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TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR MEASURING POLITICAL
SUSTAINABILITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MOZAMBIQUE AND SWEDEN

By

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ABSTRACT

Background

The sustainability of the political relationship between people and institutions has been measured by indicators that even if accomplished do not cease the revolutionary behavior. This research study is aimed at the formulation of a Political Sustainability Index (PSI) to measure the institutional legitimacy of states.

Methodology

To calculate the level of Political Sustainability between Autocracy, Democracy, and Ecocracy, data coded from the country case studies; Mozambique and Sweden that adopted constitution were classified in one of six standard stages of levels of separation of power through three categories: electoral, central, and local authorities.

Results

While observing both countries within a historical period, Ecocracy has been revealed as the highest form of Political Sustainability that dissuades struggle for recognition, while autocracy and democracy, in all versions, are concerned with the projection of *domination* rather than preservation of everyone's interest.

Conclusions

Correlation analyses indicate that the two countries yet are facing different hierarchical stages of political sustainability, but with the same pathways 'evolving towards a measurable finite trajectory', where decisions are made based on scientific evidence of preservation of all beings and the universalization of ecological institutions as the final form of human government".

Keywords: Ecology, Ideology, Institution, Legitimacy, and Sustainability.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1. Framework and objectives

The relationship between *people* and *institutions* has been a focus of continuous conflict throughout human history. Academics, civil society, governments across the world are pursuing political sustainability, in an effort to improve political satisfaction and avoid discontentment and political disorder. Have these efforts led to a durable political order? As our political systems continue on their collision course where institutions are disobeyed by their own people, this study asks whether we have the scientific capacity to avoid large-scale war. Can liberal democracy, respond in time to globalization challenges that require dramatic changes in the way we approach the human natural being? Can a new form of government save us from ourselves and the false promises of ideological greatness? During the human history a social contract between institution and people have given political control to ideologies in exchange for the promise of ideological greatness. In a new political scenario imposed by globalization, the terms of contract still not be met without generating political conflicts. We will need a new guiding vision, a new social contract of sustainability trusteeship. The study makes a case that we must adopt new standards of analysis for institution informed by a sustainability worldview and predicated on our best scientific understanding of human coexistence. The figure below (1) illustrates the revolutionary behavior of people against institutions:



Figure 1: Disobedience against institutions

If on one side “institutions are rules or norms that shape and constrain human behavior – as its basic element” Bertelli (2012), “constraints include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities”, North, Douglass (1990), on the other side, according to Zürn (2018), “institutional legitimacy is the *impartial* exercise of authority”. So, which kind of institutions have a stronger/weaker legitimacy on avoid revolutionary behavior? And how have scholars approached this issue?

According to Bertelli (2012), ‘institutions do not define behavior in an absolute sense but rather shape that behavior by creating incentives. People and organizations need not respond to them’

Bertelli (2012). Yet, political institutions are also constantly under change, which makes it more difficult to predict their effect on behavioral outcomes. In order to make sense of how they perform, we need a *framework* to understand decisions, outcomes, causes and the like. The *problem* in the field of political institutions analysis is not that we lack theories; the challenge is *ordering, synthesizing*, and making sense of multiple theoretical and empirical perspectives.

Theorists from Montesquieu to Fukuyama have long emphasized the importance of separation of power as vital to the livelihood of institutions. There is nothing particularly novel about claims for the virtuous of separation of power and their capacity to perform many functions of states promise on protection of the interest of all citizens. ‘Popular pluralist theories in the 1960s emphasized the role of interest groups at aggregating and articulating public demands, providing multiple alternative channels of political participation for linking citizens and the State’ Jeffrey (1984). From a *pragmatic* perspective, international and national relations are imbued with institution without any legitimacy to ensure the balance of satisfying the interests of all citizens; according to The Economist (2018), just around 4.5% of the world population live in “full democracies” and 35.6% continue to live in authoritarian regimes in continuous protest for a balanced political recognition. However, a look at the history of humanity shows a *path dependence* on political regime adoption, evolving from centralized, hierarchical structure to decentralized, open and horizontal structure, travelling along roughly the same hierarchical railway as a **historical train** moved by the interaction of two powerful forces: An **invariant law** – *people’s power* that involuntarily *search for recognition*, that shapes a **variant law** – ‘*Political Opportunity Structures – (POS)*’ Kitschelt, (1986), which are being adjusted to high levels of check and balance. This anti-oligarchic trend has evolved the legitimacy of institutions, introducing more balance to political participation, offering quality and choice to citizens, as opposed to the operational role of the centered power regime. ‘The main **goal of power** is to compel obedience, and experience demonstrates that if such obedience is not widespread, then power is ineffective’ Moreira (2012). Impliedly, when people have the power to disobey institutional authority, the political environment is not sustainable, or the ideology is not compatible to the demands of the people, in short, the institution is not **legitimate**. Heywood, (1992, p6) defines ‘ideology as an officially sanctioned set of ideas used to legitimize a political regime’.

Political regime can be defined as a ‘solution that a community adopts for its political life’ Moreira (2012), meaning solution translated into adopted rule that influence **political behavior**, which is the way or how people act with regards to the adopted regime. Therefore, the adopted regime is the setup between institutions and people who have *cooperative behavior* when they are satisfied with the regime and *revolutionary behavior* when they are not satisfied. In this context, institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, they are the ‘restrictions granted to human beings that shape and constrain human behavior, with his role of reducing uncertainties by stabilizing the interaction between men’ NORTH (1990), in other words, institution is nothing more than a mechanism for *choosing* and *authorizing* governments. Then, the main goal of institutions would be *shape and constrain human behavior*, to ensure predictable behavior and reduce the uncertainty about the proportion of relative political participation.

So, if institutions are established and based on the exclusion of majority or minorities it produces *permanent losers* who feel relative deprivation that compels to struggle for recognition through a historical institutional process on pursuit of balanced political participation. Therefore, the **adopted regime** can become a “**problem of power**” at one

institution and not at another. It means that each institution has its own structures, and the **problem of power** is explained by those structure that can create or not permanent losers with enough power to disobey the established authorities. Institutions, once consolidated, tend to have channels that materialize **balanced participation**, weakening the possibility for creation and consolidation of permanent losers willing to put the State in check as a general instance of representation and social regulation.

Based on the foregoing, this study aims to a develop a Political Sustainability Index (PSI) to measure institutional legitimacy. It focuses on the shifts at institutional design through separation of power indicators; considers what impact these designs have had on the responsiveness on political demand; comprehensively reviews the evidence on the effects of structure of shape and constrain human behavior in a country and discusses the implications for political sustainability. ‘A model such as this is a conceptual map, a diagram of forces, and a heuristic device. From and within it we can develop more detailed sets of typologies and more specific theories which will classify and explain specific patterns and trends, both within individual countries and across groups of countries. Therefore, the model is a way of learning. It will also serve as a guide to structure political institutions as a power manual. All scientific work aims at producing tools to MEASURE natural phenomena that can be predicted to avoid exposure to the superpowers of Mother Nature or diseases that we cannot defend ourselves from naturally. For example, MEDICINE has developed tools to know what measures need to be taken to keep the human body alive, just as political science would like to develop tools to know what measures need to be taken to avoid political conflicts. This study seeks to discover the MEASURES that need to be taken in order to achieve a durable political order that results in sustainable peace - HAPPINESCITY.

1.2. *Research aims and objectives*

The main purpose of this study is a formulation of a Political Sustainability Index (PSI) to understand why the people rebel against the institutions that in principle they themselves legitimized, or why institutions fail on shape and constrain human behavior . ‘The legitimacy of public institutions relates to a key interactive dimension between the state and civil society’ Pierre, (1993, pp. 387–401). To achieve this goal, the study seeks to:

1. Examine the types and legitimacy of institutional structures that exist.
2. Identify the conditions that favor the legitimation and sustainability of institutions through the establishment of a conceptual analytical framework.
3. Explore a measuring tool for political sustainability.

1.3. *Research Questions*

The primary research question is: How can *institutions* be structured to avoid disobedience from *people* and to make them legitimate?

Secondary research questions are:

1. What types of institutional structure do exist, and which is more legitimate?
2. What conceptual framework can be developed for understanding institutional structure?
3. How can we best measure institutional legitimacy to verify political sustainability?

1.4. Hypothesis

Institutions based on *ideologic laws*¹ are more likely to experiment revolutionary behavior than ecological/ neutral one.

1.5. Justification and contribution (significance) of study

PSI provides assessments of factual levels of political sustainability for a cross section of countries. PSI is a composite index, using the assessments data of the adopted rules. A range of *prototype rules* give consensus on the level of *institutional legitimacy* and provides confidence that the facts compared are informative on actual levels of sustainability. The goal of PSI is to provide data on extensive facts of political sustainability within institutions or countries. This is a means of enhancing the understanding of factual levels of political sustainability and how these differ from one adopted institution or country to another. Measuring political sustainability serves specifically the following three functions: (1) contextual description, monitoring, and documentation of levels of institutional legitimacy; (2) classification of different types of political regime on political behavior; (3) mapping and pattern effectiveness of institutions over space and time; contextual description provides the raw information upon which, measures of political sustainability are based. Finally, mapping provides time-series and spatial information on the broad patterns of institutional legitimacy on ensuring the balanced political participation within and across different countries. **These are the contributions this study makes which underscore its significance.**

The report of the historical incursion of the contextual/ country is important for the adopted regime to be understood by the conceptual incursion. Thus, to the author, we need more the way to know each other, especially when our current lifestyle is so uncomfortable. However, the scientific evidence is irrefutable: the man's exploration of nature is unsustainable. We live obsessed by the economic growth, but it is not possible to the economies from all countries to continue growing indefinitely. It is fundamental that science and technology become even more consensual. We need rigorous observations and measurements of everything that goes on everywhere on the planet to be alert and to know where to act. Above all, we need new political regime to live in harmony with us and the Earth. It allows the accountability of the State and not the abuser of power who will always be willing to abuse if there is opportunity.

