THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF DEMOBILISED EX-COMBATANTS
IN MOZAMBIQUE

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A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Johannesburg, 1998
DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination in any other university.

(Gulamo Amade Taju)

Johannesburg, the 30th March, 1998
ABSTRACT

This study is an analysis of the social integration of demobilised soldiers in Mozambique, in the context of post-war social reconstruction. De-constructing the concept of "reintegration" that informed the top-down programmes designed for the social integration of ex-combatants, that dichotomize society into the military sphere and the civilian one, so that the process into which ex-combatants are involved after leaving the Army is one of "returning home", as society remaining the same or in a moving equilibrium, one saw society marked by social differentiations, even amongst the demobilised ex-combatants. The ideal of "sameness" between "civilians" and ex-combatants involved in the concept of reintegration seems more an utopia.

This research used previous studies of my colleagues. In criticizing them, I do not wish to create the impression that these works are of little value. Their analysis stand from very different disciplinary approaches, and with others aims. The major weakness I often saw was the indefinition of the terms they use and the mix of concepts like social integration and reintegration as having the same meaning. Other documentary research was carried out, and as the study included the understanding of meanings, values, individual actions and social interactions, in order to capture the meaningfulness of such life other qualitative methods were employed as the informal interviews, the use of key informants, participation in and observation of events in the setting.

Looking society in a dynamic change, social integration is regarded as the process of negotiation of a common social order between actors in interaction (demobilised soldiers, other social groupings, and institutions like the state). It is better approached using the concept of integration. As an interactive process it is marked by a tension between the affirmation of the individuality of actors and the will to the sense of community. In its course different actors mobilise and use different identities according to the situations, avoiding or erasing specificities of previous socializations and identities and highlighting others.

In my hands, a home-made post-card:

Pai eu te amo muito com o amor por ti eu escrevo esta carta.
Pai eu quero que você volte,
de que eu estou morrendo
saudades tuas. Um beijo m

DUCHA, my lovely daughter, was crying
for my quickly return "back-home".
She was missing me!...
I am aware. I spent long time away
I left my family in Maputo
without my warm...
But the end result is here.

To Ana Joao, Quika, Ducha and Sueky,
my sincere thanks for their patience, love and encouragement
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I arrived at Wits University doubly handicapped. History was my disciplinary background, and Portuguese was my intellectual language. I would like to say "my deep thank you" to all my lecturers who helped me to reach this stage.

A special place was occupied by my supervisor, Professor Jacklyn Cock, who always was the source of encouragement and advise during the research process. For ever I am indebted to her.

Ford Foundation was supportive in allocating me the necessary funds for my studies. A special thanks I would like to address to Dr Ken Wilson, for the extra-support and discussions we had around my topic of research.

I benefited from the discussions I had, in the beginning of the 1995, at the Refugees Studies Programme, Oxford University, during the design of a researcher proposal for the Oxford and Mondlane Universities joint study on the Social Integration of Demobilised soldiers in Mozambique. A study in which later I was not involved due my student duties at Wits University. However, the results of such studies I know, through the friendly hand of Dr J. P. Borges Coelho.

I benefited also from discussions during many years with the Governor of Manica Province, Mr Arthur Canana, the Mayor of Chimoio City, Mr Jose Maria, the District Administrator of Barue Mr A. Milição.

My special thanks to the Eduardo Mondlane University, with special reference to the Centre for African Studies.

Xino Madeira, my great friend. That is the result of what I was doing when I was at your home!
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMODEG - Mozambican Demobilised Soldiers' Association.

CORE - Reintegration Commission (set up within the mandate of ONUMOZ to deal with demobilisation and social integration of ex-combatants. It involved representatives from the government, RENAMO, South Africa, France, German, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweeden, Switzerland, The United Kingdom, US and European Community).

FAM - Mozambican Armed Forces (the National Army before the demobilisation process)

FPLM - Mozambique Liberation Popular Forces (FRELIMO's military wing during the national liberation war)

FRELIMO - Mozambique Liberation Front

ILO - International Labour Organisation

IMF - International Monetary Fund

IOM - International Organisation for Migration

ISCOS - an Italian non-government organisation

NGO - Non-Government Organisation

ONUMOZ - United Nations Mission in Mozambique
RENAMEO - Mozambican National Resistance

SAP - Structural Adjustment Programmes

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOHA - United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination

WB - World Bank
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

1.1. General Introduction

The aim of this study is to investigate the social integration of demobilised ex-combatants in Mozambique, with a sociological perspective. Such an approach will analyse the social identity and social relations of ex-combatants, within the broader context of post-war social reconstruction.

The social integration of ex-combatants is a relatively new problem calling the attention of the social researcher. It is being approached under very different disciplinary perspectives, others than sociological. Most of the empirical evidence reported in the existing studies and papers is based on action-oriented research to define strategies to handle the problem politically, and theoretically it is not yet explicitly well addressed.

In fact, since 1992, after almost 16 years of internal warfare, Mozambique is confronted with the challenge of reconstruction of its social fabric and economic infrastructure. A serious problem is the resettlement and social integration of 5 million civilians who have been away from their homelands in consequence of the war and about 100,000 demobilised ex-combatants.

The demobilised soldiers are a sensitive and demanding social category. Those from the government army are "frustrated by long wasted years in the army" (more than

\[\text{1} \text{-- In this report the term } \textit{"combatants" \ is used in the same sense as soldiers (without introducing differentiations categories such as guerrilla, rank-in-file, officers). Also, it is used "Army" to refer both to conventional government army and to RENAMO guerrilla forces.}\
\[\text{2} \text{-- Estimations from the World Refugee Survey indicate that 5.7 million persons were directly affected by the war between 1984-1993, of whom 1.7 million sought refuge in the neighbouring countries, and 4 million were internally displaced (Coelho and Vines, 1995:37)}\]
10 years on average); and those from RENAMO are "deceived by the unfulfilled promises of the supposed victory" (Coelho and Vines, 1995:56). Damages suffered by civilians during the war and the questioning of what soldiers were fighting for have influenced the reconciliation and sharing of resources between both - affected civilians and ex-combatants. Economic crisis and a myriad of equally pressing priorities for the government place the social integration process on a hard road.

Even assuming that the majority of ex-combatants comes from a peasant background, the war socially dislocated them. The massive incorporation of a huge number of young people and even children into the armies impacted on the individuals by exposing them to a different social environment with persons of different social background, different ages and experiences of life; and by being in contact with different geographical and cultural areas for long years. At the end of the war, many social changes also occurred in the civilian milieu, such as the new economic policy, under the structural adjustment programme, replacing the previous attempts to construct a "socialist" society; many civilians moved (having been kidnapped or by their own means to get refuge in different safe areas) becoming involved, in the new areas of settlement, in relationships with different social groupings.

Ultimately, the society into which ex-combatants are being integrated is profoundly damaged at human and infrastructural levels.

In order to get an understanding of the process of social integration of demobilised soldiers, the following questions will be addressed:

(i) How ex-combatants, side by side with other social groups, cope with their differences to negotiate a new social order;

(ii) How they mobilise and use their identities and different resources (material and symbolic) to live together; and

(iii) What role is played by the state, the individuals and the community?

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2. "Community" in the sense of kinship and neighbourhood even when the settlement are geographically scattered.
1.2. Literature Review

In many countries military personnel are being demobilised as both an effect of the ending of internal wars and the formation of "new" armies, and/or as an attempt to reduce military expenditures. The Mozambican case resulted as part of a Peace Accord reached in 1992, between the conflicting parties (RENAMO and Government), under which the constitution of a new army of 30,000 soldiers (50% from each side) was agreed, and the demobilisation of the remaining combatants. The end result was that nearly 100,000 ex-combatants were demobilised on a voluntary basis.

Combatants from the government army (FAM) had been conscripted under the Act No 4/1978, which established 2 years compulsory military service for all Mozambicans from the age of 18. Nevertheless, both due to the inability of the military bureaucracy to conscript new citizens regularly, and by consequence, to demobilise those who completed their service, and due to the widespread nature of the war throughout the country, the majority of the soldiers stayed in the army indefinitely, until the Peace settlement.

From the RENAMO side, recruitment of guerrilla forces was generally by kidnapping, with the soldiers kept in the RENAMO ranks by control mechanisms, including threats of execution for attempted desertion (Minter, 1989:i; Gersony, 1988:11).

War deeply affected the entire society. Even with regional differences, it reached the stage of being qualified by high-ranking officials of the US State Department as "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since world war II" (Vieira et al, 1992:242). Besides the incorporation of the young generation into the war machines, the brutality of the war is well documented in Gersony's report (1988), and confirmed more at its end by Roesch (1996). The level of violence
conducted by RENAMO against the civilian population of rural areas was "extraordinary high". The relationship between RENAMO and the civilian population involved almost exclusively a harsh extraction of labour: working in the fields or as porters; young girls and adult women also were providers of sex and food to the combatants. The only reciprocity provided by RENAMO for the efforts of the civilians was the possibility of remaining alive. In the RENAMO controlled areas populations remained as "captive" (both indigenous and abducted from other areas), detained against their will, and prohibited from attempting to depart. Villages of 40 or more families were the "priority targets" of the RENAMO attacks: in those attacks unarmed civilians (including children, often together with mothers and elderly people) were "victims of purposeful shooting deaths and executions, of axing, knifing, bayonetting, burning to death, forced drowning and asphyxiation" (Gersony, 1988:19). Schools and health clinics were other typical targets for destruction. By the mid-1989, 45% of the total primary schools had been destroyed or closed; 850 health clinics and 10 of the 27 rural hospitals were destroyed or damaged (Vieira et al, 1992:242).

Atrocities against the civilian population were also committed by the government forces. These "brutalities" included (i) the control of population movements through the exigency, in the then established "control posts", of the presentation of Identity Cards, Pass/Traveller documents signed by community leaders allowing one to travel from one side of the country to another, (ii) the appropriation by the government forces of goods supposed to be illegally owned by civilians; (iii) physical punishment and executions of the supposed sympathizers and supporters of RENAMO (Caba, 1997), and (iv) forced movements and settlement from the RENAMO areas of influence to the government's ones (labelled by the government as "recuperated" population). This was the case, for example, in the forced removals that occurred in the 1980s in the Northern Manica Districts to government controlled areas.

These abuses from both sides disoriented the population, which became unsure in whom to trust, with negative effects in moral values, decrease in agriculture production, and huge mass migrant movements to the urban areas and neighbouring
countries. Rural communities were seriously disrupted, forcing the majority of their members "to live a nomadic existence" (Vieira et al., p.244).

Nevertheless, the reaction of population to the war was diverse. Members of social groups more wealthy, relying on relatives living and working in the cities, were the first to decide to escape and settle in "safe" areas (provincial or districts headquarters). With the spread of violence, many other groups followed the same decision and movement, not only to these areas but also to the neighbouring countries.

Amongst the remaining population, one group "accepted" to live with RENAMO. Another one searched for "hiding places" and ways to survive without leaving their homelands, but out of the control of the warring parties, who always suspected and threatened them. They built their huts in the bush, generally two, and in different places, with different ways of access. They watched out for strange movements from the top of the trees, before going to their farming plots. As they had learned through experience military attacks were run early in the morning, so they used to do their "normal" activities after 9-10 am up to 5pm (Caba, 1997).

As predicted "once peace is re-established, the accumulated effects of material and human devastation will require gigantic efforts at repair which will be difficult for a country in a state of complete exhaustion (...) More serious then the physical destruction have been the human traumas, and the fact that a considerable number of children in the rural areas have been deprived of access to schooling, and of the minimum diet needed to prevent physical and mental problems. A significant proportion of the future generation will appear ignorant, and physically and perhaps mentally stunted. This will certainly prolong in time the effects of destabilisation, long after the destabilisation itself has ended" (Vieira et al., 1992:248).

