeia 24 de Marco, Conselho Executivo: 1981. Collective interview.