1.6. Structure of the dissertation

To understand how political regimes structure the political behavior and compromises political sustainability, this study is organized around chapters as follows:

- Chapter 1: Introduction and background.
- Chapter 2: Reviews and summarizes the central concept of political sustainability index.
- Chapter 3: Conceptual and theoretical framework: Presents a new model of measuring.
- Chapter 4: Outlines the Assessment methods for measurement of PSI.
- Chapter 5: The PSI is tested through a comparative analysis of the two case studies.
- Chapter 6: Discusses and concludes the study and makes recommendations.

¹ Thompson 'conceptualizes ideology as the "meaning at the service of domination' Thompson, (1990)., that produces permanent losers and revolutionary behaviors on 'struggle for recognition' Hegel's ' (1977).

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Literature review on political sustainability index

Political Science was inspired by a set of theoretical or normative political index, but the emerging of the concept of “sustainability” changed the way of seeing and dealing with us and the world where we live. Since the Brundtland Report defined the concept of sustainability in 1987, several different indexes and indicators to assess sustainability have been developed Saisana, & Philippas (2012). In terms of the framework of classification on *political sustainability*, from classic authors such as Montesquieu (1823) ‘Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Republic’, Auguste Comte (2012) ‘Theological, Metaphysical’, and Positive States’, and Karl Marx (2008) ‘Slavery, Feudalism, Capitalism, and Communism’, to more recently Francis Fukuyama (1994) ‘Socialism and liberal democracy’, Democracy index (2018) ‘political participation and Robert Dahl (1971) ‘Polyarchy: public contestation and inclusiveness’, all exhibit *conceptual* frameworks of political regimes from starting point to desirable endpoint within which it is possible to discuss ‘legitimacy’ of institutions, that seems to be “Democracy” that has been indicators “government of the people, by the people, for the people” Fox (2008) that even if accomplished do not cease the revolutionary behavior because the demands of the polite animal were not met, in short, they are not sustainable. Nevertheless, “*constitutionalism* and *democracy* can appear to oppose each other. For example, whereas the first term refers to ‘restrained and divided’ power, the second implies its ultimately ‘unified and unconstrained’ exercise’ Wolin (1989, p. 8). Another weakness of Democracy is that “We must note a tone that rules the majority is often alleged to be the very essence of democracy” LIJPHART, (2008), which guarantees a dictatorship of this majority against the minority that will always rebel against the institutions. What is wrong with democratic regimes is that the full variant can’t provide political sustainability!

Above we present *what the literature says* about democracy and then highlighting its weaknesses or gaps which require further research to fill political sustainability. The gaps in literature which then justifies the necessity of this research on present an new analytical framework that explain how can *institutions* be structured to avoid disobedience from *people*. This study therefore attempts to take the discourse further by introducing an *ecologic* dimension as the sustainable endpoint of institutional legitimacy, emphasizing that democracy, in any of its ideal version, is concerned with the maintenance and extension of *political ideology - domination* versus *preservation* of the entire biosphere, by removing decision making from political personal influence or partial domination. The advantage of impersonal decision is the flexibility and frequent alternation between losers and winners to avoid consolidation of dissatisfied groups with capacity to subvert the established order. The aim is to understand how to avoid irrationalities built into decision-making processes.

Kitschelt (1986) argued that ‘political opportunity structures function as “filters” between the mobilization of the movement and its choice of strategies and its capacity to change the social environment’. The crucial dimensions of these political opportunity structures are the openness or closedness of regime to inputs from non-established actors and the strength or weakness of their capacities to deliver the effective implementation of policies once they are decided. “The rule must represent a settlement of issues and interests that is recognizable for citizens as reflecting their histories, values, aspirations and compromises, and what they have learned about themselves. When a people ideology is assumed by POS, an *individuality* is also assumed relative to another, which can be subordinated or balanced. As long as collective think that they can achieve self-determination on the basis of people ideology, they will strive to create an ideologically pure population in the region or regions they covet.

The people struggle for power would lessen if the Institutional structure balance ideology interests; that is, if they became sustainable and disperse dominance, eliminating the source of ideology power struggles. However, the achievement of such political sustainability implies the success of Institutional Structure. The pursuit of these structure entails the end of all kinds of ideology struggles. The infliction of such harm brings about conflicts between *people* who are excluded, and *institution* captured by the powerful people ideology. Because of natural human characteristic of struggle for recognition, these conflicts follow a trajectory that starts from the destruction of less inclusive people ideology until the balance of the political participation of all ideology, that is, the complete elimination of the *institutionalization of ideologies*. Therefore, we can have a complete view of **history** in this trajectory of construction and destruction of successive people ideologies in search of sustainability. “The greater the degree of separation of power, the more elaborate the "checks and balances" - , the greater the degree of formal access” Zitier (1991). It is in this light that is proposed that the institutional structure should be characterized by a balanced political participation or a structure with highest level of separation of power rather than accommodation of one People ideology to detriment of the other. That means that people can and should build their ideologies, but they must not institutionalize under the risk of clashing with others.

‘Often governments, *dominated* by a particular ideology group, are involved: sometimes instigating attacks against other groups, and sometimes under attack themselves’ Stewart (2008), until an agreement is reached that accommodates the disaffected ones. But ‘when the government regain strength, nothing will stop it from overturning the agreement’ Håvard (2004, pp. 243--252), unless this agreement leaves no room for maneuver for the abuse of power.

2.2 *The role of science in politics*

The new end point: Brought by relation between ideology versus science to attain sustainability.

Can Political Science

Politics?

Science can be considered as ‘development of reliable explanations of phenomenon through repeatable experiments, observation and deduction’ Heywood, (2015). In the case of politics, science could be considered as an endeavor that could enlighten decisions on how to structure institutions in order to *preserve* diverse interests to produce impersonal losers, institutional legitimacy and cooperative behaviors. Nowadays, science has been seen as the great ally of capitalism and the devastation of the ecosystem. However, while it is not science that could be called into question: it is its technological propositions as the construction of weapons of mass destruction for example, that express unilateral position and guide to uncertainty in life condition.

Science as a method is the best guarantee of a sustainable life for human species, for its ability to access the ecologic dimension – (essential reality – patterns, probabilities, and likely outcomes) that is beyond the dogma – (constructed reality, beliefs, fiction); When Thompson (1990), conceptualizes *ideology as the “meaning at the service of domination*, argues that:

‘Ideological phenomena are meaningful symbolic phenomenon in so far as they serve, in particular social-historical circumstances, to establish and sustain relations of domination’.

But to be ideologically neutral, it is necessary to be aware of the ideological elements that are intended to be neutralized – “domination”. If domination is the main characteristic of the *State of Nature*, institutions appear with the role of ‘constrain human behavior reducing uncertainties by stabilizing the interaction between men’ NORTH (1990), then, is a reliable measure of the impartiality on political interaction. ‘If the winners and losers are known beforehand, institutions appear biased’ Mozaffar, (2002). The “discriminating factor” between “efficient” (impartial) and “redistributive” (biased) institutions lies in “the uncertainty of the outcomes they produce” Tsebelis, (1990). The close association between procedural legitimacy and substantive uncertainty poses the paradoxical challenge for “institutionalizing uncertainty” Przeworski (1988).

Reality	Shaping and constraint human interaction	
	Ideological Institutions	Ecological Institutions
Source of information	Scientific underpinning: Not Provided	Scientific underpinning of preservation of all beings: Provided
Regime (Decision)	(Decision) Decision informed by the intentions of the will of the Minority or Majority - Defense of the interests of some	Decision informed by the intentions of Nature - Preservation of the interests of all
Behavior (Reaction)	Revolutionary behavior	Cooperative behavior
Result	Political unsustainability	Political sustainability

Table 1: Distinction between ideological and ecological institutional elements

The assumption is that public life cannot be treated as a championship that generates clubs, losers and winners. The results of scientific studies impersonalize and toggles winners and losers to guarantee lack of reason to organize power against institutions. If ‘organization is efforts to change or maintain the status quo in society’ Bertelli (2012), so the main objective of the ecocratic regime is to avoid structuring organizations outside the institutions through alternating losers or the uncertainty of the outcomes promulgated by the institutions.

Current social science focus on the expression of people dominance, ‘our approach to the social world overall is too people-centric; we are part of the universe, but we are not at the center of the universe’ Epstein, (2015), while this approach focus on the expression of ecologic dominium as the center of the universe. Ecocracy aims at eliminating the domination on political activity. The State merely awards its contracts to professionals regulated by scientific protocols, so that they cannot generalize their influence and not to political groups or parties that have the greatest potential to capture it. Political parties for example do not have professionalization of the various areas of interest. Therefore, institutions are sustainable when it contains channels for the manifestation of the interests of diverse groups to avoid disobedience to established order.

Thus, science *describes and explains* the presence of actors and their respective powers to *predict* the consequences of not being accountable with the powerful actor. Be accountable with the powerful actor – “ecology/ natural need for recognition, guide us to **avoid revolutionary behavior** through the densification of separation of power in order to enable ‘high frequency of give-and-take power between authorities and people’.