Due to the fact that demobilisation and social integration of ex-combatants are relatively new issues, little published literature on the ongoing experiences is
available. The majority of international conferences and papers address the question in a policy-oriented manner; they attempt to define policies and strategies, such as the World Bank discussion paper, and the 1995's International Labour Organisation (ILO) papers (see bibliography).

The World Bank is involved in the process in response to requests by member governments, mainly as part of their advice packages to reduce state expenditure (like the retrenchment of other "redundant" civil servants). The World Bank report (1993) recognises the great differences between demobilisation and social integration of ex-combatant programmes, and the civil service ones. These differences are the larger number of people involved in the first type, the frequent need to disperse ex-combatants geographically over a short period of time, and the security repercussions of a failed programme - crucial issues calling for institutional capacity in terms of planning, implementation and overseeing, exacerbated by a myriad of equally urgent reconstruction demands and lack of financial resources, which require external assistance (World Bank, 1993:ix).

The involvement of the ILO is mostly concerned with the design of strategies for training and employment/income generation activities for ex-combatants. The summary of the 1995's ILO studies states that demobilisation is generally conceived as a "military exercise" and the social integration left to civilian society. In this duality, the ex-combatants get demobilisation payments, fixed according to the military service which the combatants have rendered or were hoping to render, payments that can facilitate or assist the process of integration into civilian life, but no payments exist for the last one, fixed according to the needs of that second step (ILO, 1995b:5).

The current process of social integration is not the first such experience of Mozambique since 1975. The first was of demobilisation of ex-combatants of the national liberation war (FRELIMO guerrilla forces). An unpublished report (Taju and Mondlane, 1991) analysing the social integration of those ex-combatants shows that
the majority were settled in rural areas (in special "communal villages") with a co-operative system as a model of income generation. A targeted programme in agriculture, when the expectations of ex-combatants were other than farming, an inadequate articulation with the other sources of income, and the lack of capital and skills in management and marketing, resulted in the failure of the programme. A special targeted credit package was later introduced, but resulted again, in a failure, mainly due to the misuse and mismanagement of funds (e.g. allocation for consumption purposes by the individuals), and their perspective that "the state owes them".

Similar situations were experienced in Zimbabwe. In that country, the government identified the concept of co-operatives as an important vehicle towards the full integration of demobilised ex-combatants. Under "Operation Seed" (the Operation of Soldiers Employed in Economic Development), ex-combatants were encouraged to work on land acquired by government for that purpose. For many ex-combatants, the exercise was perceived as a way to deny them a chance to join the new army. For those who welcomed the idea, it soon became a disappointment: lack of adequate counselling (guidance in choosing the civilian line of activity, psychological advice and assistance), limited government assistance, lack of preferential credit, technical advice, pricing schemes, market contracts, technical know-how, managerial skills, contributed to poor performance and failure of most of these co-operatives (Cilliers, 1994; Moyo, 1985). The typical combatant had a low level of education and no employment prior to join the army. He was removed from civilian life for a long period and returning to the land was difficult in most case. "At the end of the first cycle of demobilisation involving 35,000 combatants, only 19,000 had been absorbed in economic activities by 1983" and the remaining 16,000 presented a variety of problems (Srivastava, 1994:11).

In Namibia, the social integration of ex-combatants was also focused in the economic area. The programmes designed included training in functional skills to enable them to support themselves economically; and, the identification of viable projects (job
creation) where these people would be productively deployed. But again, inadequate funding and the lack of managerial expertise were limitations to an adequate development of those programmes (Cilliers, 1994:70-71).

Near to the beginning of the 1994 demobilisation programme a survey of potential demobilised soldiers, in the government army side, and their expectations once in civilian life, revealed the following features: the average age of soldiers was 32; they had remained in the army 12 years; 88.7% were "de facto" married; with 5 dependants on average; the education level was 4 years of primary education (43.4% were students at the time of conscription); 89% were born in rural areas (defined as "regions outside the provincial headquarters"); 73% had not acquired any non-military skills in the Army; the expectations of the majority of potential demobilised, at the time, were to settle their families in the countryside (76.6%), whilst they searched for wage labour earnings elsewhere (59%), (Taju, 1994).

Coelho and Vines (1995), evaluating the ongoing implementation of the social integration strategy in Mozambique, state that its long-term programming was narrowly focused on economic issues, giving particular relevance to peasant agricultural farming, and leaving the social and cultural dimensions to the communities, on the ground that "indigenous society demonstrates great capacity for social interaction and support" (p.59). Also it was said that externally sponsored programmes are unlikely to improve this capacity for "self-regeneration". The basic assumption, underlying the strategy was that the Mozambican economy would be unlikely to provide the ex-combatants with employment, and that family agriculture would be the most reliable sector for integrating the demobilised ex-combatants into stable civilian life (Idem, p.29). Even the urban workers, earning low salaries and having many dependants, have small fields close to the cities, where their wives cultivate food products to complement the needs not met by the salaries (Loforte, 1987:60). The strategy, giving priority to small-scale agriculture, seems adequate. However, several decades of the integration of peasant production into the capitalist market means that small scale agriculture has not had the capacity to guarantee by
itself the subsistence of the rural family. Rather it has been complemented by salaries earned in migrant wage labour in South Africa, internal plantations or other sectors. The agrarian question (presenting not in terms of land shortage, but mainly in terms of integration of the rural economy in the market system, with particular importance of wage labour as a source of income, including acquisitions of tools and implements for agricultural production) was not addressed in the design of the programmes. The lack of roads and rural shops, the prevalence of land-mines and the price policies, exacerbated the weak potential of small-scale agriculture. As a result, ex-combatants dispersed "through" small-scale agriculture are looking for income earning activities, particularly in the informal sector, which is more dynamic in the cities, while their families remain working on the fields (Coelho and Vines, 1995:59).

Another limitation in Mozambique is the Structural Adjustment Programme. These reforms are currently informed by "neo-classical Populism", advocating the "achievement of efficiency and equity through perfect market conditions" while attacking the "oppressive plutocratic state" (Levin and Neocosmos, 1989: 2311). For example, in the agricultural sector (the core of the Mozambican economy) the role of the state is seen as promoting a "free market" framework and providing research and extension services, infrastructures (particular rural roads, schools and health facilities) (Gibbon, 1992:53). As such, (i) while seeking to push back the state, the World Bank has to act through the state (this includes forming alliances with key individuals and factions in the state apparatus); (ii) African states marked by the full misery of their own contradictions hardly provide a project of bourgeois "reform". Moreover, the "leaner" state required by structural adjustment is by no means a minimalist state but one on which greater demands of technical expertise and efficient performance in policy and macroeconomic management, as well as greater effectiveness in terms of control, are imposed. "The 'modernising' state called for by structural adjustment has to be much more 'stable' as well as 'efficient' than African states have proved to be up to now. Stability means controlling the social and political tensions (of class, of gender, of rural-urban divisions, of regional and cultural divisions) generated by the history of capitalism in Africa, and likely to be
exacerbated by the effects of structural adjustment" (Bernstein, 1990:22-23).

In Mozambique, the major programmes, sponsored by international aid agencies, and for social integration of ex-combatants were generally top-down in their design, and targeted in their implementation. However, experiences from other parts of Africa highlighted that "the challenges posed by demobilisation and reintegration must be examined within the context of the overall devastation wrought by war (...). Food production capacity and infrastructure are common targets of attack, civilian are displaced by fighting and famine, losing their assets and opportunities to improve livelihood in the process. Health and education spending suffer at the cost of military spending. At the end of the war, the needs of the community are enormous and the needs of ex-combatants are only a subset of these (...). Overall programme orientation should be towards meeting the need of both ex-combatants and the communities to which they return, and must also encourage full reintegration by ensuring that ex-combatants are no longer a special group among the community" (Cilliers, 1994:79). Contrary to the above mentioned perspective, Cock (1993), discussing the issue in the South African context, defends a targeted approach, in a way similar to "affirmative action" programmes. She maintains that a well conducted process of social integration is a moral imperative (rooted in the concern for the well-being of ex-soldiers) and a political necessity arising from the need for stability. Appealing to the lessons of the post world war II in South Africa, she argues for a "Soldier's Charter" (pp. 45-53), like the one in the past, through which a programme of demobilisation and social integration of ex-combatants was established as part of a wider social transformation. Meanwhile, she acknowledges that in the current situation of South Africa the demobilisation process will face a number of constraints, such as: (i) the financial resources to meet the needs of ex-combatants; (ii) the lack of social consensus on what soldiers were fighting for; (iii) the existence of other categories of population with similar problems with whom targeted benefits could cause resentment and division between ex-soldiers and them.
The view of the World Bank is similar to one quoted in Cilliers (1994:79). This powerful institution defends that "providing ex-combatants with benefits and opportunities that exceed those of the rest of the population who are also quite needy and have also suffered the consequences of protracted periods of war may create the basis of new hostilities" (World Bank, 1993:xv), and, to avoid increasing polarisation among social groups; the programmes may be limited in duration, and as soon as possible, integrated into the mainstream development programmes. In the process of policy decision, it is recommended that the following considerations be taken into account: (i) whether demobilised ex-combatants are a special-needs population; (ii) whether their return to productive non-military activity is more important to the overall security of the nation than that of other groups; and (iii) whether targeted programmes are effective and efficient.

The same strategy is advocated by ILO (1995), recommending that: (i) social integration policy should be seen in the broader context of post-conflict reconstruction, and the economic integration of demobilised combatants should be seen within the framework of a community development approach; (ii) social integration policy should be based on equity and should avoid creating a privileged group with access to special benefits and resources. For national security reasons ex-combatants often receive preferential attention, therefore, policy should aim at enabling the demobilised to reach as soon as possible the level from which they are able to compete with other groups on an equal basis, particularly in terms of resources, skills and social values. The ILO acknowledges the apprehension of the "receiving communities" about the ex-combatants (in the case of Mozambique, it is important to remember the nature and the level of violence that characterised the relationship of the warring parties and the civilian population). A good deal of sensitisation is required at the community level. Massive movements of the population has adversely affected the ability of many communities to participate in the social integration. The receiving communities are also engaged in the task of social rebuilding after the trauma of conflict and new power relations have emerged as a result of the conflict.
CHAPTER TWO - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

2.1. Social Integration and Social Identity

The key concepts used in this study are social integration and social identity. These are frequently discussed in static or essentialist terms. In this study they are treated as dynamic and fluid.

A widely disseminated view amongst the international agencies involved in Mozambique’s peace process, that influenced the government and the programmes intended to re-establish the life of demobilised soldiers, was that during the war soldiers become "brutalised and alienated from societal norms" (Dolan and Schafer, 1997), where the standards for behaviour were determined by the possession of weapons, the ability to maintain power over others by threatening them with death. Such behaviour, it was argued, might continue in the post-war period. The view was supported by the "long duration" of the military life experienced by each individual involved in the armies, and the presence of child soldiers in the conflicting parties, who "have been forcibly recruited or kidnapped from their families, coerced and brainwashed into killing and maiming their victims" (ILO, 1995f:7-8).

This identity attached by others to the ex-combatants involves signs of stigmatisation, in order to disqualify them, to exclude them from decision-making process, and to "legitimise" all programmes targeting them, in order to destroy the group identity of demobilised soldiers, "to buy the peace" from ex-combatants (Dolan and Schafer, 1997:5), i.e. to keep them dispersed throughout the country, diluting their identity into the communities, maintaining them far from weapons, making sure that they did not return to arms.

Conservatively, assuming a dualistic model of society, as dichotomised into two parts, the civilian and the military, the process ex-combatants are involved in after leaving
the army, was conceptualised as "reintegration", i.e. envisaged as a returning back home (to civilian life or to the original home). What the decision-makers had to provide were "targeted programmes of cash compensation, training, or income generation meant to increase the potential for economic, and social integration of ex-combatants and their families or other displaced persons" (World Bank, 1993:vi).