2.3 Ecocracy – The endpoint

The term ecocracy (eco "ecologic", arkhe "rule") where here used by the author to describe a State ruled by ecologic principles of men nature – “be recognized”; and science is the mechanism with ability to deliver results with impartial interests of diverse groups demands. The *balance of political participation to preserve the diversity* interest of all political beings is here considered ecological. At the end, it is to end any kind of ideology by which one can impose interests of one against the other in an unbalanced way. Summarizing, the role of science in politics is to develop theories that help the ‘*description, explanation and prediction*’ Frederickson, (2016) of political phenomena to inform decision-makers on how the *institutions* organize them to avoid disobedience from *people*. The satisfaction of natural demands such as the human need for recognition is the very essence of ecocracy. Ecocratic theory shares the view that common citizens don’t carry elementary rational capacities that are sufficient to judge the conduct of government in order to produce sustainable outcomes. For such judgments to have meaning, ecocratic citizens are expected to be guided by technical experts as it is in medicine. A technical expert does not take ideological decisions, they follow instructions given by scientific finds that prove the factors necessary to sustain the ecosystem– (ecology is considered the supreme power). ‘The central idea of the ecological standards approach is to restrain or set limits to all activities that may harm nature, or impair health or the environment’ TJALLINGII (1996, p 43), so, the assumption is that political sustainability occurs when the nature of human being is preserved. This means, the State is no longer seen from the angle of its assertion of coercive force and production of "domination devices" FOUCAULT, (2004). Controlled by a minority or majority, but rather, as a legitimate actor in the management of Man's natural demand, which is the recognition obtained through political participation.

2.4 Ecocratization – Why do ideological regime Ecocratize?

Ecocratization is the process through which ecocracy is implemented. It results from the social struggle between ecological and ideological power, which takes shape in face of different levels of separation of power, **slowly evolving** as a historical train towards a measurable and finite trajectory where political interest are **balanced** and **preserved**, it’s an endpoint with enough ideological neutrality to avoid the creation of permanent losers with the capacity to organize and disobey formally established institutions.

2.5 Classification of political regimes

‘The primary propose of theory is to assemble facts into a comprehensive explanatory picture and to use this comprehension to inform policymaking and guide public policy implementation’ Frederickson, (2016). Medical science, for example, seeks to understand the natural functioning of the human body, as is the possibility of identifying levels of diseases and respective antidotes to save lives. Based on observable regularities facts of institutionalization of the winners' desire, the study suggests that the type of a regime can be distinguished into standard stages of ‘cloud winner’², and that at each stage the challenge of sustainability is somewhat differentiated by levels of separation of power which classify regimes in six stages presented in table 2. Starting from a programmatic vision of society where by “the ultimate goals of all human being is to be recognized or participate politically, was used 5,56% point scoring system for the 18 indicators. Indicators on scale from 0% to 100%, weighted on a scale from 0 to 6 points/regimes.

² ‘Cloud of winners are stages community solution or agreement adopted for stabilizing the interaction between men. The clouds of winners treated here as political regimes were defined based on the historical past and projection of the political transition.

Institution	Regime type	Access power	Dominants Actors	Deliberative source of decision	Punctuation
Ideological	Authoritarian	Violence	Leader as individuals	Individual	16,6%
	Hybrid		Consensus parties	Consensual	33,3%
	Flawed Dem.	Election	Corporations in competition	Popular illiberal	50,0%
	Full Dem.		National citizens	Popular liberal	66,6%
	Flawed Eco.	Selection	Citizens of international political deal	Scientific with territorial restriction	83,3%
Ecological	Full Eco.		Global citizen/ Human being	Scientific / Global	100%

Table 2: Institutional performance on ensuring the institutional legitimacy.

If politics is a set of activities that are associated to make decisions about division of limited resource in order to avoid disobedience, so this limited resource, that is, static, obliges to have limited variables of division, which means that we can divide in evenly or unbalanced way. Private entities structure organizations, aiming at maximizing their gains in that division. The parameters for the establishment of political regimes followed the combination of criteria of the four theories presented above: separation of power, relative deprivation, struggle for recognition and historical institutionalism:

1. The hierarchical separation of powers into only three possible forms – minority, majority and ecological, then subdivided into six parts to better specify the ideology;
2. Relative deprivation explains the origin of the driving force of history;
3. The struggle for recognition explains the need to overcome hardships;
4. Historical institutionalism explains the path dependence of the ideological regime to the ecological or neutral - 'end of history.

It is important to note however that the balance of political participation among all citizens is a criterion to assess the level of political sustainability.

The transition from one regime to another can take place in two ways: by reform or by revolution. We differentiate political reform from political revolution:

- Political reform – (covenant) is a deliberate change in the arrangements for the structural design of political participation. ‘Reform implies some planning component based on technical skills, inevitably involves an element of 'top-down' imposition by senior actors in the political process’ Boyne, (2003), in which institutions deliberately introduce liberalizing amendments that ultimately lead to ecocracy; while
- Political revolution – (broken) is the ‘collapse of the political order and its replacement by a new one’ Arjomand (1986. p. 383). A violent revolt to overthrow an established order.

Both alter the political organization of power, the separation of power between citizens and authorities becomes more homogeneous. A distinction between revolution and reform could help us clarify the merits of science in politics. As in medicine, it is clear that the cure for a pathology does not come from the patient, but from the technical skill brought about through science.

The six (6) political regimes: ‘Who and how rules the institutions’ Lasswell (1936).

Note: There are three regime types each with 2 variants or sub-types making 6 variants of regimes differentiated by levels of separation of power or winners' desire.

AUTOCRATIC REGIME is a political law in which a minority of a population have political control of power over the majority. Through subjective decisions, the system creates certainty of outcomes. Here “opposites” are considered as “enemies”. In reaction to these types of institutions, political behavior is violent with recourse to the establishment of clandestine and military organizations.

1. **AUTHORITARIAN** – Are *personalistic institutions*, only single-party or group can take power over the State role. Government is free from undue influence by the legislative or judicial power and the local authority decision-making is completely restricted by the central authority. There is an oligarchizing of the institution based on the pretext that a strong leadership is needed to punish the usurpers and protect all.
2. **HYBRID** – Party_crac³ institutions in which more than one party can assume power for the administration of the state; the legislative and judicial branches are relatively independent from the executive branch; local authorities are relatively free, depending on the budget of the central authority. The pretext is that the winning party represents the interests of all citizens – (Cosmetic democracy).

DEMOCRATIC REGIME: We must note a tone that rules the majority is often alleged to be the very essence of democracy Lijphart, (2008). Majority rule is a political principle providing that a majority usually constituted by fifty percent plus one of an organized group will have the power to make decisions binding upon the minority. Why should the law be the expression of the majority? Perhaps because the majority is less disobeyed? However, the minority, still able to subvert the established order, so with democracy, the problem of disobedience and subversion of established institution remains to be solved. In reaction to these types of institutions, political behavior is violent with recourse to the establishment of formal organizations.

3. **FLAWED DEMOCRACIES** – These are corporo_crac⁴ institutions in which the Electoral process and Legislative power are subject to lobbying by private/economic interests. The judicial power is independent from the executive power; Local authorities have financial or disproportionate autonomy to the central authority. The justification is that corporations pay taxes and generate jobs for everyone. Commodification of political activity.
5. **FULL DEMOCRACIES** – They are nationalist institutions in which governments are elected under the prohibition of anti-competitive private influence. Majority groups assume the administration of a welfare state; Legislative power is relatively superior to executive and judicial power; the local authority has proportional powers to the central authority with the exception of international relations. The justification is that the majority represents everyone's interests - populism - popularization of political activity. In these cases, most are being less tyrannical in the sense of not belonging to any particular group.

³ Party_crac are institutions governed by groups without democratic appointment by the people; a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the consensus of limited groups and exercised directly by them under a oppressor system.

⁴ Corporo_crac are institutions governed by influence of private sector.

ECOCRATIC REGIME – It is an institutional design where laws are conceived on the basis of *scientific evidence*⁵ of the most sustainable alternative. It is important to note that the preservation of natural human demand - recognition is the very essence of ecocracy. “Adversaries” become “colleagues” by profession”. Ecocratic theory shares the view that common citizens don’t carry elementary rational capacities that are sufficient to judge the conduct of government. For such judgments to have meaning, ecocratic citizens are expected to be guided by technical expert as it is in medicine. A technical expert **does not take ideological decisions**, they follow instructions given by scientific finds. In reaction to these types of institutions, political behavior is cooperative with recourse to the establishment of formal organizations.

6. **FLAWED ECOCRACIES** – Are semi-Ecologic States, where in which decisions are made based on scientific evidence of preservation of all beings in territories⁶ in agreement. Decision-makers are selected based on territorial citizenship and expertise of a given professional area; the local authority has power to decide on artistic and cultural preservation. The pretext is that peoples with consensual civic values do not demand border barriers;
7. **FULL ECOCRACIES** – Ecological institutions in which decisions are made based on scientific evidence of preservation of all beings from everywhere - "universalization of ecological institutions as the final form of human government". Decision makers are selected based on specialist in a given professional area; the local authority has a duty to share the artistic and cultural legacy; The pretext is that nature has the imperative/supreme power that governs life – naturalism, professionalization of political activity.

Figure 6 shows the human nature (doesn't fit in as a permanent loser) as the engine that drive political transitions, and that the higher the level of separation of powers, the lower the informal organization of power to overthrow established institutions.




Figure 2: Constitutional Transitions to Ecocracy: Paths and Legacies.

Ecocracy has the highest form of Political Sustainability by dissuades struggle for recognition, for the ability to avoid structuring the ideology through empathy of permanent losers or winner.

⁵ Scientific evidence refer to science with evidence of sustainability; Scientific councils will be used to ensure impartial research findings. The structure of the Scientific councils must obey a separation of power rule.

⁶ “Part of the problem is that voters are often selfishly concerned with their narrow material interest, and ignore the interests of future generations and people living outside national boundaries who are affected by the policies of the government.” Bell (2015).

Axioms (cases) of the six political regimes

1. AUTHORITY – These are countries like France in the era of Louis XIV, North Korea of Kim Jong-un, where governance is personal, and power is centralized in a single person or group.
2. HYBRID – These are countries like Mozambique, established by consensual arrangement between political parties or groups that share power through legal agreements limited to them.
3. FLAWED DEMOCRACY - These are countries like Brazil or United States of America, where constitutions are established in favor of the market interest and corporations have legal permission to influence the decision-making process.
4. FULL DEMOCRACY – In countries like Sweden, where decisions results from the will of the majority, institutions are structurally established for social assistance, that is, they guarantee balanced access to basic public services such as education, health, transport, etc.
5. FLAWED ECOCRACY – They are semi-ecological states united for the defense of natural rights, as would be a politically consolidated OECD, AU or EU, which unlike empires, the citizens of the targeted territories share the same political, economic and social opportunities, through of scientific deliberations.
6. FULL ECOCRACIES – Global institution like the United Nations, politically consolidated, with the authority to impose “Natural Rights” in all territories of the Planet. So we would be facing a Global citizen.

If we look at the shape and constrain human behavior structure adopted by the United Nations, specifically by the security council, we can see that humanity has adopted a hybrid regime, where a minority of Nations, through private consensus, makes decisions about the governance of the planet without the participation of all. The framework assumes a hierarchy of decision-makers and the table 2 helps us to understand the levels on which ideology is being neutralized by a more rational approach. If ‘the underline utility of any theory is its capacity to *describe, explain, and predict*’ Frederickson, (2016), then, we can assume that the level of separation of power assemble facts into a comprehensive explanatory picture whereby regime stages can be compared and ordered sequentially as predictable trace on pursuit of sustainable institution. It provides political reaction to each regime approach, so that, decision on institutional structure, can be taken based on ecological information that addresses the problem of political disobedience.

Observation 1: transition process: The main difference between regimes is the level of separation of power. The gap in the political market perceived by political entrepreneur consist in increase the number of political participation/power to supplant the adopted paradigms. For example: corporations create more solutions than parties by generating mass jobs and taxes, defending a greater number of people interest than party. The approach that covers the largest number of people is that they have more power to stay sustainable, adopted through path dependence. The political entrepreneur sells for the lowest price the same product as the regime in power, and that product is political participation.

Observation 2: the prove of sustainability: The necessity of prove sustainability elements before the decision process, removes the man from the position of *master* to the *nature*. Explanations through repeatable experiments, observation, and deduction of how to preserve nature constringe the domination agenda. Exclusions and limitation are intrinsic to any rule-governed activity, but they become a problem/partial when the losers are permanent. The specialists are unequivocally better prepared than others to govern by subject, who through scientific prove can be trusted with complete and decisive authority in the government of the state.

CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Causal statement: political regime and political behavior

Institutions structure the political action of social actors - not institutions in the sense of organizations, but rules and conventions that constitute patterns of behavior. Therefore, the importance of “institutions” is granted to explain the human actions in relation with power. Revolutionary behavior becomes cooperative when the rule is decentralized so that people can find channels to observe their interests. ‘Institutions do not define behavior in an absolute sense but rather shape that behavior by creating incentives; people and organizations need not respond to them’ Bertelli, (2012). The dialectic between “**ideologic** institutions and human **natural** need for recognition” is the *engine of history*. And the **end of history** is the **endpoint** of mankind’s ideological evolution, the globalization of advanced level of institutional “separation of power”. This makes **Ecocracy** the final form of human government. A position clearly opposed to the perspective that defends the 'unpredictability' of the human action as the *engine of History* considered by this study as units of the historical analysis. ‘In particular, it led many historical institutionalists to look more closely at the State, seen no longer, as a neutral broker among competing interests but as a complex of institutions capable of structuring the character and outcomes of group conflict’ Hall, (1996). For two groups to end a war, they need to agree to respect a mutual interest by drawing a new social contract that ensure *coexistence of interests*. This ‘one size fits all’ solution theory helps to define the **political problem** here “hypothesized” as “lack of balanced political participation”, as a ‘universal value’ that all Humans expect to achieve.

3.2 Theoretical and conceptual ordering, synthesizing

To examine the implications of legitimacy of institutions for political sustainability, four theories were **ordered** and **synthesized**. The four theories fit very neatly into this analytic Framework. When we combine them, we can analyze the legitimacy of the institutions on exercise authority impartially. The conceptual framework articulates the internal logic of possible structure that compose the possibilities of regime and the process by which societies make the transition from one regime to another.

The four theories utilized for the study are:

1. Separation of power: the level explains relative deprivation
2. Relative deprivation: explains struggle for recognition
3. Struggle for recognition: explains historic institutionalism and
4. Historic institutionalism: explains the path from the ideological to ecological regime – ‘end of history’.

1. Separation of power - Who restricts political participation?

‘Separation of Power’ in political theory has often centered on ‘check and balance’, most famously used in the English governments as a model, sees the separation of power as a guarantor of political liberty Montesquieu’s *The Spirit of Laws* (1750), is considered by many people a landmark contribution to political theory. Montesquieu devotes the first few chapters of the treatise to the distinction between the law and the spirit of the law. He then considers the principles behind each form of government and the law as it relates to those principles. Next, he examines the relationship between laws and political liberty and then considers the impact

of climate and terrain on the laws of a certain nation and the nation's general spirit and manners. Thereafter, he relates laws to economic and religious systems. And finally, he launches into a historical examination of laws in different contexts, based on the hypothesis that 'to prevent abuse of power, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power'.

Ordering theory: The *abuse of power* generate the relative deprivation.

2. Relative deprivation - When does political participation evolve?

According to Gurr's (1968) theory of **relative deprivation** it is "a causal model of civil strife": which refers to individuals' perceptions of the discrepancy between the standard of living that they *believe deserving* and the standard of living they are *actually capable of achieving*.

Ordering theory: The *discrepancy of recognition* generate struggles.

3. Struggle for Recognition - Who struggles for political participation?

Struggle for Recognition, most famously exemplified in 'life-and-death struggle' that leads to the relation of master and slave in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (published in 1807). By 'struggle for recognition here is meant the struggle of dominated group against the dominant group. Recognition can be achieved through self-assertion, self-negation and re-definition of oneself group in relation to another group. This is because recognition is an intersubjective state and as such can be reached only through a mutual 'give-and-take'.

Ordering theory: The *domination of one group over another* generate the path dependence on establishing institutions.

4. Historical institutionalism - How does political participation evolve?

There is considerable agreement among institutionalists in that 'they all see institutions as rules that structure behavior' Fioretos, (2011). In other words, 'historical institutionalism pays attention to temporality as crucial for analytical reasons, since later events are conditioned by earlier ones (not simply the constellation of interests and constraints at the moment), but also in substantive terms because it redefines the disciplinary object form one directed at the study of stationary outcomes to one focused on explaining diverse and dynamic process of institutional development' Pierson, (2004). This means that the 'history of institutions is always important' Bertelli. (2012). Its process traces the historical roots of institutions on separation of power configuration and its changes. According to Vilar. (1985), 'the object of study of history *is the dialectic of human societies*'.

Ordering theory: The *later events* generate a new level of separation of power.

My theory of institutional legitimacy is constructed from these four theories combined. The ordering and making sense of multiple theoretical and empirical perspectives helps us to identify and examine the levels of institutional legitimacy and classify the conditions that favor the political sustainability.

The figure 3 ordered and synthetizing the four theories:




Figure 3: A model of institutional analyze - POLITICAL SUSTAINMETER.

3.3 Why does rule or constitution exist?

If a State is to function effectively, its citizens need to agree on the rules of the game. If it functions ineffectively, there are spaces for rule adaptation to satisfy those who are struggling for recognition until a sustainable form of government is adopted. The rules in a constitution specify the bodies, which make decisions, that is to say, people through their institutions. They also specify how these bodies are formed and how functions are distributed among them. These basic rules of the game create the conditions that give legitimacy to the decisions taken and create consequences of those decisions. The state being an instrument of social relationship, It is the way in which the citizen seeks to achieve his or her fundamental political objectives through balanced political recognition so that each one can materialize his or her objective without limitation of other and vice-versa. For example, in the face of the need to travel in a city, the driver will always choose the access road with less traffic and in view of the restrictions of this same road, he will compare the flow from that of the other roads by making two possible decisions: Avoid the city with more traffic, which in politics correspond to immigrating to other cities or rebel against the institutions, which corresponds to disobedience.

In short, in a situation of political deprivation, the intention of the human being will be to subvert the established order. This dialectic leads institutions from a starting point (an alpha) to some desired place or state of affairs in the future (an omega). The three basic elements— an initial state, a trajectory, and a future state—make up a scenario” Politt, (2017). The theoretical framework helps to understand the mechanisms behind the meter - “sustainmeter”. It is a general model of how and why institutional reform takes place and which condition is more sustainable. It simply models the forces, sequence and influences affecting reformers.