In the consensus theoretical framework such can be understood as a return to their primary groups of socialisation, ignoring that socialisation is an unending and lifelong continuous process: both the individuals and their original home acquire new values along the time. If changes in the individuals are recognised, they were labelled as resulting from "a-socialisation" (deviant to the "normal" pattern, and demanding "re-socialisation").

Even assuming that ex-combatants return to their original homelands, describing the experience of these people who have left communities and then return to them, through the concept of "reintegration", can be taken to imply that the social and economic environment to which people return has not changed since they left: they are the returnees who have changed and they have to adapt back to what they find. This view is not only simplistic but also ahistorical and conservative: it does not take into account social and economic changes. It involves an expectation of recovering the past, while society and its different social groupings are dynamic. There are continuities, but both the individual and the community experienced changes and transformations. During the period where the returnees have been away social changes occurred (even "invisible" and "intangible"). Both, "stayers" and "returnees" have consciously to learn new ways to co-exist. Furthermore, many ex-combatants did not return to their original homes. Many civilians who, during war-time, took refuge in other areas, returned to their original areas or preferred to settle in new ones. Consequently, in a single settlement or even a family unity, may coexist ex-combatants that are "returnees" or "newcomers", and civilians that are "returnees" or "newcomers", side by side with "stayers", which means a cross breeding of identities, experiences, values, and competition or sharing of resources.
Go back home and become the same as other civilians, was the policy formulation in Mozambique, both from the government side and international agencies involved. This took the view that "reintegration" happens when the fundamental characteristics distinguishing ex-combatants from other members of their communities cease to exist, and not when all their problems are resolved (Coelho, 1997:18). The central goal of reintegration was the "sameness", the elimination of differences between the demobilised and the rest of the community.

The ex-combatants are not an homogenous grouping. Added to this, in a context of an increasing social differentiation, and where a large number of the civilian population left their homes in search of security, massive changes in demographic profile and patterns of livelihood occurred, as Dolan and Schafer (1997) correctly argue, it is difficult to identify the baseline against which to measure ex-combatants’ livelihoods and lifestyles. Further, since the end of the war everyone has been involved in the process of social reconstruction and, in the differences relevant to assess "reintegration" is the difference between "civilians" and "ex-combatants" the most fundamental?

Moreover, the resultant absence of difference can indicate "assimilation" or "absorption" of ex-combatants by local communities’ members, which in Berry’s acculturation model (Preston, 1993:2/7) means relating with other groups by negating one own identity, can be indicative of the very opposite: the lack of integration, because integration involves a sense of belonging to a community though respect for elements of identity by each group in interaction. In sum, the issue of integration has been treated, first of all, by policy-makers in the design of the programmes intended to facilitate such integration. From the point of view of Government and international agencies, the design of programmes for demobilised ex-combatants' social integration was intended to destroy the identity of the group, in a way to avoid its potentialities to threaten the peace building process and security, by dispersing them geographically, and eliminating the differences between them and the local population, in a process of absorption into communities.
From the side of ex-combatants and their organisation (AMODEG), soldiers were engaged in the military life not by their own will. They were there on behalf of the "bosses" whose causes they defended. Because they wasted time and opportunities to improve their education and thereby chances of promising professional careers, they perceived that now was the time to be acknowledged and compensated. The government, representing the unified will of peace and democracy reached through the peace agreement signed in 1992, owed them. This integration would mean the elimination of differences between those harmed by war (the ex-combatants) and those who continued their education and professional careers. The equalisation of livelihood opportunities through compensation of the "victims" of the war (the ex-combatants) was a position contested by the "donors" who said that it was unfair to "reward" them more than their civilian "victims" (who is the real "victim")?

More recently an increasingly interest is being paid by scholars conducting studies in the field. Such is the case of recent field research conducted jointly by the Eduardo Mondlane University and the University of Oxford, and another from the War-Torn Societies Project (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development). However, it seems to remain a conceptual weakness in those studies. The issue is being approached as integration or reintegration in the "usual sense", without submitting these concepts to a further and rigorous definition, risking serious confusion.

Coelho (1997) in the Mondlane and Oxford Universities' project, uses the concept of reintegration. He recognises that its notion is ambiguous and imprecise, holding a "prefix of repetition" what presupposes that those about to be reintegrated were once integrated, that war or military life-style separated them from society, and that now is necessary to reintegrate them "back" into civilian life (p.17). He criticises the view as static and mechanical, that looks to society and ex-combatants as remaining the same, without changes. He declines to coin a definition for "reintegration" based on the attempt to solve the ex-combatants problems outside the context of the communities into which they are resettling themselves, arguing for an approach
aiming the equality, when ex-combatants problems and the problems of the community should become as similar as possible. Following the line of the policymakers, he regards "reintegration" as the stage "when fundamental traces distinguishing ex-combatants from other members of their communities cease to exist" (p. 18). (This view is strongly criticised by Dolan & Schafer: 1997, in another report of the same Universities Project). The conception leads him to a comparative approach adopted in his study to contrast local communities and their ex-combatants.

In a dynamic seen as not different from one of the other households in community, the report stresses the importance of the family, defined in terms of household, as the major agency in the social "reintegration", and in the process, the role of the ex-combatants' wives in the creation of livelihood conditions is considered relevant in "complementing" the income (p. 89).

Finally, Coelho contrasts the ex-combatants' negative discourse and their effort towards self-reintegration, through their diverse occupations; noting that "the strengthening of their individual choices corresponds to the weakening of their sense of belonging to a distinct group" (p. 90).

Dolan and Schafer (1997) accept (without defining) the concept of "reintegration", and suddenly, at the end of their paper and on a single page (p. 181) use integration (five times) and reintegration (four times) as if they have the same meaning. What they do is a critique of the notion of "absence of differences between demobilised and non-demobilised" involved in the term "reintegration", as defined by international agencies operating in Mozambique, and accepted by Coelho. They consider the definition of "sameness" as intending to achieve the objectives of peace and security; they show that no criteria to define the community standards were set against which to measure the differences to overcome. What the demobilised themselves present as the major "differences" are (i) the need for compensation for the direct suffering they experienced during war, and (ii) non-discriminatory recognition by the government in the form of pensions and other benefits for RENAMO ex-combatants. In such a
way, the demobilised ex-combatants do not want to go "back to the status quo ante". "They want to be part of a wider process of reconstruction in a way which reflects their personal transformation, justifies their losses, and acknowledges their role in bringing about democracy" (Dolan and Schafer, 1997:180). However, in the analysis of the programmes targeted to demobilised soldiers they recognise that in practice they went beyond the simple elimination of differences, and in fact attempted to create economic opportunities in the interest of long-term security.

Brito and Mussanhane (1997) adopt also, primarily, the term "reintegration", and in a single foot-note they break it into two dimensions: the "social reintegration" defined as the "re-insertion (of ex-combatants) into the family and community, and the elimination of the mental perception of a group apart", and "economic reintegration" as their "involvement in activities of income generation and the elimination of the special material needs" (p.3). Nevertheless, the authors tend to mix the terms indiscriminantly. On page 3, for example, they indistinctively use 4 times the word reintegration and 7 times the word integration.

Their study concludes that the policy-makers, who designed and financed the programmes for demobilised ex-combatants, are happy with the results, because "the basic (aim) was achieved and the status of a special group ended" (p.3), and the current problems the demobilised face are not different from those of the rest of the population, which will be solved only through a general policy of development. While in other side, the demobilised themselves continue arguing that the programmes undertaken did not helped them to be equal to other civilians. They complain the fact that those who led them to the military condition now abandoned them without recognising the efforts done in their behalf (p.3).

Due to the fact that social integration lends itself to multiple theoretical approaches many of the uses of the term are ambiguous, and definitions are not sociologically framed. They do not deal with the structural and historical forces which link the individual to society. There is a need for a sociological perspective to approach the
problem, concerned with the processes in social relationships between and within communities and other social groups. The Collins Dictionary of Sociology defines social integration as "the extent to which an individual experiences a sense of belonging to a social group or collectivity by virtue of sharing its norms, values, beliefs, etc.", which arises from socialisation and agreement on values (Jary and Jary, 1995:325/326 and 610/611).

From the very beginning, sociologists, concerned with the explanation of the "reproduction of the social order", found the answer in the social integration of the individual actors achieved by the process of socialisation into a consensus of norms and values. Durkheim⁴, for example, and his followers, utilise the concept of social integration framed by the view that society exists independently of its individuals. Members of society adopt its values, beliefs and traditions in common, what happens neither by chance, nor by individual members of society consciously deciding to support particular values and/or beliefs. Rather, they argue that individuals are constrained to adopt their norms and values precisely because they feel obliged to conform to the feeling of the collectivity (Bilton et al, 1994:488). The process of socialisation and internalisation come to bind society together, reproducing practices and institutions. They are means by which social integration is achieved, enabling society to continue as an integrated whole and not collapsing into a mass of warring individuals (Idem, pp.19-20). Viewing society as a vast organism; a unity reflecting its organisation; where the function a social institution serves is not for individuals but for the society out of which there are composed, the degree of social integration

⁴- In one of his well known study, the 'social integration' appears as a key variable to explain the variation of the rates of suicide. Accordingly, (i) too little social integration causes suicide ('egoistic suicide'). E.g.: suicide is lower among Catholics because they are bound more closely to one another and the guidance of the Church than are the Protestants; (ii) too much social integration causes suicide ('altruistic suicide'). E.g.: suicide is high among officers than conscripts because they are bound even more tightly to their units and sacrifice themselves to the 'good of the service'; (iii) great and rapid changes in the degree of social integration causes suicide ('anomic suicide'). E.g.: the newly wealthy, whose means are now beyond their needs are made normless and more inclined to suicide than perpetual poor folk, whose social norms remain undisturbed (Thompson, Ed, 1985).
of a society's members is determined by "social forces" that exist independently of them. The behaviour of individual members is determined by norms of conduct of which one is not aware, but imposed on by social institutions (Rosenberg, 1988:120).

Such is the explanation of social integration defended by consensus theorists (functionalism, structuralism, etc.) who tend to "reify" society as a stable one or "in moving equilibrium", mainly governed by value consensus and internalization of institutionalised shared norms and common morality, neglecting the role of individual social actors.

Against this view, conflict theorists argue for an account of social integration which emphasizes difference of interests between groups, and the role of power and coercion. For them, the difference of interests is a normal aspect of the social life, and generate conflict. Power and coercion are somethings which emerges from the social system in order to keep it together. They are integrative sources. Cohesion, in a conflicting and changing process, stems from the coercion of some members by those at the top, from enforcement of those dominated in pursuing the dominante values. Social order is maintained by power, and sanctions are brought to bear against those who do not comply. (Ritzer, 1992:123/126, Marshall, 1996:82-83).

From the action theory perspective (symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology) human beings necessarily engage in an "interpretative process" when in encounter with others, as others do with them. In such a way, social order is a "negotiated order"; socialisation is not simply a matter of internalisation of fixed social rules. Socialisation is by its nature "a means to create change as well, because human behaviour is learned rather than imprinted" (Bilton et al, 1994:23). Being that socialisation is not a simple one-way process (where individuals have to conform to the existing configuration of society), social integration arises from practical interactions between social actors, in which process they negotiate roles, status and norms.
The social integration which the study is interested in is not necessarily in ones' society, where an individual was born and grown. The emphasis will include geographical mobility, which implies interaction between individuals with diverse material and cultural backgrounds, and specificities of previous socialisations. Consequently, it need to lend this understanding from other discussions on social integration derived from research on international and internal migration (refugees or migrant labour) as "newcomers" to the areas of destination or as "returnees" in places of origin after periods of times away. Those models are claimed to be relevant to the study of post-war mass movements (Preston, 1993:2/6). However, there are important factors in social relationships in post-war integration as how the experience of conflict influences the daily interaction between those who return and those who remained at home during the war-time; and, how families with members who fought in opposing forces cope with the stress that this implies.