Figure 4: Example of structures of shape and constrain human behavior from traffic.

3.4 Political ideology and the revolutionary organization

‘People see themselves in many different ways; they have many identities. Some are fluid, short-lived and insignificant (for example, being a member of an evening class), while others are more permanent and more significant personally and socially (for example, gender, ethnicity and religion)’ Stewart (2008). Stewart reinforces that the importance people attribute to different aspects of their ideology also varies according to the context and over time. Clearly, where violent conflicts are mobilized and organized by ideology, such identities must be sufficiently important to enough people to make them prepared to fight, kill and even die in the name of that ideology. For this to happen, the group boundaries must be relatively clearly defined and have some continuity over time, so the definition of the term *people ideology* captures the comparative variables structured by empathy of permanent losers or winners. Ideology may be divided into regimes in many ways – according to subsistence partner, political party, way of production, social consensus, geography and logic. Yet only those divisions that have or may acquire strong social significance – that is, such meaning for their members and for others in society that they influence behavior and well-being in a significant way – are likely to form the basis of ideology conflicts, Stewart (2008). Ideology arise partly from individuals *own* perceptions of membership of and ideology with a particular group – that is, the self-perceptions or beliefs of those in the group – but they are also determined by the perceptions of *those outside the group* about others.

These ideologies, structure their claims by forming *organizations* that are ‘groups in which like-minded people aspire to a certain target that materializes through institutions; Organizations and their entrepreneurs engage in purposive activity and in that role are the agents of, and shape the direction of, institutional change,’ NORTH, Douglass C. (1990.). The structuring of revolutionary organizations is done on the basis of bringing together the interests of political losers. Revolutionary behavior is as old as history became an issue alongside the growing concern about sustainable form of political institution. In face of the possibility of unbalance resource accumulation – “weak institutions”, group interests have been dominating the establishment of political regimes that maximize their gains over other groups that rebel in resistance against this exclusion, making clear the need of a **legitimate power model** to control and limit the access to the “commons good”.

“Any discussion of Rousseau (1712–78) in connection with the notions of ‘human dignity’ and ‘human rights’ runs up against two problems. **First** of all, Rousseau rejects the idea that man would have an **exalted place in nature** – in fact, even primitive man is in a way disadvantaged as compared to other animals. The **second** problem is that Rousseau rejects the traditional notion of ‘natural right’ as an ideological ploy to protect the rich against the poor” Verbeek, (2014). The purpose here is simply to identify those restrictions imposed by institutions to protect interests of one in detriment of other group. Having identified these features, we are in a position also to recognize their level of separation of power. On the basis of this definition, that People ideology does matter at explaining comparison of political sustainability by the level of institutional relative interests accommodation. To evaluate whether and how People ideology matters in the way to compare states phenomena, we need indicators that identifies the properties of ideology identities. It would be an added advantage if this indicator also captured the way in which People ideology is institutionally engineered among other communities.

3.5 Political Sustainability

The concept of "sustainability" has become increasingly important for all fields of research and work in response to the demands of a kind of ecological dictatorship that imposes ideological choice, demanding that all sectors review its character, considering this principle because of its ability to differentiate the pathological condition from the healthy, that is, ecological.

If in the recent past the model concepts for science were “genomes in the 2000s, nanotechnology/2010 and artificial intelligence/ 2020, today, with the realization of COP26, the concept of sustainability takes on full prominence. Therefore, according to the United Nations/ Brundtland Report, (1987), Sustainability is “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” On the other hand, David Easton (1965) understands politics as the “authoritarian/imperative allocation of values in a society”, therefore, based on the two concepts, **Political sustainability** would be the situation in which the allocated imperative values “meet the interests of some without compromising the interests of others”, so that there are no conditions of discontent and organization to disobey the authorities, that is, removal of domination in political interaction. It implies adopting values that recognize everyone and are recognized by everyone, *everywhere*. The assumption for this to happen is that there has to be “institutional legitimacy, which is the *impartial* exercise of authority” Zürn. (2018).

CHAPTER 4

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The methodology adopted is qualitative analysis, which looks for balance of political participation as pattern and seeks to make generalization, according to the *historical, institutional and new behavioural* approach - “positivist indicators”- (process tracing and causality), based on a documental data of constitutions and all other legal or juridical disposition that explain the ways in which institutions shaped political outcome. It involves the ‘writing of constitutional analysis based on three indicators: *selective authority, central and local authority*’ that synthesizes bits of information into a narrative description of six levels of separation of power from 0% stand for unsustainable to 100% for sustainable rule.

The approach is inductive because it draws inferences from repeated observation. It seeks to explain the relationship between independent variable – *political regime* and dependent variable - *political behavior* the ways in which rules, procedures and formal organization succeed or fail to satisfy political demand.

4.2 METHODS FOR DATA ANALYSIS

The PSI evaluates the strength of institutions on *give-and-take power* to people through a *cybernetic system*, whereby strong institutions are those ones whose circulation frequency of power between institution and people is major compared to those who centralized the power – weak institutions. Taking into account the ratings for 18 sub-indicators, grouped into three indicators - points of check and balance – “categories”, each sub-indicator has a rating of 5.56%. The category indexes are based on the weighted average of the sub-indicator scores in the category, converted from a 0% to 100% scale among the six (6) hierarchical political regimes. The *cybernetics system* approach also helps to evaluate institutional performance or legitimacy through the feedback of a determinate political regime rule adopted. The average of the three checkpoints collected rating the type of regime and the respective margin around “16,67%” between “0% to 100%” of political participation to determine adopted rule.

The conceptual scheme for classifying the locus of *evolutionary regime change* is based on Parsons (1937), who, supported by advances in biology, adopted the idea of cybernetic hierarchy of control in his theory of social system and social change. So, cybernetic is methodological tool that can analyze actions, social relationships, and whole systems according to what Parsons calls *pattern variables*.

Figure 5 below shows that, the greater the frequency of give and back power between people and institution, the greater the institutional legitimacy and political sustainability. Applying these dimensions to the historical record or path dependence of institutional structure, comes to distinctions among political regimes.




Figure 5: Cybernetic system with a power loop between people and institution

	Autocracy			Democracy			Ecocracy											
Check points	Patrimonialism	Partisanship	Corporatism	Nationalism	Multinationalism	Globalism												
Electoral authority	Leader influence	Parties influence	Company influence	People influence	Semi-Ecologic influence over specific territory	Ecological influence												
Central authority	Leader influence	Parties influence	Company influence	People influence	Semi-Ecologic influence over specific territory	Ecologic influence												
Local authority	Leader influence	Parties influence	Company influence	People influence	Semi-Ecologic influence over specific territory	Ecologic influence												
Score	16,67			16,67			16,67											
	5.6	11	16	22	27	33	38	44	49	55	61	66	72	77	83	89	94	100

Table 3: Conceptual analytical framework for measuring institutional legitimacy - PSI

The (3) indicators - check points or categories: The process by which power is redistributed by institutions.

1. **Selective authority:** Analyses the level of separation of power in candidates' conditions; balance in constraints and opportunity to access competition; Who can run?;
2. **Central authority:** It analyses the level of separation of power between the *legislative, judicial and executive* powers; How rules?
3. **Local authority:** It analyses the level of separation of power between the central and local authorities. Who to be accountable to?

The model – the three checkpoints crossed by the six regime types: Model to recognize patterns, design categories, and measure and compare political phenomena. Were created six modular constitutions/ regimes to read or collect encoded data in formal documents of the adopted political regime. The conceptual framework of law is a model that represents the six options of State structure in representation of the five ideological institutions and one neutral. How decentralization is precisely quantified? The variable for measuring the extent of decentralization is relative inclusion.

4.3 *The scoring system*

Starting from a programmatic vision of society where by “the ultimate goals of all human being is to be recognized or participate politically, was used 5,56% point scoring system for the 18 indicators. Indicators on scale from 0% to 100%, weighted on a scale from 0 to 6 points/regimes.

1. Authoritarian regimes: (scores less than or equal to 16,67%)
2. Hybrid regimes: (scores greater than 16,67%, and less than or equal to 33,33%)
3. Flawed democracies: (scores greater than 33,33%, and less than or equal to 50%)
4. Full democracies: (scores greater than 50%, and less than or equal to 66,67%)
5. Flawed ecocracies – (scores greater than 66,67%, and less than or equal to 83,33%)
6. Full ecocracies – (scores until 100%).

4.4 *Data collector*

Data collector encoded in formal documents of the adopted political regime. The conceptual framework presented here, provides unifying analytical tool capable of:

- Producing clear prediction about the institutional design that legislators will favour in different situations.
- Explaining the identified institutional political irregularities across a wide range of political regime types.

The level of sustainability may vary per country/institution and depend to some degree on its path dependence structure. In short, the unequal access to and the unequal distribution of power may have an effect on the equality of political participation and competition. Equal competition can be seriously undermined by gross structure disparities between political forces, giving the better resourced groups a substantial advantage over their competitors. Therefore, the institutional structure can be perceived as illegitimate.