Acknowledging this factors, the concept of social integration may be used both in post-war and post-migratory contexts, to guide the study of relationships between social groups at the place of destination, after departure, or else, at the place of origin, after return. Accordingly, there is integration "when, regardless of social status, people work through their lives with sufficient tolerance of each other to contain differences as they arise, without a general collapse of social order" (Preston, 1993:2/2). The process of social integration is one of "adaptation, of give and take on either side as people learn to live together. At destinations, adaptation takes places between host community and their guests. At places of origin, it is between those who have returned and those who remained at home during their absence" (Iadem: 2/4).

Harrell-Bond (1989), in the context of a discussion at refugees/host communities, identifies common origins, language and culture as important but not sufficient conditions for integration. For her, the most important one is the availability of resources, and as such integration would be defined as a situation in which host communities and newcomers are able to co-exist, sharing the same resources - both economic and social - with no greater mutual conflict than that which existed before
within the host community. However, that sharing of resources (including their control) occurs in a context of social differentiation: "the level of conflict may well have increased within the host community as a result of pressure of greater members. Moreover, co-existence does not necessarily imply equality of access to resources and even the absence of measurable conflict would not necessarily preclude the exploitation of one group, or segments of it, by another" (Idem, p.7).

My approach will privilege the concept of "social integration"\footnote{Giddens (19984), distinguishes the concept of "social integration" from another one, "System integration", where integration is regarded as occurring as the result of operation of the social "substratum", e.g.: unintended consequences of econmic relations or structures of power. As a matter of interaction at distance, and involving "reproduced practices", which arise from "the interrelation of groups and collectivities, and operation of institutions, processes which tend to occur behind the back of the individuals involved (Jary and Jary, 1995:610)}\footnote{Giddens (19984)}, described in an interactionist perspective as a process of transaction between those who have \textit{returned} and those who \textit{remained} at home during their absence, or between \textit{host} community and their \textit{guests} - a process arising from "face-to-face interaction" of individual social actors in which both are mutually influential, and by which an individual experiences a sense of belonging to a social group or collectivity by virtue of sharing material resources, norms, values and beliefs. In the process, individual social actors mobilise different identities, in different situation, according to different purposes, constraints and advantages.

Social integration involves the acquisition of a social insertion achieved through being able to interact in concrete contexts, to learn to live with constraints, to transform and overcome them, in order to enable the individual project to be inscribed in the social setting. Everyone searches for the recognition of his/her existence in the existing system of social interactions. To be a member of a community consists, for an individual, in participating in the system of interactions, gaining a recognition from the partners of such interaction. It means to be able to participate in the construction or transformation of the reality, and, in the process, to transform and to recreate himself/herself. Such a search for individual social recognition demands on the one
hand, that a "place" be given to a person in this system of interactions, and in other hand, that the person "feels" this recognition (Pinto, 1995:127/129)

Social integration involves simultaneous the affirmation of the individual specificity and solidarity with other members of the community, what implies different strategies adopted by social actors (Idem):

(i) For the affirmation of personal singularity, (a) the person may avoid the threat of "dissolution" into society ("differentiation"); (b) a person may try to affirm his/her difference in order to be accommodated in the milieu where a person is being integrated ("visibility"); or (c) s/he may try a more radical affirmation ("singularization").

(ii) For the affirmation of the will to integration, (a) the person can develop a behaviour of active conformity with the social expectations; (b) the person can try to maintain and use his/her space in his/her benefit, hiding himself/herself in the anonymity; or (c) the person will try to erase the specificities of previous socialisations, different from those within which s/he intends to integrate.

The level of social integration will depend upon a series of constantly changing contextual factors. It is seen to be achieved "when group members can maintain relationships at different levels with people from other groups, at the same time as maintaining elements of their own culture and identity. Failure to relate to non-group members or loss of individual identity in the process of doing so does not result in integration. Instead it produces states variously described as separation, assimilation or marginalisation" (Preston, 1993:2/6-2/7).
Berry’s model quoted previously crosses group identity and the relationship with other groups to explain such states (see the table below):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IDENTITY - &quot;yes&quot;</th>
<th>IDENTITY - &quot;no&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RELATIONS - &quot;yes&quot;</td>
<td>integration</td>
<td>assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELATIONS - &quot;no&quot;</td>
<td>separation</td>
<td>marginalisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is separation when a group maintain its identity and does not enter into relationships with others. There is marginalisation when, in spite of not relating with other groups one loses its own identity. And assimilation is when the relationship with another groups is achieved at the expense of (the "loss" of) one’s own identity.

However the question of identity is not a fixed one. In social interaction social groups appeal and mobilise different identities on different occasions.

Sociology emphasises the social embeddeness of identity, meaning that identity is socially constructed: identity as a sense of self in relationship to others is not something private to the individual. It exists only in societies, which define and organise it. Identity inheres the role a person occupies in the social structure. The role defines the social position and expectations in terms of which a person relates to others. This involves a non-essentialist view of the self. The self is formed in relation to "significant others", who mediate to the subject the values, meanings and symbols of the world s/he inhabits. The self is constituted by multiple identities; identities which are all socially constructed (Hall, 1992:275-280).

My study refuses the essentialist or fixed conception of identity. All identities are seen as complex, fragmented and multiple, in two senses: (i) each person has many different identities, and (ii) different identities are claimed in different situations. To illustrate this it was noted that ex-combatants appeal and mobilise the identity of
demobilised soldiers when as a group or as individuals they feel that they are denied or marginalised as regards to access to resources. When they do not feel considered as "equal" (in the context of social differentiation) to other members of the community. When they feel that because they spent a long time in the army, they are marginal to the internal dynamic of the society. Such identification happens mainly when they are before state representatives or other "strangers". In their daily life, at the community, they use to avoid to identify themselves, to be seen and treated as ex-combatants. In short: the social identity of demobilised ex-combatants is constantly created, recreated or "achieved" and destroyed through interaction of social actors, continually engaged in negotiating the meaning of their social reality.

2.2. Methodology

As Giddens (1995) advises "In investigating social life we deal with activities that are meaningful to the people who engage in them. (...) humans are self-aware beings, who confer sense and purpose on what they do". So, it is important to bear in mind that social "facts" are laced with values; the world of human beings are made of meanings, and meanings are social constructions. Scientific knowledge need to understand the meanings which people apply to they do or verbalize (Idem). However, these meanings may change (or may be explained differently, "adequated to the relational situation") in the research interaction process.

The research on the social integration of demobilised soldiers aimed to understand how ex-combatants negotiate a social order with other social actors in the places where they live; how in such a process they construct their identities (what they are? when they are used and not?) and their use of different resources (including symbolic resources like the "healing" processes and marriage) to achieve their goals as well as what constraints they face. In this line questions such as the following were addressed: (i) the context in which social identity operates, given particular social processes, (ii) the social characteristics such as age, education level, kinship attitudes
towards violence, access to resources and power, and (iii) the types of stigmas experienced by the ex-combatants. In addition their involvement in local community activities and political activism were explored, e.g. participation in local ritual ceremonies, festivities, and their political preferences.

The research included the understanding of individual actions and social interactions, subjective aspirations, meanings, values and the language people have in everyday life. In order to get the meaningfulness of such life one needs to let the social actors "to speak in their language" (verbally or by their daily normal actions). The most appropriated way to approach these was by employing qualitative research methods because they are more "open" to the interactive process of research. Researcher and researched may adapt to each one and build a confidence, may talk the language of each one. Involving in depth study of the particular milieu in which the research is concerned about, the approach "cover less but gain in greater richness of data and penetration of analysis" (Bulmer and Warwick, 1993).

The point is that quantitative research, even if covering more individuals in a sample of population, using standardized questionnaires, to gather comparable data, looses the meanings of social actors and imposes the language (and meanings) of the researcher. The standardized questionnaire are by norm linear and fixed, imposing the conceptual and theoretical framework of the researcher, ignoring or intentionally rejecting the social actor's concepts and meanings (Blaikie, 1993).

Further, the qualitative approach employed relies on a wide range of methods: informal interviews, the use of key informants, participation in and observation of events in the setting as and when they occur, and documentary research. This combination (i) enabled the researcher to obtain crucial information that was not available from a single method; (ii) improved qualitative depth and increased the confidence in the accuracy of measurements and observations made; (iii) augmented the possibility of generalisation; (iv) enabled the researcher to understand the present by reconstructing the past (Bulmer and Warwick, Ed, 1993).
The field research focused on a limited geographical area (Manica Province) and sampled a group of ex-combatants through in depth interviews, group discussion with key informants, and observation of social behaviours in the residence and work place (especially in the informal market).

Manica Province was chosen as the area for the empirical study. This province, located at the centre of the country, is essentially agricultural, with, among others, some textile and clothing factories, mining and wood industrial units. The central districts have good conditions in terms of soil, water and climate, and the best production infrastructures as well the best access to markets. The peripheral districts are mainly agricultural, with poor natural potential, and where the family is the main economic institution, and migration of male family members to seek wage-earning employment appears to be a strategy of collective survival. This is the typical pattern of the entire country (Centro de Estudos Africanos, 1988). Further, Manica was heavily devastated by the war and received huge numbers of demobilised soldiers, and my early field-work study on demobilisation of soldiers and their expectations once in civilian life was conducted in this Province (Taju, 1994).

My previous contact with the persons, the institutions and the environment were helpful. Also useful was the background (and the possibility of applying past knowledge) I got from my field research in Manica in 1990\(^6\), 1993\(^7\), 1994\(^8\), studing forced migrations and demobilisation, expectations of soldiers once in civilian life, and social integration of the "freedom fighters".

The field work, during the months of August/September 1997, was carried out in two different geographical and cultural areas (according to the concentration of those

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\(^{6}\) Study on the social integration of the national liberation war combatants and other conscripted soldiers (Taju and Mondlane, 1990).

\(^{7}\) Field research on Internal displaced persons and returned refugees (see: National Comission for Planing, 1990; Bohwasi and Taju, 1994a).

\(^{8}\) Idem (and see also: Bohwasi and Taju, 1994b). And propective survey on the profile and expectations of soldiers once demobilised (Taju, 1994).
categories of population): in the city of Chimoio, and in a remote rural area of Barue district - in order to compare the situations occurring in different milieus, and the relationships between rural and urban.

Forty ex-combatants were interviewed. The number initially planned was fifty. However, absence of records on demobilised soldiers, attempts by themselves to avoid their identification as ex-combatants, made difficult in the field the identification of the individuals. What was done was using the local Departments of Ex-Combatants Association (in Chimoio and in Barue) to help in identifying demobilised soldiers. In their areas of residence, the first demobilised soldiers to be located and interviewed were asked to invite others that they knew. However, everywhere it was attempted to include in the group different social categories: RENAMO ex-combatants vs. Government ex-combatants; Male vs. Female; Young (Children) vs. Mature; living with their families vs. living alone; settled in their original home vs. settled in new areas; self-employed (informal sector or peasant farming) vs. wage labour.

Two categories are "few represented" in the sample: the RENAMO ex-soldiers and the Female ex-combatants. These groups may be more "hidden" and scattered; some of ex-RENAMO soldiers are still in the earlier so-called "RENAMO areas", and I did not visited these locations.

Sixteen key informants were interviewed, and with them happened a more "not localised and global" discussion. They were:
- local leaders in the neighbourhoods where demobilised soldiers were interviewed,
  - the Mayor of Chimoio City Council,
  - the District Administrator of Barue,
  - the GTZ ("Open Reintegration Fund") representative in Manica Province,
  - a.GTZ.field worker in Barue,
  - a high ranking Renamo politician,
- a high ranking ex-Government officer,
- AMODEG representatives (in Chimoio and Barue), and
- a group of agricultural officials in Manica (forestry, agriculture and fishery).

Participant observation and techniques of Participatory Appraisal (Chambers, 1994a,b,c) were used. The researcher tried to experience the daily life, and feel by inside the interaction in communities, and to discuss with groups or individuals ways of improving their lives and social acceptance. To give a single example: I discussed with a group of combatants on how to design an economic project, defining the activity, the means they have, the means that they need (and why), the market, and related issue to see how they understand such things, to get a profit from the activities they say they want to do.
CHAPTER THREE - THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION INTO RURAL AND URBAN COMMUNITIES

3.1. Identifying Demobilised Soldiers in the Communities

As result of social transformations due to war and post-war population movements related to, at the community level, and even at a family unit, ex-combatants co-exist and interact with other different social groupings with different experiences and exposure to the war, with different expectations and different identities.

For the purposes of this study these other social groups are: (i) stayers, (ii) internally displaced persons already resettled, and (iii) refugees already returned. Like ex-combatants, the last two groups may be returnees or newcomers in the communities where they currently live.

(i) *Stayers* - are those groups who had lived in relatively safe zones during war-time, and "never" abandoned their homes. In the rural areas, during the unsafe periods at the peak of the war, these groups made short distance and short period movements, without changing their residence. According to the safety factor, they usually stayed in their homes or fields during the day, but at night they slept in the bush, or the inverse, or they even slept in neighbouring villages or cities which offered more security.

(ii) *Internally Displaced Persons already resettled* - are those who abandoned their lands and homes, by their "own choice" to settle in the safer areas, or who were coerced (kidnapped or "recuperated") by one or other side of the warring parties. The 1991/2 drought was an added cause for these movements.
The concept of "displaced" was adopted by the Mozambican government in the late 1980s to assist persons settled in special "camps" inside the country, who had been "forced to abandon their normal place of residence for reasons outside their own will" (Ratilal, 1990: 68). If this definition was provided to qualify who was eligible for humanitarian assistance and not for analytical purposes of the migration movements, the term became widely used to define internal "forced migrants", even those not covered by relief aid. Later, the International Organization for Migration (operating in Mozambique) adopted the international legal definition of "displaced persons" as designating people who "have been forced to flee their homes in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, human right violations or disasters, moving to a place of refugee within their own country. They sometimes include former refugees who, once back in their own country, are still unable to get to their place of origin" (OIM, 1994).

A study carried out at the end of the war, in 1993-4, by the National Commission for Planning (1994) shows that in general such mass movements in the rural areas were many times, neither programmed, nor with a pre-established destination, and "When the families started to flee they had no intention to change their usual residence, they only sought for a more safe zone (known or unknown)" (p.34). In some cases, a family had to move more than once because the place where they originally moved became insecure.

With the end of the war some decided to settle definitively in the new areas, whilst others returned to their original homes. According to the survey of the National Commission for Planning (Idem), in the cities 60% of displaced were living in such a condition for more than five years, and in the rural areas 53% of them were in same situation more than five years. The more time spent in the "displacement", especially in the urban areas, the less is the possibility of returning to areas of origin, mainly because of the proportional rate of socialization and integration in the local community, either through employment and/or an active informal market developed for the selling of local production and other manufactured goods (beer, biscuits,
cigarettes, locally prepared food, alcohol, etc), or through children attending schools and other social facilities.

This group is the most deprived, especially those who remained in the "captive" during war-time.

(iii) **Refugees already returned** - are those who, like the displaced people, were threatened by the violence and moved to the neighbouring countries (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Swaziland and Tanzania). At the end of the war, most of them returned to the country, many by their own means, while others under the UNHCR support who also provided them with materials to re-start a new independent life in the communities of settlement. In their return to the country, those who accumulated some assets in the refuge, and those sponsored by UNHCR brought housing material, domestic and agricultural tools, and other goods locally not available. They learned new elements of the culture where they were exposed, and in Barue District, for example, the experience they acquired in Zimbabwe of gardening vegetables like lettuce and cabbage to improve their diet is being widely disseminated. And still having networks with Zimbabwe undertake cross-border trading, bringing clothing and other manufactured goods to sell in the remote areas of the Districts.

These groups are not equally distributed all over the country. Taken together, Manica, Tete, Inhambane, and Sofala Provinces, it should be noted that out of their total population, some 66% were involved in migratory movements in direct connection to the war (2% are demobilised soldiers, 27% were refugees in the neighbouring countries, 37% are those who were internally displaced). Only 34% never abandoned their homes (GTZ, 1996:d-2).

Within Manica Province, as the table below shows, the geographical distribution per District is unequal, but in every District these groups are present:
### Table 1: Manica Province: groups by district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>total population</th>
<th>refugees returned</th>
<th>displaced settled</th>
<th>ex-combats + dependnts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>guro</td>
<td>59,555</td>
<td>20,975</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tambara</td>
<td>60,054</td>
<td>30,179</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barue</td>
<td>78,697</td>
<td>27,508</td>
<td>69,500</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>macossa</td>
<td>29,494</td>
<td>3,207</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manica</td>
<td>172,013</td>
<td>21,092</td>
<td>35,500</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gondola</td>
<td>304,504</td>
<td>10,119</td>
<td>21,606</td>
<td>4,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sussundenga</td>
<td>39,578</td>
<td>11,752</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>1,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mossurize</td>
<td>88,992</td>
<td>21,153</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>machaze</td>
<td>95,113</td>
<td>35,191</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>928,000</td>
<td>181,176</td>
<td>208,206</td>
<td>9,735^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(19.5%)</td>
<td>(22.5%)</td>
<td>(1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UNOHAC, 1994: 17, 19, 21, 23)

According to the figures displayed in the table-1, in Manica Province, 57% of the total population are stayers, 42% are civilians who were involved in migration movements, and near to 1% are demobilised soldiers.

Within the group of demobilised ex-combatants living in Manica Province 68% are natives, and 32% are non-natives (making a ratio of non-local to local 1:3) - the second highest proportion of non-local demobilised soldiers in the country (Pardoel, 1996:20). According to my sample, most of the demobilised soldiers who are not from Manica are from the neighbouring Provinces of Tete and Sofala, plus Maputo.

^9. The total demobilised soldiers settled in Manica is 9,034. The remaining 701 are "dependents" who travelled "back-home" with ex-combatants.
Out of the total demobilised soldiers settled in Manica, 30.7% are those demobilised in others Provinces who moved to this Province. Out of the total 6,262 ex-combatants demobilised in Manica and settled here it is reported that 49% of them have moved from one District to another (IOM, 1994).

Overall, Manica Province attracted large numbers of demobilised soldiers, even those who are not natives, but who were stationed in the Province during war-time. Notwithstanding the "individual" motives of some ex-combatants, according to different sources and observations the most general reasons that make Manica attractive are its agricultural potential, its location between Zimbabwe and the port city of Beira, the possibility of cross-border trade (for the informal trade, Zimbabwe was, even during the war, the main supplier of manufactured goods traded in Manica and Beira city), and the achievements of different Non-Government Organisations operating in the rural settlement and development field (the most important having been the Italian sponsored programme - "Programa de Desenvolvimento Rural de Manica").

Looking at specific areas of settlement, demobilised soldiers are dispersed in the existing communities with the other groups in the population. The only reported kind of concentrated settlement of demobilised soldiers is in rural areas and involving ex-RENAIMO soldiers. Some of the reasons presented\(^{10}\) for this "separation" and sometimes "marginalisation" (in Berry's conception) are:

(i) Lack of family connections and political suspicions preventing them from approaching their original and/or existing communities (aware of the crimes they had committed in their villages, they were afraid to return to them).

(ii) Sense of belonging to RENAMO and fear of being always seen by neighbours as a RENAMO supporter stigmatised as "bandit" or physically threatened.

\(^{10}\) Key Informant-1 (from Government side), confirmed by a Key Informant-7 (from RENAMO side) in terms of "ya'li That could be happened. It was before the general elections and we expected everything...". Coelho (1997:85) found the same in Maputo.
Others were told by the RENAMO leadership to remain separated in order to facilitate the reunification of the forces in the case of the re-start of war.

(iii) Another reason is that demobilised soldiers were transported by IOM to the areas of settlement, prior to the general elections. And as the peace accord was proclaimed by RENAMO leadership as a clear military victory for "democracy" they fought for, raised amongst combatants expectations of rewards for their efforts particularly the access to scholarships abroad and the benefits from the good things of the cities. RENAMO soldiers preferred to stay, hoping for RENAMO electoral victory and subsequent benefits. If scattered it would be difficult to identify them.

Besides these cases, in general, there are two main overall reasons for the choice of the place of settlement: the original place of birth/growing up (even when not demobilised there) and the area where they stationed during the war, where they formed new families or they have kinship solidarity networks and economic and social opportunities to start a new life as civilians.

However, as in the case of migrants from the rural to urban areas, the decision of the choice of settlement is highly influenced by the (extended) family. The decision is almost a way to improve the material conditions of the family, not just for the individual alone, even when the family remains living in a different area.

To discuss further the social integration of demobilised soldiers, one needs to clarify their profile. Such will be done using the findings of the field research (in a sample of 40 ex-combatants):

(i) Gender:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>% of Demobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 2: Ex-combatants by gender category |
Ex-combatants are predominantly men. The dimension of female involvement in the military activities, and the number of them was never clear in the process of demobilisation and integration.

From the government side, in the line of woman emancipation and gender equality, as the military service was defined as a "right and obligation" for everyone, a "Female Detachment" was set up, where female conscripts where assembled. Their recruitment was stopped in the early 1980s, but those in the army remained in the civilian tasks of the Ministry of Defence, without being formally demobilised, up until the end of the war.

From the RENAMO ranks, and based in testimonies of "women returned from RENAMO bases", two groups of females lived in RENAMO areas, the civilians and the military. The role of the women in the last category is not clear. Muianga (1997) states that the civilian women she interviewed refer to them (negatively) as "wives" of the military commanders, who used to stay in the "military area" of the base, "who wore military uniform", and obliged other women (living in the "civilian area") to serve them, but were never involved in military combat. Their "public" role was perceived as to mobilise others to remain with RENAMO and not to escape from the base.

The identification as "wives" may be informed by a preconception based on the "traditional" view that military activities are "male tasks", and women are not "naturally" suitable to perform them. On the other hand, it may be a result of power differentiation between groups of women, that those deprived used such stigma\(^{11}\) to "disqualify" others who wore military uniforms as getting power and resources.

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\(^{11}\) "Stigma" are labels with "sign or social attribute which so devaluates an actor's social identity as to disqualify from full social acceptance" (Goffman, 1964). Such "spoiled" identities are much a matter of social definition, of what is the conception of stable, orderly, understandable social life imposed by a community or a social group. The study of stigmatised identities throws light on the social construction of the "normal identities".
through sex. It may be stated that other women who were spouses of commanders and other RENAMO combatants remained civilians, and were treated as such. This is evident in the group sampled by Muianga (Idem).

The female ex-combatants, are less open to talk about their past. They regard the (dis)qualification as a prejudice or a stigma. Because of this view of their (supposed sexual) role in the military ranks many of them avoided to settle in the areas that they were known, and in their daily life they avoid to identify themselves as RENAMO ex-soldiers more than their male counter-parts.

(ii) **Ages and time spent in the army:**

Table 3: Age groups at the time of recruitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ages</th>
<th>12-14</th>
<th>15-17</th>
<th>18-20</th>
<th>21-23</th>
<th>24-26</th>
<th>27-29</th>
<th>30-32</th>
<th>33-35</th>
<th>36-38</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of dem</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>20²</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of ex-combatants (82.5%) were recruited under the age of 26. Adopting 18 years old (the minimum age of entrance in the army according to the Mozambican law), to define those below of this age as "child soldiers", 22.5% of ex-combatants fall in this category, all of them conscripted in the decade 1980/90, the worst period of the war. Their age range from 13 to 17 years old.

The issue of "child soldier" is widely documented all over the world in "Machel Report" (Machel, 1996). As in other parts of the world they were recruited in diverse ways: conscripted, press-ganged or kidnapped, forced to join the army to defend their families, self-protection, to gain power (and power is a very strong motivator where people feel powerless) and as the only way to guarantee regular meals, clothing or

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¹² 5% of them entered the military service as "volunteers" before the approval of the military conscription law in 1978. I will miss them in the analysis of "child soldiers".
medical attention.