4.5 The functional form of countries PSI can be written as follows:

$$PSI = PWEL * \sum_{i=1}^3 PRW_i$$

- PSI = Political Sustainability Index
- PWER = Percentage Weight of Each Regime = $\frac{100\%}{6} = 16.6\%$
- PWEL = Percentage Weight of Each Level = $\frac{PWER}{3} = 5.5\%$
- PRW = Political Regime Weight (1, 2, ..., 6)
- i = CPPD = Categories - Check Points of Political Power Disposition (1, 2 e 3)

$$PSI = \frac{PWER}{PWEL} * (S_{electoral\ auth.} + Central\ auth. + Local\ auth.) = Institutional\ legitimacy\ \%$$

Note: The level or result of *institutional legitimacy* is what informs the level of *political sustainability*, that is, the lower the institutional legitimacy, the lower the political sustainability.

If a mean comparison test between the six political regimes is conducted for the single indicator chosen – “institutional legitimacy”, then, in general, it seems obvious that full ecocracies attain higher results. Differently from other indexes, PSI does not indicate only the level of institutional legitimacy or political participation, it indicates the specific articles as well that prevent or favour political recognition, providing concrete tools for the pressure groups to enable political reforms.

These considerations lay the foundations for the criteria necessary to develop a reliable and valid measure of political sustainability. The arguments suggest that any measure needs to take into account both independent and dependent variable of political sustainability simultaneously, that is, the strength of empirical evidence (measured in terms of belonging to a specific national rule).

CHAPTER 5

5. PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF MOZAMBIQUE AND SWEDEN

Why compare Mozambique and Sweden?

The political sustainability index can be applied to all sovereign territories. In terms of similarity, Mozambique and Sweden are both countries with sovereign institutions. In terms of difference, several studies 'Democracy Index' EIU (2018) place Sweden as an example that complies with democratic indicators and even so, the country observes revolutionary behaviors against established institutions.

5.1 Country report

PSI country report is a political radiography of the countries that explains the power phenomenon by the adopted rule, performing a country's political, rule outlook; the risk services identify current and potential threats and help decision-makers to understand the implications for their institution.

- Show the specific weaknesses of the country rule - (Political risks);
- Apparent Sustainability: Unsustainable peace achieved based on exploration of local resource such as sale of cheap work force or donation and external investment.;
- National Perspective of institutional legitimacy stage - (forecast of political national behavior);
- Action: address how they can improve their rule and the next steps that could be taken by the stakeholders.

5.2 Results achieved by those who adopt the PSI mechanism

- 1) Discover how political developments will shape the social environment. Detailed analysis and long-term forecasts will help you to prepare for the future.
- 2) **Premium Country Access:** gets the full picture of a country's political, economic and business situation with Premium Country Access. This service provides you the best of our country and industry analysis, forecasts, data and risk analysis.
- 3) **Risk:** offers a unique range of services to help you preventing, or at least reduce the likelihood, of a Political catastrophe that would cause human deaths or environment point of no return.

In short, the political sustainability index useful to ensure that the commitment to mitigating institutional illegitimacy can be verifiable, transparent, reportable in a way that is comparable to the efforts of other institutions.

5.3 Mozambique report

Political regime, political behavior and Political Sustainability in Mozambique

Country background information

Mozambique gained independence and became a *one-party State* controlled by Frelimo, which immediately faced the second war from 1976 to 1992 led by RENAMO disobedience, which ended with a General Peace Agreement, creating the first level of separation of power moving to *multi-party regime* – ‘Party_cracy’ in 1994.

Table 4 and 5, presents the data collected within a historical period in Mozambique:

POLITICAL REGIMES (Categories of political recognition)	AUTOCRACIES		DEMOCRACY		ECOCRACY	
The model - Index values are used to place countries into one of six regime types:	AUTHORITARIAN		D.P.	D.P		
<p>Selection authority</p> <p>Levels of checks and balance</p> <p>(Do laws provide for broadly balanced opportunities for all candidates?) Are selections for the legislature and judicial free?</p> <p>The bodies of electoral administration should be transparent, neutral, impartial, independent and professional</p>	<p>CHAPTER III PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC. ARTICLE 47 The President of the People's Republic of Mozambique is the President of FRELIMO.</p> <p>ARTICLE 50 At the time of investiture, the President of the Republic takes the following oath: I swear on my honor as a FRELIMO militant to devote all my energies to defending, promoting and consolidating the achievements of the Revolution, to the well-being of the Mozambican people, to ensuring respect for the Constitution and bring justice to all citizens.</p> <p>ARTICLE 52: In the event of the death, resignation or permanent incapacity of the President of the Republic, his functions shall be immediately assumed by the Central Committee of FRELIMO, which shall designate, as soon as possible, the new President of the Republic' Constitution of Mozambique Republic (1975.).</p>					
<p>Central authority</p> <p>(Do laws appropriate balance between executive, legislative and judicial branches).</p> <p>Specialized skills for the exercise of political functions are required?</p>	<p>CHAPTER I PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY;</p> <p>ARTICLE 37: The People's Assembly is the supreme organ of State in the People's Republic of Mozambique.</p> <p>The People's Assembly is the highest legislative body in the People's Republic of Mozambique.</p> <p>ARTICLE 42: 'Popular Assembly is convened and chaired by the President of the Republic' Constitution of Mozambique Republic (1975.).</p>					
<p>Local authority</p> <p>(Do laws appropriate balance between Central and Local Authority's).</p>	<p>CHAPTER V: ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AND LOCAL STATE BODIES. ARTICLE 60: The President of the Republic may annul the decisions of the governors or of the Provincial Governments and of the Provincial Assemblies.</p> <p>ARTICLE 48: The President of the People's Republic of Mozambique is responsible for: f) Appointing and dismissing the provincial governors' Constitution of Mozambique Republic (1975.)</p>					

Table 4: Mozambique Authoritarian Regime – 1975

POLITICAL REGIMES (Categories of political recognition)	AUTOCRACIES		DEMO		ECO	
	AUTHORITARIAN 0% - 16%	HYBRID 17% - 33%				
The model - The index values are used to place countries or globally within one of six types of regime:						
<p>Selection authority</p> <p>Levels of checks and balance</p> <p>(Do laws provide for broadly balanced opportunities for all candidates?) Are selections for the legislature and judicial free?</p> <p>The bodies of electoral administration should be transparent, neutral, impartial, independent and professional</p>	Non Competitive party system – Oligopolistic system	<p>CHAPTER II RIGHTS, DUTIES AND FREEDOMS Article 53 (Freedom to constitute, participate and join political parties) 1. All citizens enjoy the freedom to form or participate in political parties. 2. Membership of a political party is voluntary and derives from the freedom of citizens to associate around the same political ideals.</p> <p>TITLE V Organization of Political Power. UNIQUE CHAPTER Article 135 General Principles of the Electoral System Law nr. 9/2014 from 12th March Article 6 (Constitution of the National Election Commission) 1. Members of the National Committee of Elections are appointed as follows, in compliance with Article 5(2), are designated as follows: a) five representatives of FRELIMO b) Four representatives of RENAMO; (c) one representative of MDM d) and repealed f) revoked seven members from civil society organisations. Note: The Constitution of the National Election Commission results from negotiation between FRELIMO and RENAMO Lei n.º 9-(2014).</p>				
<p>Central authority</p> <p>(Do laws appropriate balance between executive, legislative and judicial branches).</p> <p>Specialized skills for the exercise of political functions are required?</p>	TITLE VI Presidency of Republic Chapter II Jurisdiction Article 158 On the 3 Powers: g) Appoints the President of the Supreme and Vice Court, of the Constitutional Court, Administrative Court h) Appoints, discharges and dismisses the Attorney General of the Republic and Vice TITLE VII Assembly of the Chapter III Assembly and operation. President of the Parliament. CHAPTER III Organization and operation. President of the Parliament. Article 189 2. The Head of State convenes and presides over the session that elects the President of the Parliament. CHAPTER II Police Article 253 (Definition) 1. The Police of the Republic of Mozambique is directed by a Commander-General (Appointed by the President of the Republic). TITLE XIII NATIONAL DEFENSE AND NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY CHAPTER I Article 262 (The defence and security services) 4. The forces of defence and the security services of the State owe special obedience to the President of the Republic his status as Commander-in-Chief. The Constitution of Republic of Mozambique (2020).					
<p>Local authority</p> <p>(Do laws appropriate balance between Central and Local Authority's).</p>		TITLE XIV LOCAL POWER Article 277 (Administrative guardianship) 1. Local authorities are subject to the administrative supervision of the State. 2. Administrative supervision over local authorities shall consist of verifying the legality of administrative acts of local authorities in accordance with the law. Article 278 (Regulatory power) Local authorities have their own regulatory power, within the limits of the Constitution, laws and regulations emanate by the authorities with guardianship Lei n.º 5 (2019).				

Table 5: Mozambique hybrid regime – 2020

Calculation:

$$PSI = PWEL * \sum_{i=1}^3 PRW_i$$

Mozambique

$$PSI = \frac{PWER}{PWEL} * (S_{electoral\ auth.} + Central\ auth. + Local\ auth.) = Institutional\ Leg.\ %$$

$$PSI\ Moz = \frac{PWER}{PWEL} * (Hibridy + Authoritarian + Hibridy) = Political\ Regime\ %$$

$$PSI\ Moz = \frac{16.6}{3} * (2 + 1 + 2) = 27.66j\%$$

Mozambique Findings

The classification of PSI from 2020 in Mozambique: Hybrid Regime with 27.6% within (0% - 33.3%) of political sustainability.