If this particular group included in the sample, reached the time of demobilisation (1993-4) aged more than 23 years and got demobilisation benefits, others under the age of 18 were not included in programmes implemented to benefit demobilised soldiers. As recorded by the ILO (1995f: 11-12), the United Nation Mission in Mozambique (ONUSOMOZ), responsible for mediating the peace process and demobilisation, did initially demobilise children who were fifteen at the time of cease-fire, but discontinued the process apparently due to its "sensitivity". Public recognition that children had been actively involved in the war was considered a "political liability", and their demobilisation as soldiers was "inconvenient"; they were forbidden to join the Assembly Areas. Later, international humanitarian agencies assisted the "youth with experience of war" (defined as "any person 15 years of age and under who underwent military training and participated in military operations as a combatant") to re-join their families. The definition left those between 16-17 without any kind of support.

Table 4: No. of years in the army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Years</th>
<th>% of Demobilised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-17</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-20</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-23</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further to the youth of the entrants, it should be noted that the majority of conscripts stayed in the military ranks between 3-17 years (the duration of the war was near to 16 years). The 5% of cases that stayed 23 years are those FRELIMO combatants of the national liberation war who were integrated in the national army, after independence. Excluding those "freedom fighters", the average time in the army was 10.45 years. Such length of time led to disruption of individual plans and opportunities of schooling and professional careers.
The case of "child soldiers" is especially acute. They remained in the military ranks an average of 9.7 years. Having entered at the earlier ages and remained so long in the army, the negative consequences in their lives are particularly high. This is why those who entered young are more vindictive when compare themselves with their fellows who continued their studies and their "normal" civilian life in their teenage years.

(iii) **Marital Status and family size**:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>% of Demobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of ex-combatants interviewed got married during military service, as they remained there for more than 10 years on average. In the sample, 10% of them are polygamous, those being aged (from 43-48 years old), and living in rural areas, one of them with 3 wives and 11 children. In the case of the only one living in town one of the wives is settled in a rural area. Half of the polygamous men were separated by war for long periods from the first wife, and in consequence they married another woman. On return after demobilisation they found the first wife but continued married to the new one.

The "recovery" of the "old" spouses may be a good sign of social reconciliation, a facilitator of the social integration of a demobilised soldier, through the links and the social networks, cultivation of land and integration in other activities that the wife maintained when the husband was away.

Those unmarried and/or with a lack of family ties seem to be more unstable in their decisions and options. A case is one respondent, originally from the neighbouring

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13. For the purposes of this study it is considered "married" all man/woman living with a partner as "spouse" independently of the "legal" status.
Province of Tete, and during military service stationed in Maputo. He married a woman from Maputo but when demobilised he decided to travel alone to Tete to assess the conditions for moving his family there. Later on, when he realised he had established the conditions of livelihood he informed the family to join him, which soon happened. Expecting a standard of life she was habituated to in Maputo, when the husband was a soldier, the wife became disappointed and left her husband to go back to Maputo where "they" own a house. With the disruption of his family, unsatisfactory he moves from one place to another, in the search for a job that can meet the expectations of his wife. The ex-soldier strongly criticises the state for not creating jobs for those who served it.

Table 6: Dependents (spouses and children)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of Dependents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average number of dependents per each ex-combatants is 3.5 per person. It is lower in the cities where the economic possibilities and social support network to maintain a big family are reduced. Contrarily, in the countryside (i) the existence of means for the maintenance of a big family (land for agriculture is available for all who need it. None of the interviewed complained about arable land), (ii) the social network based on the extended family network is comparatively stronger to support one in difficulties, (iii) children are not only "consumers" but "producers", they are engaged in different agricultural activities and/or other household productive activities. All these incentivate large households.

However, it should be noted in general that most ex-combatants are quite starting a civilian life, so 77.5% of them have got 1-3 children.
(iv) Military affiliation:

Table 7: Military affiliation of the ex-combatants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>% of Demos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nationwide, the majority of ex-combatants comes from the government ranks. However, this difference does not represent an acute problem in the daily life, provided the strong commitment to forgiveness and reconciliation, even with some prevailing obstacles. The views displayed by ex-combatants are illustrative:

- "One of my neighbours was a RENAMO soldier. At the very beginning, during 'the drinks', (civilian) people used to say to him: 'you, from RENAMO, were bandits. You killed people indiscriminantly without reason and compassion'. Nowadays they realised that everyone was engaged in the military life not by choice. They stopped saying that" (Demob-12, Government);

- "I was kidnapped and forced to fight against 'communism'. I have got a brother who was an officer in the ranks of the government army. Our relationships are good. Even with other members of the community. The only bad thing about which we feel discriminated about are the retirement pensions that only ex-government soldiers are receiving" (Demob-9, RENAMO).

However, suspicions and problems are still existing:

- "I never played or had a drink with an ex-RENAHO soldier. I don't like to be abused. There still are persons with resentments of the past" (Demob-6, Government);

- "I was a high officer. During war-time, many of RENAMO soldiers operating in the areas I was knew me by name. With the demobilisation, when I tried to run a business in a so-called 'RENAHO area' they (RENAHO ex-soldiers) made things
going difficult for me and my business. I decided to stop and change the place. They are still bitter with us” (Demob-10, Government).

Some demobilised soldiers pointed out that there is more "reconciliation" between ex-soldiers from both sides than with the civilians that never were soldiers:

- "Civilians are still suspicious about ex-RENAMO soldiers. They don’t trust them well. They killed a lot, they were 'bandits'. No one can guarantee that they have changed. Between demobilised soldiers more forgiveness exists. The only source of tension is that, unlike government ex-soldiers, RENAMO ex-combatants who completed more than 10 years in the army are not ineligible for pensions, according to the law. They didn’t served the state" (Demob-3, Government).

3.2. Occupations and sources of income: labour division in the family

Employment is the major source of complaints and tensions amongst demobilised soldiers. They and their families are engaged in a wide range of activities for income generation. However to find out these sources of income through the interviews was not an easy task. During the research process it was clear that their positionality, as of most of the other civilians, to define "work" was influenced by cultural values. There were also expectations of more benefits as a result of the inquiry, coupled with a sense of being forgotten and marginalised by the state, precarious types of occupations engaged in what leads to high mobility, represented additional factors to identify themselves as "non-working".

Research on "work and unemployment" in other contexts shows that the "meaning" of work is always a "reflection of cultural evaluations and power relations" (Madry and Kirby, 1996:1). The subordinate and gendered status of domestic labour and its popular classification as non-work, is a good example. For many males work meant "paid employment, the selling of labour in the context of an employee-employer
contract" (Idem, p.2). Being occupied in the informal sector or in family agricultural production is not regarded as a proper "male" work, and is like unemployment.

Many demobilised soldiers had attended training courses for different crafts and occupations run by diverse organisations dealing with the social integration of demobilised soldiers, intended to provide skills and kits of tools for self-employment. However, at the end many sold the tools to get money while searching for a paid employment. In Chimoio, for example, many attended these courses, but few are working as self-employed:

- "I attended a locksmith training course, in Chimoio, sponsored by an Italian organisation, ISCOS. At the end we received kits of tools. This was to encourage us to work independently as self-employed. I decided to make a team with a friend of mine. We earn enough to survive. However, I know that most people who attended the course sold the tools. Their aim is to be employees" (Demob-5, Government).

Another illustration is an episode told me by the manager of the branch of a Bank ("Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento") in Inhambane Province. At the end of the 1980s a special credit facility package was established for other group of ex-combatants. At the meeting held to explain to ex-combatants how to use this facility, the only question they posed to the manager was "how to get a paid job", because at the end of each month one expect his salary without any risk.14

Wage labour, despite the low salaries paid, and not being always a pleasant experience, is seen as not risky, and as sign of prestige, it "is not only a source of income but also an important source of personal status and social identity. If people are asked to describe themselves they will often do so with reference to their job and employment status" (Madry and Kirby, 1996:135).

In the "traditional" division of the labour within the household, where men are the

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14- Personal notes, 1990.
"breadwinners" (who bring money home), and women the dependent "housewives"[^15], the lack of paid employment "suitable" to the role of the man affects relationships between the couple, however with little changes in the clearly gendered domestic division of labour. When such cases lead to poverty and financial stress it can produce the break-up of marriages, as seen in cases of demobilised soldiers that during war-time had access to resources to meet the needs of the family without themselves working in a "lowly" activity like the family agricultural production.

At the macro-level lack of employment amongst demobilised soldiers brought some moments of instability and mass demonstrations. But they were few and occurred in direct connection to specific promises of further cash assistance alleged to have been made. Yet the economy is unable to accommodate all the demobilised soldiers searching for paid jobs[^16] even those with skills gained in the army as drivers, mechanics and radio-operators, house-painting, administration (in the sample such skilled people represent 30%). Furthermore, many demobilised lack marketable education, training and skills to compete in the (narrow) labour market.

In the present shortage of employment, and lack of skills and experience to run their own business, the most immediate initiative taken by the government and international agencies involved in the programmes for demobilised soldiers was to train them in appropriate technical skills, and in all aspects of project running, from drawing up of the projects proposal to the keeping of financial records. Once trained they received kits or financial loans to start their business (small-scale projects). The

[^15]: Women's efforts and contribution to income are often not properly given value. They do most cultivation in the family agricultural production, and in the cities dominate the informal trading economy. This is not well recognized due to the tradition of male dominance, even when their income earnings surpasses the amount of money brought home by men.

[^16]: According to data presented in 1996 by the Ministry of Labour (Mozambique) from each existing post of work there are (officially) 232 candidates (Dias, 1996: 6). More: through the forced retrenchment of "redundant" workers (in Portuguese: trabalhadores "excedentarios"), the process of privatisation of the state owned enterprises is furthering the number of unemployed persons.
emphasis was on self-stimulated income-generating activities with a minimum of external intervention and maximum self-initiative to provide a sustainable source of income.

These courses and loans, often included other civilians, to empower people giving them skills and capital, breaking the prevalent dependency syndrome, accommodating both ex-combatants and the rest of the community, thereby, increasing the interaction between these groups\textsuperscript{17}. This was not welcomed by demobilised soldiers who saw it as a deviation, a dispersion of resources for those not needy. But it should be emphasised that, at the end, the most confident and fortunate in self-running their business were other groups than demobilised soldiers.

For most demobilised soldiers family-based agricultural production is still the main source of income generation (even in the urban areas where they have lands at some distances from the living places). Land is available for everyone, owned by the family or acquired through local mechanisms of distribution by community leaders (as the arable land is abundant, its availability is never cited as a problem).

Prior to the demobilisation process the tendency to rely on agricultural production was high and the civic education provided in the "Assembly Areas" encouraged ex-combatants to settle in the rural areas and farming\textsuperscript{18}. My previous study on Manica Province provided evidences in the same direction: 76.6\% of the soldiers wished to resettled in a rural area, and more than 83\% of the support they required referred to financial loans, farm implements and tools for different crafts. This was in a context that 56\% of them aspired to wage labour whilst the labour market does not provide enough employment, such that this was an indicator of an intention to build a basis of private security in order to supplement income from wages or when it is not possible to find the employment desired as an alternative source of income (Taju, 1994).

\textsuperscript{17} Key Informant (GTZ-ORF, Manica).
\textsuperscript{18} Srivastava, 1994:6
In the good raining seasons, food for the household consumption is available from their own agricultural production. They produce maize, fruits and vegetables, and livestock (chickens, goats, pigs and some cows). What lacks is cash from the selling of their surpluses (as the market is narrow and the prices are low), and from the selling of part of their labour force (as the labour market is tiny). Consequently, they are not able to improve their technologies, and to purchase most of the manufactured goods (salt, matches, petrol, clothes, etc) needed by the household. Credit facilities and state subsidies aggravate the tendency for their peripherisation or exclusion from the "market economy".

Demobilised soldiers display significant differences in occupations and sources of income between rural and urban areas, as evidenced by the field observations, interviews with key informants, and confirmed by the population sampled in August/September 1997:

i) In rural areas all the ex-combatant households combine different activities. According to the sampling, for 46.6% of the rural (ex-soldiers) respondents agriculture is the major occupation, even minimised, as reflected in common response as "Nao trabalho, sou 'camponés'" (I have no job, I am just a "peasant") - camponés (peasant) meaning a "poor", a "deprived", as utilised in the political discourse of post-independence to mobilise "the working class and the (poor) peasants" to the ideals of socialism.

Another 40% are self-employed in informal activities, ranging from vending, carpentry, tailoring, bread-making, brick-making and charcoal-making. The remaining 13% are builders and masons in occasional wage labour (engaged in the construction of rural clinics and schools), depending on the extension of the programme.

Independently of their "personal" occupation, all men do "help" their wives in clearing land for agriculture. Women are primary cultivators and more active in the harvest; they are also responsible for the "domestic" activities such as cooking,
cleaning, and search of water, fuel-wood and the vending of alcohol at home.

Relying mainly on family agricultural production the rural ex-combatants’ households are more capable of improving their livelihood. The constraints they face are prices, market networks, capital and modern technologies.

ii) In the urban milieu, the lack of employment and the relatively long distance located the land for agriculture make the life more competitive and hard for ex-combatants to establish themselves.

More than in rural areas, informal sector activities, such as house-building and brick-making, carpentry, tailoring, brewing, bread-baking, and painting are activities most disseminated in urban areas, and in which men are more involved than in agriculture. In the sample, no one of the urban respondents declared himself as "campones" (peasant). The majority (40%) identify themselves as "unemployed", even with occasional job, self-employed or engaged in agricultural production. Those who declared that they have an occupation/source of income 22.5% are involved in the informal economy mentioned above.

Trade in the informal sector (vending of vegetables brought from their own gardens, cooked food, different items of manufactured goods, beers and traditional alcoholic beverages, on the street-corners, at door of their houses or even at the "dumba-nengue"19), and agriculture are the major occupations of the urban ex-combatants’ wives.

Both in the rural and urban areas, no significant evidences of difference between demobilised and non-demobilised can be found in occupations. This does not necessarily means that social integration is achieved. As the population settlements

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19- A Tsonga expression widely popular used to designate informal market sites, meaning "be confident on your legs" to run away (as the Police initially took it as an illegal activity).
are more scattered, the social differentiation is not so pronounced in the rural milieu, the majority of the population was affected by the war (destruction of their belongings, forced migration) and all are rebuilding their lives, rural people feel better integrated into the family and community than do people in urban areas.

In the town of Chimoio, for example, one can find "marginalised" individuals, always complaining about the state (and sometimes RENAMO) not paying enough attention to them, in provision of wage labour.

3.3. **Negotiating a Social Order: Actors and Positionalities**

As explained in the previous chapters, in the policy definition of demobilisation and social integration of ex-combatants a dichotomised view of society informed the approach. The exercise was primarily conceived as a process of "returning home". Coupled with this ex-soldiers were regarded as potential sources of instability\(^{20}\) that needed to be dispersed throughout their "homes" and tied to them through the (bi)monthly cash payments in order to dilute their group identity inside the communities.

The state and "donors" positioned themselves as the actors who best knew what was "suitable to the demobilised soldiers' characteristics and needs". Ex-combatants were placed as "beneficiaries" or "recipients" of the aid, and not active participants in the definitions concerned about the destiny of their own lives. Even their civic organisation, AMODEG, was denied a role to play in the decision-making process. The exclusion was under the label of AMODEG\(^{21}\) as a "politically-informed

\(^{20}\) Contradicting this apriorism it is well documented that "out of the total number of the criminals arrested by the Police, the demobilised ex-combatants represent a percentage disproportionately low" (Wyss, 1996: 8). And according to the field research the trend is still the same.

\(^{21}\) AMODEG is the ex-combatants association regardless of their previous military affiliation (RENAMO or government forces). For example, currently the President is an ex-government soldier, while the Vice-President is an ex-RENAMO
organisation" and that the policy definitions should be "impartial" and "apolitical".22

Under the short-term programmes of "reintegration" it was decided to fund transport to go back home, cash compensation (for 24 months), and training courses and/or financial loans to facilitate one to be self-employed. The long term and finally outcome was left to the family-based agricultural production and in the "mainstream development programmes" (of the structural adjustment programme) into which demobilised soldiers should be integrated.

In such an approach "home" was mainly regarded as the place where one has his/her "roots" (place of birth, and/or where his/her family lives (if still there!)). Even when it was publicly affirmed that each one could choose the place of destination, the "counselling" programme held in the Assembly Areas "persuaded" the combatants "to return to the rural areas and family-based agriculture" (Srivastava, 1994: 6. My underline). The mayor of Chimoio City Council told me also that it was hard and difficult to convince the "donors" to allocate funds for activities related to the social integration of demobilised soldiers in the urban milieu, to push them to the rural areas. However, with or without funds ex-soldiers are in the city.

This conception of "returning home" is competently criticised by Ranger (1994). Discussing the meaning of "home" in the context of "repatriation or return" of refugees, he invites one interested in understanding social integration to historicize "home", to investigate how social actors perceive it and how do they define "identity", because History is full of "flight" and "return", and of processes of "inventing" and "imagining" group identities. Therefore, there are "multiples ideas of identity and entitlement", even for people who "construct their identity in terms of permanence and rooted ancestral continuity (...) 'home' is constantly re-created after movements.(...). Even for these 'rooted' groups, then, 'home' is not so much a place as an idea" (p.289).

22. Personal notes from a discussion with ONUMOZ staff in early 1993.
Elsewhere Wilson (1997) captures the same argument against the fixed conception of “home” as “the ideology of ‘sedentarism’ – the pathologising of uprootedness – holding that is ‘natural’ and indeed appropriate for peoples to conceive their identity as being attached to a very particular piece of territory; and indeed that people should only expect to hold rights (…) in such a place, and that, quite frankly, they should go back there as their ‘home’ at the end (…)” (pp. 281-282).

In Goviden’s words “The search for home has to do with the very real need for food and shelter, where family and community life can be sustained and nurtured” (1998:68). However and at odds with this conception, overall the state and international agencies programming of the demobilisation and social integration of ex-combatants was guided by the definition of “reintegration” as a process of returning to the roots. These programmes “benefited” ex-combatants regardless of their previous military affiliation, what is a positive attitude towards reconciliation and equity. They included different lines:

i) Prior to their departure, at the Assembly Areas, all demobilised soldiers were registered and received a civic education which, among other items, included “general information on the peace agreement; counselling and information on civilian life, the reintegration programme and employment and training programme; functional literacy training; and public health and environmental awareness training” (Srivastava, 1994: 6). As referred, in the “counselling” the return to the rural areas and family-based agriculture was highlighted.

ii) When they left the Assembly Areas to return to civilian life, they received kits containing civilian clothing, agricultural tools and seed, basic household items such as buckets and crockery, and food for three months. Transportation for the demobilised and his/her dependants, to the area of destination, was provided by International Organisation for Migration.

iii) In addition to these rights, all demobilised soldiers received a total of two
years salary (demobilisation compensation), fixed according to the military rank. Six months were funded by the government. From which, the firsts 3 months were paid in the Assembly Areas, and the rest, when the demobilised arrived in their district of choice. Thereafter, they received a further 18 months' subsidy funded by the international agencies and collected on a monthly or bi-monthly basis.  

iv) An "Information and Referral Service" was set up to provide assistance the demobilised soldiers in understanding and accessing the benefits to which they were entitled, to identify opportunities in private enterprises and NGOs for employment and training, and to refer ex-combatants to programmes appropriate to their needs and interests.

v) A Provincial Fund was established to fund economic projects to promote employment and self-sufficiency. In Manica Province the fund was run by the German Technical Co-operation (GTZ) and it was known as the Open Reintegration Fund (ORF).

vi) Under the ILO sponsorship and implemented through diverse organisations (such as the Italian ISCOS), an "Occupational Skills Development" programme provided training in various skills, from basic management skills to carpentry, soldering, locksmith, tailoring, amongst others.

vii) The government was independently responsible for pensions, what according to the Decree governing the principle of retirement and pensions in the army, issued in 1986 (long before the peace settlement, and not yet cancelled) covered only those who served (in the government army) for ten years or longer. In the context of a general demobilisation the Decree became a source of conflicts and complaints by

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23. For a rank-in-file the monthly salary was in the firsts 6 months 35,000 Meticais (roughly 15 Rand), and 75,000 Meticais (approximately R 35) in the following 18 months.

RENAMO ex-combatants not eligible for retirement pensions. Paradoxically (if not contradictory) the same decree govern the principle of pensions for soldiers handicapped in result of the military activities, and in such matter the decree is being used to qualify RENAMO ex-combatants handicapped.

In the transitional period (from the Peace Agreement in 1992 up to the general elections in 1994) lack of confidence, distrust and sometimes confrontation between RENAMO and government, the strength role of the International Agencies (UN agencies, WB/IMF, and foreign NGOs) in the policy-decision process and monitoring, reduced the national capacity to set up agendas related to the social integration of demobilised soldiers (and other needy groups).

The strength role of the international agencies (especially World Bank/International Monetary Fund) and the weakness of the nation-state is a general trend towards globalisation and neoliberalism via the structural adjustment programme.

Contrarily to what happened in the reconstruction of Europe after World War II, and the social integration of its ex-combatants and other affected groups, based in the "Keynesian political economy of the New Deal" which reserved a great role to be played by the state in the economy, in planning and job creation, to correct the failures of the market, the current structural adjustment programmes promote deregulation and allocation of resources by the market instead of by the government decree. Economic failures of the most Third World states are attributed to the fact that their governments "mismanaged their economies simply by trying to manage them" (Bello, Cunningham and Rau, 1994:20).

As in the others Third World countries, in Mozambique, the debt crisis served in the

25 A good example is the case of the 1995 Parliamentary session on state budget discussion that was postponed until the approval of the external aid by the "Paris Club". That is not to "decriminalize" the state known that the structural adjustment programmes are made possible because of the alliance held with the local elites in the government positions.
mid-1980s as the opening door for the imposition of structural adjustment programmes - via the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund - which rationale is budgetary austerity, currency devaluation, trade liberalisation, privatisation and destatization (Idem, p. 46; Chossudovsky, 1997:35).

The underlying objective is the dismantling of the state as an agent of economic development. The essence of the SAPs is the reduction/removal of direct state intervention in the productive and distributive sectors of the economy.

All these became translated into (i) cutting spending in health, education, and welfare; (ii) cutting or severely constraining of the rise of wages; (iii) unemployment of "redundant" employees; (iv) liberalizing imports what makes local production not competitive and gradually suffocated. At the end, the social costs of SAPs became the enforcement of the poors to rely on the informal activities as food preparation and selling, illegal beer and alcohol production and vending, tailoring, shoes-repairing, car watching and washing, smuggling, and female (and child) prostitution.

If the World Bank (1993:xv) defends that the long term social integration of demobilised soldiers must be located in the "mainstream development programmes", it is in the above mentioned neoliberal environment that ex-soldiers should be integrated: into poverty and growing inequality.

Paradoxically, looking at "family agriculture" production - the economic activity reified as the reliable sector for integrating the demobilised soldiers into a stable civilian life, and so in the "main stream development", one find it included and excluded from the "main stream". Included in the sense of reproducing poverty and inequality, but excluded in the sense that it is conceived as disconnected from the market, from the capitalist relations, as a sector of "subsistence" despite years and years of engagement with the market.
For a "stable civilian life" the fact that in general arable land is still not a problem, access to land is not everything. In a deregulated capitalist environment one must address the agrarian question in terms of the class differences and the differentiation process (within the peasantry and between them and other social groups).