Discussion

Applying these findings in the Mozambican case, it can be proved that the excessive centralization of power in limited party through the composition of National Electoral Commission and in the President of the Republic are factors that exclude the recognition of interests of other social groups that consequently resort to violence to have their political rights observed.

Mozambique Analyze and Conclusion

The conclusion was that political participation allowed by the institutions/ constitution to Mozambican citizens sink their roots into a Hybrid regime with 27.66% of political sustainability. Thus, we end by arguing that the General Peace Agreement signed in Rome and the process of political transition that followed it, despite introducing elements of democratization into Mozambican society, were insufficient to guarantee significant progress at building political sustainability in the country.

Forecast

The Mozambican elite currently party_cratic is migrating to the corpocratic dimension. The hybrid regime allows the enrichment of public servant elite who seek investment in companies as an alternative to maintain their power advoking the establishment of new rule that protect their interest.

5.4 Sweden report

Political regime, political behavior and Political Sustainability in Sweden

Country background information

The Swedish revolutionary process started after the death of the warrior king Karl XII in 1718 – “*Oligarchical ideology*” and Sweden’s defeat in the Great Northern War, the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) and council were strong enough to introduce a new constitution that abolished royal absolutism and put power in the hands of parliament - “*Hybrid regime*”. The first Social Democrats entered government in 1917. The economic crisis of the early 1970s broke the long hegemony of the Social Democrats. A new Instrument of Government was adopted in 1974, stating that all public power is derived from the people, who are to select the members of parliament in free elections.

Table 6 and 7, presents the data collected within a historical period in Sweden:

POLITICAL REGIMES (Categories of political recognition)	AUTOCRACIES		DEMOCRACIES		ECOCRACIES	
The model - The index values are used to place countries or globally within one of six types of regime:	AUTHORITARIAN	HYBRIB	FLA. DEMOCR.	FULL DEMOCR.		
Electoral authority Levels of Political Selection (Do laws provide for broadly balanced opportunities for all candidates?) Are selections for the legislature and judicial free? The bodies from electoral administration should be transparent, neutral, impartial, independent and professional	Article 1: The realm of Sweden shall be governed by a king and shall be an hereditary monarchy with the order of succession as established by the law of succession’ Constitution of Kingdom (1809).					
Central authority (Do laws appropriate balance between executive, legislative and judicial branches). Specialized skills for the exercise of political functions	Article 3: The person of the King shall be held sacred and revered; he shall not be subject to any prosecution for actions’ Constitution of Kingdom (1809).					
Local authority (Do laws appropriate balance between Central and Local Authority’s).	Article 4: The alone shall govern the kingdom in accordance with the provisions of this instrument of government; he shall, however, in the cases hereafter specified, seek the information and advice of a council of honorable, and generally respected native Swedish subjects who professing kinshi.’ Constitution of Kingdom (1809).					

Table 6: Sweden Authoritarian Regime, Absolute Monarchy - 1809 - 1920

POLITICAL REGIMES (Categories of political recognition)	AUT		DEMOCRACIES			ECO
The model - The index values are used to place countries or globally within one of six types of regime:			FLAWED DEMOCRACY	FULL DEMOCRACY		
Electoral authority Levels of Political Selection (Do laws provide for broadly balanced opportunities for all candidates?) Are selections for the legislature and judicial free? The bodies from electoral administration should be transparent, neutral, impartial, independent and professional				The Election Review Board consist of seven members led by a chairperson who is required to be, or must have been, an ordinary judge and may not be a Member of Parliament. The remaining members of the Board are appointed by the Parliament. Note: The Riksdage is formed by direct election, and suffrage extends to all Swedes who have reached the voting age of 18. Section 6 of Act on Transparency of Party Financing includes possibility to have contributions from companies. However, the size of the donations must be disclosed' The Constitution of Sweden (2013)..		
Central authority (Do laws appropriate balance between executive, legislative and judicial branches). Specialized skills for the exercise of political functions				Chapter 12. Elections in the Riksdag. Election of chair to a Riksdag body. Art. 16. A body whose members are appointed by the Riksdag in whole or in part shall elect from among its members a chair person and one or more deputy chairs, unless otherwise prescribed. Chapter 11. Administration of justice. Independent administration of justice. Art. 3. Neither the Riksdag, nor a public authority, may determine how a court of law shall adjudicate an individual case or otherwise apply a rule of law in a particular case. Nor may any other public authority determine how judicial responsibilities shall be distributed among individual judges. Art. 4. No judicial function may be performed by the Riksdag except to the extent laid down in fundamental law or the Riksdag Act. Art. 5. A legal dispute between individuals may not be settled by an authority other than a court of law except in accordance with law. Declaration of war Art. 14. The Government may not declare war without the consent of the Riksdag except in the case of an armed attack on the Realm. Deployment of armed forces Art. 16. The Government may send Swedish armed forces to other countries or otherwise deploy such forces in order to fulfil an international obligation approved by the Riksdag. Swedish armed forces may also be sent to other countries or be deployed if. 1. it is permitted by an act of law setting out the conditions for such action; or 2. the Riksdag permits such action in a special case. Section 4 "If anyone has been appointed a member of the Riksdag or the European Parliament following personal preference voting, the party's revenue statement shall also cover members personal election campaign" However the size of donations must be disclosed if elected' The Constitution of Sweden (2013).		
Local authority (Do laws appropriate balance between Central and Local Authority's).				Chapter 14. Local authorities. Art. 1. Sweden has municipalities and county councils. Decision-making powers at these local authorities are exercised by the elected assemblies. Art. 2. The local authorities are responsible for local and regional matters of public interest on the principle of local self-government. More detailed rules on this are laid down in law. By the same principle, the local authorities are also responsible for other matters laid down in law' The Constitution of Sweden (2013).		

Table 7: Sweden full democracy regime 2020.

Calculation:

$$PSI = PWEL * \sum_{i=1}^3 PRW_i$$

$$PSI = \frac{PWER}{PWEL} * (S_{electoral\ auth.} + Central\ auth. + Local\ auth.) = Political\ Regime\ %$$

$$Sweden\ PSI = \frac{Regime\ weighth}{Check\ points} * (Full\ D. + Full\ D + Full\ D) = Full\ Democracy\ %$$

$$Sweden\ PSI = \frac{16.6}{3} * (4 + 4 + 4) = 66.36\%$$

Sweden Findings

The classification of PSI from 2020 in Sweden is Full democracy Regime with 66.3% of political sustainability.

Discussion

Applying these findings, it can be proved that Sweden is a representative democracy and is governed on the basis of a democratic structure at different levels of society. 'In 1914, the Swedish government increased local aid to the poor with national funds; more importantly, it established the National Unemployment Commission, which undertook public works projects to combat unemployment' Valocchi, (1992). The joint to the EU on January 1st, 1995 showed his trend to adopt the flawed ecocracy by partial abolishing border centralization at least in Europe zone.

NB: The adoption of the Welfare State explains the contour to the *corpocratic* regime that results from the high inequalities created by the *party cratic* regime which, in the case of Sweden, arises in times of crisis with no room to consolidate and degenerate.

Sweden Analyze and Conclusion

Thus, conclude that the considerable separation of power adopted by the institutions, Sweden citizens sink their roots into a Full democracy regime with 66.3% of political sustainability. Thus, we end by arguing that the actual demonstration for climate change, are signals that their path dependence trace is introducing elements of Ecocracy.

Forecast

In Sweden, the defining characteristic of new social movements, can be understood as advocacy for a multinational political paradigm materialized by Europe Union, which, once consolidated, fulfills the requirements of a flawed Ecocracy.

5.5 A comparative analysis of Mozambique and Sweden

The first major difference between the two lies in their level of historical dialectical process or longitudinal evolution, hence the shape and constrain human behavior . "While Mozambique's historical dialectical process is recent with only a transition from authoritarian to hybrid with 27% political participation, Sweden's trajectory is a much more elaborate product with 66% institutional legitimacy. This leads to a second behavioral difference: Mozambicans resort to an insurgent and violent approach to channeling their demands, while Swedes' political behavior is civil channeled institutions.

Figure 6 shows how the ordering and synthetizing of the four theories explain the institutional legitimacy and therefore the political sustainability of each country.




Figure 6: Comparison of political regime legitimacy from Mozambique and Sweden.

5.6 Two countries traveling on the same historic train, but in different wagons

Revolution - The price of Evolution

Whereas in 1718 the two territories already existed as legal entities, recognized and both governed by authoritarian regimes, why the Swedish wagons was faster in its transitions compared to Mozambique? or on the other hand, when does the regime transition take place? It is worth remembering that in 2020 the two countries are in different positions – (27.3% for Mozambique and 66.3% for Sweden).

The driving force of the revolution – (explained by ordered and synthesizes theories)

Arjomand (1986. p. 383) 'define *social revolution* as the collapse of the political order and its replacement by a new one. The study argue that, the onset of revolutions is determined by lake of 'Separation of power, based on the hypothesis that prevent abuse of power' Montesquieu, (1823); that creates the "discrepancy between the standard of living that they *believe deserving* and the standard of living they are *actually capable of achieving*" Gurr, (1968). It is this relative deprivation that leads to 'struggle against the dominant groups on pursuit of institutional recognition' Hegel's (1977) that are 'conditioned by earlier ones' Pierson (2004).