From the colonial domination and capitalism development in Mozambique, the capitalist economy was always based in social relations that interlinks the accumulation of capital to the peasantry agriculture. While never totally dispossessed of their lands, and ever "encouraged" to produce their own subsistence, peasant agriculture was integrated into the market through the production of commodities and the supply of labour force to the capitalist interests (commercial farms, industry, and migrant labour to the neighbouring countries) (Wuyts, 1978; O'Laughlin, 1981). Peasantry became what Bernstein (1990) calls petty commodity producers involved in a "form of small-scale (usually 'household' or 'family') enterprise in capitalism engaged in more or less specialized commodity production, and which combine places of capital and labour" (p. 54). They have to reproduce both their means of production (as capitalists) and their labour (as workers) in circumstances of greater or lesser risk or opportunity. The pressures of reproduction as both labour and capital, and the degree to which peasants succeed in dealing with them leads to their class differentiation (Levin and Neocosmos, 1989).

Peasants become petty commodity producers because they are unable to reproduce themselves outside the relations and processes of commodity production. As such they always need the market framework to sell part of their production and employment to sell part of their labour force, from where they earn cash to improve their social status. The fundamental source for their differentiation are the salaries. That is why ex-soldiers who identify themselves as "camponeses" claim and search for a wage labour.

The current situation attempt to disconnect the petty commodity producers from the market. Shops to sell their surpluses or cash crops are scarce, and the state
intervention through the "Cereals Institute" whose vocation is to buy and stock the local production of maize and other cereals is limited and weak. In Manica peasants rely almost only on informal traders (generally females from Maputo, Inhambane and Beira) who buy their maize at lowly prices. Most of the petty commodity producers sell it only when they are needy, to buy salt, paraffin, clothing, hoes, medicines, stationery for their schooling kids, etc.

Observation in the field and discussion with different groups, show that the demise of the state in promotion of food production in the agricultural sector through "Cereals Institute", soon may lead to the transformation of areas like Barue District to be deficitaries in food by the involvement of many peasants in a most profitable crop, tobacco, that is being stimulated by a private company. People know how to adapt. Maize is not profitable. Imported is cheaper than the local and no state subsidies exist.

The concept of petty commodity production is a useful analytical tool to show the dilemma of the family-based agricultural production, inside the capitalist market, and to demystify the view that the peasantry are "traditional" self-sufficient producers of subsistence and undifferentiated social category. An illusion that was inside the top-down programming of social integration of demobilised soldiers.

In the other side, it should be noted that ex-combatants are a highly demanding category expecting huge support from the state. The majority of ex-combatants entered the army when the state was still perceived as the "deliverer of well-being" for everyone. For example, no medical treatment and school fees existed up until the mid-1980s. The state was regarded as a "great father", and during military service soldiers developed a sense of "dependence" on the superiors.

They knew previous experience of state-sponsored preferential benefits delivered to the "freedom fighters" in Mozambique, as also in the neighbouring Zimbabwe. Even
with failures, what they know or interest to highlight is the "good face" of such preferential programmes.

Amongst some RENAMO soldiers, there was an expectation of "marching in Maputo" as HEROES, like the FRELIMO "freedom fighters" in the 1974-5. Associated with this is the immediate image (real or imagined) that it re-calls of the colonial settlers leaving the country (with the houses and jobs) and being replaced by the freedom fighters. Some of the RENAMO soldiers expected a political victory, and so, to replace also the FRELIMO rulers.

However, war in Mozambique was not opposing two armies of distinct nations-states. It was between two warring parties (RENAMO and FRELIMO government). Soldiers from each side were from the same citizenship, even if "foreign interests" were involved in the warfare. At the end peace was reached through an agreement, with no winner and no defeated in the battlefield.

After the general elections in 1994, in the new political dispensation, there is no consensus on the legitimacy for the state to support heavily the demobilised soldiers at the expense of other groups. Questioning of what soldiers were fighting for divide the perceptions. There still are rifts in society caused by political differences and rivalries, varying degrees of involvement of the community in the conflict, unequal suffering among those in war-affected areas and those outside.

As a war-torn society and under SAP, "Conflict and violent social change have affected social welfare networks between families and communities. Rapid urbanisation and spread of market-based values have also helped erode systems of support that were once based on the extended family" (Machel, 1996:14)

However, positive factors at the kinship and community level are existing and playing an integrative role. These are the strength of the community networks or family-based coping mechanisms, the potential natural resources of the country (especially
the availability of arable land for everyone who want it), a general feeling of tiredness of war, a strong commitment to national reconciliation (mainly to avoid the return to war, due to its negative effects experienced by everyone).

To cope with changes and exposure to the war, "traditional" mechanisms were put in place, especially through the performance of healing ceremonies to maintain a "sense of continuity and purpose" (Wilson, 1991).

Historical records shows that always that happened after population movements, as mechanism of turning the newcomers or returnees full of rights (and duties) in relation to land, wives, power and other resources.

Two general ceremonies were performed: (i) Giving thanks to their household spirits for their safe return, and (ii) "Cleansing" the demobilised of any evil they have perpetrated during war, through their isolation and 3 days "bath" at the witchdoctor's place.

"Strong spiritual convictions hold that anyone who has killed is haunted by the evil spirits of the victims. This, to accept a former (...) soldier into one's village is to accept evil spirits. In such a context (...) for re-entry into the community have effectively involved traditional healers in 'cleansing' and other processes" (Machel, 1996:20). Traditional healers and/or religious leaders are the performers of such ceremonies. Amongst the Muslims the "cleansing" is also directed to save one from the "haram", the forbidden meals one took.

In general terms, the demobilised do not respond at first that they had undergone any kind of these "traditions" . The rule is to keep it secret. More acute is in the urban areas and with those who seem more educated. Only using different ways of asking they say "Ya... you see, once I had a problem I was asked by friends if I have done such ceremonies and I did by advice from friends" (Demob-17, Government).
One respondent said that his return to civilian life was celebrated with a "party", joining relatives and friends (even those living far) and neighbours, where food and drinks were available. Due to the fact that he is Catholic, the ceremony didn’t involve a healer to "cleansing". However, when the business he was running started to fail he was advised by a friend to consult a witchdoctor, who told him to take a 3 days bath to "clean" his body from the evils.

Those of different Christian denominations, as professing "modern" religions, claim to use religion practices to keep away the evils. Only what they have done is the celebrations of returning safe.

The positive psychological and social impact is reflected by a general acceptance of persons with different levels of participation in the war at the community level, and a sense of reparation. The role of the family is too high in such a process.

Ranger (1994:290-291) explains better the significance of such "healings" as processes of "making home" what associated with marriage with natives turn one "imagined as a kin". The celebration of "parties" of return, taxes paid to elders and community leaders in form of "gifts" (as many demobilised recounted) are part of the local power relations, and are within these interconnected processes that the social integration operates, and the end result depends on how its terms are negotiated.
CHAPTER FOUR - CONCLUSION

The study undertaken intended to analyse the social integration of demobilised soldiers in Mozambique, in the broader context of post-war reconstruction. As such, integration was regarded in a process of negotiation of roles, behaviours, access to resources and power, between different groups, with different experiences/exposures to the war.

Interaction of such groups defined as demobilised (with different previous political affiliations), refugees returned, displaced already settled and stayers, is a social process that occurs within the community of settlement and also at the family household.

As such, the aim was not to evaluate the effectiveness (or not) of the programmes designed (by the government and international partners) and targeted to demobilised soldiers.

The overall portrait that one can capture is that ex-soldiers are currently living in the "same" situation as other groups, in poverty, unemployment, and growing inequality. In the daily life, at the community level, the majority of demobilised soldiers do not identify themselves as ex-combatants.

Traditional mechanisms of cleansing performed by "healers" played an important role to "civilianize" the ex-combatants and to create the sense of community. Availability of land and the positive role played by the family/kinship in coping with the frustrated expectations of rewards helped in great extent the social integration of ex-combatants.

Leaders of the Ex-combatants Association state that their future as an association is threatened. The identification of demobilised soldier with this association happens
only when the individuals face problems of social integration. To be in connection with the association and others ex-combatants would be an indication of prevailing identification with their past. They are becoming more prone to join groups with other motivations related to the improvement of their current lives.

The manipulation of their identity as ex-combatants occurs before the state's representatives, NGO's, and other "strangers" in order to make complains and get more support. However, like other groups (young males) the major demand is employment, even known that those in jobs earn low salaries, paid work is still seen as a the suitable occupation for males and a source of social status. Being occupied in agriculture or informal economy, side by side with females, do not mark the difference imposed by the traditional division of labour where the man is the "breadwinner" and woman the "dependent housewife". The social identity of male as "breadwinner" is diluted and with consequence in the roles and social relations within the household and the community as a whole.

Furthermore, the ex-combatants entered military service when the state was playing the developmental role, as deliverer of well-being (in the line of the proclaimed "socialist" policy), and also they known that combatants of the liberation war (1962-1974) received some preferential facilities packages when were demobilised, and the close experience of Zimbabwe state support to ex-combatants, are the major sources of claiming huge state support to get jobs and credits to run their own businesses, even when widely this means only access to funds for different purposes.

Where the social differentiation is more pronounced, like in the cities, the complaints are also greater, where young male demobilised soldiers, compare themselves with others of the same age, sometimes that have been schooling together before entering to the military, showing that they lost opportunities, fighting in the behalf of the "bosses" that today forget them.
The sense of having been enforced to fight against their own will will avoid the polarisation within ex-soldiers based on their past political affiliations. Tensions happened in the first moments (if are still happening, they are minimised) between soldiers and civilian who lost relatives and properties. Such anger and resentments was more addressed to ex-RENAMEO soldiers (politically stigmatised during war as "bandits"). The difference between ex-combatants is related to pensions that ex-government soldiers with more that 10 years of service receive.

The failure to address the economic and social pressure under which the demobilised find themselves is a key factor in maintaining a sense of group identity. This identity is manipulated in different circumstances by different actors, with different purposes (Dolan & Schafer, 1997:178).

(i) By civilians, who hope to benefit from stigmatising them;
(ii) By the government, in two ways. To stigmatise ex-combatants and to deny them a role in the decision-making process related to their own lives, and for fund raising (to attract more foreign aid funding) their suffering is "recaptured";
(iii) By political parties, in order to score political points.
(iv) By demobilised soldiers in order to press demands for compensation. Especially in their attempts to seek compensation from the state their sense of group identity is strongest. In their domestic setting, in relation with other social groups, very few of the demobilised are interested in being seen as former combatants. There they behave as equal as other civilians. But, when before the state and the international agencies, they claim the identity of ex-combatants and compensations. Feeling that during the war, and because of it, they sacrificed their careers (they lament the loss of educational opportunities due to the war, and the access to wage employment which they believe an uninterrupted education would have brought), they fulfilled their duties fighting for the causes dictated by belligerents, and the final result was the achievement of "peace and democracy", now it is the time to be compensated and rewarded. It is in this context that they appeal to their identity regardless of war-time affiliations.
Finally, the Mozambican demobilisation process, must be emphasised, was neither envisaged as part of a process of demilitarization to "redirect resources" (Cock and Mckenzie, 1998) to developmental goals, nor as part of a "wider social transformation" (Idem; Cock, 1993). It was just only a way to dismantle the previous opposing armies, and to set up a new one (for which few volunteered).

The social integration of ex-combatants and the peace-building process were conceived not in terms of social transformation but in strictly strategic terms of destroying the potential threat the ex-soldiers would pose, dispersing them throughout the communities. As such, the long road to social integration "starts from the brutal and miserable life in military barracks (...) and ends in the poverty of a village or a city" (GTZ, 1996:C4). However, a new social order, with its dynamic and contested process of power and inequality, is being negotiated at micro-level by demobilised ex-combatants and their communities, to cope with the constraints of the structural adjustment and the weakness of the state.
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