One train/ Global, Two wagons/ Countries

Since both countries went through the same phenomena ‘*described, explained and predicted*’ Frederickson, H. (2016) by the four ordered and synthesized theories, Sweden is more evolved than Mozambique. From 1718 to 2020, *Sweden* processed 2 political transitions:

1. **Authoritarian regime** – 1719: First revolution by ending the absolute monarchy and establishing the Riksdag of the Estates as the highest organ;
2. **Hybrid regime** started with ‘the constitution of 1772 that resulted from the agreement made between Queen Ulrica Eleonora and the Riksdag of the Estates, where the latter acknowledged her as queen regnant in exchange for signing a new constitution of reduced royal power and introduction of a parliamentary system’ Lundh-Eriksson, Nanna (1976) and ends in 1969 with the elimination of the Upper House or First Chamber of the Swedish parliament and the introduction of a more directly proportional electoral system. “Thus one can conclude that the new constitution decreased Social Democratic power in Sweden” Immergut (2002).
3. **Full democracy** – 1969 – 1974 by partial revision of the constitution. This revision eliminated the indirectly elected Upper House (or First Chamber) of the Swedish parliament, and provided for a new, more proportional, system of electoral representation.

While *Mozambicans* did just process one transition:

1. **Authoritarian regime** - 1975 get independence from Portugal; FRELIMO's Marxist Leninist policies characterized by abuse of power. Note: It was not a revolution in the sense of “collapse of the political order and replacement by a new one” Arjomand, (1986), it was just the exchange of one dictatorship for another.
2. **Hybrid regime** – 1992 – 2020 by signature of General Peace Agreement For Mozambique (1992), between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

In short, the *difference* of political sustainability can be explained by the *level of separation of power*. However, countries are considered as wagons of a single train because, while the nationalist dialectic takes priority, the global ecocratization process structures a universal dialectical platform where everyone is called to surrender their sovereignty and claim their space – globalization.

The table 8 demonstrates that the Nation project is just an ideology and that the history of humanity is slowly evolving like a historical train towards a finite measurable trajectory where political interests of all citizens are balanced and preserved, an end point with sufficient ideological neutrality to avoid informal disobedience.

Categories	Political regime	Autocracies		Democracies		Ecocracies	
		Authoritarian	Hybrid	Flawed Democracy	Full Democracy	Flawed Ecocracy	Full Ecocracy
1	Electoral authority		Party ideology		Nationalist ideology		
2	Central authority	Personal ideology			Nationalist ideology		
3	Local authority		Party ideology		Nationalist ideology		
Score	(Average) %	0	27.6		66.3		100
Country			Mozambique		Sweden		

Table 8: Country comparison in 2020: One train/global, Two wagons/countries

5.7 Global ecocratization: People and Institutions – What history proves to us.

“The effects of *technological change* on the global economic structure are creating immense transformations in the way companies and nations organize production, trade goods, invest capital, and develop new products and processes. Sophisticated information technologies permit instantaneous communication among the far-flung operations of global enterprises” National Research Council (1988). As a result of this globalization, the Nation State has lost its monopoly on the shape and constrain human behavior that have become international, therefore, it has started to share problems and solutions with multiple nations, and is not capable of controlling several variables that interfere in national life, “reminded us that the nation is just a historical formation, which must not be equated with ‘the society’ Alasuutari, (2000).

The past: The occurrence of events such as ‘decolonization’ process and the three waves of ‘democratization’ is unequivocal proof that oppression is naturally reject by humankind. Those events, constitute the same phenomenon, occurring at different times and places involving the same specie - Mankind. History teaches us those ideological institutions have their own contradictions and vulnerabilities that human beings will take advantage of to rebel and demand their dignity and recognition.

The present: ‘What now needs to be reminded is that ‘nations-state are still powerful units, especially as regards people’s changing mentalities and identity construction’ Stiglitz (2002).

The future: If today, States rely on institutional competence to establish agreements or restrictions of citizenship, we can infer that in the near future, the establishment of weak Ecocracies will make sense to countries that, through their institutions, will be prepared to share scarce resources, as its citizens will be prepared to fulfill their duties and the institutions will be prepared to provide for their rights.

Globalization exposes States to a closer relationship of “global governance without global government” Stiglitz (2002), which demands this global government that would be implemented by a full ecocratic regime. The *slow process* towards full ecocratization is causing damage such as wars, migration and climate change, compromising current and future quality of life. This slow evolutionary process of State building is rather a political reform through the design of policies and based on scientific evidence, ensuring that all interests are preserved and guided by technical experts, free from ideological influences, as it is already in medicine.

CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Summary

The analytical theoretical approach used in this study is based on the empirical study of institutional factors - (regimes) that shape political (behaviours) and, consequently, condition the supervening political facts. The essence of this theoretical-analytical approach is based on two combined premises: (1) The processes and results of political processes are conditioned by the laws adopted by the institutions; and (2) To explain the political behaviour of different people or social groups, it is necessary to examine the characteristics of the structure institutions that establish themselves as an interconnector between them empirically. Here, in this last characteristic, of the “new institutionalism”, given that, it assumes that the behaviour is “role driven”, that is, it is strongly conditioned by the laws adopted in a given social context. So, political sustainability can be briefly understood as the process by which the society seeks an institutional set that cannot be disobeyed through a permanent learning of how to organize power politically.

All institutions have specific mechanisms that play the role of agents of political sustainability, namely the physical strength, public consultation, and others. An important observation indicates that while in more sustainable political societies such as Sweden, multilateral source of information is the main agent of political deliberation, less sustainable political countries, such as Mozambique, the use of unilateral participation calls this function more prominently.

When political sustainability is scrutinized from an institutional perspective, it is referred to according to the degrees of separation of powers between different ideologies to the extent that ideological neutrality is achieved to reach impartiality and consequent institutional legitimacy. The study distributes the institutions of a given political society into three classes: **(i) autocratic institutions** - with power held by the minority; **(ii) democratic institutions** – with power held by the majority; and **(iii) ecocratic institutions** – with power held by the nature, accessed through scientific evidence of sustainability.

A cross-analysis of the concepts of political sustainability and degrees of separation of power, allows us to reach the following conclusions: **First**, the greater is the separation of power, the greater is the degree of political sustainability. And, **Second**, institutions with a high degree of separation of power are also the least exposed to violent political revolutions, but they are also the countries best equipped to manage divergences without resort to the use of physical force - because, firstly, there is room for different ideologies express their interest. It is, therefore, the countries that tend to deliberate collective decisions based on inclusive criteria.

The central argument of the debate is that ideological justifications produce revolutionary behavior to institutions. The ideological approach creates dominant groups that motivate the creation of protestant. Therefore, only an extreme separation of power would be the solution to eliminate the possibility of consolidating outbreaks of discontent. The use of balanced division cannot be understood only as an equal division, but as a division that seeks to satisfy those who have the capacity to subvert the instituted power by creating political unsustainability.

6.2 Conclusion

Comparison of countries is useful for making diagnostic and prediction of unwanted phenomena. The main purpose of this study was to create an index to understand why the people rebel against the institutions that in principle they themselves legitimized, or why institutions fail on shape and constrain human behavior, and through theory *ordering* and *synthesizing* it concluded that:

First: An institution characterized by a regime of dense *separation of power* enables ‘high frequency of give-and-take power between authorities and people’, promoting impartiality/institutional legitimacy, which preserves the interest of all, reduces relative deprivation and encourages cooperative behavior, thereby underpinning the conditions to ensure political sustainability. **Second:** The institutionalization of ideology causes domination, abuse of power and ultimately the *relative deprivation* crating individual's feelings of being treated unfairly compared to other citizens. **Third:** In order to realize freedom and pursuit individual goals, people fundamentally depend on the feedback of institutions as mechanism by which our existence as social beings are generated. **Fourth:** Countries like Sweden and Mozambique have the same pathways (both countries are moving from extremely centralized to decentralized power), yet are facing different hierarchical stages of political sustainability, slowly evolving as a *historic* train towards a measurable finite trajectory where decisions are made based on scientific evidence of preservation of all beings, which implies the universalization of ecological institutions as the final form of human government”, an endpoint with enough ideological neutrality to avoid disobedience.

So, to avoid disobedience from *people*, institutions must be structured based on ecological principles provide by scientific finds on pursuit of sustainability.

6.3 Recommendations

The Secretary General of the United Nations sums up the current condition of humanity in the following terms: “*If I had to select one sentence to describe the state of the world, I would say we are in a world in which global challenges are more and more **integrated**, and the responses are more and more **fragmented**, and if this is not reversed, it’s a recipe for disaster*” Guterres (2019). Taking on a single goal challenge that is capable of making the other goals viable. Only with “institutions that work in a transparent, responsible and inclusive way - SDG - 16” UN, (2017), it will be possible to achieve other sustainable development goals. For example, companies will keep exploit natural resources in unsustainably way if government’s not force them to stop, so we won’t get climate action unless we have government action to regulate the use of the atmosphere. With that is also to say: ‘Democracy is incompatible tool to meet the challenges such as climate crisis, migrant crisis, the pandemic, poverty and inequality, racial injustice, or the threats posed by major technology companies’, because she submits to the will of the majority while the crises described above are of natural demand. There for, the study recommend:

At national level:

- Strengthening the science-politics interface by dissemination of scientific finds like this.
- Apply the PSI to the current legislation to analyse the past and present level of political sustainability.
- Based on the PSI result, design and implement institutional reform strategy.
 - The strategy must clearly demonstrate that all parties gain sustainable peace as a result of the process.
 - The transition must be gradual to be accepted by the permanent winners of the adopted regime.

At global level:

- United Nations must adopt a global strategy for reforming political institutions through mimetic isomorphism.

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